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CHAPTER	  ONE:	  INTRODUCTION	  AND	  
OVERVIEW	  OF	  BANKRUPTCY	  LAW	  
	  
A.	   Introduction	  	  	   The	  Bankruptcy	  Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  (“BAPCPA”)	  was	   approved	   by	   Congress	   and	   signed	   into	   law	   by	   President	   George	  W.	   Bush	   in	  2005.	  	  With	  its	  passage	  fueled	  by	  the	  filing	  of	  new	  consumer	  cases	  that	  had	  grown	  to	  well	   over	  one	  million	  per	  year	  by	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   supporters	   and	  opponents	   alike	  characterized	   the	   legislation	  as	  a	  major	  change	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  bankruptcy	  law.	   	   Whereas	   prior	   policy	   embodied	   principles	   of	   generosity	   and	   forgiveness	   of	  consumer	   filers,	   BAPCPA	   (commonly	   pronounced	   “Bap-­‐C-­‐Pa”)	   placed	   significant	  restrictions	   on	   their	   ability	   to	   re-­‐start	   their	   lives	   free	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   their	  indebtedness.	  	  Before	  2005,	  most	  consumer	  debtors	  sought	  relief	  under	  Chapter	  7	  of	  the	   Code,	   which	   in	   most	   instances	   resulted	   in	   the	   fairly	   simple	   and	   expeditious	  discharge	  of	  their	  financial	  obligations,	  in	  most	  cases	  without	  any	  recovery	  by	  their	  creditors.	  	  	  The	   major	   changes	   made	   by	   the	   new	   law	   were	   intended	   to	   require	   more	  debtors	   to	   file	   cases	   under	   Chapter	   13	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code,	  which	   conditions	  relief	  on	   the	  repayment	  of	   some	  or	  all	  of	   their	  debts	  over	   time.	   	  The	  amendments	  introduced	  means	  tests	  to	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	  which	  in	  essence	  required	  debtors	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  simpler	  relief	  afforded	  in	  Chapter	  7.	   	  The	  new	  law	  also	  expanded	  the	   class	   of	   cases	   subject	   to	   dismissal	   for	   undefined	   “abuse,”	   and	   required	  prospective	  debtors	  to	  undergo	  debt	  relief	  counseling	  before	  filing	  their	  bankruptcy	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cases.	   1 	  	   Until	   the	   BAPCPA	   changes,	   American	   bankruptcy	   policy	   was	   broadly	  forgiving	  not	  only	  to	  filers	  who	  were	  the	  victims	  of	  misfortunes	  like	  job	  loss,	  serious	  illness,	  or	  divorce,	  but	  also	  those	  who	  had	  mismanaged	  their	  personal	  finances.	  	  In	  a	  marked	   departure,	   the	   new	   law	   conditioned	   relief	   on	   notions	   of	   personal	  responsibility.	  	   In	   an	   era	   of	   growing	   congressional	   acrimony,	   the	   legislation	   had	   broad	  bipartisan	   support,	   gaining	   the	   votes	   of	   all	   of	   the	   House	   and	   Senate’s	   Republican	  members	   and	   significant	   percentages	   of	   both	   chambers’	   Democrats.	   	   However,	   in	  passing	   the	   legislation,	   Congress	   rejected	   the	   advice	   not	   only	   of	   its	   own	   specially	  appointed	  commission	  but	  the	  opinion	  of	  many	  bankruptcy	  law	  specialists	  (Warren	  1999;	  Jacoby	  2004).	  	  	  What	   was	   responsible	   for	   this	   shift	   in	   long-­‐standing	   congressional	   policy?	  	  The	   explanation	  most	   commonly	   proffered	   in	   both	   the	   academic	   literature	   and	   in	  popular	  accounts	  was	  that	  legislative	  support	  for	  BAPCPA	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	   credit	   card	   industry’s	   lobbying	   effort	   and	   campaign	   contributions	   (Chapter	   5;	  
see	  also	  Warren	  1999	  and	  Bartlett	  and	  Steele	  2000).	  	  To	  be	   sure,	   the	   credit	   card	   industry,	   and	  more	  broadly	   the	   financial	   sector,	  spends	   enormous	   amounts	   of	   money	   on	   lobbying	   expenses	   and	   campaign	  contributions,	   including	   expenditures	   on	   bankruptcy	   legislation.	   	   However,	   as	  explained	   in	  Chapter	  5,	   financial	   contributions	   at	   best	   provide	  only	   a	  portion	  of	   a	  satisfactory	   explanation.	   	   Even	   though	  BAPCPA	   enjoyed	  broad	  bipartisan	   support,	  its	   path	   to	   enactment	   was	   far	   from	   certain.	   	   In	   fact,	   2005	   was	   the	   fifth	   time	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  A	  brief	  overview	  of	  American	  bankruptcy	  law	  is	  contained	  in	  Part	  D	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  Descriptions	  of	  the	  changes	  made	  by	  BAPCPA	  are	  in	  Chapter	  Five.	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supporters	   tried	   to	   get	   it	   enacted	   into	   law.	   	   From	  1997	  until	   2004,	   the	   legislation	  passed	   the	   House	   by	   wide	   margins,	   only	   to	   have	   its	   passage	   stalled	   by	   various	  procedural	   hurdles	   in	   the	   Senate	   or	   in	   conference	   committee,	   and	   once	   by	  presidential	   veto.	   	   One	   might	   assume	   that	   if	   the	   overwhelming	   resources	   of	   the	  financial	   industry	   were	   sufficient	   to	   influence	   BAPCPA’s	   approval,	   its	   supporters	  would	  have	  required	  fewer	  than	  five	  chances	  to	  do	  so.	  	  In	  fact,	  empirical	  studies	  do	  not	   indicate	   a	   significant	   correlation	   between	   campaign	   contributions	   from	   the	  financial	   industry	   and	   roll	   call	   votes	   favoring	   bankruptcy	   reform	   legislation	  (Chapter	  Five;	  Nunez	  and	  Rosenthal	  2004).	  This	  study	  takes	  the	  view	  that	  the	  long	  but	  ultimately	  successful	  path	  leading	  to	   BAPCPA’s	   enactment	   in	   2005	   can	   only	   be	   fully	   understood	   in	   the	   fuller	  examination	  of	  all	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  since	  the	  1930s.	   	  This	  study	  examines	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  over	  a	   seventy-­‐three	  year	  period	  beginning	   in	  1932	  and	  continuing	   to	   2005.	   	   This	   period	   is	   long	   enough	   to	   take	   in	   not	   only	   BAPCPA’s	  adoption,	   but	   the	   enactment	   of	   the	   two	   major	   bankruptcy	   bills	   of	   the	   twentieth	  century:	  the	  Chandler	  Act	  of	  1938	  (Chapter	  Three)	  and	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  of	  1978	  (Chapter	  Four).	  	  Examination	  of	  this	  longer	  period	  indicates	  that	  BAPCPA’s	  passage	  was	  a	  marked	  departure	  from	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  in	  the	  previous	  sixty	  years,	  when	  Congress	  deferred	  on	  such	  matters	  to	  the	  recommendation	  of	  a	  small	  group	  of	  attorneys,	  judges,	  and	  scholars	  described	  here	  as	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	  Two	   general	   themes	   stand	   out	   in	   an	   expanded	   analysis	   of	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	   and	   implementation	   over	   the	   whole	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   	   The	  first	   theme	   derives	   from	   the	   observation	   that	   bankruptcy	   judges	   engage	   in	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policymaking	  in	  two	  capacities,	  both	  in	  their	  traditional	  juridical	  roles,	  and	  as	  active	  legislative	   advocates.	   	   Therefore,	   a	   comprehensive	   explanation	   of	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	   must	   include	   the	   courts	   and	   account	   for	   both	   activities.	   This	   study	  draws	  on	  the	  political	  jurisprudence	  and	  interbranch	  perspective	  literature	  from	  the	  public	   law	   field,	   and	   on	   work	   in	   the	   policy	   implementation	   field,	   to	   develop	   in	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Five	  an	  integrated	  explanation	  of	  the	  roles	  of	  courts	  and	  judges	  in	  bankruptcy	  policymaking.	  The	   second	   theme	   derives	   from	   the	   structural	   features	   of	   bankruptcy	  policymaking.	   	   The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   dominated	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  for	  more	  than	  sixty	  years.	  The	  group’s	  influence	  ended	  abruptly	  in	  the	  1990s	   when	   Congress	   actively	   engaged	   in	   debates	   over	   bankruptcy	   policy.	  	  Throughout	  the	  entire	  period,	  the	  courts	  persistently	  modified	  and	  extended	  formal	  policy	  through	  their	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  statutes.	  	  The	  existence	  of	  multiple	   real	   and	   potential	   policy	   venues	   and	   the	   shifts	   of	   relative	   authority	  between	   them	  point	   to	   the	  agenda	  setting	   literature	   for	  explanation.	   	   	  Contrary	   to	  the	   interest	   group	   model,	   which	   focuses	   entirely	   on	   resources,	   or	   public	   choice	  models,	   which	   emphasize	   the	   relative	   incentives	   of	   policy	   participants,	   agenda	  setting	   models	   see	   the	   scope	   of	   conflict	   around	   an	   issue	   as	   the	   critical	   factor	  influencing	   policy	   outcomes	   (Schattschneider	   1960).	   	   Advocates	   may	   seek	   to	  mobilize	  support,	   limit	  participation	   in	  policymaking	  processes,	  or	  move	  a	  dispute	  to	  another	  decisive	  venue,	  as	  suits	  their	  particular	  purposes.	  	  Their	  primary	  conflict	  management	  tool	  is	  the	  effective	  definition	  and	  redefinition	  of	  problems	  and	  issues	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993).	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B.	   Bankruptcy	   Policymaking	   Framework	   Overview;	   Plan	   of	   the	  
Dissertation	  The	   dissertation	   establishes	   a	   comprehensive	   framework	   of	   American	  bankruptcy	   policymaking	   that	   includes	   Congress,	   the	   courts,	   and	   interest	   groups.	  	  The	  framework	  follows	  the	  agenda	  setting	  literature	  and	  identifies	  conflict	  levels	  as	  the	  most	   important	   variables	   affecting	   venue	   choice	   in	   bankruptcy	   policymaking.	  	  Chapter	   Three	   describes	   how	   a	   small	   group	   of	   attorneys,	   judges,	   and	   academics	  gained	  control	  of	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	   from	  Congress	   in	  the	  1930s,	   largely	  by	  emphasizing	   the	   complex	   and	   technical	   nature	   of	   the	   law.	   	   Chapter	   Four	   explains	  how	  the	  successors	  of	  that	  group	  remade	  bankruptcy	  policy	  in	  the	  1970s	  consistent	  with	  their	  core	  belief	  that	  the	  law	  should	  afford	  financially	  unfortunate	  individuals	  the	   maximum	   opportunity	   possible	   for	   a	   fresh	   start,	   and	   made	   that	   belief	   the	  policy’s	   dominant	   image.	   	   Chapter	   Five	   describes	   how	  proponents	   of	   pro-­‐creditor	  reforms	   redefined	   bankruptcy	   policy	   by	   attacking	   both	   its	   image	   and	   the	   policy	  community’s	   technical	   competence,	   resulting	   in	   a	   more	   politicized	   policymaking	  process.	  	  The	  persistent	  influence	  of	  the	  courts	  on	  bankruptcy	  policy	  and	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  that	  activity	  relates	  to	  legislative	  policymaking	  are	  described	  in	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Six.	  	  	  Building	   on	   these	   analyses,	   an	   integrated	   framework	   of	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  is	  set	  out	  in	  Chapter	  Six.	  	  Structurally,	  the	  framework	  draws	  from	  the	  agenda	  setting,	  policy	  implementation,	  and	  interbranch	  literatures	  to	  identify	  three	  venues	   in	   which	   bankruptcy	   policy	   is	   made:	   Congress;	   an	   organized	   bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  made	  up	  of	  lawyers,	  judges,	  and	  scholars;	  and	  the	  courts.	   	  Scope	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of	   conflict	   principles	   determine	   the	   venue	   where	   particular	   policies	   are	   made.	  	  Courts	   acting	   in	   individual	   cases	  make	  policy	   at	   the	   lowest	   level	   of	   conflict.	   	   Such	  policies	   may	   remain	   localized	   or	   may	   be	   transmitted	   within	   the	   network	   and	  adopted	   in	   other	   courts.	   	   Broader	   conflicts	   arise	   when	   the	   courts	   can	   no	   longer	  adapt	  existing	  statutes	  to	  meet	  changing	  circumstances.	  	  Congress	  then	  turns	  to	  the	  policy	   community	   to	   formulate	   new	   laws,	   which	   it	   ordinarily	   adopts	   with	   little	  controversy.	  	  Congress’	  deference	  to	  the	  community	  prevailed	  from	  the	  early	  1930s	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  core	  image	  underlying	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community’s	  policymaking	  monopoly	  was	  the	  “fresh	  start.”	  	  Major	  statutory	  reforms	  enacted	  in	  1938	  and	  1978	  incorporated	   this	   principle,	   which	   favors	   individual	   consumer	   debtors 2 	  by	  combining	  a	  broad	  discharge	  of	  debts	  with	  generous	  exemption	  provisions	  allowing	  them	   to	   retain	   all	   or	  most	   of	   their	   real	   and	   personal	   property	   after	   bankruptcy.3	  	  However,	   by	   the	   1990s,	   new	   systemic	   conflicts	   resulting	   from	   rising	   levels	   of	  consumer	   debt	   and	   increased	   filing	   rates	   led	   to	   new	   calls	   for	   bankruptcy	   reform.	  	  Congress	   rejected	   the	   community’s	   recommended	   changes	   and	   instead	   embraced	  stricter	  reforms	  proposed	  by	  the	  consumer	  credit	  card	  industry.	  	  Industry	  interests	  drew	   Congress	   directly	   into	   the	   reform	   debate	   and	   gained	   members’	   broad	  bipartisan	  support	  by	   recasting	  bankruptcy’s	   image	   in	  politically	  popular	   terms	  of	  debtor	  responsibility.	  Their	  efforts	  followed	  classic	  agenda	  setting	  principles,	  which	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Until	  enactment	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  in	  1978,	  bankruptcy	  filers	  were	  known	  as	  “bankrupts.”	  	  The	  Code	  adopted	  the	  term	  “debtors”	  to	  describe	  such	  entities.	  	  Today,	  both	   common	   usage	   and	   the	   academic	   literature	   distinguish	   between	   consumer	  debtors,	  i.e.,	  those	  whose	  debts	  are	  of	  a	  household	  or	  personal	  nature,	  and	  business	  debtors,	  which	  are	  typically	  formally	  organized	  entities	  engaged	  in	  business.	  3	  See	  Chapter	  Four.	  
	  	  
7	  
maintain	   that	   issue	   re-­‐definition	   is	   essential	   to	   insurgents’	   efforts	   to	   break	   a	  monopoly’s	  hold	   in	  a	  particular	  policy	  arena.	   	  The	   framework	  not	  only	  provides	  a	  basis	  for	  understanding	  how	  bankruptcy	  policy	  is	  made	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  it	  also	   provides	   a	   template	   for	   analysis	   of	   policymaking	   in	   other	   fields	   of	   American	  law.	  	  	  
C.	   Methodology	  and	  Sources	  This	   dissertation	   employs	   a	   long-­‐term,	   longitudinal	   case	   study	   method	   to	  analyze	   policymaking	   in	   a	   single	   policy	   domain,	   bankruptcy	   law.	   	   Longitudinal	  studies	   are	   particularly	   well	   suited	   to	   understanding	   changes	   in	   the	   policy	   and	  agenda	  status	  of	  single	  issues,	  as	  the	  effects	  of	  changes	  in	  political	  systems	  may	  be	  cumulative	   and	   only	   discernible	   over	   long	   (forty	   to	   one	   hundred	   year)	   periods	   of	  time	   (Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   1993,	   39-­‐41).	   	   Similarly,	   Sabatier	   (1988)	  maintains	  that	   long-­‐term	   examination	   of	   policy	   change	   is	   necessary,	   at	   a	  minimum,	   to	   fully	  understand	  internal	  feedback	  effects	  and	  evaluate	  policy	  success	  or	  failure.4	  The	  case	  study	  method	  of	  analysis	  derives	  from	  the	  subject	  matter.	   	  Studies	  of	  both	  interest	  groups	  and	  judicial	  policymaking	  rely	  heavily	  on	  this	  methodology	  (Pralle,	   2006;	   Feeley	   and	   Rubin	   1999,	   29).	   	   Case	   study	   is	   the	   primary	   mode	   of	  analysis	  in	  the	  interbranch	  literature,	  especially	  when	  the	  subjects	  of	  study	  include	  the	  lower	  courts.	  	  The	  almost	  infinite	  number	  of	  variables	  and	  paths	  to	  a	  particular	  decision,	  and	  the	  multiple	  potential	  decision	  points	  in	  a	  given	  case	  restrict	  the	  use	  of	  quantitative	  analysis	  in	  the	  study	  of	  trial	  level	  courts.	  	  As	  stated	  in	  a	  recent	  study:	  [A]	   district	   judge	   may	   rule	   in	   a	   single	   case	   on	   multiple	   occasions	   and	   on	  different	  types	  of	  questions,	  only	  a	  few	  of	  which	  could	  be	  dispositive	  but	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Sabatier	  (1988,	  131)	  recommends	  periods	  of	  a	  decade	  or	  more.	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of	  which	  affect	  the	  case’s	  progress	  and	  ultimate	  outcome.	  Moreover,	  because	  many	  of	  the	  judge’s	  actions	  are	  taken	  in	  response	  to	  motions	  by	  the	  parties,	  there	   is	   no	   determinate	   sequence	   in	  which	   pretrial	   litigation	   events	   occur.	  Rather,	  how	  a	  case	  proceeds	  depends	  on	  the	  choices	  made	  by	  the	  parties—what	   motions	   are	   filed	   by	   whom	   and	   how	   discovery	   unfolds	   	   (Kim,	   et	   al.	  	  2009,	  85).5	  	  	  	  Similarly,	   the	   discussion	   of	   BAPCPA’s	   enactment	   in	   Chapter	   5	   points	   out	   the	  difficulty	   of	   making	   quantitative	   associations	   between	   external	   variables	   and	  legislative	  action	  in	  specific	  cases.	  	  For	  instance,	  relationships	  between	  roll	  call	  votes	  and	   general	   factors	   like	   party	   affiliation	   or	   political	   ideology	   may	   be	   readily	  discerned.	   	  However,	  correlations	  are	  more	  difficult	   to	  measure	  when	  the	  external	  factors	  are	  asymmetrical,	  as	  is	  true	  when	  an	  interest	  group	  with	  broad	  interests,	  like	  the	   financial	   industry,	   seeks	   to	   influence	   legislation.	   	   Therefore,	   this	   dissertation	  uses	   the	   specific,	   heavily	   fact-­‐driven	   approach	   typical	   of	   case	   studies	   for	   data	  gathering	  and	  analysis.	  The	   legislative	   cases	   selected	   for	   study	   are	   the	   three	   major	   bankruptcy	  reform	  measures	   enacted	   since	   1930s:	   the	   Chandler	   Act	   of	   1938,	   the	   Bankruptcy	  Code	  of	  1978,	  and	  the	  2005	  Bankruptcy	  Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act.	   	   The	   long-­‐term	   nature	   of	   the	   study	   requires	   multiple	   data	   sources.	   	   Events	  leading	  to	  enactment	  of	  the	  Chandler	  Act	  and	  the	  Code	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  extensive	  examinations,	   including	   scholarly	   analyses	   and	   primary	   source	  material	   including	  first	  person	  accounts	  and	  contemporaneous	  media	  reports.	  	  Fewer	  academic	  studies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  However,	   the	   development	   of	   newer	   databases	   affords	   some	   potential	   for	   such	  studies	  (Kim	  2009).	  	  BAPCPA	  included	  mandates	  for	  data	  keeping	  and	  study	  by	  the	  Department	   of	   Justice’s	  United	   States	   Trustee	   Program	   and	   by	   the	  Administrative	  Office	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Courts.	  	  A	  proposal	  using	  this	  data	  for	  a	  quantitative,	  multi-­‐district	  study	   of	   BAPCPA’s	   implementation	   in	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	   is	   contained	   in	   the	  Appendix	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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are	  directed	  to	  enactment	  of	  the	  2005	  Act;	  most	  of	  those	  were	  published	  prior	  to	  its	  final	  passage,	  although	  valuable	  studies	  by	  Warren	  (1999),	  Jacoby	  (2004),	  and	  Skeel	  (2001)	   provide	   valuable	   accounts	   up	   to	   their	   respective	   dates	   of	   publication.	  	  	  Examination	   of	   the	   2005	   legislation	  will	   necessarily	   rely	  more	   on	   primary	   source	  materials,	  especially	  contemporaneous	  media	  reports.	  	  
D.	   A	  Brief	  Overview	  of	  U.S.	  Bankruptcy	  Law	  	   American	  bankruptcy	  law	  is	  noted	  for	  its	  complexity.	   	  Even	  lawyers	  who	  do	  not	  regularly	  practice	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  find	  its	  terms	  and	  procedures	  to	  be	  arcane	  and	  convoluted	  (indeed,	   its	  apparent	  complexity	   is	  a	  central	   feature	  of	   this	  study).	   	   The	   following	   overview	   is	   not	   intended	   to	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	  summary	   of	   bankruptcy	   practice.	   	   Rather,	   it	   provides	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   basic	  provisions	  of	  bankruptcy	  law	  intended	  to	  be	  useful	  to	  understanding	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  study.	  	   Some	   portions	   of	   bankruptcy	   law	   are	   applicable	   to	   all	   bankruptcy	   filers	  (called	   debtors)	   and	   all	   kinds	   of	   cases.	   	   However,	   for	   purposes	   of	   a	   basic	  understanding	   of	   bankruptcy	   law,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	   categorize	   the	   different	   types	   of	  bankruptcy	   cases,	   first	   by	   the	  nature	   of	   the	   debtor,	   and	   then	  by	   the	   kind	   of	   relief	  sought.	   	   Hence,	   there	   are	   personal	   liquidations	   (Chapter	   7)	   and	   repayment	   plans	  (Chapter	  13),	  corporate	  liquidations	  (also	  Chapter	  7,	  but	  with	  significant	  differences	  from	  personal	  cases,	  and	  business	  reorganizations	  (Chapter	  11).6	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Other	   forms	   of	   bankruptcy	   include	   Chapter	   9	   (municipalities)	   and	   Chapter	   12	  (family	   farmers).	   	   However,	   the	   incidence	   of	   filings	   under	   these	   chapters	   is	   very	  small	  and	  so	  they	  are	  not	  discussed	  here).	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1.	   Personal	  Bankruptcy:	  Chapter	  7	  The	   ultimate	   goal	   of	   individual	   debtors	   (also	   called	   consumer	   or	   personal	  debtors)	  who	  file	  bankruptcy	  is	  that	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  case	  they	  receive	  a	  discharge	  from,	  with	  few	  exceptions,	  all	  of	  their	  financial	  obligations	  that	  exist	  as	  of	  the	  time	  their	   case	   is	   filed.	   	   Those	   obligations	   are	   voided,	   and	   creditors	   are	   barred	   from	  seeking	  collection	  of	  those	  debts.	  A	  debtor	  may	  be	  denied	  discharge	   for	  certain	  kinds	  of	   serious	  wrongdoing,	  such	  as	  failing	  to	  obey	  bankruptcy	  court	  orders	  or	  concealing	  assets.	  	  Specific	  debts	  may	  also	  be	  excepted	  from	  discharge.	  	  These	  include	  certain	  classes	  of	  debt,	  such	  as	  student	  loans,	  most	  tax	  debts,	  and	  family	  support	  obligations.	  	  Other	  excepted	  debts	  are	   the	   result	   of	   particular	   acts	   of	   misconduct,	   such	   as	   fraud	   committed	   by	   the	  debtor	  while	  acting	  in	  a	  fiduciary	  capacity,	  or	  for	  injuries	  and	  losses	  caused	  by	  the	  debtor’s	   willful	   and	   malicious	   actions.	   	   Such	   actions	   are	   uncommon.	   	   In	   the	   vast	  majority	  of	  consumer	  Chapter	  7	  cases,	  the	  debtor	  is	  relieved	  of	  all	  of	  his	  obligations	  to	  repay	  his	  debts	  owed	  at	  the	  time	  his	  case	  was	  filed,	  and	  creditors	  are	  barred	  by	  the	  discharge	  from	  seeking	  repayment.	  Personal	  bankruptcy	  may	  be	  one	  of	  two	  types,	  Chapter	  7	  or	  Chapter	  13	  (see	  below).	  	  In	  a	  Chapter	  7,	  or	  straight	  liquidation	  case,	  the	  debtor	  turns	  all	  of	  its	  assets	  over	  to	  the	  bankruptcy	  court	  and	  the	  assets	  are	  sold	  by	  a	  bankruptcy	  trustee.	   	  The	  sale	   proceeds	   are	   used	   first	   to	   pay	   the	   trustee’s	   fees	   and	   costs	   associated	   with	  liquidation	   and	   distribution,	   and	   then	   are	   distributed	   to	   the	   debtor’s	   creditors.	  	  Federal	   bankruptcy	   law	   establishes	   the	   order	   of	   payment.	   	   Secured	   creditors,	   i.e.,	  those	  who	  have	   liens	  on	  particular	  assets,	   are	  paid	   first	   from	   the	  sale	  proceeds	  of	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those	  particular	  assets.	  	  The	  remaining	  proceeds	  are	  distributed	  to	  certain	  claimants	  designated	   by	   law	   as	   holding	   “priority”	   claims,	   including	   certain	   claims	   for	  wages	  and	  employment	  benefits,	  taxing	  authorities,	  and	  unpaid	  spousal	  and	  child	  support.	  	  Remaining	  funds,	  if	  any,	  are	  distributed	  pro-­‐rata	  to	  the	  debtor’s	  remaining	  creditors	  (known	  in	  bankruptcy	  parlance	  as	  unsecured	  creditors).	  In	   fact,	   relatively	   few	  personal	  Chapter	  7	  cases	  result	   in	  any	  distribution	   to	  creditors.	   	   This	   is	   because	   bankruptcy	   law	   allows	   debtors	   to	   retain	   a	   specified	  portion	  of	  their	  real	  and	  personal	  property	  (determined	  by	  value),	  notwithstanding	  their	  bankruptcy	  filing.	   	  These	  are	  known	  as	  exemptions.	   	  Exemptions	  are	  allowed	  on	   items	   provided	   by	   federal	   or	   state	   law,	   such	   as	   household	   goods,	   professional	  tools,	  motor	  vehicles,	  and	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  equity	  in	  the	  debtor’s	  residence.	  	  Although	  the	  exemptions	  are	  mostly	   limited	   in	  amount,	   that	   limit	  usually	  exceeds	  the	  actual	  value	   of	   the	   debtor’s	   property.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   no	   property	   is	   liquidated,	   and	   no	  distribution	  is	  made	  to	  creditors.	  	  These	  are	  called	  “no-­‐asset”	  cases,	  and	  account	  for	  the	  bulk	  of	  personal	  Chapter	  7	  filings	  (Skeel	  2001,	  7).	  Most	   Chapter	   7	   cases	   are	   resolved	   fairly	   quickly.	   	   A	   “first	   meeting	   of	  creditors”	   is	  held	  approximately	  thirty	  days	  after	  a	  new	  case	   is	   filed.	   	  The	  meeting	  has	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  formal	  judicial	  hearing	  but	  is	  held	  outside	  of	  the	  court	  and	  is	  presided	  over	  by	  a	  case	  trustee.	  	  The	  case	  trustee	  is	  a	  private	  attorney	  or	   other	   insolvency	   professional	   appointed	   by	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	   to	  investigate	  the	  debtor’s	  financial	  affairs,	  collect	  and	  liquidate	  non-­‐exempt	  property,	  and	  supervise	  the	  claims	  process.	  	  Because	  of	  case	  volumes,	  most	  first	  meetings	  are	  over	  within	  minutes.	  	  In	  nearly	  all	  consumer	  Chapter	  7	  cases,	  the	  first	  meeting	  is	  the	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only	  formal	  contact	  the	  debtor	  will	  have	  with	  the	  bankruptcy	  system.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  an	  order	  discharging	  the	  debtor	  from	  all	  of	  his	  financial	  obligations	  incurred	  prior	  to	  filing	  bankruptcy	   is	   entered	  about	   sixty	  days	   after	   the	   first	  meeting.	   	   	  Overall,	   the	  median	   duration	   of	   a	   consumer	   bankruptcy	   case	   in	   2010,	   from	   filing	   to	   formal	  closing	  by	  the	  court	  clerk,	  was	  120	  days.7	  Aside	  from	  discharge,	  the	  other,	  and	  most	  immediate,	  benefit	  to	  the	  debtor	  is	  the	  automatic	  stay	  of	  proceedings.	  	  The	  automatic	  stay	  goes	  into	  effect	  immediately	  when	  a	  new	  bankruptcy	  case	   is	   filed,	  without	  notice	  to	  any	  creditor,	  and	  halts	  any	  kind	  of	  action	  by	  a	  creditor	  to	  enforce	  or	  collect	  a	  debt	  or	  other	  financial	  obligation.	  	  A	  creditor	  or	  collector	  who	  knowingly	  violates	  the	  stay	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  sanctions,	  and	  actions	  taken	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  stay	  are	  void	  or	  voidable.8	  	  Creditors	  may	  seek	  an	   order	   from	   the	   court	   modifying	   the	   automatic	   stay	   in	   limited	   circumstances.	  Therefore,	   once	   the	   debtor	   files	   bankruptcy,	   the	   only	   remedy	   available	   to	   most	  unsecured	  creditors	  is	  to	  file	  a	  proof	  of	  claim	  with	  the	  bankruptcy	  court	  and	  share	  in	  any	  distribution	  that	  might	  be	  made	  in	  the	  case.	  
2.	   Personal	  Bankruptcy:	  Chapter	  13	  Chapter	  13	  bankruptcy	  is	  available	  to	  debtors	  with	  regular	  income.	  	  Debtors	  agree	  to	  use	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  on-­‐going	  income	  to	  repay	  all	  or	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  debts	  over	   a	   three	   to	   five	   year	   period,	   during	   which	   time	   their	   financial	   affairs	   remain	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  a	  case	  trustee	  (known	  as	  a	  Standing	  Chapter	  13	  Trustee).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 	  Administrative	   Office	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Courts.	   2010	   Report	   of	   Statistics	  Required	   by	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Abuse	   Prevention	   and	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act	   of	  2005.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  U.S.	  Government	  Printing	  Office,	  2011.	  8	  For	   example,	   a	   lender	   that	   repossesses	   a	   motor	   vehicle	   from	   the	   debtor	   after	  bankruptcy	  without	  first	  obtaining	  court	  approval	  will	  have	  to	  return	  the	  vehicle	  to	  the	  debtor.	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In	  return,	  Chapter	  13	  debtors	  obtain	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  automatic	  stay	  and	  retain	  all	  of	  their	  property,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  valued	  higher	  than	  the	  exempt	  amounts	  allowed	  under	  the	   law.	   	  Therefore,	  Chapter	  13	   is	  sometimes	  an	  attractive	  option	  for	  debtors	  with	  substantial	  equity	  in	  their	  property,	  particularly	  their	  personal	  residences.	  Payments	  are	  made	  according	  to	  a	  Chapter	  13	  Plan	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  review	  by	   the	   standing	   trustee	   and	   creditors,	   and	  which	  must	   be	   approved	   by	   the	   court.	  	  Debtors	  receive	  a	  discharge	  when	  they	  make	  all	  of	  the	  payments	  required	  under	  the	  approved	   plan.	   	   Debtors	  who	   fail	   to	   comply	  with	   the	   plan	   either	   have	   their	   cases	  dismissed,	  or	  converted	  to	  Chapter	  7.	   	  Overall,	  29.2%	  of	  the	  individual	  bankruptcy	  cases	   filed	   in	   the	   12	   month	   period	   ended	   September	   30,	   2011	   were	   Chapter	   13	  cases.9	  
3.	   Business	  Bankruptcy:	  Chapter	  7	  For	  businesses	   like	   corporations	   and	   limited	   liability	   companies,	   Chapter	  7	  remains	   the	   basic	   form	   of	   bankruptcy.	   	   However,	   unlike	   individuals,	   business	  organizations	   neither	   receive	   a	   discharge,	   nor	   may	   they	   claim	   a	   portion	   of	   their	  property	   as	   exempt	   from	   liquidation.	   	   This	   is	   because	   bankruptcy	   law	   permits	  corporations	  and	  other	  business	  entities	  to	  either	  reorganize	  under	  Chapter	  11	  (see	  below)	  or	   liquidate	  under	  Chapter	  7.	   	   In	  a	  Chapter	  7	   liquidation,	   the	  operations	  of	  the	   business	   cease	   when	   the	   bankruptcy	   case	   is	   filed.	   	   The	   bankrupt	   business’	  property	  is	  turned	  over	  to	  the	  court	  and	  is	  liquidated	  by	  the	  trustee.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9 	  Administrative	   Office	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Courts,	   U.S.	   Bankruptcy	   Courts––
Business	   and	   Nonbusiness	   Cases	   Commenced,	   by	   Chapter	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code,	  
During	   the	   12-­‐Month	   Period	   Ending	   September	   30,	   2011,	   available	   at	  http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx	  (accessed	   January	  6,	  2012).	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trustee	  may	  seek	  recovery	  of	  certain	  pre-­‐filing	  payments	  made	  by	  the	  debtor	  to	  its	  creditors	  (known	  as	  avoidance	  actions	  in	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	  but	  often	  described	  in	  media	   reports	   as	   “claw-­‐back”	   actions).	   	   Any	   recoveries	   from	   those	   actions	   are	  added	  to	  the	  liquidation	  proceeds	  and	  are	  distributed	  to	  creditors	  according	  to	  the	  priorities	  established	  by	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  
4.	   Business	  Bankruptcy:	  Chapter	  11	  Financially	  troubled	  businesses	  that	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  liquidate	  may	  seek	  relief	  under	   Chapter	   11.	   	   Chapter	   11	   bankruptcy,	   known	   as	   reorganization,	   is	   the	  most	  complicated	  form	  of	  bankruptcy.	   	  Cases	  often	  stretch	  out	   for	  years	  before	  they	  are	  finally	  resolved.	  Under	   Chapter	   11,	   the	   automatic	   stay	   provides	   companies	   with	   breathing	  space	   from	   their	   creditors	  while	   their	  managers	  develop	   a	  plan	  of	   reorganization.	  	  The	   contents	   of	   the	   plan	   are	   regulated	   by	   statute	   and	   subject	   to	   approval	   by	   the	  court	  and	  acceptance	  of	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  debtor’s	  creditors.	  	  Creditor	  acceptance	  is	  key.	   	   Therefore,	  much	   of	  management’s	   efforts	   in	   a	   Chapter	   11	   case	   are	   directed	  toward	  negotiations	  with	  creditors.	  	  A	  plan	  of	  reorganization	  agreed	  to	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  creditors	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  approved	  by	  the	  court,	  sometimes	  even	  if	  it	  does	  not	  meet	  all	   of	   the	   statutory	   requirements.	   	   Alternatively,	   the	   court	   has	   the	   authority	   to	  approve	  a	  plan	  even	  when	  creditors	  do	  not	  accept	   it	  under	  a	  procedure	  known	  as	  “cram-­‐down.”	  Chapter	  11	  provides	  major	  benefits	  to	  a	  reorganizing	  company	  besides	  debt	  reduction.	   	   Provisions	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   code	   allow	   the	   courts	   to	   terminate	   the	  debtor’s	   long-­‐term	   contracts	   and	   obligations,	   including	   real	   estate	   and	   equipment	  
	  	  
15	  
leases,	  purchase	  contracts,	  and	  collective	  bargaining	  agreements.	  	  Hence,	  Chapter	  11	  has	  become	  a	  favorite	  restructuring	  tool	  of	  retailers	  and	  airlines.	  As	  noted,	  businesses	   in	  Chapter	  11	  are	  usually	  run	  by	  their	  pre-­‐bankruptcy	  managers.	   	   However,	   creditors	   may	   organize	   into	   formal	   committees	   with	   some	  oversight	  powers.	  	  Additional	  oversight	  is	  provided	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Trustee,	  a	  division	  of	   the	  Department	  of	   Justice	  (and	  different	  than	  Chapter	  7	  case	  trustees	  or	  Chapter	  13	  standing	  trustees).	  	  Despite	  the	  attention	  given	  to	  prominent	  Chapter	  11	  cases	  like	  Lehman	  Brothers,	  Enron,	  and	  General	  Motors,	  they	  account	  for	  a	  small	  number	  of	  overall	  bankruptcy	  case	  filings.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Administrative	  Office	  of	  the	  United	  States	  Courts,	  Chapter	  11	  cases	  accounted	  for	  only	  11,979	  of	  the	  1,467,221	   bankruptcy	   cases	   filed	   (0.8%)	   in	   the	   U.S.	   in	   the	   fiscal	   year	   ending	  September	  30,	  2011.10	  Business	   reorganization	   law	   was	   overhauled	   in	   both	   the	   1938	   and	   1978	  reforms	   (the	   latter	   creating	   the	   modern	   Chapter	   11	   bankruptcy).	   	   However,	   the	  technical	  nature	  and	  limited	  scope	  of	  business	  bankruptcy	  means	  that	  it	  historically	  draws	   little	   attention	   outside	   of	   the	   narrow	   confines	   of	   the	   policy	   community.	  	  Personal	   bankruptcy,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   more	   directly	   provokes	   debate	   on	  questions	  of	  values	  and	  morality,	  and	  so	   lends	   itself	   to	  greater	  controversy.	   	   	  As	  a	  result,	   public	   debates	   about	   bankruptcy	  policy	   are	  mainly	  debates	   about	  personal	  bankruptcy.	  
E.	   A	  Brief	  Review	  of	  Major	  Bankruptcy	  Legislation	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  Footnote	  9.	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Article	  I,	  Section	  8	  of	  the	  Constitution	  authorizes	  Congress	  to	  enact	  uniform	  bankruptcy	   laws	   for	   the	   nation.	   	   Nonetheless,	   throughout	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	  efforts	   by	   Congress	   to	   pass	   such	   laws	  were	   controversial,	   and	   statutes	   enacted	   in	  1800,	   1841,	   and	   1867	  were	   very	   unpopular.	   	   Each	  was	   repealed;	   their	   aggregate	  duration	  was	  less	  than	  fifteen	  years.	  National	   financial	   troubles	   in	   the	   late	   eighteenth	   century	   led	   Congress	   to	  narrowly	  pass	  the	  first	  national	  bankruptcy	  law	  in	  1800.	  	  Cases	  under	  the	  law	  were	  limited	   to	   those	   filed	   by	   creditors	   against	   “merchant”	   debtors.	   There	   was	   no	  provision	   for	   voluntary	   bankruptcy	   filings.	   The	   1800	   Act	   was	   repealed	   in	   1803.	  	  Presaging	   criticism	   to	   be	   leveled	   at	   later	   bankruptcy	   laws,	   opponents	   claimed,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  the	  Act	  provided	  little	  real	  financial	  benefit	  to	  creditors.	  Despite	   frequent	   economic	   downturns,	   Congress	   did	   not	   enact	   another	  bankruptcy	   law	   until	   1841.	   	   Like	   many	   other	   issues	   of	   the	   antebellum	   period,	  bankruptcy	  legislation	  was	  caught	  up	  in	  the	  growing	  divide	  between	  the	  North	  and	  South	   and	   their	   conflicting	   concepts	  of	  national	  power.	   	  Uniform	  bankruptcy	   laws	  were	  favored	  on	  the	  whole	  by	  northern	  merchant	  and	  manufacturing	  interests	  but	  opposed	   in	   the	   southern	   agrarian	   states.	   	   	   However,	   in	   its	   early	   days,	   the	   United	  States’	   economy	   frequently	   swayed	   between	   periods	   of	   boom	   and	   bust,	   spurring	  efforts	  to	  adopt	  a	  national	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	   The	   effects	   of	   the	   1837	   Depression	   induced	   Congress	   to	   adopt	   a	   new	  bankruptcy	  law	  in	  1841.	  	  33,000	  Americans	  sought	  relief	  under	  the	  new	  law,	  which	  unlike	   the	  1800	  statute	  permitted	  voluntary	  case	   filings,	  yet	   like	   its	  predecessor	   it	  proved	  highly	  unpopular.	  	  High	  administrative	  costs	  again	  resulted	  in	  allegations	  of	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meager	   dividends	   for	   creditors,	   and	   challenges	   to	   the	   constitutionality	   of	   the	   law	  kept	  its	  legitimacy	  in	  doubt.	  	  The	  law	  was	  repealed	  in	  1843	  after	  being	  in	  effect	  for	  only	  14	  months.	  Congress	   enacted	   another	   national	   bankruptcy	   law	   in	   1867.	   	   Although	   the	  law	   achieved	  passage	   by	   only	   a	   two-­‐vote	  margin	   in	   each	   chamber,	   it	  was	   initially	  well	   utilized.	   	   More	   than	   25,000	   cases	   were	   filed	   in	   each	   of	   the	   first	   four	   years	  following	   its	   enactment.	  Officers	   called	   registers	   (so	  named	  because	  debtors	  were	  registered	   as	   bankrupt	   once	   a	   district	   judge	   had	   adjudicated	   their	   petitions)	  performed	  the	  daily	  work	  of	  administering	  bankruptcy	  cases.	   	  However,	  unlike	  the	  referees	   or	   judges	   of	   later	   bankruptcy	   laws,	   registers	   had	   little	   judicial	   authority;	  that	   was	   granted	   to	   the	   district	   judges.	   	   Although	   the	   law	   was	   amended	   several	  times,	   the	  changes	  were	   inadequate	   to	  bridge	   factional	  divides.	   	  However,	  debtors	  and	   creditors	   were	   united	   in	   their	   criticism	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   system’s	   high	  administrative	   costs	   and	   low	   creditor	   dividends.	   	   The	   law	  was	   finally	   repealed	   in	  1878.	   The	  Bankruptcy	  Act	  of	  1898	  was	   the	  nation’s	   first	   “permanent”	  bankruptcy	  law.	   	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   national	   bankruptcy	   law,	   debtor-­‐creditor	   relations	  were	  litigated	  in	  the	  state	  courts.	  	  The	  results	  were	  often	  unsatisfactory.	  	  Creditors	  raced	  to	   obtain	   court	   judgments	   so	   that	   they	   could	   be	   the	   first	   to	   seize	   the	   debtor’s	  property.	  	  The	  process	  favored	  local	  vendors	  over	  interstate	  ones,	  and	  discouraged	  any	   of	   them	   from	   allowing	   their	   debtors	   to	   work	   out	   their	   financial	   problems.	  	  Moreover,	   although	   debtors’	   prisons	   had	   been	   long	   abandoned	   as	   a	   remedy	   for	  unpaid	  bills,	  many	  individuals	  lost	  their	  homes,	  farms,	  or	  businesses,	  and	  still	  were	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burdened	  with	  staggering	  debt	  that	  they	  had	  no	  ability	  to	  repay.11	  	  The	  Bankruptcy	  Act	  of	  1898	  addressed	  these	  dual	  concerns.	  	  Passage	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Act	  of	  1898	  (the	  “1898	  Act”)	  is	  traced	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  National	  Organization	  of	  Members	  of	  Commercial	  Bodies	  in	  1880.	  	  That	  group	  lobbied	  Congress	  for	  a	  new	  bankruptcy	  law	  for	  eighteen	  years	  before	  finally	  finding	  success	  in	  1898.	  	  The	   law	   then	   enacted	   included	   many	   of	   the	   terms	   and	   procedures	   of	   the	  modern	  law.	   	  It	  provided	  for	  voluntary	  filings,	  dedicated	  bankruptcy	  tribunals,	  and	  generous	  provisions	  for	  discharge	  of	  personal	  debts.	   	   It	   lacked	  provisions	  for	  large	  business	  reorganizations	  or	  individual	  wage	  earner	  plans,	  like	  the	  current	  Chapters	  11	  and	  13,	  respectively	  (see	  above).	  By	   the	   early	   1930s,	   these	   shortcomings,	   coupled	   with	   investigations	  revealing	   corruption	   in	   many	   bankruptcy	   cases	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   Great	  Depression,	  led	  to	  a	  move	  to	  revise	  the	  1898	  Act.	   	  Those	  efforts	  began	  in	  1932	  but	  were	   not	   complete	   until	   1938	   (Chapter	   Three).	   	   The	   resulting	   legislation,	   named	  after	  its	  congressional	  sponsor,	  Representative	  Walter	  Chandler	  of	  Tennessee,	  made	  major	   changes	   to	   the	   Act,	   most	   notably	   the	   addition	   of	   the	   aforementioned	  corporate	  reorganization	  and	  wage	  earner	  sections.	  As	   in	   1938,	   it	  would	   be	   another	   forty	   years	   before	   federal	   bankruptcy	   law	  would	   again	   be	   substantially	   revised.	   	   In	   1978,	   after	   approximately	   eight	   years	   of	  work,	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Act	   was	   completely	   overhauled	   and	   replaced	   by	   the	  Bankruptcy	   Code	   (Chapter	   Four).	   	   The	   Code	   included	   streamlined	   provisions	   for	  individual	   Chapter	   7	   bankruptcy	   cases,	   and	   all	   new	   rules	   for	   corporate	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  See	  Coleman	  (1974)	  for	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  state	  debtor-­‐creditor	  laws	  prior	  to	  the	  1900s.	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reorganizations	  (11	  USC	  §§	  1101,	  et	  seq.,	  commonly	  known	  as	  Chapter	  11)	  and	  for	  individual	  wage	  earner	  cases	  (11	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1301,	  et	  seq.,	  known	  as	  Chapter	  13).	  Both	   the	   1938	   and	   the	   1978	   legislation	   were	   enacted	   with	   relatively	   little	  controversy.	  	  However,	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  a	  growing	  unease	  in	  Congress	  over	  ever-­‐increasing	   numbers	   of	   new	   bankruptcy	   filings,	   support	   for	   financial	   deregulation,	  and	   a	   general	   social	   welfare	   policy	   retrenchment	   that	   emphasized	   personal	  responsibility	   combined	   to	   spur	   the	   introduction	   of	   legislation	   intended	   by	   its	  supporters	   to	   meliorate	   what	   they	   perceived	   as	   the	   existing	   law’s	   pro-­‐debtor	  tendencies	  (Chapter	  5).	  	  Like	  the	  prior	  reforms,	  it	  took	  proponents	  several	  years	  to	  enact	   the	  new	  legislation.	   	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  two	  efforts,	  however,	   the	  new	  bill’s	  new	  limits	  on	  consumer	  bankruptcy	   filers	  was	  extremely	  controversial,	  and	   it	  was	  enacted	   into	   law	   in	   2005	   only	   after	   four	   attempts	   over	   eight	   years.	   Although	  Congress	  has	  sole	  constitutional	  authority	   to	  enact	  bankruptcy	   laws,	   it	  did	  so	  only	  sporadically	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  Bankruptcy	  laws	  enacted	  in	  1800,	  1841,	   and	   1867	   were	   short	   in	   duration	   and	   generally	   unpopular.	   	   They	   were	  adopted	   in	   response	   to	   specific	   financial	   crises	   and	   provoked	   significant	   political	  conflict.	   	  The	  1867	   law,	  which	  was	   the	  most	  durable	  of	   the	   three	  and	  remained	   in	  place	   until	   1878,	   was	   repealed	   amid	   charges	   of	   ineffective	   and	   corrupt	  administration.	  Although	   it	  was	  overhauled	   in	  1978	   (Chapter	  4)	   and	   substantially	  amended	  in	  1938	  (this	  chapter)	  and	  2005	  (Chapter	  5),	  the	  1898	  Act	  established	  the	  basic	   principles	   and	   procedures	   that	   still	   serve	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   American	  bankruptcy	  policy.	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CHAPTER	  TWO:	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  
POLICYMAKING	  IN	  THE	  BANKRUPTCY	  COURTS	  
	  	   The	  study	  of	  judicial	  politics	  has	  developed	  in	  ways	  that	  parallel	  public	  policy	  studies	  of	  the	  legislative	  and	  executive	  branches	  of	  government.	   	  However,	  despite	  such	   similarities,	   it	   has	   mostly	   been	   pursued	   as	   a	   distinct	   sub-­‐field	   of	   political	  science,	  with	   its	  own	  concepts,	  models,	  and	   terminologies	   (Barnes	  2007).	   	   Judicial	  politics’	   disciplinary	   isolation	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   its	   historic	   focus	   on	   the	   Supreme	  Court,	   which	   has	   led	   judicial	   scholars	   toward	   behaviorally	   based	   “attitudinal”	  models	  not	  commonly	  used	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  the	  profession.	  	  It	  is	  also	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  field’s	  overlap	  with	  legal	  scholarship	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  latter’s	  persistent	  insistence	   that	   judges,	   particularly	   those	   on	   the	   lower	   courts,	   do	   not	   (or	   at	   least	  should	   not)	   engage	   in	   policymaking	   (Feeley	   and	   Rubin	   1998).	   	   The	   result	   is	   that	  lower	  court	  judges’	  policymaking	  roles	  have	  mostly	  avoided	  rigorous	  attention.	  However,	   in	   recent	   years,	   the	   study	   of	   judicial	   politics	   has	   experienced	   a	  surge	   as	   a	   new	   generation	   of	   political	   scientists	   has	   utilized	   contemporary	  institutional	  models	  to	  explain	  judicial	  policymaking	  and	  identify	  its	  legitimate	  place	  in	  America’s	  constitutional	  structure	  of	  separated	  powers.	  	  	  This	  approach,	  which	  is	  identified	  as	  the	  interbranch	  perspective	  (Miller	  and	  Barnes	  2004),	  is	  built	  on	  “a	  set	  of	  working	   assumptions	   about	   the	  nature	  of	  American	  policy	  making	   and	  politics,	  which	  provide	  an	  analytical	  foundation	  for	  building	  diverse	  research	  agendas	  on	  the	  courts	  and	  judicial	  decision	  making	  (Barnes	  2007).”	  	  Its	  fundamental	  premise	  is	  that	  policymaking	  authority	  in	  the	  American	  system	  is	  constitutionally	  shared	  among	  the	  three	   branches,	   with	   central	   authority	   shifting	   across	   issues	   and	   over	   time.	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However,	   despite	   the	   modest	   impact	   that	   its	   name	   implies,	   the	   interbranch	  perspective	   proposes	   a	   normative	   framework	   that	   places	   judicial	   policymaking	  firmly	  within	  the	  legitimate	  activities	  of	  the	  American	  policy	  process.	  As	  stated	  above,	  this	  chapter’s	  basic	  premise	  is	  that	  studies	  in	  judicial	  politics	  have	  developed	  separate	  from,	  but	  in	  important	  ways	  parallel	  to,	  studies	  in	  the	  area	  of	   public	   policy	   and	   more	   particularly	   policy	   implementation.	   	   The	   plan	   of	   this	  chapter	   is	   that	   it	   will	   first	   chart	   the	   development	   of	   the	   general	   implementation	  literature,	   followed	  by	  a	  description	  of	   the	  parallel	  course	  taken	  in	   judicial	  politics	  scholarship.	  	  Building	  on	  these	  sections,	  the	  chapter	  will	  proceed	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	   general	   agenda	   setting	   literature,	   establishing	   a	   basis	   for	   development	   of	   a	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  framework	  in	  the	  following	  chapters.	  	  	  
A.	   Policy	  Implementation:	  General	  Studies	  The	   study	   of	   public	   policy	   encompasses	   three	   broad	   areas:	   formation,	   also	  known	  as	  policymaking;	   implementation,	  or	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  policy	  decisions	  are	  carried	  out;12	  and	  evaluation,	  or	  the	  assessment	  of	  the	  efficacy	  of	   implemented	  policies.	  	  Policy	  most	  basically	  is	  government’s	  expression	  of	  what	  it	  intends	  to	  do	  or	  not	   do	   (Birkland	   2001,	   132).	   Anderson	   opts	   for	   a	   more	   limited	   definition.	   	   He	  defines	  policy	  as	  “a	  relatively	  stable,	  purposive	  course	  of	  action	  followed	  by	  an	  actor	  or	  set	  of	  actors	  in	  dealing	  with	  a	  problem	  or	  matter	  of	  concern	  (Anderson	  2003,	  2).	  	  Either	   definition	   is	   broad	   enough	   to	   not	   only	   include	   laws,	   regulations,	   and	   rules,	  but	  their	  implementation	  and	  enforcement	  as	  well.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Policy	   formation	   is	   further	   divided	   into	   multiple	   sub-­‐categories,	   which	   will	   be	  described	  later	  in	  this	  chapter.	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A	  comprehensive	  examination	  of	  the	  policy	  roles	  of	   lower	  courts	  must	  start	  by	   considering	   them	   as	   policy	   implementors.	   	   	   Lower	   court	   judges	   interpret	   and	  apply	  rules	  promulgated	  by	  legislatures	  or	  appellate	  courts.	   	  Although	  examples	  of	  judges	  making	   up	   their	   own	   rules	   are	   the	   stuff	   of	   popular	   debate	   and	   courtroom	  legend,	   they	   are	   also	   rightly	  described	   as	   idiosyncratic.	   The	  bulk	  of	   judicial	   policy	  making	  is	   interstitial,	   i.e.,	   it	  happens	  when	  judges	  fill	   in	  gaps	  in	  existing	  rules,	  or	  it	  happens	  when	  judges	  extend	  existing	  laws	  to	  new	  or	  changed	  circumstances.	  	  	  This	   part	   of	   the	   chapter	   reviews	   the	   implementation	   literature,	   with	   an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  parallel	  development	  of	   implementation	  models	   in	  general	  policy	  studies	   and	   judicial	   politics.	   	   The	   review	   serves	   two	   purposes.	   	   First,	   it	   advances	  understanding	   of	   the	   interbranch	   perspective	   through	   examination	   of	   the	   parallel	  challenges	  faced	  by	  general	  policy	  specialists	  and	  the	  similar	  approaches	  developed	  by	   scholars	   in	   both	   fields.	   	   Second,	   it	   establishes	   the	   basis	   for	   extending	   general	  policy	  formation	  models	  to	  the	  judicial	  politics	  field,	  thereby	  providing	  the	  means	  to	  address	  questions	  so	  far	  left	  unanswered	  by	  the	  interbranch	  studies.	  
1.	   “Bottom	  Up”	  Implementation	  Approaches	  The	  original	  work	  on	   implementation	  was	   composed	  of	   case	   studies	   of	   the	  seeming	  failures	  of	  federal	  programs,	  most	  notably	  that	  of	  a	  Commerce	  Department	  economic	   development	   program	   in	   Oakland,	   California	   (Pressman	   and	  Wildavsky	  1984).	  	  These	  studies	  were	  generally	  descriptive	  and	  not	  theoretical.	  	  However,	  one	  of	   their	   main	   contentions	   was	   that	   legislators	   and	   executive	   branch	   officials	  generally	  guaranteed	  the	  failure	  of	  their	  policies	  if	  they	  ignored	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	   they	   would	   be	   implemented.	   	   This	   insight	   led	   to	   two	   divergent	   but	   more	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rigorous	   perspectives	   on	   implementation,	   commonly	   known	   respectively	   as	   the	  “bottom	  up”	  and	  “top	  down”	  approaches.	  Bottom-­‐uppers	  and	  top-­‐downers	  share	  the	  observation	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  policies	  are	  carried	  out	  “on	  the	  ground”	  often	  deviate	  from	  their	  makers’	  intentions.	  	  From	   there,	   however,	   they	   diverge,	   particularly	   on	   the	   desirability	   of	   such	  deviations.	   	  Top	  down	  theorists	  see	  governments	  as	  hierarchical	  systems	   in	  which	  policy	   is	  made	  at	   the	   top	   levels	  and	   implemented	  at	   the	   lowest	  ones.	   	   In	   the	   ideal	  system,	   discretion	   is	   greatest	   at	   policymaking	   levels	   while	   implementors’	   actions	  are	  wholly	  ministerial.	  Top-­‐downers	  argue	  against	  any	  normative	  role	   for	  variable	  implementation	   on	   the	   basis	   that	   policy	   deviations	   are	   anti-­‐majoritarian	   because	  they	   undermine	   the	   decisions	   of	   elected	   officials	   and	   their	   duly	   appointed	  subordinates.	  	  	  Bottom	  up	  advocates	  counter	  the	  top	  downer’s	  normative	  argument	  with	  one	  of	   their	   own.	   	   They	   contend	   that	   local	   bureaucrats	   are	   better	   attuned	   to	   the	  circumstances	   “on	   the	   ground.”	   	   Therefore,	   bottom	   up	   implementation	   is	   more	  effective	   because	   it	   allows	   policies	   to	   be	   tailored	   to	   the	   needs	   of	   their	   intended	  beneficiaries.	   	   Therefore,	   bottom	  uppers	   argue	   that	   effective	   policymaking	   should	  promote	   the	   participation	   of	   the	   policies’	   intended	   implementors	   (deLeon	   and	  deLeon	  2002,	  469).	  	  
3. Top	  down	  approaches	  
	  	  
24	  
To	   no	   small	   extent,	   the	   difference	   between	   the	   bottom	   up	   and	   top	   down	  approaches	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  perspective.	  	  Advocates	  of	  the	  top	  down	  approach13	  share	  bottom	  uppers’	   concern	   that	   the	   policy	   formation	   process	   should	   take	   the	   role	   of	  implementors	   into	   account.	   	   However,	   top	   downers	   favor	   enacting	   policies	   that	  expressly	   constrain	   implementors’	   discretion	   by	   setting	   explicit	   implementation	  standards.	   	   Their	   fundamental	   premise	   is	   that	   variable	   policy	   implementation	  represents	   a	   failure	   of	   policymakers’	   intentions	   and,	   more	   fundamentally,	   a	  subversion	  of	  representative	  government.	  	  	  The	   same	  hierarchical	   perspective	   lends	   the	   top	  down	  approach	   to	   a	  more	  orderly	  and	  rigorous	  examination	  than	  do	  bottom	  up	  perspectives.	  	  	  Mazmanian	  and	  Sabatier	   (1983)	   broadly	   group	   the	   challenges	   policymakers	   face	   in	   the	  implementation	  process	  into	  three	  categories:	  first,	  the	  amenability	  of	  the	  problem	  addressed	   to	   resolution;	   second,	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   policymakers’	   mobilize	  political	   support	   for	   their	   objectives;	   and	   third,	   their	   ability	   to	   formally	   structure	  institutions	   to	   influence	   the	   implementation	  process.	   	   The	   third	   category	   includes	  factors	  such	  as,	  inter	  alia,	  the	  clarity	  with	  which	  the	  policymaker	  communicates	  its	  policy	  objectives;	  policymakers’	  ability	  to	  persuasively	  connect	  the	  new	  policy	  to	  a	  particular	   cause	   or	   phenomena;	   the	   degree	   of	   hierarchical	   integration	  within	   and	  among	   implementing	   institutions;	   and	   implementing	   officials’	   commitment	   to	  policymakers’	  objectives	  (Mazmanian	  and	  Sabatier	  1983,	  25).	  	  Failure	  in	  any	  area	  is	  sufficient	  to	  thwart	  policymakers’	  intentions	  and	  enhance	  the	  likelihood	  that	  policy	  implementors	   would	   deviate	   from	   them.	   	   	   	   Although	   later	   scholars	   (including	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Other	  works	  and	  fields	  of	  study	  bodies	  variously	  identify	  the	  top-­‐down	  approach	  as	  the	  “command	  and	  control”	  or	  “agency”	  models.	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Sabatier)	  would	  reject	  their	  rigid	  hierarchal	  formulation,	  Mazmanian	  and	  Sabatier’s	  empirical	  structure	  would	  influence	  later	  implementation	  perspectives,	  partly	  for	  its	  identification	  of	   elements	   in	   the	   implementation	  process,	  partly	   as	   a	   scholarly	   foil	  for	   future	   policy	   theorists,	   and	   partly	   because	   it	   captures	   the	   perspective	   many	  policymakers	  bring	  to	  the	  policy	  process.	  
3.	   Hybrid	  or	  Synthesized	  Approaches	  	  The	  inability	  of	  either	  the	  top	  down	  or	  bottom	  up	  approaches	  to	  capture	  the	  full	   scope	  of	   the	  policy	   implementation	  process	   led	   researchers	   to	  propose	  newer	  multi-­‐faceted	   models.	   These	   integrated,	   or	   contingency,	   models	   of	   policy	  implementation	  are	  based	  on	  the	  concept	  that	  different	  conditions	  require	  different	  implementation	  strategies	  (deLeon	  and	  deLeon	  2002,	  471).	   	  They	  combine	  various	  implementation	   modes	   within	   a	   single	   policy	   area,	   sometimes	   in	   the	   process	  blurring	   or	   eliminating	   distinctions	   between	   policymaking	   and	   policy	  implementation.	  	  	  According	  to	  Matland	  (1995),	  the	  venue	  (i.e.,	  unit	  of	  government)	  and	  manner	  in	  which	  a	  particular	  policy	  is	  implemented	  is	  a	  function	  of	  its	  broader	  political	  context.	   	  Specifically,	   the	  manner	  and	  venue	  of	   implementation	  correlates	  with	  two	  variables,	  policy	  conflict	  and	  policy	  ambiguity.	  Policy	  conflicts	  arise	  when	  two	   entities	   with	   incompatible	   objectives	   and	   views	   see	   a	   particular	   policy	   as	  affecting	   their	   respective	   interests.	   	   Ambiguity	   results	   from	   intentional	   and	  unintentional	  gaps	  in	  formal	  policy	  statements,	  unarticulated	  or	  compromised	  goals,	  or	   a	   disjunction	   between	   goals	   and	   means,	   where	   implementors	   lack	   the	   tools	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  policymakers’	  intentions.	   	  Using	  a	  contingency	  table	  (Figure	  1),	  Matland	  identifies	  four	  implementing	  modes:	  administrative	  (low	  conflict	  and	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Figure	  2.1:	  Ambiguity-­‐Conflict	  Matrix	  (Matland	  1995,	  160)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Low	  Conflict	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  High	  Conflict	  	   	   	   	  	  Low	  Ambiguity	  	   	   	  	  	  High	  Ambiguity	  	  	  ambiguity);	  experimental	  (low	  conflict,	  high	  ambiguity);	  political	  (high	  conflict,	  low	  ambiguity);	   and	   symbolic	   (high	   conflict,	   high	  ambiguity).	   	  The	   first	   two	   categories	  correspond	   to	   top-­‐down	   and	   bottom-­‐up	   implementation,	   respectively.	   	   	   Political	  implementation	  occurs	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  conflict	  when	  either	  the	  executive	  or	  legislative	   branches	   are	   led	   by	   highly	   publicized	   political	   factors	   to	   be	   actively	  engaged	  in	  policy	  implementation.	  	  According	  to	  Matland,	  outcomes	  at	  this	  level	  are	  determined	  by	  power	  (Matland	  1995,	  163).	  The	  White	  House’s	  active	   involvement	  in	  the	  automobile	  industry	  bailout	  in	  2009-­‐10	  is	  an	  example	  especially	  pertinent	  to	  this	  paper.	   	  The	  Obama	  administration,	   relying	  on	  a	  broad	   interpretation	  of	  TARP	  legislation	   adopted	   late	   in	   George	   W.	   Bush’s	   second	   term,	   pushed	   Congress	   to	  authorize	   a	   bailout	   of	   General	  Motors	   and	   Chrysler	   Corporation,	   and	   then	   closely	  supervised	  the	  restructuring	  of	  both	  companies	  through	  a	  specially	  appointed	  “car	  czar.”	   	   The	   administration	   also	   pushed	   for	   legislation	   called	   “cash	   for	   clunkers,	   “	  where	   the	   federal	   government	   subsidized	   new	   car	   purchases	   by	   consumers	   who	  traded	   in	   certain	   old,	   gas	   guzzling	   vehicles.14	  	   Because	   symbolic	   implementation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  The	  Troubled	  Asset	  Relief	  Program	  (“TARP”)	  was	  enacted	  to	  bail	  out	  banks	  on	  the	  brink	   of	   financial	   ruin	   because	   of	   investments	   in	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities.	   	   Its	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involves	  high	  levels	  of	  both	  conflict	  and	  ambiguity,	  it	  is	  the	  hardest	  to	  define,	  and	  it	  is	  commonly	  associated	  with	  policy	  failure	  (Matland	  1995,	  168).	  To	   a	   large	   extent,	  Matland’s	   specific	   categories	   are	   less	   important	   than	   his	  identification	   of	   multiple	   venues	   in	   which	   a	   given	   policy	   might	   be	   implemented,	  based	  in	  substantial	  part	  on	  the	  level	  of	  conflict	  surrounding	  the	  policy.	  	  	  	  Sabatier’s	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework	  takes	  the	  latter	  point	  further,	  and	  in	  the	  process	  blurs	  or	  even	  obliterates	  any	  distinction	  between	   implementation	  and	  the	   other	   stages	   of	   the	   policy	   process	   (deLeon	   and	   deLeon	   2002).	   	   	   	   By	   the	  mid	  1980s,	  Sabatier	  had	  abandoned	  the	  rigid	  hierarchical	  perspective	  that	  had	  marked	  his	   earlier	  work	   in	   favor	  of	   a	  model	  based	  on	   the	  policy	   subsystems	  described	  by	  Heclo	  (1978),	  Kingdon	  (1995),	  and	  others.15	  	  According	  to	  Sabatier,	  [U]nderstanding	  the	  policy	  process	  requires	  looking	  at	  an	  intergovernmental	  policy	   community	   or	   subsystem	   –	   composed	   of	   bureaucrats,	   legislative	  personnel,	   interest	   group	   leaders,	   researchers,	   and	   specialist	   reporters	  within	  a	  substantive	  policy	  area	  –	  as	  the	  basic	  unit	  of	  study.	  	  The	  traditional	  focus	   of	   political	   scientists	   on	   single	   institutions,	   or	   single	   levels	   of	  government,	  will	   help	   in	   understanding	   the	   effects	   of	   institutional	   rules	   on	  behavior	  and	  at	   times,	   in	  understanding	  specific	  decisions.	   	  But	   it	   is	  usually	  inadequate	  for	  understanding	  the	  policy	  process	  over	  any	  length	  of	  time	  .	   .	   .	  (Sabatier	  1991,	  148).	  	  In	  Sabatier’s	  view,	  implementation	  is	  therefore	  part	  of	  the	  larger	  policy	  process.	  	  His	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework	   is	  made	  up	  of	  (1)	  a	  policy	  subsystem	  or	  community	  consisting	   of	   public	   and	   private	   actors	   who	   compete	   to	   achieve	   their	   preferred	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  application	  to	  the	  automobile	  manufacturers	  was	  highly	  political	  and	   led	  to	  one	  of	  the	  earlier	  battles	  between	  President	  Obama	  and	  congressional	  Republicans.	  	  For	  an	  account	  of	  auto	  bailout	  from	  the	  administrations	  point	  of	  view,	  see	  Rattner,	  Steven	  (2010).	   Overhaul:	   An	   Insiders	   Account	   of	   the	   Obama	   Administrations	   Emergency	  
Rescue	   of	   the	   Auto	   Industry.	   New	   York:	   Houghton	   Mifflin	   Harcourt	   Trade.	   	   For	   a	  critical	  analysis	  of	  the	  program,	  see	  Zywicki,	  Todd	  (Spring	  2011).	  	  “The	  Auto	  Bailout	  and	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,”	  National	  Affairs,	  7:66-­‐80.	  	  15	  See	  below	  in	  this	  chapter	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  policy	  subsystems.	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policy	  goals;	  (2)	  external	  influences	  including	  socio-­‐economic	  conditions,	  the	  effects	  of	   actions	   by	   other	   policy	   subsystems	   or	   broader	   governing	   coalitions;	   and	   (3)	  “stable	  system	  parameters”	  like	  constitutional	  rules	  (Sabatier	  1991.	  152-­‐3).	  	  	  	  Although	  the	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework	  risks	  ignoring	  implementation	  as	  a	  separate	  field	  of	  policy	  study,	  it	  places	  it	  squarely	  within	  the	  broader	  field	  of	  policy	  studies	  and,	   like	   the	  ambiguity-­‐conflict	  model,	   identifies	   it	  as	  an	  explicitly	  political	  activity.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  ACF	  recognizes	  that	  policymakers’	  intentions	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  realized	  when	  implementors	  are	  members	  of	  a	  long-­‐standing	  and	  stable	  policy	  subsystem.	  
B.	   Judicial	  Policy	  Implementation	  	   Political	   scientists	   have	   not	   generally	   drawn	   on	   the	   implementation	  literature	   for	   explanations	  of	   judicial	   activity.16	  	  However,	   comparisons	  of	   the	   two	  demonstrate	  marked	  similarities.	  Utilizing	  the	  descriptive	  framework	  from	  general	  implementation	   studies	   described	   in	   the	   preceding	   section	   of	   this	   chapter,	   this	  section	   will	   make	   those	   comparisons	   and	   establish	   the	   basis	   for	   application	   of	  agenda	  setting	  models	  to	  judicial	  politics.	  
1.	   Bottom	  Up	  Policy	  Implementation	  and	  the	  Judiciary	  The	  bottom	  up	  approach’s	  defining	  lack	  of	  standards	  hindered	  its	  acceptance	  by	  political	  scientists,	  including	  those	  focused	  on	  judicial	  politics.	  	  However,	  some	  of	  its	  central	  elements	  have	  parallels	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  judicial	  study.	   	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  legal-­‐sociological	  study	  of	  local	  legal	  culture.	   	  That	  doctrine	  merits	  some	  examination	  here	  because	  it	  achieved	  some	  prominence	  in	  studies	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  The	  most	  prominent	  exception	   is	  Baum’s	  adoption	  of	  Mazmanian	  and	  Sabatier’s	  top	  down	  model	  (1976),	  discussed	  in	  Part	  2	  of	  this	  section.	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courts	  in	  the	  1990s,	  and	  because	  it	  highlights	  both	  the	  promises	  and	  shortcomings	  of	  applying	  bottom	  up	  approaches	  to	  the	  courts.	  Sullivan,	   et	   al.,	   defined	   local	   legal	   culture	   as	   “systematic	   and	   persistent	  variations	  in	  local	  legal	  practices	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  a	  complex	  of	  perceptions	  and	  expectations	  shared	  by	  many	  practitioners	  and	  officials	  in	  a	  particular	  locality,	  and	  differing	   in	   identifiable	   ways	   from	   the	   practices,	   perceptions,	   and	   expectations	  existing	   in	   other	   localities	   subject	   to	   the	   same	   or	   a	   similar	   formal	   legal	   regime	  (Sullivan,	   et	  al.	   1994,	   804).”	   	   The	   authors	   identified	   and	   examined	   three	   types	   of	  local	  variation	  in	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  matters.	  	  They	  are	  (1)	  the	  debtor’s	  decision	  to	   file	  bankruptcy	   (in	  which	   the	  courts	  are	  not	  directly	   involved);	   (2)	   the	  debtor’s	  election	  to	  seek	  relief	  in	  bankruptcy	  under	  Chapter	  7	  or	  13;	  and	  (3)	  the	  amount	  of	  pre-­‐bankruptcy	  debt	  repaid	  to	  creditors,	  either	  through	  a	  formal	  process	  in	  Chapter	  7	  cases	  known	  as	  “reaffirmation,”	  or	  through	  a	  court	  approved	  plan	  in	  Chapter	  13.	  	  	  Local	  geographic	  variations	  in	  these	  areas	  persisted	  uniformly	  over	  long	  periods	  of	  time,	  notwithstanding	   that	   the	   courts	   examined	  were	   enforcing	   the	   same	  national	  bankruptcy	   law,	   and	   despite	   relative	   economic	   similarities	   of	   debtors	   in	   the	  examined	  districts.	  Instead,	   the	   Sullivan	   group	   argued	   that	   local	   variations	   in	   bankruptcy	  practice	   reflected	   the	   effect	   of	   actions	   of	   legal	   actors	   including	   judges,	   attorneys,	  case	  trustees	  and	  the	  local	  U.S	  Trustee.	  	  Based	  on	  interviews	  with	  such	  individuals	  in	  various	  districts,	  the	  authors	  identify	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  judicial	  activities	  other	  than	  formal	  opinion	  writing	  that	  affect	  bankruptcy	  policy	  in	  a	  particular	  jurisdiction.	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For	   example,	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   a	   debtor	   elects	   to	   file	   a	   case	   under	  Chapter	  7	  or	  13	  appears	  on	  the	  surface	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  between	  attorney	  and	  client,	  subject	  only	  to	  statutory	  restrictions.	  	  However,	  Sullivan	  and	  her	  colleagues	  provide	  narrative	   evidence	   of	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   judges	   affect	   the	   local	   legal	   culture	   and	  influence	   that	   choice	   by	   making	   one	   or	   the	   other	   chapter	   comparatively	   more	  attractive	  to	  attorneys	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.	  1994,	  841).	  	  Those	  benefits	  and	  disadvantages	  are	  incorporated	  into	  the	  recommendations	  the	  attorneys	  then	  make	  to	  their	  clients.	  	  The	   authors	   cite	   the	   following	   examples	   as	   ways	   in	   which	   judges	   affect	   chapter	  choice	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.	  1994,	  844-­‐5):	  
• Several	  of	  the	  described	  activities	  involved	  attorney	  fees.	  	  The	  court	  approves	  debtors’	   attorneys’	   fees	   in	   all	   cases.	   However,	   fees	   in	   Chapter	   7	   consumer	  cases	   are	   not	   scrutinized	   except	   in	   the	   most	   egregious	   circumstances;	  moreover,	   Chapter	   13	   cases	   are	   generally	   more	   time	   intensive	   than	   one	  under	  Chapter	  7.	  	  Hence,	  many	  observers	  believe	  that	  the	  system	  provides	  an	  inherent	   bias	   toward	  Chapter	   7	   election.	   	  Higher	   fee	   awards	   in	   Chapter	   13	  cases	   act	   to	   counter	   such	   bias	   by	   making	   the	   cases	   more	   profitable	   for	  attorneys.	  The	  authors	  suggest	  that	  courts	  that	  routinely	  grant	  higher	  awards	  to	   debtors’	   counsel	   in	   Chapter	   13	   cases	   may	   be	   explicitly	   and	   implicitly	  promoting	  debtor	  election	  of	  the	  more	  complex	  chapter.	  
• More	  subtly,	  the	  authors	  observe	  that	  many	  judges	  have	  sought	  to	  streamline	  Chapter	  13	  procedures	  to	  make	  the	  cases	  less	  time-­‐consuming	  for	  attorneys,	  with	   the	   result	   that	   attorneys	   in	   those	   jurisdictions	   view	   Chapter	   13	   as	   a	  more	  attractive	  alternative	  to	  Chapter	  7	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• Alternatively,	   the	   authors	   contend	   that	   some	   courts	   gave	   preferential	  scheduling	   to	   Chapter	   7	   cases,	   making	   Chapter	   13	   less	   attractive	   in	   those	  jurisdiction	  because	  of	  added	  waiting	  and	  delay.	  
• Judges	  who	  routinely	  approve	  only	  high	  distribution	  Chapter	  13	  plans	  while	  rejecting	  low	  ones	  effectively	  discourage	  Chapter	  13	  filings.	  These	   examples	   demonstrate	   the	   myriad	   ways	   in	   just	   one	   narrow	   area	   in	  which	  bankruptcy	  judges	  can	  substantially	  affect	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  policy	  short	  of	  making	  formal	  case	  dispositions.	  	  Lopucki	  (1996)	  provides	  examples	  of	  how	  local	  legal	   culture	   is	   reflected	   in	   courts’	   formal	   decisions	   in	   both	   commercial	   and	  consumer	  cases,	  leading	  to	  diametrically	  opposed	  outcomes	  in	  similar	  cases	  across	  the	  country.	  	  By	  example,	  he	  cites	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts’	  varying	  acceptance	  of	  the	  practice	   of	   filing	   sequential	   consumer	   cases	   under	   Chapters	   7	   and	   13,	   known	  euphemistically	  as	  “Chapter	  20.”17	  	  	  Local	   legal	   culture	   models	   make	   important	   contributions	   to	   our	  understanding	   of	   the	   courts	   and	   their	   role	   in	   policy	   implementation.	   	   They	  demonstrate	   that	   localized	   judicial	   activities	   can	  have	  normative	  effects	   that	  are	  a	  potent	   form	   of	   policymaking.	   	   However,	   while	   the	   existence	   of	   wide	   variation	   in	  judicial	   implementation	   of	   the	   uniform	   national	   bankruptcy	   laws	   is	   widely	  acknowledged,	  explanations	  based	  on	  local	  cultural	  difference	  have	  not	  gained	  wide	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Debtors	  must	  fall	  within	  specified	  debt	  levels	  to	  qualify	  for	  Chapter	  13	  relief;	  on	  the	   other	   hand,	   it	   offers	   creditors	   fewer	   grounds	   to	   ask	   the	   court	   to	   except	   their	  claims	  from	  discharge.	  	  In	  certain	  circumstances,	  the	  debtor	  may	  first	  file	  Chapter	  7	  and	  then	  if	  left	  with	  any	  debt	  exempt	  from	  discharge,	  file	  a	  new	  Chapter	  13	  case	  that	  likely	  enables	  him	  to	  pay	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  non-­‐discharged	  debt	  over	  time.	  	  The	  procedure	   greatly	   benefited	   debtors	   with	   large	   unsecured	   debts	   and	   non-­‐dischargeable	  debts,	  and	  is	  not	  expressly	  contemplated	  in	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	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acceptance.	   	   	   	   The	  most	   frequently	  made	   criticism	   is	   that	   explanations	   relying	   on	  legal	   culture	   identify	   differences	   but	   do	   not	   explain	   their	   sources.	   	   	   Alternatively,	  they	  share	  the	  fault	  of	  their	  better-­‐known	  realist	  forebears,	  that	  they	  are	  ultimately	  so	   reductive	   as	   to	   lose	   analytical	   significance.	   Moreover,	   as	   Sullivan	   and	   her	  colleagues	  acknowledge,	   local	   legal	   culture	  models	  do	  not	  explain	  why	   judges	   in	  a	  single	  district	  might	  rule	  differently	  on	  similar	  issues	  (Sullivan	  et	  al.	  1994,	  841-­‐2),	  or	  why	  judges’	  rulings	  deviate	  from	  expected	  results	  when	  applying	  some	  statutes	  but	  not	  others,	  or	  why	  local	  influences	  lead	  judges	  to	  rule	  in	  one	  way	  instead	  of	  another.	  	  	  Moreover,	  while	   the	   variation	   identified	  by	   the	   legal	   culture	   scholars	   lends	  support	  to	  arguments	  treating	  the	  federal	  judiciary	  as	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  system	  (at	  least	  in	   bankruptcy	   matters),	   the	   variability	   inherent	   in	   this	   and	   other	   bottom	   up	  approaches	  hinders	  empirical	  research	  of	  such	  models	  because	  it	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  gather,	  assess	  and	  compare	  data	  across	  policies	  or	  agencies.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  bottom-­‐up	   implementation	   research	   lacks	   commonly	   recognized	   standards	   and	   relies	  heavily	   on	   case	   studies.	   	  Moreover,	   the	   bottom	  up	  model’s	   emphasis	   on	   variation	  ignores	   the	   broader	   normative	   effects	   of	   implementing	   activities,	   e.g.,	   the	  development	   of	   policy	   innovations	   in	   the	   courts	   and	   their	   diffusion	   across	  jurisdictions	   through	   reported	   decisions,	   conferences	   and	   journals,	   and	   appellate	  processes.	  
2.	   Top	  Down	  Policy	  Implementation	  and	  the	  Judiciary	  Given	  the	  general	  understanding	   that	   there	   is	  no	   federal	  common	   law	  (Erie	  
Railroad	  v.	  Tompkins,	  304	  U.S.	  64	  (1938)),	  scholars	  originally	  conceived	  the	  federal	  judiciary	   was	   as	   a	   dual	   hierarchical	   system,	   with	   the	   trial	   courts	   at	   the	   bottom	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implementing	  congressional	  statutes	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  Supreme	  Court	  directives	  on	   the	  other.	   	  This	  perspective	  had	  profound	   implications	   for	   the	  study	  of	   judicial	  politics	   and	   continues	   to	   dominate	   law	   school	   curriculums.	   	   The	   study	   of	   judicial	  policy	   implementation	  evolved	  along	  similar	   lines	  as	  the	  general	  studies	  discussed	  above.	   	   Political	   scientists	   began	   to	   formally	   study	   judicial	   implementation	   to	  explain	   the	   failure	  of	   southern	   federal	  district	   court	   judges	   to	   follow	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	   desegregation	   rulings	   of	   the	   1950s	   (see	   Murphy	   1959).	   	   However,	   Baum	  (1976)	   was	   the	   first	   to	   apply	   specific	   lessons	   from	   public	   policy	   studies	   to	   the	  courts.	   	   Baum’s	   concern	   is	   with	   lower	   courts’	   implementation	   of	   higher	   court	  decisions.	  	  His	  resulting	  model	  of	  judicial	  policy	  implementation	  is	  explicitly	  a	  “top-­‐down”	  one	  that	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Mazmanian	  and	  Sabatier	  (Baum	  1980).	  	  While	  Baum	   acknowledges	   that	   variation	   is	   inevitable	   in	   a	   system	   that	   conceptually	  separates	   policy-­‐making	   from	   implementation,	   such	   deviation	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  undesirable.	  	  	  Multiple	  institutional	  factors	  contribute	  to	  variable	  implementation	  by	  the	   lower	  courts,	   including	   inadequate	  communication	  between	   judicial	   levels	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  effective	  sanctions	  within	  the	  judiciary.	  	  These	  combine	  with	  lower	  court	  judges’	  own	  interests,	  policy	  preferences,	  and	  perceptions	  of	  higher	  court	  authority	  to	  result	  in	  deviation	  from	  policies	  established	  in	  high	  court	  decisions.	  	  	  However,	  Baum	  asserts	   that	   the	   instances	  when	   lower	  court	   judges	  deviate	  from	   policies	   established	   by	   senior	   courts	   are	   relatively	   low	   when	   compared	   to	  variation	   in	   executive	   branch	   bureaucracies.	   	   According	   to	   Baum,	   respect	   for	  authority	  is	  “unusually	  strong”	  in	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  normative	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role	  of	  stare	  decisis.18	  	  Respect	  for	  appellate	  authority	  is	  part	  of	  both	  legal	  culture	  but	  also	   the	   constitutional	   structure	   of	   American	   law	   and	   the	   common	   law	   role	   of	  precedent.	   	  An	  appellate	  court	   interpretation	  of	  a	  statute	  restricts	   the	   trial	   judge’s	  own	  interpretive	  capacity,	  at	  least	  as	  concerns	  the	  particular	  application	  at	  issue	  in	  the	   appellate	   case.	   	   Therefore,	   the	   recognition	   of	   appellate	   authority	   provides	  “powerful	   cement”	   in	   the	   judicial	   system	   that	   is	   lacking	   in	   other	   bureaucratic	  systems	  (Baum,	  1976).	  	  	  Baum’s	   application	   of	   the	   top	   down	   model	   of	   policy	   implementation	   to	  judicial	  politics	  was	  influential	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Johnson	  and	  Canon	  1984),	  and	  many	  of	  his	  insights	  retain	  considerable	  relevance	  more	  than	  three	  decades	  after	  they	  were	  first	  made.	   	   However,	   the	   limitation	   of	   the	   top	   down	   model	   is	   in	   its	   focus	   on	   only	   a	  portion	   of	   the	   activities	   of	   lower	   courts,	   i.e.,	   implementation	   of	   Supreme	   Court	  decisions.	   	   In	   fact,	   federal	   trial-­‐level	   courts	   (which	   include	   the	   district	   courts	   and	  bankruptcy	   courts)	   devote	   the	   bulk	   of	   their	   efforts	   to	   fact-­‐finding	   and	   to	  interpreting	  and	  applying	  congressionally	  enacted	  statutes.	  	  While	  stare	  decisis	  may	  preclude	   lower	   court	   statutory	   interpretation	   on	   many	   issues,	   appellate	   courts	  review	   only	   a	   tiny	   fraction	   of	   the	   decisions	   made	   by	   trial-­‐level	   judges,	   including	  those	   from	   bankruptcy	   courts.	   	   Moreover,	   virtually	   all	   federal	   cases	   originate	   in	  trial-­‐level	  courts.	  	  Fact-­‐finding	  is	  the	  exclusive	  function	  of	  trial	  courts	  in	  the	  federal	  system,	  and	   is	   rarely	  overturned	  on	  appellate	   review.	   	   	   In	   fact,	  despite	   rules	  of	  de	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 	  Baum	   suggests	   that	   lower	   courts	   are	   similarly	   constrained,	   but	   legislators’	  common	   use	   of	   subjective	   and	   undefined	   terms	   like	   “abuse”	   provides	   trial	   judges	  with	  substantial	  latitude	  to	  depart	  from	  congressional	  intent.	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novo	   review	   on	   issues	   of	   law,	   appellate	   courts	   often	   affirm	   trial	   courts’	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  statutes.	  	  Only	  793	  of	  the	  57,740	  appeals	  instituted	  in	  all	  federal	  circuits	  (1.4%)	  in	  the	  12-­‐month	  period	  ended	  September	  30,	  2009	  originated	  in	  bankruptcy	  courts.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  represents	  only	  a	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  the	  1.4	  million	  total	  bankruptcy	  cases	  filed	  in	  the	  same	  period.	  	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  federal	  system,	  higher	  courts	  do	  not	  review,	  or	  even	  supervise,	  the	  great	  bulk	  of	  bankruptcy	  court	  activity.	  	  Combined	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  trial	  court	  decisions	  are	  affirmed,	  top-­‐down	  approaches	  only	  describe	  at	  best	   a	   portion	   of	   the	   federal	   judiciary.	   	   Conversely,	   bottom	  up	   approaches	   do	   not	  account	  for	  conformity	  within	  the	  system.	  
3.	   The	  Attitudinal	  Model	  The	  attitudinal	  model	  of	   judicial	  decision	  making	  merits	  attention,	   if	   for	  no	  other	   reason	   than	   to	   explain	   its	   unsuitability	   to	   understanding	   outcomes	   in	   trial-­‐level	   courts.	   	   With	   their	   common	   focus	   on	   high	   court	   outputs,	   i.e.,	   opinions,	  attitudinal	  explanations	  of	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  can	  in	  some	  ways	  be	  conceived	  as	  related	  to	  the	  top	  down	  model.	  	  However,	  while	  top	  down	  models	  have	  not	  been	  widely	   applied	   to	   the	   judiciary	   by	   political	   scientists,	   the	   attitudinal	   model	   has	  become	  the	  dominant	  model	  in	  the	  field.	  	  Although	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	  have	  long	  been	   characterized	   in	   political	   terms,	   the	   attitudinal	   model	   originated	   with	  Pritchett’s	  study	  of	  the	  Roosevelt	  court	  (1948).	  	  Pritchett	  argued	  that	  Supreme	  Court	  justices	   are	   in	   fact	   political	   actors	   who	   decide	   cases	   according	   to	   their	   personal	  policy	  preferences,	  contrary	  to	  then-­‐prevalent	  legal	  scholarship	  and	  the	  images	  the	  justices	   themselves	   sought	   to	   maintain.	   	   By	   the	   1990s,	   Pritchett’s	   perspective,	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bolstered	   by	   convincing	   arguments	   and	   empirical	   studies	   utilizing	   detailed	  databases,	  had	  become	  the	  dominant	  public	   law	  model	  of	   judicial	  decision-­‐making	  (Segal	  and	  Spaeth	  1993,	  2002).	  	  	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  attitudinal	  model	  maintain	  that	  justices’	  policy	  preferences	  (i.e.,	  attitudes),	  as	  measured	  on	  a	  liberal	  –	  conservative	  scale,	  are	  the	  most	  important	  predictors	  of	  their	  judicial	  decisions.	  	  Those	  decisions	  are	  the	  product	  of	  the	  justices’	  interpretation	   of	   the	   facts	   of	   a	   case	   as	   filtered	   through	   their	   preferences.	   	   Legal	  precedents	  have	  no	  predictive	  value	  under	  the	  attitudinal	  model;	  proponents	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  authors	  of	  every	  Supreme	  Court	  majority	  opinion	  and	  dissent	  cite	  both	   texts	   (legal	   and	   constitutional)	   and	   extensive	   precedents	   to	   support	   their	  positions	  (Segal,	  Spaeth	  and	  Benesch	  2005,	  25-­‐33)	  	  Generalized	  versions	  of	   the	   attitudinal	  model	  dominate	  public	   and	  political	  discourse	   about	   the	   Supreme	   Court,	   and	   the	   development	   of	   more	   sophisticated	  applications	   have	   enabled	   the	   model	   to	   maintain	   its	   prominence	   in	   public	   law	  studies.	  	  However,	  while	  the	  attitudinal	  model	  dominates	  Supreme	  Court	  analysis	  in	  public	   law,	   and	   has	   found	   some	   application	   to	   the	   circuit	   courts	   of	   appeal	   (see	  Sunstein,	   et	   al.	   2006),	   it	   has	   not	   been	   useful	   in	   the	   study	   of	   trial	   courts	   and	   is	  considered	  by	  some	  to	  be	  counter-­‐productive	  to	  that	  end.	  	  	  Early	  efforts	  to	  apply	  the	  attitudinal	  model	  to	  federal	  district	  court	  decision-­‐making	   were	   ultimately	   found	   to	   be	   ineffectual	   and	   were	   abandoned	   in	   favor	   of	  different	   approaches	   (Carp	   and	   Rowland	   1983;	   Rowland	   and	   Carp	   1996).	   	   	   The	  problems	  are	  both	  methodological	  and	  conceptual,	   and	  as	  described	  by	  Kim,	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  derive	  from	  the	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  trial	  and	  appellate	  courts.	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One	   important	   difference	   is	   that	   virtually	   every	   appellate	   case	   follows	   the	   same	  procedural	  path	  to	  a	  resolution,	  and	  is	  resolved	  by	  way	  of	  a	  single	  opinion	  entered	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  case.	   	  However,	  there	  are	  myriad	  ways	  for	  cases	  to	  proceed	  through	  the	  trial	  courts,	  many	  of	  which	  are	  determined	  by	  the	  litigants’	  choices	  and	  not	  the	  courts.	   	  Hence,	   the	  number	  of	  variables	  present	  at	   any	  given	  point	   in	  a	   trial	   court	  case	  are	  innumerable	  and	  frustrate	  comparison.	  Methodology	  aside,	  the	  attitudinal	  model’s	  broader	  limitation	  is	  its	  parochial	  outlook.	   	   Under	   the	   attitudinal	   model,	   judicial	   decision-­‐making	   and	   policymaking	  are	   one	   and	   the	   same.	   	   By	   conflating	   decision-­‐making,	   a	   personal	   or	   individual	  process,	   with	   policymaking,	   an	   institutional	   one,	   the	   attitudinal	   model	   reduces	  everything	  to	  the	  former	  and	  renders	  other	  perspectives	  irrelevant.	  	  The	  result	  has	  not	  only	  been	  the	  doctrinal	  isolation	  described	  by	  Barnes	  and	  a	  narrowed	  research	  agenda	  that	  excludes	  the	  bulk	  of	  activity	  in	  the	  federal	  judiciary,	  as	  discussed	  above,	  but	  also	  a	  research	  framework	  that	  all	  but	  precludes	  examination	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	   the	   judiciary	   and	   the	   other	   branches	   and	   delegitimizes	   judicial	  policymaking.	  	  Therefore,	   the	   attitudinal	   approach	   is	   a	  methodologically	   and	   conceptually	  inappropriate	   method	   for	   understanding	   lower	   courts.	   	   Therefore,	   some	   judicial	  scholars	  have	  reconceived	  the	  study	  of	   lower	  courts	   in	  ways	  that	  draw	  from	  other	  doctrinal	  sources.	  
C.	   Interbranch	  Approaches	  to	  the	  Courts	  Just	  as	  many	  general	  policy	  scholars	  moved	  to	  consider	  implementation	  in	  a	  broader	   context,	   some	   contemporary	   judicial	   politics	   scholars	   reconceived	   the	  
	  	  
38	  
judiciary	  and	  particularly	   the	   lower	   courts	  as	   integrated	  participants	   in	   the	  policy	  process.	   	   Commonly	   identified	   as	   the	   interbranch	   perspective	   (Miller	   and	   Barnes	  2004),	  this	  institutionally-­‐oriented	  viewpoint	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  the	  courts	  as	  one	  of	   three	   constitutionally	   empowered	   policy	   making	   centers	   in	   American	  government.	  	  	  The	  fundamental	  premise	  underlying	  this	  viewpoint	  is	  that	  power	  or	  authority	   over	   particular	   policies	   is	   dispersed	   across	   the	   government	   and	   its	  constituent	  parts.	  	  The	  interbranch	  perspective’s	  power-­‐sharing	  approach	  explicitly	  rejects	  traditional	  hierarchical	  policy-­‐making	  models,	  particularly	  top-­‐down	  ones,	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  constitutionally	  based,	  decentralized	  one:	  	  “No	  branch	  of	  government	  has	  the	   final	   say	   on	   the	  meaning	   of	   federal	   statutes	   or	   the	  U.S.	   Constitution.	   	   Instead,	  policymaking	   is	   best	   understood	   as	   an	   ongoing,	   interbranch	   dialogue,	   which	   is	  shaped	   by	   institutional,	   political,	   and	   strategic	   contexts	   (Miller	   and	   Barnes	   2004,	  5).”	  	  	  
1.	   The	  Scholarship	  of	  Martin	  Shapiro	  	   The	   interbranch	   approach	   has	   its	   origins	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Martin	   Shapiro	  (Barnes	  2010).	  	  Shapiro’s	  studies	  of	  judicial	  politics,	  especially	  his	  early	  examination	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  develop	  two	  primary	  themes.19	  	  The	  first	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	   a	   concept	   of	   policymaking	   he	   identifies	   as	   “political	   jurisprudence”	   (Shapiro	  1964a).	  The	  label	  describes	  an	  inclusive	  conceptualization	  of	  public	  policy	  in	  which	  courts	   are	   integral	   policymakers.	   	   Political	   jurisprudence	   is	   a	   considerable	  departure	  from	  political	  science’s	  predominant	  treatment	  of	  the	  study	  of	  the	  courts	  as	   distinct	   from	   the	   political	   branches	   of	   government	   and	   separate	   within	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Gillman	  (2004)	  provides	  an	  excellent	  overview	  and	  summation	  of	  Shapiro’s	  work.	  
	  	  
39	  
discipline.	   	   Shapiro	   argues	   that	   the	   distinctions	   are	   formalistic	   and	   artificial	   ones,	  because	   the	   courts,	   too,	   are	   political	   actors.	   	   “[T]he	   court	   is	   inside	   the	   political	  process.	  	  We	  have	  an	  Olympian	  judiciary.	  	  If	  it	  is	  to	  do	  anything,	  it	  must	  do	  it	  where	  the	  doing	  gets	  done,	  in	  the	  give	  and	  take	  of	  politics	  (Shapiro	  1961,	  quoted	  in	  Gillman	  2004,	   364-­‐5).”	   	   	   Therefore,	   Shapiro	   rejects	   traditional	   structural	   frameworks	   that	  segregate	  the	  courts	  from	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government.	  Instead,	  he	  develops	  a	  policy-­‐oriented	   conception	   of	   American	   politics	   in	   which	   the	   courts	   are	   one	   of	  several	   competing	   segments	   (Shapiro	   1962).	   	   As	   summarized	   by	  Gillman,	   “Rather	  than	  talk	  (formalistically)	  about	  one	  nondemocratic	  branch	  of	  government	  and	  two	  democratic	  branches	  it	  would	  be	  more	  accurate	  to	  think	  about	  American	  politics	  as	  made	  up	  of	  ‘many	  centers	  of	  decision-­‐making’	  and	  then	  ask	  how	  courts	  fit	  into	  these	  competing	  power	  centers	  (Gillman	  364).”	  This	  reconception	  of	  the	  courts	  has	  significant	  consequences.	  	  “[T]he	  core	  of	  political	   jurisprudence	   is	   a	   vision	   of	   the	   courts	   as	   political	   agencies	   .	   .	   .	   any	   given	  court	   [can	  be]	   seen	   as	   part	   of	   the	   institutional	   structure	   of	  American	   government	  basically	  similar	  to	  such	  other	  agencies	  as	  the	  ICC,	  the	  House	  Rules	  Committee,	  the	  Bureau	   of	   the	   Budget,	   the	   city	   council	   of	   Omaha,	   the	   Forestry	   Service	   and	   the	  Strategic	  Air	  Command	  (Shapiro	  1964a,	  296-­‐7).”	   	  This	   in	   turn	   leads	  Shapiro	   to	  re-­‐describe	  much	  litigation	  as	  a	  political	  activity	  in	  terms	  drawn	  from	  David	  Truman’s	  seminal	   work,	   The	   Governmental	   Process	   (1951),	   but	   which	   presage	   Lowi’s	   later	  studies	   of	   interest	   group	   liberalism	   (1964,	   1979).	   	   “His	   thesis	   .	   .	   .	  was	   that	   courts	  often	  have	  a	  clientele	  ‘consisting	  of	  precisely	  those	  interests	  which	  find	  themselves	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unable	   to	   obtain	   representation	   from	   other	   agencies’	   (Gillman,	   364,	   quoting	   from	  Shapiro	  1961).”	  Shapiro’s	  formulation	  recalls	  Justice	  Stone’s	  famous	  dicta	  in	  footnote	  4	  of	  his	  opinion	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  Carolene	  Products	  (1938),	  where	  he	  identified	  a	  particular	  role	   for	   the	  courts	  when	  dispossessed	  or	  disenfranchised	  minorities	  are	  unable	   to	  find	  redress	  for	  violation	  of	  their	  constitutional	  rights	  in	  the	  legislative	  or	  executive	  branches	   of	   government.20	  	   Shapiro’s	   thesis	   recast	   that	   role	   in	   broader	   and	  more	  expressly	   political	   terms.	   	   Litigants	   have	   interests,	   and	   they	   seek	   recourse	   in	   the	  courts	  because	   they	   conclude	   that	   the	   likelihood	  of	   seeing	   their	  preferred	  policies	  enacted	  or	  enforced	  are	  better	  than	  in	  the	  other	  branches.	  	  American	  government	  is	  “an	   elaborate	   power	   structure	   in	   which	   groups	   seek	   advantage	   through	  maneuvering	   among	   various	   power	   centers”	   including	   the	   courts	   (Shapiro	   1962).	  “As	  part	  of	  a	  governmental	  system	  designed	  to	  accommodate	  conflicting	  interests	  by	  allowing	  each	  access	   to	  and	   representation	  by	   some	  segment	  of	   the	   structure,	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  therefore	  functioning	  properly	  when	  it	  acts	  as	  spokesman	  for	  an	  increasingly	   pressing	   political	   interest	   that	   can	   find	   no	   satisfaction	   elsewhere	  (Shapiro	  1964b,	  241).”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Footnote	   4	   reads	   in	   relevant	   part:	   “It	   is	   unnecessary	   to	   consider	   now	  whether	  legislation	   which	   restricts	   those	   political	   processes	   which	   can	   ordinarily	   be	  expected	  to	  bring	  about	  repeal	  of	  undesirable	  legislation	  is	  to	  be	  subjected	  to	  more	  exacting	   judicial	   scrutiny	   under	   the	   general	   prohibitions	   of	   the	   Fourteenth	  Amendment	   than	   are	   most	   other	   types	   of	   legislation	   .	   .	   .	   Nor	   need	   we	   enquire	  whether	   similar	   considerations	   enter	   into	   the	   review	   of	   statutes	   directed	   at	  particular	  religious	  .	  .	  .	  or	  racial	  minorities,	  [or]	  .	  .	  .whether	  prejudice	  against	  discrete	  
and	  insular	  minorities	  may	  be	  a	  special	  condition,	  which	  tends	  seriously	  to	  curtail	  the	  
operation	  of	  those	  political	  processes	  ordinarily	  to	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  protect	  minorities,	  
and	  which	  may	   call	   for	   a	   correspondingly	  more	   searching	   judicial	   inquiry	   (304	   U.S.	  144	  at	  152	  (1938);	  italics	  added).”	  	  
	  	  
41	  
Shapiro’s	  second	  theme,	  derived	  from	  his	  first	  and	  no	  less	  important,	  is	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  can	  be	  studied	  using	   theories	  and	  methodologies	  developed	   in	  other	   area	   of	   American	   political	   study.21	  	   “Political	   jurisprudence	   is,	   among	   other	  things,	  an	  extension	  of	   the	   findings	  of	  other	  areas	  of	  political	  science	  by	  somehow	  integrating	   legal	   and	   judicial	   facets	   into	   the	   total	   picture	   of	   political	   life	   (Shapiro	  1964a,	   295).”	   	   In	   other	  words,	   by	   recasting	   the	   courts	   as	   political	   actors,	   judicial	  activity	   can	   be	   examined	   in	   explicitly	   political	   terms.	   Re-­‐description,	   therefore,	  might	  lead	  to	  better	  understanding	  of	  judicial	  activity.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  
stare	  decisis	   is	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   American	   jurisprudence	   that	   holds	   that	  “judges	   should	   look	   to	   past	   decisions	   for	   guidance	   and	   answer	   questions	   of	   law	  consistent	  with	  precedent	  (Hall	  2005,	  769).	   	  Under	  stare	  decisis,	  precedent	  is	  to	  be	  abandoned	   only	   rarely	   and	   instead	   should	   be	   observed	   in	   similar	   disputes.	   	   As	   a	  result,	   judicial	   policies	   tend	   on	   the	  whole	   to	   be	   fairly	   stable	   and	   normally	   evolve	  only	  slowly	  over	  time.	  	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  judicial	  doctrine	  of	  stare	  decisis	  resembles	  the	   public	   policy	   concept	   of	   incrementalism	   (Lindblom	   1959).	   	   Incrementalism	   is	  often	  described	  as	  a	  decision-­‐making	  tool	  that	  promotes	  limited	  variation	  of	  existing	  policies	  (Anderson	  2003).	  	  As	  with	  stare	  decisis,	  decision-­‐makers	  view	  of	  a	  problem	  and	   the	   possible	   options	   available	   to	   address	   it	   are	   constrained	   by	   existing	   rules,	  institutions,	   policies,	   and	   traditions.	   	   Likewise,	   just	   as	   stare	   decisis	   promotes	  jurisprudential	   stability	   through	   consistency,	   so	   incrementalism	   promotes	  consensus	   by	   reducing	   uncertainty	   among	   policymakers,	   interest	   groups,	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Shapiro’s	  work	   focused	  on	   the	  United	   States	   Supreme	  Court.	   	  However,	   as	   both	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  interbranch	  approach	  that	  follows	  and	  this	  dissertation	  makes	  clear,	  the	  principles	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  entire	  judiciary.	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others.	  	  	  These	  similarities	  suggest	  the	  possibility	  that	  public	  law	  scholars	  might	  gain	  new	  understandings	  of	  the	  role	  of	  stare	  decisis	  in	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  through	  use	  of	  the	  lessons	  learned	  from	  incrementalism	  and	  its	  related	  theories.22	  According	   to	  Shapiro,	   the	  challenge	   for	  political	   jurisprudence	  specialists	   is	  the	  integration	  of	  judicial	  studies	  with	  the	  broader	  study	  of	  political	  science.	  	  Their	  segregation	  from	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  profession	  is	  mostly	  self-­‐imposed.	  	  Domestic	  public	   law	  scholars’	   focus	  on	  judicial	  behavior	  and	  constitutional	   law	  has	  led	  them	  to	   produce	   studies	   of	   little	   use	   or	   interest	   to	   other	   political	   scientists.	   	   Shapiro	  believes	  that	  their	  adoption	  of	  more	  generalized	  theories,	  models,	  and	  methods	  will	  promote	  acceptance	  by	  other	  members	  of	  the	  profession	  and	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  judges	  and	  courts	  in	  every	  area	  of	  political	  study	  (Gilman	  2004).	  	  
2.	   The	  Interbranch	  School	  of	  American	  Public	  Law	  Taken	   together,	   the	   main	   themes	   underlying	   Shapiro’s	   work	   reflect	   a	  commitment	   to	   the	   substantive	   and	   methodological	   integration	   of	   the	   judicial	  studies	   with	   the	   broader	   political	   discipline.	   	   That	   commitment	   is	   at	   the	   core	   of	  interbranch	   scholarship.	   	   The	   interbranch	   school	   is	   variously	   identified	   as	   a	  perspective,	  an	  approach,	  or	  a	  movement	  (Miller	  and	  Barnes	  2004;	  Miller	  2009).	  	  As	  described	   by	   one	   writer,	   it	   is	   “a	   set	   of	   working	   assumptions	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  American	   policy	   making	   and	   politics,	   which	   provide	   an	   analytic	   foundation	   for	  building	   diverse	   research	   agendas	   on	   the	   courts	   and	   judicial	   decision	   making	  (Barnes	  2007).”	  	  These	  assumptions	  draw	  on	  Shapiro’s	  basic	  framework	  and	  include	  the	  presumptions	  that	  (1)	  judicial	  decision-­‐making	  encompasses	  policymaking;	  (2)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  For	   a	   similar	   analysis	   applying	   incrementalism	   to	   judicial	   decision-­‐making,	   see	  Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  1998,	  297-­‐335,	  and	  below	  in	  this	  text.	  
	  	  
43	  
the	   courts	   legitimately	   share	   policymaking	   authority	   with	   the	   other	   branches	   of	  government;	  (3)	  policymaking	  authority	  is	  dispersed	  across	  and	  shifts	  within	  in	  the	  American	  political	  system;	  (4)	  policymaking	  processes	  are	  contextual	  and	  depend	  in	  part	   on	   the	   policy	   in	   question;	   and	   (5)	   variations	   in	   the	   number	   and	   nature	   of	  potential	   policymaking	   centers	   and	   the	   different	   means	   by	   which	   policymaking	  authority	   shifts	   between	   them	   requires	   multiple	   methodologies	   for	   the	   policy	  process	  to	  be	  fully	  understood.	  	  (Miller	  and	  Barnes	  2004).	  	  	  	  	  	  Moreover,	   unlike	  most	   public	   law	   studies,	   interbranch	   scholarship	   extends	  Shapiro’s	  basic	  themes	  to	  the	  lower	  courts.	  	  Kagan	  (2004)	  groups	  judicial	  activities	  into	   two	   broad	   categories.	   	   The	   first	   encompasses	   the	   courts’	   role	   as	   boundary	  setter,	   exercising	   their	   judicial	   review	   powers	   to	   ensure	   that	   statutes	   and	  regulations	  pass	  constitutional	  muster	  and	   that	   the	  executive	  branch’s	   rulemaking	  and	  enforcement	  activities	  do	  not	  violate	  due	  process.	  	  These	  activities	  typically	  fall	  within	   the	  domain	  of	  appellate	  courts,	  and	  have	  attracted	  most	  of	   the	  attention	  of	  public	   law	  scholars.	   	  Kagan’s	   second	  category	   includes	   courts’	   role	   in	  adjudicating	  disputes	  over	  the	  meaning	  and	  application	  of	  statutes	  and	  regulations,	  and	  imposing	  sanctions	  on	  parties	   found	   to	  have	  violated	   them;	   i.e.,	   judicial	   activities	  associated	  with	  trial	  courts.	  	  	  	  	  Given	   the	   level	   of	   activity	   in	   the	   lower	   courts,	   the	   interbranch	   school’s	  attention	  to	  them	  is	  a	  marked	  advance	  over	  other	  areas	  of	  judicial	  study.	  	  However,	  because	  nearly	  all	  lower	  court	  cases	  are	  in	  some	  way	  unique	  (Kim,	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  associated	  with	  their	  study	  is	  likewise	  increased.	  	  This	  situation	  leads	   to	   two	  dominant	  methodological	   choices	   in	   the	   interbranch	  approach.	   	  First,	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interbranch	  literature	  is	  policy-­‐oriented,	  and	  describes	  both	  specific	  policy	  changes	  and	   the	   evolution	   of	   particular	   policies	   and	   policy	   areas	   over	   time.	   	   The	   second	  methodological	   choice	   is	   that	   interbranch	   scholarship	   typically	   examines	   entire	  cases;	  other	  branches	  of	  American	  public	   law	   focus	  on	   final	  decisions	  due	   to	   their	  overwhelming	  attention	  to	  high	  courts	  (Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  1999,	  29).	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  literature	  tends	  toward	  highly	  descriptive	  case	  studies.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3.	   Select	  Case	  Studies	  Following	   Shapiro,	   the	   leading	   interbranch	   literature	   incorporates	   insights	  from	   other,	   non-­‐judicial,	   branches	   of	   political	   science.	   	   Feeley	   and	   Rubin	   (1999)	  combine	   classic	   and	   incrementalist	  models	  of	  policymaking23	  developed	   in	   studies	  of	  administrative	  agencies	  to	  described	  the	  leading	  roles	  lower	  courts	  played	  in	  U.S.	  prison	  policy	  reform	  from	  the	  1960s	  to	  the	  1990s.	  	  Federal	  judges	  in	  Arkansas	  and	  Texas,	  responding	  to	  pro	  se	  petitions	  from	  prison	  inmates,	  took	  the	  lead	  in	  defining	  the	   problem	   and	   identifying	   the	   goal.	   	   The	   problem,	   as	   defined	   by	   district	   court	  judges	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1960s,	  was	   that	   the	  methods	   and	   conditions	  of	   incarceration	   in	  the	  South	  diverged,	  often	  dramatically,	   from	  established	  and	  evolving	  standards	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country	  (Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  1999,	  157).	  	  It	  follows	  that	  their	  goal	  was	  to	   elevate	   Southern	  penal	   practices	   to	   equal	   those	   commonly	   accepted	  nationally,	  and	   which	   emphasized	   rehabilitation	   over	   punishment	   (Feeley	   and	   Rubin	   1999,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  “	   [T]he	  best	  way	   to	  describe	   judicial	  policy	  making	   .	   .	   .	   is	   to	   rely	  on	   the	   familiar	  descriptions	  of	  public	  policy	  making	  by	  other	  governmental	  institutions,	  particularly	  executive	   or	   administrative	   agencies.	   	   The	   classic	   description	   divides	   the	   process	  into	   five	   discrete	   steps:	   defining	   the	   problem,	   identifying	   the	   goal,	   generating	  alternatives,	   choosing	   the	   solution	   from	   among	   these	   alternatives,	   and	  implementing	  the	  chosen	  solution.	  	  An	  alternative	  approach	  is	  to	  treat	  policy	  making	  as	   an	   intuitive,	   incremental	   process,	   where	   each	   step	   is	   based	   upon	   the	   decision	  maker’s	  observations	  about	  the	  prior	  step’s	  success	  (Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  1999,	  147).”	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162,	  252-­‐8).	   	  As	   the	  authors	  describe,	   these	  courts	  became	  beacons	  of	  change.	   	  As	  judges	   in	   other	   jurisdictions	   learned	   of	   how	   their	   Arkansas	   and	   Texas	   colleagues	  defined	  problems	  and	  goals	  in	  their	  penal	  systems,	  they	  adopted	  their	  definition	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  their	  own	  efforts	  to	  improve	  prison	  conditions.	  	  Aside	  from	  its	  social	  and	  ethical	  merits,	  the	  rehabilitative	  model	  appealed	  to	  federal	   judges	   because	   it	   was	   already	   in	   place	   in	   the	   federal	   prisons.	   	   Therefore,	  Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  argue	  that	  the	  new	  prison	  policies	  imposed	  by	  the	  courts	  could	  be	  characterized	   as	   an	   incremental	   change	   because	   they	  were	   based	   on	   familiar	   and	  arguably	  successful	  existing	  policies	   (Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  1999,	  258-­‐63).	   	  While	   that	  might	  be	  true	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  new	  policy	  options,	  the	  new	  policies	  as	   implemented	   nonetheless	   marked	   a	   major	   shift	   in	   the	   overall	   orientation	   of	  prison	  policy	  in	  the	  states.	  Feeley	  and	  Rubin’s	  analysis	  of	  prison	  policy	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  and	  fullest	  efforts	  to	  explicitly	  use	  major	  policy	  models	  to	  understand	  judicial	  policymaking	  in	  the	  lower	  courts.	  	  It	  is	  also	  typical	  of	  the	  research	  in	  the	  field,	  which	  shies	  away	  from	  quantitative	   analysis	   and	   instead	   favors	   the	   case	   study	   method	   used	   in	   policy	  literature	  (Feeley	  and	  Rubin	  1999,	  29).	   	  A	  recent	  effort	  in	  the	  same	  vein	  is	  Barnes’	  2008	   examination	   of	   the	   role	   of	   courts,	   particularly	   bankruptcy	   courts,	   in	  developing	   asbestos	   claims	   compensation	   policies	   in	   the	   1980s	   and	   90s.	   	   Barnes	  draws	  on	  Hacker’s	   influential	   theory	  of	  drift	  (2004)	  as	  a	  starting	  point	   to	  describe	  how	   bankruptcy	   courts	   developed	   procedures	   for	   resolving	   growing	   numbers	   of	  asbestos	  claims	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  congressional	  action.	   	  The	   term	  “drift”	  describes	  the	   effects	   when	   “institutions	   and	   policies	   remain	   fixed	   while	   new	   risks	   emerge	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(Barnes	   2008,	   636).”	   	   In	   other	   words,	   drift	   functionally	   changes	   policies	   without	  action	  that	  formally	  revises	  them.	  	  	  According	   to	   Barnes,	   the	   combination	   of	   divided	   authority	   and	   economic	  dynamism	  combine	   to	  make	  drift	  a	  particularly	  potent	   factor	   in	  American	  politics.	  	  However,	  where	  Hacker	  describes	  drift	  as	  an	  endpoint	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  Barnes	   argues	   that	   it	   can	   serve	   to	   stimulate	   venue	   shopping	   by	   entities	   seeking	  different	  outcomes.	   	  Alternate	  venues	   include	   the	  courts.	   	  Of	  course,	   this	   insight	   is	  not	   in	   itself	   new.	   	   Business	   owners	   in	   the	   early	   part	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	  famously	  found	  relief	   in	  the	  courts	   from	  progressive	   labor	  regulation.	   	  The	  NAACP	  Legal	   Defense	   Fund	   redirected	   its	   efforts	   to	   the	   courts	   after	   southern	   committee	  chairs	   successfully	   blocked	   meaningful	   desegregation	   legislation	   in	   Congress,	  ultimately	   leading	   to	   the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  decision	   in	  Brown	  v.	  Board	  of	  Education.	  	  Barnes’	   contribution,	   following	   Shapiro,	   is	   to	   examine	   such	   events	   in	   an	   explicit	  policy	  context,	  and	  particularly	  how	  they	  are	  played	  out	  in	  the	  lower	  courts.	  Litigation	  by	  plaintiffs	  allegedly	   injured	  by	  asbestos	  exposure	  climbed	   from	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  and	   throughout	   the	  1980s,	   overwhelming	   some	  courts	   and	  driving	  some	   manufacturers	   like	   Johns-­‐Manville	   and	   their	   customers	   into	   bankruptcy.	  	  Numerous	   bills	   introduced	   in	   Congress	   to	   address	   the	   situation	   failed.	   	   Federal	  district	  court	   judges	  relied	  on	  multi-­‐district	  rules	  to	  conduct	  consolidated	  pre-­‐trial	  proceedings,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  conducted	  group	  trials.	  	  Bankruptcy	  judges	  adapted	  existing	  bankruptcy	  statutes	  to	  create	  dedicated	  funds	  to	  pay	  asbestos	  injury	  claims	  in	  manufacturers’	  Chapter	  11.	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None	  of	   these	  procedural	   innovations	  were	   the	   result	  of	   statutory	   changes.	  	  Rather,	   judges	   both	   created	   and	   implemented	   these	   changes,	   acting	   on	   their	   own	  initiative	   or	   at	   the	   urging	   of	   litigants.	   	   Barnes	   highlights	   the	   Chapter	   11	   trusts	   as	  being	   most	   notable.	   	   The	   trusts,	   an	   extension	   of	   amendments	   to	   the	   Bankruptcy	  Code	  made	   in	  1994,	  were	   incorporated	   into	   reorganizing	   asbestos	  manufacturers’	  plans	  of	  reorganization.	  	  They	  altered	  the	  nature	  of	  asbestos	  litigation	  in	  two	  major	  ways.	  	  First,	  they	  placed	  a	  cap	  on	  the	  reorganizing	  manufacturers’	  financial	  exposure	  on	   asbestos	   claims.	   	   Second,	   creation	   of	   a	   dedicated	   fund	   to	   satisfy	   those	   claims	  eliminated	   the	  need	   to	   litigate	   the	  manufacturers’	   liability.	   	  As	   a	   result,	   the	  highly	  inefficient	   tort	   litigation	   process,	  which	   drove	   the	  manufacturers	   into	   bankruptcy	  and	  resulted	  in	  relatively	  little	  compensation	  to	  victims,	  was	  replaced	  in	  the	  Chapter	  11	  cases	  with	  a	  more	  streamlined	  one	  of	  claims	  administration.	  Explaining	   how	   relationships	   between	   American	   government’s	   three	  branches	   change	  both	  across	  policy	  areas	  and	  over	   time	   is	  one	  of	   the	   interbranch	  school’s	   critical	   missions	   (Miller	   2009).	   	   The	   two	   studies	   discussed	   above	  demonstrate	   how	   policymaking	   authority	   can	   shift	   to	   the	   courts	   in	   the	   face	   of	  intransigence	   in	   the	   other	   branches	   (e.g.,	   state	   officials	   in	   the	   prison	   cases	   and	  Congress	   in	   asbestos	   litigation).	   	   These	   phenomena	   are	   of	   primary	   interest	   to	  general	   policy	   scholars	   through	   the	   agenda	   setting	   literature.	   	   However,	   agenda	  setting	  is	  given	  only	  brief	  mention	  in	  Barnes’	  study,	  and	  none	  in	  Feeley	  and	  Rubin’s.	  	  A	  fuller	  integration	  of	  the	  two	  fields	  would	  promote	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  courts	  in	  the	  policy	  process,	  not	  only	  in	  how	  they	  gain	  policymaking	  authority	  but	  how	  it	  shifts	  away	  from	  them	  to	  the	  other	  branches	  as	  well.	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D. Agenda	  Setting	  	  	  Notwithstanding	   the	  markedly	   similar	  developmental	  paths	   followed	   in	   the	  interbranch	   and	   implementation	   literature,	   interbranch	   scholars	   have	   not	   fully	  accessed	   the	   insights	   of	   general	   policy	   studies.	   	   In	   one	   common	   formulation,	  interbranch	   scholars	   describe	   the	   collective	   policymaking	   process	   as	   a	   “dialogue”	  (Miller	  and	  Barnes	  2004),	  albeit	  a	  competitive	  and	  sometimes	  confrontational	  one.	  	  However,	   such	   classification	   is	   more	   descriptive	   than	   explanatory,	   giving	   the	  perspective	  indefinite	  contours.	  	  Examination	  of	  the	  policymaking	  “dialogue”	  within	  a	   broader	   policy	   framework	   would	   enhance	   the	   empirical	   value	   of	   the	   resulting	  research	   and	   advance	   the	   integration	   of	   judicial	   studies	   and	   the	   broader	   political	  science	  field.	  
1.	   Policy	  Agendas	  	  The	  matter	  of	  how	  policy	  comes	  to	  be	  made	  in	  one	  venue	  rather	  than	  another	  is	   part	   of	   the	   well-­‐developed	   body	   of	   agenda	   setting	   literature.	   	   An	   agenda	   is	   “a	  collection	   of	   problems,	   understandings	   of	   causes,	   symbols,	   solutions,	   and	   other	  elements	   of	   public	   problems	   that	   come	   to	   the	   attention	   of	  members	   of	   the	   public	  and	  their	  governmental	  officials	  (Birkland	  2001,	  106).”	  	  Cobb	  and	  Elder	  (1983,	  14)	  refine	  the	  definition	  to	  “refer	  to	  a	  general	  set	  of	  political	  controversies	  that	  will	  be	  viewed	   at	   any	   point	   in	   time	   as	   falling	   within	   the	   range	   of	   legitimate	   concerns	  meriting	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  polity.”	  	  Kingdon	  similarly	  defines	  an	  agenda	  as	  “the	  list	  of	   subjects	   or	   problems	   to	   which	   governmental	   officials,	   and	   people	   outside	   of	  government	   closely	   associated	   with	   those	   officials,	   are	   paying	   some	   serious	  attention	  at	  any	  given	  time	  (Kingdon	  1984,	  3).”	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  
49	  
Cobb	  and	  Elder	   identify	   two	  kinds	  of	  agendas.	   	  The	   first	   is	   the	   systemic,	  or	  public,	   agenda.	   	   The	   systemic	   agenda	   “consists	   of	   all	   issues	   that	   are	   commonly	  perceived	  by	  members	  of	  the	  political	  community	  as	  meriting	  public	  attention	  and	  as	   involving	   matters	   within	   the	   legitimate	   jurisdiction	   of	   existing	   governmental	  authority	   (Cobb	   and	   Elder	   1983,	   85).”	   	   Systemic	   agendas	   tend	   to	   be	   general	   and	  abstract	  and	  include	  the	  wider	  universe	  of	  potential	  problems	  and	  solutions	  subject	  to	  governmental	  action.	  	  They	  are	  not	  by	  definition	  part	  of	  the	  formal	  policymaking	  process.	  The	   other	   agenda,	   the	   institutional	   or	   formal	   one,	   consists	   of	   the	   matters	  given	   “active	   and	   serious	   consideration”	   by	   policymakers	   (Cobb	   and	   Elder	   1983,	  86).	   	   Actual	   policies,	   i.e.,	   enacted	   laws,	   formal	   decisions,	   and	   the	   other	   things	  government	   actually	   does,	   are	   drawn	   from	   the	   institutional	   agenda.24	  	   Given	   the	  relatively	   small	   number	   of	   items	   actually	   acted	   on	   by	   policymakers,	   the	   major	  challenge	  to	  advocates	  of	  new	  policies	  is	  in	  moving	  those	  policies	  from	  the	  systemic	  to	   the	   institutional	   agenda.	   	   Alternatively,	   those	   who	   have	   already	   succeeded	   in	  gaining	   a	   place	   for	   their	   preferences	   on	   the	   institutional	   agenda	   will	   seek	   to	  preserve	  their	  agenda	  setting	  authority	  by	  blocking	  out	  challengers.	  
2.	   Scope	  of	  Conflict	  Therefore,	  achieving	  and	  maintaining	  control	  of	  the	  institutional	  agenda	  is	  at	  the	   core	   of	   political	   activity.	   	   In	   pluralist	   democratic	   societies,	   control	   is	   properly	  viewed	   as	   the	   outcome	   of	   competition	   between	   interests.	   	   This	   insight	   is	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Kingdon	  (1984)	  additionally	  identifies	  a	  subset	  of	  the	  institutional	  agenda	  called	  the	  decisional	  agenda,	  which	  consists	  of	  those	  matters	  under	  active	  consideration	  by	  the	  policymaking	  body.	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foundation	  of	   the	  work	  of	  E.E.	   Schattschneider	   (1960),	  on	  which	  all	   of	   the	  agenda	  setting	   literature	   is	   based.	   	   	   Schattschneider	   described	   how	   success	   in	   any	   policy	  dispute	   depends	   of	   the	  mobilization	   of	   parties	   to	   join	   the	   original	   disputants.	   	  He	  compared	   policy	   disputes	   to	   street	   fights.	   	   Just	   as	   the	   loser	   in	   a	   street	   fight	   can	  appeal	   to	  bystanders	  to	   join	  him	  in	  the	  brawl,	  and	  thereby	   improve	  his	  chances	  of	  prevailing,	  policy	  disputes	  frequently	  turn	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  advocates	  to	  gain	  allies	  and	   shift	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   in	   their	   favor.	   	   According	   to	   Schattschneider,	  advocates	   for	   policy	   change	   generally	   seek	   to	   expand	   the	   scope	   of	   conflict	   to	   add	  participants;	  the	  greater	  the	  success	  at	  mobilizing	  new	  participants,	  the	  more	  likely	  policy	   change	   will	   occur.	   	   Conversely,	   dominant	   actors	   generally	   act	   to	   restrict	  participation,	   since	   low	   levels	   of	   mobilization	   favor	   entrenched	   monopolies	   and	  established	  policies	  (Cobb	  and	  Elder	  1983).	  Schattschneider	   was	   mainly	   concerned	   with	   mono-­‐dimensional	   policy	  disputes,	   i.e.,	   those	   in	   which	   policy	   contestants	   appeal	   to	   a	   single	   authoritative	  venue.	  	  Later	  studies	  built	  on	  his	  work	  to	  describe	  how	  policy	  is	  made	  when	  multiple	  venues	   can	   lay	   claim	   to	   policymaking	   authority.	   	   Heclo	   (1978)	   recognizes	   that	  multiple	  venues	   in	   the	  American	  policy	  system	  give	  rise	   to	  diffuse	   issue	  networks,	  components	  of	  which	  may	  operate	  in	  concert	  or	  in	  conflict.	  	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  (1991)	  observe	  that	  particular	  policy	  disputes	  can	  be	  decided	  in	  any	  of	  the	  venues	  within	  an	   issue	  network.	   	   	   	   	  Because	  conflict	   can	  originate	   from	  any	  of	   the	  venues	  within	  given	  policy	  network,	  advocates	  of	  a	  particular	  policy	  may	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	   conflict	   to	   include	   venues	   in	   which	   they	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   find	   success.	   	   The	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relative	   advantage	   of	   any	   particular	   venue	   depends	   on	   a	   combination	   of	   formal	  factors	  (laws,	  institutional	  structures)	  and	  informal	  ones	  (politics,	  resources).	  	  	  The	   agenda	   setting	   models	   provide	   the	   explanation	   of	   how	   policymaking	  authority	   shifts	   within	   the	   American	   political	   system.	   	   One	   of	   the	   key	   questions	  raised	  in	  those	  studies	  is	  how	  courts	  rather	  than	  legislators	  or	  bureaucrats	  come	  to	  make	   policy	   on	   a	   given	  matter.	   	   Once	   the	   courts	   are	   identified	   as	   one	   of	   several	  venues	  within	   an	   issue	   network,	   the	   framework	   for	   understanding	   how	   they	   gain	  and	   lose	  policymaking	   authority	   falls	   into	  place.	   	   For	   instance,	   a	   group	   seeking	   to	  advance	   a	   new	   policy	   may	   have	   the	   option	   of	   pursuing	   change	   in	   congressional,	  administrative,	   or	   judicial	   venues,	   but	  will	   choose	   to	   litigate	   because	   the	   relevant	  congressional	  committees	  and	  administrative	  agencies	  are	  dominated	  by	  supporters	  of	   existing	   policies.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   other	   interest	   groups	  may	   find	   that	   their	  resources	  are	  best	  utilized	  seeking	  legislative	  change.	  
3.	   Issue	  Definition	  and	  Policy	  Images	  Of	  course,	  not	  all	  issues	  are	  on	  their	  face	  equally	  accessible	  to	  every	  venue	  in	  a	  given	   issue	  network.	   	  For	   instance,	   in	  order	   to	   successfully	  appeal	   to	   the	  courts,	  policy	   proponents	   must	   cast	   their	   issues	   as	   legal	   or	   constitutional	   ones	   and	   not	  political	  matters.	   	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  describe	   issue	  definition	  (also	  known	  as	  “framing”)	  as	  central	  to	  the	  agenda	  setting	  process.	  	  In	  Schattschneider’s	  oft-­‐quoted	  formulation,	   “the	   definition	   of	   alternatives	   is	   the	   supreme	   instrument	   of	   power	  (Schattschneider	  1960,	  66).”	  	  Issue	  definition	  provides	  the	  link	  between	  substantive	  ideas	  and	  conflict	  expansion	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1994,	  11).	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However,	  definition	  alone	  is	  insufficient	  to	  elevate	  issues	  to	  the	  institutional	  agenda.	   	   Instead,	   definitions	  must	   align	  with	   other	   factors.	   	   According	   to	  Kingdon	  (1984),	   agendas	   change	   when	   policy	   “streams”	   converge	   to	   form	  what	   he	   calls	   a	  policy	   “window.”	   	   Kingdon’s	   three	   agenda	   setting	   streams	   include	   problems,	  proposals,	   and	   politics.	   	   The	   problems	   stream	   includes	   matters	   on	   which	  policymakers	  might	  act.25	  	  The	  proposals	  stream	  consists	  of	  the	  possible	  solutions	  to	  the	   problem.	   	   The	   political	   stream	   is	   the	  most	   unpredictable	   and	   includes	   factors	  like	   election	   results	   and	   administration	   changes,	   shifting	   public	   opinion,	   and	  interest	  group	  influences.	  	  Issue	  definition	  has	  a	  role	  in	  all	  three	  streams	  but	  is	  most	  prominent	   in	   the	   problems	   and	   proposals	   ones.	   	   In	   politics,	   the	   suitability	   of	   any	  given	  solution	  is	  due	  in	  large	  measure	  to	  how	  the	  problem	  is	  understood.	  	  Partisan	  debates	   over	   the	   effects	   of	   regulation	   are	   an	   example	   that	   runs	   throughout	  contemporary	   American	   politics.	   	   Democrats	   tend	   to	   identify	   problems	   like	   the	  mortgage	   crisis	   and	   rising	   health	   care	   costs	   as	   market	   failures	   that	   cannot	   be	  remedied	   without	   vigorous	   regulation	   of	   the	   private	   sector.	   	   Republicans,	   on	   the	  other	  hand,	  see	  government	  activity	  as	  the	  culprit	  and	  advocate	  cutbacks.	  	  However,	  neither	  side	  will	  see	  its	  preferences	  become	  official	  policy	  absent	  favorable	  political	  alignment.	  
4.	   Policy	  Images	  and	  Policy	  Monopolies	  Successful	   issue	   definition	   is	   foundational	   to	   new	   policies	   and	   essential	   to	  their	   continuing	   viability.	   	   In	   this	   phase	   the	   issue	   definition	   becomes	   the	   “policy	  image”	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993).	  	  A	  dominant	  policy	  image	  is	  critical	  to	  policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  The	  policy	  stream	  is	  sometimes	  identified	  as	  the	  “issues”	  stream.	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stability,	  which	   is	   strongly	   associated	  with	   policy	  monopolies.	   	   Policy	  monopolies	  are	  informally	  organized	  groups	  of	  bureaucrats,	  congressional	  committee	  members	  or	   their	   staffs,	   and	   interest	   groups	   that	   dominate	   policymaking	   in	   a	   given	   area.26	  	  Monopolies	  dominate	  policymaking	  in	  their	  given	  field	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time,	  even	  decades.	  	  Existing	  members	  tightly	  control	  entry	  access	  to	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  	  Such	  control	  promotes	  minimal	  change,	  and	  hence	  policy	  stability.	  	  Therefore,	   in	   addition	   to	   a	   dominant	   policy	   image,	   policy	   monopolies	   are	  characterized	  by	  well-­‐defined	   institutional	   structures.	   	   	   Structures	   are	  maintained	  by	  restricting	  participation.	  	  Monopolies	  built	  on	  complex	  or	  technical	  policy	  images	  can	  most	   easily	   limit	   participation.	   	   Conversely,	   social	   images	   are	   associated	  with	  expanded	  conflict.	  	  Therefore,	  advocates	  for	  change	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  find	  success	  if	  they	  define	   their	  preferences	   in	   those	   terms.	   	  However,	  positive	   issue	  definition	   is	  usually	   insufficient	   to	   displace	   an	   existing	   policy	  monopoly;	   advocates	   for	   change	  must	  also	  discredit	  the	  existing	  monopoly’s	  policy	  image.	  	  In	  fact,	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  conclude	  that	  Congress	  generally	  responds	  only	  to	  negative	  characterizations	  of	  existing	  policies	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993,	  101).	  	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  this	  process,	  policy	  monopolies	  are	  not	  easily	  displaced.	  	  Major	  policy	  change	  can	  occur	  during	  periods	  of	  stability,	  but	  any	  change	  remains	  true	  to	  the	  monopoly’s	   underlying	   policy	   image,	   and	   existing	   institutions	   endure	   and	   are	  even	  enhanced.	  	  However,	  while	  change	  advocates	  may	  toil	  for	  long	  periods,	  policy	  monopolies	  tend	  to	  topple	  quickly.	  	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  describe	  this	  process	  as	  “punctuated	  equilibrium.”	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Policy	  monopolies	  are	  discussed	  in	  further	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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The	   policy	   process	   is	   cyclical.	   	   As	   conflict	   expands,	   it	   displaces	   existing	  institutions,	   clearing	   the	   way	   for	   the	   eventual	   establishment	   of	   new	   ones.	   	   	   New	  institutions	   are	   structured;	   those	   best	   able	   to	   define	   their	   policy	   agendas	   become	  monopolies	  that	  provide	  preferred	  access	  and	  influence	  to	  those	  who	  help	  establish	  them.	   Agenda	   setting	   provides	   the	   link	   in	   the	   integrated	   implementation	  models	  between	  the	  various	  policy	  entities	  and	  explains	  how	  their	  formal	  roles	  are	  blurred.	  	  In	  Matland’s	  ambiguity-­‐conflict	  model,	  conflict	   is	  not	  merely	  an	  independent	  force.	  	  Interested	   parties	   and	   policy	   entities	   themselves	   recast	   implementation	   issues	   to	  gain	   the	   attention	   of	   and	   direct	   authority	   to	   their	   preferred	   venue	   in	   hopes	   of	  maximizing	  or	  minimizing	  the	  effects	  of	  particular	  policies.	  	  The	  advocacy	  coalition	  framework	   recognizes	   even	   fewer	   functional	   distinctions	   between	   formal	   entities;	  formally	   designated	   implementors	   are	   understood	   to	   be	   de	   facto	   policymakers.	  	  Whether	  and	  how	  they	  act	  as	  such	  is	  again	  a	  function	  of	  the	  agenda	  setting	  process.	  And	  so	  it	  goes	  with	  courts.	  	  Once	  the	  Shapiro/interbranch	  description	  of	  the	  courts	   as	   political	   entities	   is	   accepted,	   it	   follows	   that	   they	   are	   part	   of	   the	   agenda	  setting	  process.	  	  Moreover,	  they	  participate	  both	  as	  preferred	  destinations	  for	  policy	  advocates,	  and	  as	  active	  agenda	  setters	  themselves.	  	  Therefore,	  they	  can	  play	  active	  roles	   in	   creating	   and	   maintaining	   policy	   monopolies	   that	   structure	   policymaking	  around	   legal	   and	   technical	  policy	   images.	   	   Furthermore,	   these	   judicial	  monopolies	  are	  in	  no	  way	  neutral,	  but	  instead	  favor	  access	  and	  outcomes	  consistent	  with	  their	  underlying	   policy	   image.	   	   Because	   these	   monopolies	   are	   difficult	   to	   displace,	  opponents	   of	   existing	   judicial	   policies	   must	   either	   seek	   help	   from	   other	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policymaking	   entities,	   particularly	   Congress,	   or	   redefine	   issues	   to	   gain	   access	   to	  other	  agencies	  or	  entities.	  
E. Chapter	  Summary	  Traditional	   separation	   of	   powers	   models	   maintain	   that	   policy	   is	   made	   by	  Congress	  and	  implemented	  by	  either	  the	  bureaucracy	  or	  the	  courts.	  	  Contemporary	  scholars	  reject	  those	  rigid	  distinctions	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  dynamic	  view	  of	  the	  policy	  process.	   	   Review	   of	   the	   general	   implementation	   and	   judicial	   politics	   literature	  demonstrates	  that	  they	  have	  evolved	  along	  similar	  lines,	  with	  each	  concluding	  that	  entities	   traditionally	   viewed	   strictly	   as	   implementors	   are	   in	   fact	   active	  policymakers.	   	   Students	   of	   judicial	   politics	   have	   long	   recognized	   that	   courts,	  including	   lower	   level	  courts,	  are	  active	  policymakers,	  both	  overtly,	   through	   formal	  dispositive	   decisions,	   and	   less	   explicitly,	   through	   their	   interpretation	   and	  application	  of	  statutes.	  	  	  Explanations	  of	  how	  courts	  gain	  policymaking	  authority	  within	  the	  American	  system	  are	   found	   in	   the	  agenda	  setting	   literature.	   	  By	  defining	   issues	   to	  attract	  or	  limit	   attention	   to	   their	   preferences,	   policy	   advocates	   structure	   them	   in	  ways	   that	  favor	   particular	   venues.	   	   Successful	   agenda	   setting	   efforts	   give	   rise	   to	   stable	  structures	   called	   policy	   monopolies.	   	   American	   bankruptcy	   policy	   provides	   a	  compelling	  example	  of	  how	  agenda	  setting	  process	  plays	  out	  across	  a	  single	   issue.	  	  Although	  originally	  conceived	  as	  adjuncts	  of	  the	  federal	  district	  courts,	  bankruptcy	  judges	  (or	  referees,	  as	  they	  were	  known	  until	  1973)	  joined	  with	  other	  specialists	  by	  1930	  to	  form	  what	  will	  be	  described	  here	  as	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	  	  The	  community	   dominated	   policymaking	   both	   in	   and	   out	   of	   Congress	   throughout	   the	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remainder	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   	   The	   core	   principle	   of	   this	   monopoly	   was	  contained	  in	  its	  policy	  image,	  and	  is	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  “fresh	  start.”	  	  The	  fresh	  start	   encompasses	   broad	   elimination	   of	   debts	   with	   generous	   provisions	   allowing	  consumer	  bankruptcy	   filers	   to	   keep	   all	   or	  most	   of	   their	   property	  notwithstanding	  those	  debts.	  	  However,	  by	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  the	  century,	  creditors	  argued	  that	  rising	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  filings	  reflected	  an	  abuse	  of	  the	  fresh	  start.	  	  By	  reframing	  the	  question	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   socially	   and	   political	   appealing	   matter	   of	   personal	  responsibility,	  advocates	  for	  more	  rigorous	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  laws	  were	  able	  to	  break	   the	   community’s	   hold	   on	   policy	   and	   instead	   draw	   members	   of	   Congress	  directly	  into	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  Ultimately,	  despite	  vigorous	  opposition	  from	  the	  community,	  creditor	  interests	  successfully	  saw	  their	  preferences	  become	  law	  in	  2005.	   	  The	  next	   two	  chapters	  will	   trace	   the	  development	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	   through	   two	   major	   legislative	   enactments	   in	   1938	   and	   1978,	   paying	  careful	   attention	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   judiciary.	   	   The	   chapter	   following	   those	   will	  describe	   how	   proponents	   of	   reform	   fundamentally	   reframed	   central	   bankruptcy	  policy	   issues	   to	   draw	   Congress’	   direct	   attention	   and	   overcome	   the	   community’s	  dominant	   influence.	   	   Relying	   on	   that	   analysis,	   the	   next	   chapters	  will	   describe	   and	  examine	   a	   comprehensive	   framework	   of	   American	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   that	  fully	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  dual	  roles	  of	  bankruptcy	  judges	  in	  that	  process.	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CHAPTER	  THREE:	  BANKRUPTCY	  POLICY	  REFORM	  IN	  THE	  1930s	  -­‐	  
Conflict	  Containment	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Policy	  Community	  
_________________________	  	  	  As	  described	   in	   the	  preceding	   chapter,	   one	  of	   the	   fundamental	  premises	  of	  policy	  studies	  is	  that	  the	  bounds	  of	  policymaking	  authority	  are	  not	  rigidly	  defined	  in	  the	  American	  system.	   	  Instead,	  policymaking	  on	  a	  specific	  issue	  can	  often	  be	  might	  come	   from	  multiple	   sources,	   or	   venues,	   any	  one	  of	  which	  might	  be	  dominant	   at	   a	  given	  point	   in	   time.	   	  The	  volatility	  associated	  with	  venue	  competition	   is	   tempered	  over	  the	  long	  term	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  stable	  policy	  subsystems.	  	  Policy	  subsystems	  may	  dominate	  policymaking	  in	  a	  given	  field	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time,	  even	  decades.	  	  As	   explained	   in	   the	  preceding	   chapter,	   such	  domination	   is	   the	   function	   of	   conflict	  management,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  the	  product	  of	  successful	  issue	  definition.	  The	   emergence	   of	   a	   bankruptcy	   policy	   subsystem	   in	   the	   1930s	   is	   a	   classic	  example	   of	   how	   a	   small	   group	   of	   policy	   specialists	   employed	   the	   tools	   of	   conflict	  containment	  to	  gain	  near	  exclusive	  control	  of	  policymaking	  authority	  from	  Congress	  and	  then	  consolidate	  that	  authority	  so	  that	  it	  lasted	  for	  more	  than	  sixty	  years.	  This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  group,	  explains	  how	  it	  gained	  dominant	  status,	  and	   describes	   its	   impact	   on	   1930s	   bankruptcy	   reforms.	   The	   next	   chapter	   will	  explain	  how,	  as	  a	  mature	  monopoly,	  the	  group	  used	  its	  status	  to	  completely	  rewrite	  the	  bankruptcy	  laws	  according	  to	  its	  own	  preferences.	  	  
A.	   Policy	  Communities	  and	  Policy	  Monopolies	  Political	   scientists	   generally	   describe	   stable	   policymaking	   processes	   in	   a	  given	  field	  as	  being	  dominated	  by	  a	  narrowly	  drawn	  collection	  of	  highly	  interested	  specialists.	   Participation	   in	   these	   groups	   crosses	   formal	   lines	   of	   authority	   and	   is	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organized	   around	   particular	   policies	   or	   programs.	   Political	   scientists	   propose	  various	   models	   to	   describe	   these	   entities.	   	   One	   of	   the	   oldest	   describes	   the	  policymaking	  structure	  as	  an	  iron	  triangle.	   	  The	  three	  “corners”	  of	  an	  iron	  triangle	  include	  (1)	  representatives	  of	  a	  regulated	  business,	  activity,	  or	  other	  endeavor;	  (2)	  the	  administrative	  agency	  charged	  with	  regulating	  that	  endeavor;	  and	  (3)	  members	  of	  Congress	  keenly	  interested	  in	  the	  regulated	  endeavor,	  often	  the	  chairs	  of	  affected	  committees	  or	  subcommittees	  (Birkland	  2001,	  96).	  	  	  Despite	   its	   rigidity,	   the	   iron	   triangle	   model	   can	   be	   a	   fairly	   accurate	  description	  of	   the	  policy	  making	  process	   in	   a	   number	  of	   policy	   areas,	   particularly	  those	  in	  which	  policies	  are	  mature	  and	  stable.	  	  However,	  the	  model	  by	  itself	  does	  not	  adequately	  capture	  the	  dynamic	  policymaking	  processes	  described	  by	  Baumgartner	  and	   Jones	   (1993).	   	   As	   a	   result,	   political	   scientists	   employ	   broader,	   more	   flexible	  concepts	   to	   describe	  policymaking	   structures.	   	   Cobb	   and	  Elder	   (1983,	   4)	   describe	  these	   entities	   as	   systems	   of	   limited	   participation,	   based	   on	   their	   dominant	  functional	  characteristic,	   that	   is	   the	   limitation	  of	  decision	  makers’	  consideration	  of	  new	  issues	  and	  policy	  solutions.	  	  	  Thurber	   (1991)	   refers	   to	   such	   groups	   as	   policy	   subsystems.	   	   Policy	  subsystems	   are	   “decentralized	   power	   structures	   with	   close	   informal	  communications	   among	   their	   participants	   (Thurber	   1991,	   324).”	   	   Unlike	   political	  parties,	  the	  subsystem’s	  focus	  is	  limited	  to	  efforts	  to	  influence	  particular	  issues	  and	  policies	   in	   a	   single	   policy	   domain.	   	   Hence,	   the	   concept	   is	   similar	   to	   other	   policy-­‐centered	   constructs	   like	   Heclo’s	   issue	   networks,	   Sabatier’s	   advocacy	   coalition	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framework,27	  and	  Kingdon’s	  policy	   communities.	   	  Each	  of	   these	  models	   shares	   the	  idea	   that	   policymaking	   is	   substantially	   influenced	   by	   highly	   specialized	   groups	  outside	  of	  formal	  lines	  of	  authority.	   	  However,	  each	  term	  has	  a	  meaning	  and	  usage	  slightly	   different	   that	   the	   others.	   	   Some	   of	   them	   are	   subject	   to	   varying	   use	   in	   the	  literature.	  	  	  One	  such	  term	  is	  “policy	  community.”	  	  As	  originally	  used	  by	  Kingdon,	  it	  refers	  to	   “specialists	   in	   a	   given	   policy	   area	   .	   .	   .	   scattered	   both	   through	   and	   outside	   of	  government	   .	   .	   .	   [who]	   have	   in	   common	   their	   concern	   with	   one	   area	   of	   policy	  problems	  (Kingdon	  1984,	  123).	   	  Although	   it	   includes	  members	  of	   the	  government,	  Kingdon’s	   community	   mainly	   operates	   separate	   from	   formal	   political	   structures	  (1984,	   124).	   	   Instead,	   the	   community	   works	   to	   advance	   policy	   options	   from	   the	  systemic	   agenda	   to	   the	   formal	   agenda,	   i.e.,	   those	   options	   actively	   considered	   by	  formal	  policymakers	  (Cobb	  and	  Elder	  1983).	  	  	  Birkland’	  view	  of	  the	  policy	  community	  is	  closer	  to	  Cobb	  and	  Elder’s	  system	  of	   limited	   participation	   and	   includes	   policymakers.	   	   He	   describes	   a	   policy	  community	   as	   “those	   actors	   who	   are	   actively	   involved	   in	   policymaking	   in	   a	  particular	  domain.	  	  This	  is	  a	  small	  subset	  of	  people	  that	  could	  possibly	  be	  involved	  in	   an	   issue	   (Birkland	   2001,	   95).”	   	   Policy	   communities	   vary	   in	   the	   level	   of	  participation	  they	  permit.	  	  Birkland	  describes	  both	  iron	  triangles	  and	  Baumgartner	  and	   Jones’	   policy	   monopolies	   as	   closed	   policy	   communities.	   	   Baumgartner	   and	  Jones(1994)	   and	   Wilson	   (2000,	   249)	   distinguish	   policy	   monopolies	   from	   other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  See	  Chapter	  Two.	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policy	   communities	   based	   on	   the	   former’s	   dependence	   on	   a	   dominant	   policy	  image.28	  	  Both	   “policy	   community”	   and	   “policy	   monopoly”	   describe	   what	   Thurber	  (1991,	   327)	   calls	   dominant	   policy	   subsystems,	   i.e.,	   “relatively	   stable	  communications	   and	  decision-­‐making	   clusters	  with	   a	   small	   number	   of	   participant	  who	   significantly	   influence	   and	   often	   control	   government	   programs	   or	   issues.”	  	  However,	  in	  the	  analysis	  that	  follows,	  the	  term	  policy	  community	  will	  be	  used	  more	  generally	   to	   describe	   the	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   subsystem,	   while	   policy	  monopoly	  will	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  meaning	  given	  it	  by	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  (1993)	  and	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  subsystem	  during	  its	  period	  of	  dominance	  from	  the	  1930s	  through	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  As	   this	  and	   the	   following	  chapter	  will	  describe,	   from	  the	  1930s	   to	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  bankruptcy	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  monopolized	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  lawyers	   and	   legal	   scholars,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   judges	   (identified	   until	   1974	   as	  referees-­‐in-­‐bankruptcy)	  on	  the	  other.	  	  Congressional	  participation	  in	  the	  community	  was	  not	   constant	  but	  was	   instead	   limited	   to	   those	  members	  needed	   to	   enact	  new	  legislative	   reforms.	   	   Otherwise,	   the	   community	   only	   grudgingly	   conceded	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28 	  Wilson	   (2000)	   synthesizes	   the	   various	   approaches	   into	   a	   single	   model	   of	  dominant	  subsystem	  policymaking	  he	  calls	  the	  policy	  regime.	  	  Unlike	  other	  models,	  Wilson’s	  policy	  regime	  classifies	  the	  policies	  promulgated	  by	  the	  subsystem	  as	  part	  of	  the	  regime	  itself,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  product	  of	  the	  subsystem.	  	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  effort	  to	  accommodate	  the	  feedback	  mechanisms	  described	  as	  policy	  learning	  in	  the	  advocacy	   coalition	   framework	   (Sabatier	   1988).	   	   It	   necessarily	   follows	   from	  Kingdon’s	   policy	   streams	   (1983)	   and	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones’	   (1994)	   punctuated	  equilibrium	   models,	   that	   successful	   policies	   reinforce	   the	   subsystems	   that	  promulgate	   them	   while	   unsuccessful	   ones	   will	   ultimately	   lead	   to	   the	   monopoly’s	  undoing.	   	  However,	   to	   think	   conceptually	  of	  policies	   as	  parts	  of	   the	   regime	   rather	  than	  its	  products	  is	  analytically	  difficult.	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policymaking	  influence	  on	  specific	  issues	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  their	  broader	  control	  of	  the	   domain.	   	   The	   referees	   occupied	   a	   unique	   role	   in	   the	   community,	   acting	   as	  policymakers	  in	  their	  traditional	  adjudicative	  roles,	  but	  also	  as	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  and	  advocates,	  sometimes	  in	  their	  separate	  capacity	  and	  at	  other	  times	  as	  members	  of	   the	   professional	   group.	   	   	   	   This	   chapter	   focuses	   on	   how	   a	  movement	   for	  major	  reform	  of	  U.S.	   bankruptcy	   laws	   in	   the	  1930s	   led	   to	   the	  monopoly’s	   rapid	   rise	   and	  laid	  the	  foundation	  for	  its	  sixty	  years	  long	  period	  of	  policymaking	  dominance.	  
B. The	  Reasons	  for	  Bankruptcy	  Reform	  in	  the	  1930s	  By	   the	   early	   1930s,	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Act	   had	   been	   in	   effect	   for	   more	   than	  thirty	  years.	  	  Overall	  case	  filings	  fluctuated	  between	  13,000	  and	  27,000	  annually	  in	  the	   first	   twenty	   years	   after	   the	   law	   became	   effective	   in	   1898,	   but	   new	   cases	  increased	   past	   the	   40,000	   mark	   in	   1923	   and	   by	   1930	   they	   had	   reached	   63,845	  (Attorney	  General	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1899-­‐1930).	  	  	  The	  upsurge	  of	  cases	  by	  1930	  was	  due	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression,	  which	  added	  dramatically	  both	  to	  the	  number	  of	  business	  failures	  and	  the	  number	  of	   individuals	   seeking	  bankruptcy	   relief.	   	   Part	   of	   the	   challenge	  was	   structural.	   	  As	  established	  under	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Act,	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  did	  not	  have	  a	  national	  administrator	   or	   supervisory	   authority.	   	   Instead,	   referees-­‐in-­‐bankruptcy	   (as	   the	  judges	  were	  identified	  until	  the	  1970s)	  were	  appointed	  by,	  and	  were	  responsible	  to,	  the	   chief	   judge	   of	   the	   federal	   district	   in	  which	   they	   sat.	   	   However,	   district	   judges	  often	   paid	   little	   attention	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts,	   leaving	  responsibility	  for	  their	  administration	  to	  the	  referees	  whenever	  possible.	  Moreover,	  there	  were	  no	  uniform	  rules	  of	  bankruptcy	  procedure;	   in	  practical	   effect,	   referees	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had	   broad	   discretion	   over	   the	   administration	   of	   cases	   in	   their	   own	   courts.	  	  Predictably,	   the	  quality	  of	  administration	  varied	  widely	  across	   the	  country,	  and	   in	  many	  jurisdictions	  was	  considered	  shoddy	  or	  even	  corrupt.	  	  The	  number	  and	  complexity	  of	  the	  new	  cases	  magnified	  the	  inefficiency	  and	  other	   shortcomings	   in	   some	   courts,	   adding	   to	   the	   disparities	   in	   bankruptcy	   case	  administration	   across	   the	   country.	   	   	   The	   National	   Association	   of	   Referees	   in	  Bankruptcy	  was	  organized	  in	  1926.	  	  The	  organization	  sought	  to	  improve	  the	  quality	  of	  bankruptcy	  administration	  and	  the	  reputation	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  through	  the	  exchange	  of	  information	  and	  the	  promotion	  of	  uniform	  methods	  and	  standards.	  	  Membership	  in	  the	  association	  was	  voluntary,	  and	  many	  referees	  chose	  not	  to	  join.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  group	  sought	  to	  make	  significant	  contributions	  toward	  improving	  the	   overall	   quality	   of	   case	   administration	   through	   dissemination	   of	   data,	   case	  developments,	   and	   policy	   initiatives	   at	   its	   annual	   conference	   and	   through	   its	  publications.	  	  	   The	   other	   systemic	   challenge	   to	   the	   bankruptcy	   system	   also	   resulted	   from	  the	   design	   of	   the	   1898	   statute.	   As	   originally	   enacted,	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Act	   did	   not	  include	  provisions	   to	   reorganize	   large	   corporations,	   the	   equivalent	   of	   the	  modern	  Chapter	   11.	   	   Railroads,	   large	  manufacturing	   concerns,	   and	   commercial	   real	   estate	  owners	  were	  restructured	  in	  loosely	  defined	  state	  and	  federal	  court	  actions	  known	  as	  equity	  receiverships.	  	  Then	  (as	  now)	  the	  major	  business	  restructurings	  took	  place	  in	  Manhattan,	  regardless	  of	  the	  location	  of	  the	  debtor’s	  business.	   	  However,	  by	  the	  1920s,	   the	  New	  York	  receivership	  practice	  had	  gained	  a	   reputation	   for	  corruption	  and	   cronyism	   through	   the	   operation	   of	   “bankruptcy	   rings.”	   	   An	   investigation	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requested	   by	   the	   Association	   of	   the	   Bar	   of	   the	   City	   of	   New	   York,	   the	   New	   York	  County	  Lawyers	  Association,	  and	  the	  Bronx	  County	  Bar	  Association	  and	  conducted	  under	   the	   supervision	   of	   federal	   district	   judge	   Thomas	   Thacher	   resulted	   in	   a	  prominent	   report	   that	   revealed	   the	   extent	   of	   malfeasance	   among	   the	   New	   York	  receivership	  bar;29	  a	   second	   report,	   conducted	  by	  Thacher	  after	  he	  was	  appointed	  Solicitor	  General	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  identified	  similar	  “rings”	  in	  bankruptcy	  courts	  throughout	  the	  country	  and	  went	  further	  to	  detail	  proposed	  reforms.	  	  	  While	   these	   investigations	   resulted	   in	   some	   prosecutions,	   the	  main	   effects	  were	  legislative.	  	  A	  bill	  incorporating	  the	  Thacher	  investigation’s	  proposed	  reforms	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  Congress	  in	  1932.	  	  Among	  its	  key	  provisions	  was	  a	  proposal	  to	   change	   bankruptcy	   administration	   from	   a	   legal	   process	   to	   a	   bureaucratic	   one	  administered	  by	  a	  new	  federal	  executive	  branch	  agency.	   	  Such	  a	  move	  would	  have	  dramatically	   curtailed	   the	   need	   for	   referees	   and	   reduced	   the	   work	   available	   for	  bankruptcy	   lawyers.	   	   Not	   surprisingly,	   professional	   legal	   groups	   and	   the	   referees	  opposed	  the	  change.	   	  They	  were	  not	   in	  general	  opposed	  to	  reform.	   	   Instead,	  when	  hearings	  on	  the	  new	  legislation	  began	  in	  1932,	  lawyers	  proposed	  many	  of	  their	  own	  amendments	   to	   the	  national	  bankruptcy	   law	  while	  defending	   the	  current	  system’s	  basic	  structure.	  	  Their	  efforts	  would	  result	  in	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  the	  way	  bankruptcy	  policy	  would	  be	  made	  for	  the	  next	  sixty	  years.	  
C.	   Agenda	  Setting	  and	  Bankruptcy	  Reform:	  Limiting	  Access	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  This	  report	  is	  often	  identified	  as	  the	  “Donovan	  Report,”	  after	  the	  bar	  groups’	  lead	  investigator,	  William	  Donovan,	   later	   founder	   of	   the	  Office	   of	   Strategic	   Services,	   or	  OSS.	  	  The	  report	  detailed	  the	  operation	  of	  tight	  associations,	  or	  rings,	  of	  receivership	  specialists,	  who	  controlled	  most	  of	  the	  cases	  and	  benefited	  from	  large	  fee	  payments	  for	   their	   work	   in	   them.	   	   Such	   cases	   often	   resulted	   in	   little	   recovery	   for	   general	  creditors.	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   Therefore,	  the	  move	  for	  bankruptcy	  reform	  in	  the	  early	  1930s	  was	  driven	  by	  a	   number	   of	   factors.	   	   The	  most	   public	   ones	   were	   the	   demands	   for	   congressional	  action	   to	   address	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   Great	   Depression	   and	   the	   systemic	   problems	  reported	   by	   Solicitor	   General	   Thacher	   and	   his	   commissions.	   	   The	   other	   force	   for	  reform	  was	  the	  recognition,	  mainly	  by	  policy	  specialists,	   that	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Act’s	  thirty-­‐plus	   year	   old	   provisions	  were	   in	   need	   of	   substantial	   changes.	   	   Because	   this	  issue	  was	  more	  technical	  than	  the	  others,	  it	  drew	  less	  attention	  from	  Congress.	  	  	  The	  bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   first	   accomplishment	   was	   its	   redirection	   of	  congressional	   attention	   from	   the	   public	   issues	   to	   the	   technical	   ones.	   	   This	   re-­‐characterization	   of	   reform	   was	   essential	   to	   the	   policymaking	   dominance	   the	  community	  achieved	  in	  the	  1930s.	  	   1.	   Limiting	  Access:	  Technicality	  as	  a	  Policy	  Image	  The	   community	   was	   mobilized	   by	   a	   proposal	   that	   many	   of	   its	   members	  perceived	  as	  a	  threat	  not	  only	  to	  the	  existing	  system	  of	  bankruptcy	  administration	  but	   also	   to	   their	   own	   livelihoods.	   	   The	   Thacher	   reports,	   the	   second	   of	  which	  was	  issued	   in	   1932,	   called	   for	   replacement	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	   with	   a	   national	  bankruptcy	  administrator.	   	  Bankruptcy	  matters	  would	  be	  handled	  by	  an	  executive	  branch	   agency	   in	   an	   administrative	   proceeding	   under	   the	   proposal.30	  	   The	   agency	  proposal	  was	  at	   the	  core	  of	   the	  new	   legislation.	   	  The	   judiciary	  committees	  of	  both	  houses	  met	  as	  a	  “Joint	  Subcommittee	  of	  the	  Committees	  on	  the	  Judiciary”	  and	  held	  extensive	   hearings	   on	   the	   bill	   beginning	   in	   late	   April	   1932,	   and	   proceeding	  throughout	   the	   following	   month.	   	   The	   portion	   of	   the	   bill	   establishing	   the	   new	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Bureaucratic	  bankruptcy	   systems	  predominate	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world	   and	  had	  been	  used	  in	  England	  since	  the	  1880s.	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bankruptcy	  agency	  garnered	  the	  most	  attention	  from	  witnesses.	  Most	  of	  the	  groups	  represented	   at	   the	   hearings,	   other	   than	   lawyers,	   favored	   creation	   of	   an	  administrative	   bankruptcy	   agency.	   	   This	   faction	   included	   creditor	   trade	   groups,	  most	   prominently	   local	   chapters	   of	   the	  National	  Association	   of	   Credit	  Men,	  which	  was	   the	  nation’s	   largest	   association	  of	   general	   trade	   creditors.	   	  They	  emphatically	  favored	   the	  bill	   and	   its	   conversion	  of	  bankruptcy	   into	  a	  bureaucratic	   system.	   	  The	  American	  Bankers	  Association	  was	  less	  vocal	  but	  likewise	  supported	  the	  legislation	  (Skeel	  2001,	  91).	  	  Lawyers	  and	  referees	  understandably	  opposed	  the	  proposed	  agency,	  fearing	  that	   it	  would	   result	   in	  a	   loss	  of	   their	   livelihoods.	   	  They	  were	  quite	  explicit	  on	   this	  point,	  at	  least	  among	  themselves.	  	  A	  letter	  circulated	  to	  attorneys	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  new	  organization	   that	   called	   itself	   the	   National	   Association	   of	   Federal	   Practitioners31	  stated:	  Should	   the	  measure	  pass,	  not	  only	  would	   the	  administration	  of	  bankruptcy	  estates	   become	   distinctly	   political	   and	   under	   bureaucratic	   domination,	  costing	   the	   taxpayers	  millions	  of	  dollars	   annually,	   but	   the	   rights	  of	   citizens	  and	   indeed	   their	   liberty,	   including	   wage	   earners	   unfortunate	   enough	   to	  become	   bankrupts,	   would	   be	   seriously	   affected,	   while	   lawyers	   would	  practically	  cease	  to	  function	  in	  such	  cases.	  (1932	  Hearings,	  734).	  	   Such	  arguments	  were	  not	   likely	   to	   sway	  Congress,	   and	  were	   susceptible	   to	  characterizations	   that	   the	   lawyers	   were	   acting	   out	   of	   self-­‐interest.	   	   Instead,	   the	  theme	   underling	   the	   testimony	   of	   various	   lawyers	   before	   the	   joint	   subcommittee	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  This	  organization	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  Federal	  Bar	  Association.	  	  Jacob	  Weinstein,	   a	  Philadelphia	   lawyer,	   appeared	  on	  behalf	  of	   the	  group.	   	  His	   testimony	  indicates	   that	   the	   organization	   was	   formed	   specifically	   to	   oppose	   the	   Hastings-­‐Michener	   Bill.	   	   The	   group	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   have	   caught	   on.	   	   Although	  Weinstein	  would	   be	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   participants	   in	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	  Conference,	  no	  further	  mention	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Federal	  Practitioners	  appears	  in	  the	  literature.	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was	   that	   the	   bankruptcy	   system	   was	   in	   need	   of	   some	   modifications	   but	   that	   it	  generally	   worked	   quite	   well.	   	   Explicit	   in	   the	   testimony	   was	   the	   argument	   that	  bankruptcy	  was	  a	  legal	  matter	  to	  be	  handled	  by	  courts	  and	  lawyers,	  not	  bureaucrats.	  	  Jacob	  Weinstein,	  testifying	  at	  a	  hearing	  before	  the	  Senate	  Judiciary	  subcommittee	  on	  May	  24,	  1938,	  said:	  We	  have	  no	  hesitancy	  in	  saying	  that	  we	  think	  that	  the	  present	  bankruptcy	  act	  is	   as	  magnificent	   a	   piece	   of	   legislation	   for	   its	   subject	   as	   any	   that	   has	   been	  enacted	  anywhere	  by	  any	  country,	  and	  that	   is	  barring	  none.	   	  Experience,	  of	  course,	   sometimes	  will	   disclose	   things	   that	  nobody	  who	  prepares	  or	  molds	  the	  law	  can	  anticipate,	  and	  like	  changing	  conditions	  which	  have	  taken	  place	  in	   the	   last	   20	   years,	   have	   disclosed	   that	   in	   some	   respects	   the	   act	   may	   be	  strengthened,	  in	  our	  judgment,	  principally	  in	  procedural	  respects.	  	  We	   do	   not	   think	   that	   the	   present	   bill	   accomplishes	   that	   purpose;	   on	   the	  contrary,	  we	  think	  it	  only	  distorts	  the	  present	  act	  and	  will	  only	  create	  many	  abuses.	  (1932	  Hearings,	  735).	  	  The	   joint	  subcommittee	  was	  already	  backing	  away	   from	  the	  administrative	  option	  by	  the	  time	  Weinstein	  testified.	  	  Moreover,	  having	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  wider	  conflict	  by	   scheduling	   extensive	   hearings,	   it	   displayed	   doubts	   about	   many	   other	   key	  provisions	   of	   the	   legislation,	   particularly	   new	   amendments	   concerning	   business	  restructuring.	   	   	   The	   subcommittee’s	   ambivalence,	   particular	   that	   of	   its	   chairman,	  Senator	  Bratton	  of	  Oregon,	  and	  of	  Senator	  Hastings	  himself,	  came	  to	  fore	  early	  in	  the	  hearings	   during	   the	   testimony	   of	   Jacob	   Lashly,	   chair	   of	   the	   American	   Bar	  Association’s	   bankruptcy	   committee.	   	   Lashly,	   a	   prominent	   St.	   Louis	   lawyer	   who	  would	  head	  the	  ABA	  in	  1940-­‐41,	  spoke	  to	  the	  subcommittee	  for	  two	  days,	  May	  4	  and	  5,	   1932,	   during	   which	   time	   he	   both	   provided	   committee	   members	   with	   a	   broad	  examination	   of	   practices	   under	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Act	   and	   in	   addition	   offered	   a	  detailed	  critique	  of	  the	  proposed	  amendments.	  	  Most	  significantly,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	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the	  content	  of	  his	  testimony	  and	  the	  authority	  he	  exhibited,	  he	  reinforced	  the	  image	  of	   bankruptcy	   as	   a	   complex,	   law-­‐based	   system	   best	   left	   to	   legal	   professionals.32	  	  Adoption	   of	   bureaucratic	   system	   in	   its	   place	   would,	   according	   to	   Lashly,	   be	  hazardous,	  even	  chaotic.	  	  On	  his	  first	  day	  of	  testimony,	  Lashly	  told	  Senator	  Hastings	  and	  the	  Senate	  subcommittee:	  We	   feel	   that	   there	  would	   be	   considerable	   hazard	   in	   this	   time	   of	   industrial	  depression	   and	   economic	   disturbance	   to	   enact	   a	   revolutionary,	   in	   some	  respects,	  system	  of	  bankruptcy,	   in	  the	  process	  of	  which	  a	  great	  many	  of	  the	  old,	  well	  understood,	  forms	  of	  procedure	  are	  rejected33	  (1932	  Hearings,	  477).	  	  [T]he	  American	  Bar	  Association	  .	  .	  .	  have	  the	  feeling	  that	  the	  bankruptcy	  law	  .	  .	   .	   is	  a	  sound	  bit	  of	   legislation,	  perhaps	  as	  sound,	  generally	  speaking,	  as	  any	  other	   nation-­‐wide	   system	   of	   jurisprudence	  which	  we	   have	   in	   effect	   in	   this	  country	   .	   .	   .	   We	   take	   the	   position	   that	   our	   bankruptcy	   law	   is	   sound	   in	   its	  conception,	   that	   it	   has	  made	   a	   tremendous	   contribution	   to	   the	   commercial	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  so	  we	  start	  with	  this	  premise	  –	  that	  this	  law	  must	  not	  be	  rejected	   for	  any	  projected	  experimental	   substitute	  system,	  but	   that	   all	   that	   is	   good	   in	   the	   law	  and	  all	   that	   is	   found	   to	  be	   sound	   in	   the	  main	   .	   .	   .	   ought	   to	   be	   preserved,	   and	  moreover,	   that	   the	   experience	   of	   the	  country	  of	  33	  years	  and	  more	  of	  this	  law	  ought	  not	  be	  scrapped,	  and	  that	  the	  precedents	   and	   the	   judicial	   decisions	   through	   which	   rules	   of	   law	   and	  interpretations	  and	  application	  of	  law	  have	  been	  builded	  up	  by	  the	  courts	  of	  this	  country	  ought	  to	  be	  preserved	  (1932	  Hearings,	  484-­‐5).”	  	   The	   National	   Association	   of	   Referees	   in	   Bankruptcy	   credited	   Lashly’s	  testimony	   as	   the	   most	   important	   factor	   blocking	   approval	   of	   the	   proposed	  bankruptcy	   legislation	   (Journal	   of	   the	   National	   Association	   of	   Referees	   in	  Bankruptcy	   1938,	   125).	   	   That	   testimony,	   which	   stretched	   over	   two	   days	   and	  included	   detailed	   analyses	   of	   the	   existing	   law	   and	   the	   proposed	   amendments,	  crystallized	  opposition	  to	  the	  proposed	  legislation.	  	  By	  the	  time	  he	  concluded,	  Lashly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Lashly’s	  obituary	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  quoted	  an	  associate’s	  description	  of	  him	  as	   “a	   man	   with	   a	   piercing	   look	   who	   was	   skillful	   at	   eliciting	   information	   from	  witnesses”	   and	   “who	   spoke	   eloquently	  with	   a	   careful,	   literary	   turn	  of	   phrase	   .	   .	   .	   .	  (New	  York	  Times,	  October	  3,	  1967).”	  33	  The	  other	  countries	  had	  administrative-­‐based	  insolvency	  systems.	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had	   convinced	   the	   subcommittee’s	  members	  not	   only	   that	   the	  proposed	   revisions	  were	  ill	  conceived,	  but	  also	  that	  bankruptcy	  law	  was	  so	  complex	  and	  technologically	  challenging	  that	  only	  bankruptcy	  professionals	  should	  undertake	  its	  revision.	  	  	  Therefore,	   as	   Lashly’s	   appearance	   neared	   its	   end,	   Senators	   Hastings	   and	  Bratton,	  the	  subcommittee’s	  chairmen,	  invited	  him	  and	  his	  colleagues	  on	  the	  ABA’s	  bankruptcy	   committee	   to	   prepare	   and	   submit	   to	   the	   subcommittee	   their	   own	  changes	  to	  the	  bankruptcy	  laws:	  Senator	  Hastings.	  You	  are	  not	  in	  sympathy	  with	  this	  act	  in	  any	  particular.	  You	  did	  suggest,	  however,	  in	  two	  particulars	  the	  bankruptcy	  act	  might	  be	  amended	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  composition,	  which	  would	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  referee	  instead	  of	  the	  judge,	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  leaving	  the	  discharge	  for	  the	  referee	  instead	  of	  the	  judge.	  I	  am	  wondering	  if	  it	  would	  be	  too	  much	  to	  ask	  of	  your	  committee	  to	  submit	   to	   this	   committee	   in	   writing	   such	   proposed	   amendments	   to	   the	  bankruptcy	  act	  as	  you	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  sponsor.	  	  Mr.	  Lashly.	  We	  would	  be	  very	  glad	  indeed	  to	  do	  that.	  
. . .  
 Senator	  Bratton.	  I	  want	  to	  join	  the	  chairman	  in	  extending	  an	  earnest-­‐invitation	  to	  your	  committee	  to	  furnish	  us	  a	  bill	  that	  would	  carry	  into	  effect	  the	  views	  of	  your	   committee	   .	   .	   .	  Would	   it	   be	   too	  much	   for	   your	   committee	   to	   draft	   and	  submit	   to	   us	   a	   proposed	   omnibus	   bill,	   if	   I	   may	   call	   it	   that,	   which	   will	  accomplish	  the	  results	  which	  you	  and	  your	  committee	  have	  in	  mind?	  	  	  Mr.	  Lashly.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  too	  much,	  Senator	  Bratton;	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  would	   feel	   complimented	   to	   be	   intrusted	   [sic]	   by	   your	   invitation	   with	   that	  work	   .	   .	   .	   Our	   own	   idea	   about	   the	  matter	   is	   that	   the	   present	   law	   is	   a	   sound	  fundamental	  principle;	   that	   it	   has	   earned	   the	   sanction	  of	   the	   country	   for	   the	  work	   it	   has	   performed	   in	   more	   than	   33	   years;	   that	   a	   great	   system	   of	  precedents	  and	  adjudicated	  cases	  has	  been	  built	  up	  on	  this	  foundation,	  and	  we	  would	   rather	   by	   a	   gradual	   process	   improve	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   law	   as	   it	  stands	   in	   ways	   that	   will	   not	   find	   us	   rejecting	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   past	   or	  turning	   away	   from	   our	   written	   law	   and	   adjudicated	   decisions	   .	   .	   .	   (1932	  Hearings,	  515-­‐16).	  	  	   This	  exchange	   is	   remarkable	  several	   reasons.	   	  First,	   the	  committee	  chairmen	  are	  rejecting	  their	  own	  bill.	  	  Second,	  they	  readily	  delegated	  drafting	  authority	  to	  an	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outside	   party.	   	   Third,	   they	   not	   only	   succumbed,	   but	   readily	   endorsed	   the	   implicit	  theme	  of	  Lashly’s	  argument,	  namely	  that	  bankruptcy	  is	  a	  highly	  technical	  area	  of	  law	  that	   is	   best	   left	   to	   specialists,	   both	   to	   create	   laws	   and	   to	   administer	   them.	   	   Most	  remarkably,	  the	  exchange	  between	  Lashly	  and	  the	  senators	  is	  a	  clearly	  documented	  example	  of	  conflict	  containment	  resulting	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  policy	  monopoly.	  	   As	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  (1993,	  7)	  explain,	  the	  successful	  establishment	  of	  a	  policy	   monopoly	   depends	   on	   creation	   of	   a	   defined	   structure	   that	   limits	   external	  participation.	   	   Complex	   or	   technically	   defined	   issues	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   frustrate	  agenda	   access	   (Cobb	   and	   Elder,	   98-­‐99;	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   1993,	   41).	  	  Therefore,	  members	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  commonly	  define	  policies	   in	  technical	  terms	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  their	  dominance	  of	  the	  policy	  (Pralle,	  17).	  	  	   Issues	   that	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   legal	   problems	   are	   especially	   susceptible	   to	  complex	   and	   technical	   definitions.	   	   Tocqueville	   described	   the	   special	   status	   of	  lawyers	  this	  way:	  The	  special	  information	  which	  lawyers	  derive	  from	  their	  studies	  ensures	  them	  a	   separate	   station	   in	   society,	   and	   they	  constitute	  a	   sort	  of	  privileged	  body	   in	  the	  scale	  of	  intelligence.	  	  This	  notion	  of	  their	  superiority	  perpetually	  recurs	  to	  them	   in	   the	   practice	   of	   their	   profession:	   they	   are	   the	   masters	   of	   a	   science	  which	   is	   necessary,	   but	   which	   is	   not	   very	   generally	   known;	   they	   serve	   as	  arbiters	   between	   the	   citizens;	   and	   the	   habit	   of	   directing	   blind	   parties	   in	  litigation	   to	   their	   purpose	   inspires	   them	   with	   a	   certain	   contempt	   for	   the	  judgment	  of	  the	  multitude	  (318).	  	  [T]he	  English	  or	  American	  lawyer	  resembles	  the	  hierophants	  of	  Egypt,	  for,	  like	  them,	  he	  is	  the	  sole	  interpreter	  of	  an	  occult	  science	  (322).	  	  Even	   within	   the	   various	   fields	   of	   law,	   bankruptcy	   is	   particularly	   susceptible	   to	  narrow,	   technical	   definition.	   	   Like	   its	   courts	   and	   judges,	   attorneys	   who	   practice	  bankruptcy	   law	   tend	   to	   do	   nothing	   else.	   	   Other	   lawyers	   who	   do	   not	   usually	   find	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themselves	   in	   bankruptcy	   court	   often	   refer	   such	   matters	   to	   the	   specialists.	   	   The	  bankruptcy	   statutes	   themselves	   befuddle	   non-­‐specialists	   because	   they	   turn	  traditional	  areas	  of	   law	  on	  their	   figurative	  heads:	  debts	  are	  not	  paid,	  contracts	  are	  broken,	  creditors	  can	  be	  made	  to	  give	  back	  some	  pre-­‐filing	  payments	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  other	  creditors,	  and	  the	  ultimate	  recovery	  by	  any	  given	  creditor	  depends	  in	  large	  part	  on	  a	  statutory	  ranking	  system	  and	  not	  on	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  its	  claim.	  	  Lashly	  and	  the	  other	  attorney-­‐witnesses	  that	  testified	  before	  the	  joint	  subcommittee	  played	  the	  specialist	  card	  to	  great	  effect,	  emphasizing	  the	  legal	  nature	  of	  bankruptcy,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  raising	  the	  specter	  of	  problems	  that	  arose	  when	  non-­‐lawyers	  were	  placed	  in	   charge	   of	   bankruptcy	   administration	   in	   other	   countries	   (without	   actually	  detailing	  those	  problems).	  	  Senators	  Hastings	  and	  Bratton,	  themselves	  both	  lawyers,	  accepted	   Lashly’s	   authority	   without	   question	   after	   his	   two-­‐day	   exposition	   on	   the	  proposed	  reforms	  and	  their	  effects	  on	  American	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  In	  fact,	  as	  shown	  in	   the	   next	   chapter,	   deference	   to	   the	   technical	   expertise	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community	   was	   the	   dominant	   principle	   structuring	   Congress’	   efforts	   to	   make	  statutory	   reforms	   the	   in	   the	   1970s.	   	   Moreover,	   as	   described	   in	   Chapter	   Five,	  Congress	  would	  initially	  defer	  to	  the	  experts	  again	  in	  the	  1990s	  until	  opponents	  of	  reform	   upset	   the	   status	   quo,	   in	   part	   by	   marginalizing	   the	   expertise	   of	   the	   policy	  community.	  	  Issue	  networks,	  policy	  communities,	  and	  the	  like	  by	  definition	  do	  not	  consist	  of	   a	   single	   entity	   or	   interest.	   	   By	   the	   time	   the	  ABA	   group	   convened	   the	   following	  month	   to	   draft	   new	   legislation,	   they	   were	   joined	   by	   representatives	   of	   National	  Association	  of	  Referees	  in	  Bankruptcy,	  the	  Commercial	  Law	  League,	  private	  lawyers,	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and	   academics.	   	   As	   discussed	   in	   the	   next	   section,	   the	   group	   quickly	   developed	   a	  fairly	  detailed	  organizational	  structure,	  and	  took	  to	  formally	  identifying	  itself	  as	  the	  National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference.	   Although	   the	   group’s	   efforts	   would	   extend	   over	  the	   next	   six	   years,	   during	  which	   it	   held	   several	  meetings	   with	   representatives	   of	  various	   other	   groups	   and	   interests	   in	   attendance,	   the	   core	   group	   remained	   intact	  throughout.	  	  	  
2.	   Limiting	  Agenda	  Access:	  	  Strategic	  Concessions	  Not	  all	  relationships	  within	  a	  policy	  community	  are	  consensual.	  	  In	  fact,	  these	  alliances	  may	   sometimes	   represent	   coalitions	   of	   necessity.	   	   In	   1936,	   the	   National	  Bankruptcy	   Conference	  was	   nearing	   the	   end	   of	   its	  work	  when	   the	   Securities	   and	  Exchange	  Commission	  made	  its	  own	  proposals	  to	  reform	  business	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  The	   proposals	   would	   give	   the	   Commission	   a	   major	   role	   in	   business	   bankruptcy	  cases.34	  	  	  	  William	  O.	  Douglas,	  the	  new	  head	  of	  the	  SEC	  and	  a	  former	  Yale	  Law	  School	  professor,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  nation’s	  foremost	  authorities	  on	  business	  reorganizations.	  	  Moreover,	   Douglas’	   SEC	   was	   not	   just	   a	   casual	   interloper	   but	   in	   fact	   had	   been	  investigating	  reorganization	  practices	  in	  New	  York	  and	  elsewhere	  for	  some	  time.	  	  	   Nonetheless,	  members	   of	   the	  National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference	   (“NBC”)	  were	  not	   receptive	   to	   the	   SEC’s	   participation.	   	   One	   member	   described	   the	   changes	  proposed	  by	  the	  SEC	  as	  “startling	  and	  radical,”	  and	  lamented	  the	  delay	  caused	  by	  the	  commission’s	  intervention	  (Hunt	  1937).	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  NBC	  was	  in	  no	  position	  to	  exclude	  the	  SEC’s	  participation.	  	  As	  Douglas	  was	  arguably	  the	  nation’s	  leading	  expert	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  These	  proposals	  included	  the	  right	  of	  the	  SEC	  to	  intervene	  in	  reorganization	  cases,	  the	   appointment	   of	   trustees	   in	   reorganization	   cases	   in	   place	   of	   pre-­‐bankruptcy	  management,	  and	  providing	  labor	  organizations	  standing	  to	  be	  heard	  on	  employers’	  plans	  of	  reorganization.	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on	  business	  reorganizations,	  he	  was	  well	  positioned	  to	  challenge	  the	  NBC’s	  technical	  authority	   on	   bankruptcy	   matters.	   	   Moreover,	   as	   chair	   of	   one	   of	   the	   leading	  commissions	   established	   by	   President	   Roosevelt	   and	   his	   congressional	   allies,	  Douglas	   had	   the	   structural	   support	   he	   needed	   to	   break	   up	   the	   NBC’s	   newly-­‐developed	  hold	  on	  bankruptcy	  policy	  (and	  establish	  his	  own,	  if	  necessary).	  With	  those	  factors	  in	  mind,	  the	  conference	  adopted	  the	  only	  realistic	  course	  of	   action	   available	   to	   it:	   it	   grudgingly	   conceded	   to	  Douglas	   nearly	   all	   of	   the	   SEC’s	  specific	   demands	   in	   order	   to	   retain	   its	   control	   over	   the	   broader	   reform	   process.	  	  When	   the	  Conference	   convened	   in	  Washington	   in	   late	  March	  1937,	   it	   included	   all	  but	   one	   of	   the	   SEC’s	   proposals	   in	   a	   new	   draft	   of	   the	   legislation.	   	   With	   that	  accomplished,	  the	  SEC	  ended	  its	  efforts	  to	  influence	  the	  legislation.	  Strategic	  concessions	  are	  essential	  to	  a	  policy	  monopoly’s	  on-­‐going	  viability.	  	  The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   would	   employ	   the	   practice	   again	   when	   it	  considered	  exemptions	  policies	  as	  part	  of	  the	  1970s	  reforms.35	  	  However,	  when	  the	  group	  perceives	   that	   concessions	  would	  violate	   its	   core	  principles,	   as	   it	  did	   in	   the	  1990s	   –	   2000s,	   it	   rejects	   the	   changes,	   even	   at	   the	   risk	   of	   losing	   control	   of	   the	  policymaking	  process.36	  
3.	   Limiting	  Agenda	  Access:	  Engaging	  Congress	  Any	   group	   seeking	   to	   promote	   or	   affect	   federal	   legislation	  must	   ultimately	  engage	   Congress.	   	   This	   poses	   a	   definitional,	   and	   even	   existential,	   challenge	   for	  dominant	  policy	  subsystems	  or	  policy	  monopolies,	  whose	  function	  is	  in	  substantial	  part	   to	   limit	   access	   to	  policymaking	  processes.	   	  The	  answer,	   of	   course,	   is	   to	  bring	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  See	  Chapter	  Four,	  Part	  D.	  36	  See	  Chapter	  Five.	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members	  of	  Congress	  into	  the	  subsystem	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  necessary	  to	  achieve	  its	  legislative	   goals.	   	   Iron	   triangle	  models	   posit	   the	   participation	   of	   one	   or	   at	  most	   a	  very	  small	  number	  of	  committee	  or	  subcommittee	  members	  (usually	  their	  chairs)	  in	  policy	   subsystems.	   	   Such	   models	   typically	   describe	   policymaking	   in	   heavily-­‐regulated	  endeavors	  with	  regular	  business	  before	  Congress.	   	  However,	  bankruptcy	  policy	   only	   sporadically	   reaches	   the	   congressional	   agenda.	   	   As	   described	   in	   this	  dissertation,	  major	  reforms	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  law	  were	  made	  in	  the	  1930s,	  1970s,	  and	  1990s-­‐2000s,	  with	  other	  lesser	  amendments	  and	  additions	  in	  between.	  	  Hence,	  the	   strategic	   challenge	   for	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   is	   to	   form	   periodic	  alliances	  with	  members	  of	  Congress	  without	  opening	  broader	  participation	  and	  loss	  of	   control	  over	   the	  policymaking	  process.	   	  Therefore,	   the	  community	  must	   choose	  its	  congressional	  alliances	  carefully.	  	   Once	   congressional	   attention	   turned	   in	   1933	   to	   enacting	   the	   New	   Deal,	   the	  bankruptcy	   reform	  group	  had	   to	  proceed	   through	  1933	  and	  1934	  without	   a	   clear	  means	  of	  turning	  their	  proposals	  into	  law.	  	  That	  changed	  when	  Walter	  Chandler	  was	  appointed	   chair	   of	   the	   joint	   Congressional	   bankruptcy	   subcommittee	   in	   1935.	  	  Chandler,	  a	  Democrat	   from	  Memphis,	  Tennessee,	  and	   former	  counsel	   for	   the	  city’s	  branch	   of	   the	   National	   Association	   of	   Credit	   Men,	   was	   particularly	   interested	   in	  bankruptcy	  law;	  in	  fact,	  he	  may	  have	  been	  the	  conference’s	  handpicked	  candidate	  to	  sponsor	  its	  legislation	  (Skeel	  2001,	  74).	  Chandler’s	  appointment	  provided	  the	  third	  essential	   element	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	   community’s	   functional	   structure.	   	  The	  conference’s	  bill	  was	  introduced	  in	  the	  House	  under	  his	  sponsorship,	  and	  it	  was	  he	  who	   sheparded	   it	   through	   the	   next	   two	   years	   of	   revisions	   culminating	   in	   its	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enactment	  in	  1938.	  Representative	   Chandler’s	   association	   with	   the	   conference	   provided	   the	  group	  with	   at	   least	   two	   other	   benefits.	   	   First,	   the	   conference	   had	   focused	   almost	  entirely	   on	   the	   commercial	   side	   of	   bankruptcy	   reform.	   	   Chandler,	   however,	   had	   a	  special	   interest	   in	   the	   difficulties	   the	   Great	   Depression	   had	   caused	   individual	  debtors.	  HIs	  sympathies	  grew	  out	  of	  his	  service	  as	  Memphis	  city	  attorney	  from	  1928	  to	   1934	   (Dixon	   and	   Epstein,	   2002,	   755-­‐7).	   	   Chandler	   added	   a	   new	   provision	   for	  wage	  earner	  reorganization	  (a	  forerunner	  of	  the	  current	  Chapter	  13)	  that	  was	  based	  on	  a	  procedure	  developed	   in	   the	  Alabama	  bankruptcy	   courts.	   	   This	  portion	  of	   the	  legislation	  was	   drafted	   by	   Chandler,	   or	   at	   least	   at	   his	   behest	   by	   officials	   from	   the	  Alabama	  court	  (Dixon	  and	  Epstein,	  2002,	  755-­‐8).	  	   Congressional	   participation	   provides	   a	   policy	   monopoly	   with	   an	   important	  benefit	   besides	   a	   means	   of	   enacting	   its	   policy	   choices	   into	   law.	   	   Congressional	  patrons	  can	  also	  take	  efforts	  to	  ensure	  that	  competing	  bills	  are	  stopped	  or	  at	   least	  receive	   lesser	   treatment	   than	   those	   promoted	   by	   the	   monopoly.	   Representative	  Adolf	   Sabath	   (D-­‐IL)	   led	   a	   congressional	   inquiry	   into	   real	   estate	   reorganization	  practices	   in	   1933-­‐34.	   	   Efforts	   to	   draft	   legislation	   based	   on	   the	   investigation’s	  findings	   led	   to	   introduction	  of	   a	   broader,	   and	  many	  ways	  more	   radical	   legislation	  than	   the	   Chandler	   bill.	   	   The	   Sabath	   bill	   proposed	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   national	  bankruptcy	   administrator	   called	   the	   conservator	   to	   replace	   the	   Act’s	   system	   of	  referees	  and	  trustees.	   	  In	  addition,	  the	  conservator	  proposed	  duties	  included	  many	  of	  those	  the	  SEC	  wanted	  to	  assume	  itself.	   	  However,	  given	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference’s	   alignment	   with	   Congressman	   Chandler,	   and	   Chandler’s	   support,	   in	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turn,	  from	  the	  House	  Judiciary	  Committee’s	  chairman,	  the	  Sabath	  bill	  had	  no	  chance	  of	   getting	   through	   Congress.	   	   After	   it	   was	   introduced	   by	   Congressman	   Sabath	   in	  1936,	  it	  was	  assigned	  to	  the	  Judiciary	  Committee,	  where	  it	  was	  never	  brought	  up	  for	  a	  vote	  and	  died	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  term..	  	  Neither	  Congressman	  Chandler,	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	   Conference,	   nor	   the	   House	   Judiciary	   Committee	   (whose	   chair	   had	  appointed	  Chandler	  to	  the	   joint	  bankruptcy	  committee)	  endorsed	  Representative’s	  Sabath’s	   efforts.	   	   Without	   that	   support,	   the	   assignment	   of	   Sabath’s	   bill	   to	   the	  Judiciary	  Committee	  assured	  its	  quick	  demise.	  
D.	   Agenda	   Setting	   and	   Bankruptcy	   Reform:	   Organizing	   the	   Policy	  
Community	  
	  	   The	  creation	  and	  subsequent	  durability	  of	  policy	  monopolies	  depends	  on	  two	  essential	  elements:	  a	  dominant	  issue	  definition,	  expressed	  as	  a	  policy	  image,	  and	  a	  definable	  structure.	  	  Issue	  definition	  establishes	  the	  parameters	  of	  participation	  in	  a	  policy	   subsystem,	   but	   it	   does	   not	   by	   itself	   organize	   participants	   into	   a	   definable	  structure.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  bankruptcy	  policy,	  the	  various	  specialists	  quickly	  formed	  a	  well-­‐organized	  community.	  The	  group	  quickly	  coalesced	  into	  a	  well-­‐organized	  entity	  with	  a	  name,	   the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference;37	  a	  chairman;	  and	  defined	  roles	  for	  its	  members.	  	   Factors	   leading	   to	   the	   creation	   of	   structures	   necessary	   to	   sustain	   a	   policy	  monopoly	   are	   perhaps	   the	   least-­‐examined	   part	   of	   agenda	   setting	   theory.	   	   Most	  agenda	  setting	  studies	  begin	  with	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  core	  group	  of	  interested	  parties.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  The	   group,	  which	   soon	   came	   to	   include	   the	  National	  Association	   of	   Credit	  Men,	  was	  collectively	  identified	  as	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  at	  least	  as	  early	  as	  1935	   (New	   York	   Times,	   March	   24,	   1935).	   	   The	   organization	   formally	   organized	  under	  that	  name	  in	  the	  1940s.	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However,	   the	  wealth	   of	   documentation	   available	   on	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  in	  the	  1930s	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  understand	  both	  how	  and	  why	  the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   originally	   formed,	   and	   gain	   from	   that	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  how	  policy	  monopolies	  are	  created.	  	   Salisbury’s	   exchange	   theory	   (1969)	   provides	   the	   standard	   framework	   for	  understanding	  the	  origins	  of	   interest	  groups	  and	  political	  organizations.	   	  Salisbury	  identifies	   two	  essential	   factors	   to	   the	  creation	  of	   such	  organizations:	   (1)	  definable	  benefits	   to	  be	  distributed	   to	   the	  group,	  and	  (2)	  an	  entrepreneur	  or	  organizer	  who	  takes	  the	  lead	  in	  establishing	  the	  group,	  often	  with	  little	  hope	  of	  additional	  benefit	  or	  profit.	   	  He	  classifies	  benefits	   into	  three	  types.	  Benefit	   types	   include	  (a)	  material	  benefits;	   (b)	   solidary	   benefits,	   generally	   the	   intrinsic	   and	   intangible	   awards	  associated	  from	  being	  the	  member	  of	  a	  group,	   like	  status,	   identification,	  and	  social	  rewards;	  and	  (c)	  purposive,	  or	  expressive,	  benefits,	  which	  accrue	  to	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  reflect	  its	  core	  purposes	  (Salisbury	  1969,	  15-­‐7).38	  	  	  	   Benefits	   are	   defining;	   different	   benefits	   or	   sets	   of	   benefits	   attract	   different	  participants.	  	  Moreover,	  benefits,	  especially	  purposive	  ones,	  may	  be	  linked	  to	  policy	  images.	  	  The	  benefits	  ultimately	  deriving	  to	  the	  first	  participants	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  included	  preservation	  of	  the	  existing	  court-­‐based	  system,	  and	  the	  ability	   to	   shape	   reforms	   consistent	   with	   members’	   preferences.	   Those	   benefits	  paralleled	   the	   technical	   image	   fostered	   by	   the	   community	   to	   control	   the	   policy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  The	  typology	  is	  derived	  from	  Clark,	  Peter	  and	  Wilson,	  James	  Q.	  (1966).	  “Incentive	  Systems:	   A	   Theory	   of	   Organizations,”	   Administrative	   Sciences	   Quarterly	   6	   (Sept-­‐ember	   1966):129-­‐66.	   	   For	   an	   expanded	   explanation	   of	   benefits,	   also	   called	  incentives,	   see	   Wilson,	   James	   Q.	   (1973).	   Political	   Organizations.	   New	   York:	   Basic	  Books.	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process.	   	   Moreover,	   benefits	   can	   derive	   from	   more	   than	   one	   of	   Salisbury’s	  categories.	   	  For	   instance,	   for	  many	  participants,	  preservation	  of	   the	  existing	  court-­‐based	  system	  meant	  continuation	  of	  their	  source	  of	  livelihood.	  	  	   Although	  the	  definition	  of	  benefits	  identifies	  the	  raison	  d’etre	  for	  formation	  of	  a	  policy	  monopoly,	   it	  does	  not	  address	   the	  mechanics	  of	   creating	   such	  entities.	   	   For	  that,	  reference	  must	  be	  made	  to	  Salisbury’s	  other	  essential	  factor,	  the	  participation	  of	   a	   policy	   entrepreneur.	   	   Kingdon	   (1984,	   188)	   describes	   policy	   entrepreneurs	   as	  “advocates	   who	   are	   willing	   to	   invest	   their	   resources	   –	   time,	   energy,	   reputation,	  money	  –	   to	  promote	  a	  position	   in	  return	   for	  anticipated	   future	  gain	   in	  the	   form	  of	  material,	  purposive,	  or	  solidary	  benefits.”	  	  	  	   One	  of	   the	  key	   functions	  of	   the	  policy	  entrepreneur	   is	   to	   take	  advantage	  of	  the	   opportunity	   to	   advance	   a	   policy	   afforded	   by	   the	   opening	   of	   a	   policy	   window	  (Kingdon	  1984,	  190).	  	  Referee	  Paul	  King	  of	  Detroit	  provided	  this	  essential	  service	  in	  the	   creation	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community.	   First	   appointed	   to	   the	   bench	   in	  1919,	  King	  was	  an	  inveterate	  organizer.	   	   In	  1926,	  he	  was	  virtually	  single-­‐handedly	  responsible	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Referees	  in	  Bankruptcy,	  and	  served	  as	   the	  group’s	   first	  president.	   	  Early	   in	  his	  professional	   life,	  he	  chaired	  two	   senate	   campaigns,	   and	   served	   as	   secretary	   both	   of	   the	   Michigan	   Republican	  Party	  and	  of	  Michigan’s	   constitutional	   convention	   in	  1907	  and	  1908.	   	  He	  was	  also	  extensively	   involved	   in	   charitable	   groups	   and	   gained	   national	   prominence	   as	   the	  head	  of	  the	  Michigan,	  U.S.,	  and	  International	  Societies	  for	  Crippled	  Children.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  The	  group	  is	  now	  known	  as	  Easter	  Seals.	   	   In	  fact,	  King	  is	  credited	  by	  the	  society	  with	   creating	   its	   familiar	   fund-­‐raising	   stamp	   (http://www.easterseals.org/about-­‐
us/history,	  last	  accessed	  January	  30,	  2012).	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   King	  took	  a	  keen	  interest	  in	  the	  proposed	  revisions	  to	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Act	  even	  before	   a	   bill	   was	   introduced	   (Honsberger	   1985,	   4).	   	   He	   met	   with	   both	   Solicitor	  General	  Thacher	  and	  his	  investigators.	   	  Once	  the	  bill	  was	  introduced	  in	  early	  1932,	  King	   (who	   was	   opposed	   to	   many	   of	   its	   provisions)	   undertook	   to	   prepare	   and	  disseminate,	   at	   his	   own	   expense,	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   legislation,	   and	  corresponded	  with	   other	   professionals	   around	   the	   country	   (Honsberger	   1985,	   7).	  	  His	  correspondents	  included	  Jacob	  Lashly	  and	  Robert	  Cook	  of	  the	  Commercial	  Law	  League	  of	  America.	   	  Hence,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  Joint	  Committee	  extended	  its	  invitation	  to	  Lashly	  to	  draft	  an	  alternative	  bill,	  King	  had	  already	  cultivated	  a	  network	  of	  like-­‐minded	  specialists	  ready	  to	  take	  on	  the	  task.	  	  	   Therefore,	  when	  a	  meeting	  occurred	  at	  Cook’s	  Boston	  home	  in	  mid-­‐June,	  1932	  (just	   a	  month	   after	   the	   Joint	   Committee’s	   invitation),	   the	   group	   included	   not	   only	  Lashly,	  King,	  and	  Cook,	  but	  also	  other	   lawyers,	  referees,	  and	  scholars	  as	  well.	   	  The	  group,	  albeit	  still	  informal,	  recognized	  King	  as	  its	  chair;	  his	  wife,	  Sarah,	  accompanied	  him	   to	   Boston,	   and	   according	   to	   Cook	   served	   as	   the	   group’s	   “house	   mother”	  	  (Honsberger	  1985,	  15).	  	  	   The	  group	  made	  some	  progress,	  but	  did	  not	  complete	  draft	   legislation	  before	  the	  Boston	  meeting	  concluded.	  	  It	  met	  twice	  more	  in	  1932,	  and	  another	  two	  times	  in	  1933	   before	   producing	   a	   new	   bill.	   	   Although	   the	   attendees	   at	   these	   meetings	  differed,	  King	  held	  his	  core	  group	  together,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	  he	  and	   they	  were	  not	   compensated	   for	   their	   efforts	   and	   in	   fact	   paid	   their	   own	   travel	   expenses	  (Honsberger	  1985,	  22).	  	  King	  organized	  the	  meetings	  and	  sent	  out	  weekly	  reports	  to	  the	   conference	   members	   on	   their	   colleagues’	   progress;	   reports	   note	   that	   he	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mediated	   the	   sometimes-­‐heated	   differences	   between	   the	   group’s	   members	  (Honsberger	  1985,	  18,	  27;	  Hunt	  1937,	  196).	  	  	  	   The	   conference’s	   proposed	   bill	   included	   new	   provisions	   for	   corporate	   and	  railroad	   reorganizations.	   	   It	  notably	  did	  not	   require	   creation	  of	   a	  new	  bankruptcy	  agency.	   	  The	  proposed	   legislation	  was	  quickly	  adopted	  by	  Congress	   in	  place	  of	   the	  one	  introduced	  in	  1932,	  and	  was	  signed	  into	  law	  by	  President	  Hoover	  immediately	  before	  leaving	  office	  in	  March	  1933.	  	   Congressional	  interest	  in	  bankruptcy	  reform	  died	  down	  after	  enactment	  of	  the	  1933	   amendments,	   as	   the	   House	   and	   Senate	   turned	   their	   attention	   first	   to	   the	  banking	   crisis	   and	   then	   the	   New	   Deal.	   	   Members	   of	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	  Conference	  (as	  the	  group	  had	  now	  begun	  to	  formally	  identify	  itself)	  continued	  their	  efforts	  for	  broader	  bankruptcy	  reforms,	  albeit	  at	  a	  slower	  pace.	  	  	  It	  met	  another	  five	  times	  in	  1933-­‐4.	   	  As	  before,	   the	  attendees	  at	  these	  meetings	  tended	  to	  change,	  but	  the	  core	  group	  remained	  the	  same.	  	  King	  remained	  as	  the	  conference’s	  chairman	  and	  organized	  its	  meetings	  (J.NARB	  1938,	  128).	  In	  order	  to	  promote	  efficiency,	  he	  sorted	  the	  various	  topics	  by	  subject	  matter,	  and	  then	  he	  did	  the	  same	  with	  the	  conference,	  creating	   several	   committees	   by	   topic	   and	   distributing	   to	   each	   of	   them	   the	  corresponding	   portions	   of	   each	   existing	   proposal	   (J.NARB	   1938,	   127).	   	   He	  coordinated	  their	  responses,	  and	  took	  overall	  responsibility	  for	  assembly	  of	  the	  final	  product	  and	  well	  as	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  progress	  reports.	  	   	  Observers	  from	  the	  Justice,	  Treasury,	  and	  Commerce	  Departments	  attended	  an	  eighth	  meeting	  of	  the	  Conference	  in	  Washington.	  	  Divisions	  among	  the	  conferees	  over	   the	   new	   corporate	   reorganization	   provisions	  were	   resolved	   at	   that	  meeting.	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With	   those	   differences	   settled,	   Rep.	   Chandler	   introduced	   a	   comprehensive	   reform	  legislation	  bill	  on	  January	  20,	  1936.	  	  	  Despite	   the	   four	   years	   the	   conference	   spent	   working	   on	   the	   proposed	  reforms,	  changes	  to	  the	  legislation	  were	  by	  no	  means	  complete.	   	   	  The	  conference’s	  core	  group	  met	  with	  Representative	  Chandler	  and	  his	  subcommittee	  in	  April	  1936,	  the	  result	  of	  which	  was	  the	  introduction	  in	  the	  House	  of	  a	  substitute	  bill.	  	   The	   House	   Judiciary	   Committee	   held	   hearings	   on	   the	   Chandler	   bill	   in	   early	  June,	   resulting	   in	   additional	   amendments.	   	   The	   House	   of	   Representatives	   finally	  approved	   the	   amended	   bill	   by	   unanimous	   vote	   on	   August	   9,	   1937.	   	   The	   Senate	  Judiciary	   Committee	   took	   up	   the	   legislation	   in	   November	   1937,	   with	   hearings	  continuing	   into	   the	   next	   year.	   	   On	   June	   10,	   1938,	   the	   Senate	   passed	   the	   bill	   with	  minor	  amendments.	  	  The	  House	  approved	  the	  amended	  legislation	  three	  days	  later,	  and	   the	   Chandler	   Act	   finally	   became	   law	   when	   President	   Roosevelt	   signed	   it	   on	  August	  22,	  1938.	  	   As	  Kingdon	   (1984,	   191-­‐92)	   indicates,	   policy	   change	   requires	   both	   structural	  changes	   and	   the	   active	   involvement	   of	   “the	   right	   person	   in	   the	   right	   place	   at	   the	  right	   time”	  who	   can	   take	  advantage	  of	   a	  policymaking	  opportunity.	   	   In	   the	  1930s,	  Paul	   King	  was	   that	   person	   for	   bankruptcy	   policy.	   	   Through	  King’s	   efforts,	   a	   small	  group	   of	   bankruptcy	   specialists	   developed	   the	   internal	   structure	   and	   external	  relationships	   they	   needed	   to	   dominate	   the	   bankruptcy	   reform	   process.	   The	   two	  organizations	   King	  was	  most	   responsible	   for	   creating,	   the	  National	   Association	   of	  Referees	   in	   Bankruptcy	   and	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference,	   would	   control	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  into	  the	  1990s	  (Chapter	  Four).	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   E.	   Chapter	  Summary:	  Bankruptcy	  Policymaking	  in	  the	  1930s.	  	   This	  chapter	  describes	  how	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  rose	  quickly	  to	  monopoly	   status	   through	   a	   combination	   of	   congressional	   deference	   prompted	   by	  redefinition	   of	   central	   policy	   issues	   and	   a	   shifting	   political	   landscape,	   and	   was	  sustained	   through	   the	  creation	  of	  well-­‐defined	  external	  and	   internal	   relationships.	  	  The	  essential	  participants	  in	  the	  policymaking	  apparatus	  were	  bankruptcy	  lawyers,	  law	  professors,	  and	  politically	  active	  referees.	  The	  referees	  occupied	  unique	  roles	  in	  the	  community.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  they	  engaged	  in	  their	  traditional	  adjudicative	  roles	  in	  bankruptcy	  cases,	  making	  policy	   through	  their	   interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	   Bankruptcy	   Act	   in	   their	   administration	   of	   discrete	   cases.40	  	   However,	   with	  respect	   to	   the	   activities	  of	   the	   community,	   they	  were	  organizers	   and	  active	  policy	  advocates.	   	   Referee	   Paul	   King	  was	   a	   classic	   policy	   entrepreneur.	   	   At	   considerable	  time	   and	   expense,	   he	   laid	   the	   groundwork	   to	   oppose	   new	   bankruptcy	   reform	  legislation.	  	  Once	  the	  opportunity	  arose	  for	  professionals	  to	  take	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  policymaking	   process,	   he	   undertook	   to	   lead	   the	   group’s	   efforts,	   resulting	   in	   the	  enactment	  of	  major	  reform	  legislation,	  first	  in	  1933	  and	  more	  significantly	  in	  1938.	  	  Equally	   important,	   King’s	   work	   established	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   group’s	   continued	  dominance	  of	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  for	  the	  next	  sixty	  years.	  	  	   Members	   of	   Congress	   provide	   the	   community’s	   third	   structural	   element.	  	  	  Congressional	  participation	  in	  the	  community	  is	  essential	  if	  its	  policy	  choices	  are	  to	  become	   new	   law.	   	   The	   challenge	   to	   the	   community	   is	   to	   engage	   Congress	   while	  limiting	  its	  broader	  involvement	  so	  as	  not	  to	  provoke	  wider	  conflict.	  The	  addition	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  See	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Six.	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Congressman	  Walter	  Chandler	  to	  the	  community	  was	  critical	  to	  the	  latter’s	  ultimate	  success.	  	  While	  his	  contribution	  to	  substantive	  policy	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  addition	  of	  wage	   earner	   plans,	   he	   sheparded	   the	   conference’s	   bill	   through	   Congress	   while	  fending	  off	  competing	  proposals.	  	   The	  1930s	  bankruptcy	  reform	  process	  provides	  a	  clear	  and	  detailed	  example	  of	  how	  policy	  monopolies	  develop.	   	  However,	  the	  long-­‐term	  success	  of	  monopolies	  depends	   on	   more	   than	   defined	   structures.	   	   Rather,	   those	   structures	   must	   be	  grounded	   on	   a	   central	   principle,	   known	   as	   its	   policy	   image.	   	   The	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	   community	   gained	   its	   dominant	   position	   in	   the	   field	   through	   its	  successful	   characterization	   of	   the	   field	   as	   being	   too	   technical	   for	   non-­‐specialists.	  	  While	  technicality	  would	  remain	  central	  to	  the	  group’s	  on-­‐going	  efforts,	  it	  would	  be	  joined	   substantively	   with	   an	   image	   at	   least	   as	   powerful,	   that	   of	   the	   “fresh	   start,”	  which	  is	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	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CHAPTER	  FOUR:	  BANKRUPTCY	  REFORM	  IN	  THE	  1970s	  -­‐	  	  
Enactment	  of	  the	  1978	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  	   The	  policy	  community	  that	  bankruptcy	  professionals	  and	  officials	  formed	  in	  the	  1930s	  dominated	  policymaking	  in	  the	  field	  for	  the	  next	  six	  decades.	  	  The	  group	  achieved	  its	  greatest	  success	  in	  the	  1970s	  with	  the	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  bankruptcy	  laws	   that	   became	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	   	   The	  1978	  Code	   included	  provisions	   granting	  broad	   relief	   for	   individual	   Chapter	   bankruptcy	   filers	   and	   established	   an	   all-­‐new	  procedure	  for	  business	  reorganizations	  identified	  as	  Chapter	  11.41	  	  The	  foundational	  principle	  underlying	   that	   reform,	   and	   the	   ideological	   key	   to	   the	   community’s	   long	  period	  of	  dominance,	  was	  the	  concept	  of	  debt	  forgiveness	  known	  as	  the	  “fresh	  start.”	  
A.	   The	  Fresh	  Start	  as	  a	  Policy	  Image	  	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   (1993)	   explain	   that	   every	   policy	   monopoly	   must	  have	  two	  characteristics.	   	  The	  first	   is	  a	  stable,	  defined	  structure	  (Chapter	  III).	   	  The	  other	   is	   a	   dominant	   policy	   image.	   	   An	   “image”	   is	   the	   way	   in	   which	   a	   policy	   is	  understood	   and	   discussed	   (Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   1993,	   25).	   	   Policy	   images	   are	  closely	  related	   to	   the	  concept	  of	   issue	  definition.	   	  Hence,	   the	  notion	  of	  bankruptcy	  law	  as	  a	  highly	   technical	  specialty	  best	   left	   to	  experts	   is	  part	  of	   its	   image,	  and	  one	  that	  the	  nascent	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  asserted	  to	  its	  great	  advantage	  in	  the	  early	  1930s.	  	  	  The	   characterization	   of	   policies	   as	   technical	   or	   complex	   ones	   establish	   the	  boundaries	   of	   participation	   in	   a	   monopoly,	   and	   legitimize	   the	   authority	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Just	   as	   in	   the	  Act,	   the	  Code’s	   statutes	  are	  arranged	   topically	   into	   sections	   called	  “chapters.”	   	  For	  historical	  reasons,	  the	  Chapters	  are	  designated	  with	  odd	  numbers,	  except	   for	   Chapter	   12,	   which	   concerns	   bankruptcy	   filings	   by	   certain	   kinds	   of	  farmers.	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participants.	   	   Policy	   images	   can	   serve	   other	   purposes	   as	   well.	   	   They	   may	   give	   a	  monopoly	  ideological	  cohesion	  and	  draw	  support	  for	  the	  monopoly’s	  policy	  outputs	  from	  outsiders	  as	  well.	  	  No	  matter	  how	  tight	  the	  monopoly,	  its	  members	  must	  from	  time	   to	   time	   explain	   and	   justify	   its	   policies	   to	   outsiders	   like	   the	  public	   or	   at	   least	  non-­‐specialist	   elites,	   such	  as	  members	  of	  Congress	   (Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	  1993,	  25-­‐6).	   	   	   The	  most	   successful	   policy	   images	   reflect	   core	   social	   and	   political	   values,	  such	   as	   “progress,	   participation,	   patriotism,	   freedom	   from	   foreign	   domination,	  fairness,	  [and]	  economic	  growth	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993,	  7).”	  	  	  The	   policy	   image	   concept	   is	   expressed	   and	   utilized	   in	   various	  ways	   in	   the	  policy	  literature.	  Stone	  (1997)	  writes	  in	  term	  of	  “policy	  goals.”	   	  Like	  images,	  policy	  goals	   speak	   to	   the	   broader	   purposes	   a	   policy	   seeks	   to	   achieve,	   such	   as	   equity,	  efficiency,	   security,	   and	   liberty	   (Stone	   1997,	   37).	   	   Sabatier	   focuses	   on	   the	  conceptualization	   of	   problems	   and	   solutions	   by	   members	   of	   the	   dominant	   policy	  coalition,	   stating	   “that	   public	   policies	   (or	   programs)	   can	   be	   conceptualized	   in	   the	  same	   manner	   as	   belief	   systems,	   i.e.	   as	   sets	   of	   value	   priorities	   and	   causal	  assumptions	   about	   how	   to	   realize	   them	   (Sabatier	   1988,	   131).”	   	   Wilson	   (2000)	  describes	  the	  concept	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  paradigms,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  the	  “policy	  ideologies	  through	  the	  way	  they	  portray	  issues,	  promote	  images,	  tell	  stories,	  explain	  cause	  and	  effect,	  and	  describe	  situations	  as	  problems	  in	  ways	  that	  favor	  the	  policy	  solutions	   they	   are	   advocating.	   These	   ideologies	   legitimize	   and	   sustain	   existing	  policies	  and	  institutional	  arrangements	  (Wilson	  2000,	  254).”	  	   These	  various	  expressions	  of	  underlying	  principles	  supporting	  specific	  policies	  and	   policymaking	   processes	   are	   more	   similar	   than	   they	   are	   different.	   	   Wilson’s	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description	   of	   policy	   paradigms	   could	   equally	   explain	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones’	  policy	  images:42	  The	   paradigm	   also	   embodies	  ways	   of	   seeing,	   talking	   and	   defining	   problems,	  which	  in	  turn	  shape	  policy	  solutions	   .	   .	   .	  Policy	  paradigms	  are	  constructed	  by	  researchers	   and	   intellectuals	   who	   contribute	   to	   academic	   discourse	   which	  shapes	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  policy	  problem;	  by	  professionals	  and	  practitioners	  who	   are	   directly	   engaged	   with	   the	   issue;	   by	   interest	   group	   leaders	   and	  organizations	   who	   are	   promoting	   a	   particular	   policy	   agenda;	   and	   by	   policy	  makers	  who	  interact	  with	  academics,	  professionals,	  practitioners,	  and	  interest	  group	  leaders.	  	  Given	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  definitions	  of	  these	  concepts,	   the	  term	  “policy	   image”	   is	  used	  here	   in	   order	   to	   remain	   consistent	  with	   the	   application	   of	  Baumgartner	   and	  Jones’s	  work	  on	  policy	  monopolies.	  	   In	   American	   bankruptcy	   policy,	   the	   term	   fresh	   start	   refers	   to	   the	   debtor’s	  ability	   to	   exit	   bankruptcy	   free	   from	   the	   burdens	   of	   his	   or	   her	   past	   financial	  misfortunes	  and	  mistakes.	  	  Generally,	  the	  concept	  is	  limited	  to	  personal	  bankruptcy	  filers	  and	  is	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  provisions	  for	  discharge	  contained	  in	  Chapters	  7	  and	  13	  of	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	   (and	   their	   predecessors	   under	   the	  Act).43	  	  However,	   it	  properly	  also	  includes	  provisions	  allowing	  personal	  filers	  to	  exempt	  property	  from	  the	   reach	  of	   their	   creditors	   (see	  Chapter	   I	   for	  explanations	  of	  how	  discharges	  and	  exemptions	  work	  in	  personal	  bankruptcy	  cases).	  	  	  	   Tales	   of	   new	   beginnings	   are	   central	   to	   the	   American	   story.	   	  Whether	   that	  story	   is	   one	   of	   emigrants	   to	   the	   New	  World,	   the	   Founding,	   or	   the	   Great	  Western	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Which	   is	  not	  surprising,	  given	   the	  centrality	  of	  Baumgartner	  and	   Jones’	  work	   to	  Wilson’s	  policy	  paradigms	  concept	  (Wilson	  2000,	  271).	  43	  While	  neither	  discharges	  nor	  exemptions	  are	  available	  to	  business	  organizations	  that	   liquidate	  under	  Chapter	  7,	   they	  do	  receive	  discharges	  upon	  completion	  of	   the	  obligations	   under	   their	   approved	   plans	   of	   reorganization	   in	   Chapter	   11	   cases.	   	   In	  that	   sense,	   they	   do	   get	   a	   fresh	   start,	   even	   though	   those	   obligations	   mean	   that	   it	  comes	  with	  strings	  attached	  (See	  Chapter	  One).	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migration,	   tales	   of	   renewal	   and	   rebirth	   are	   an	   essential	   part	   of	   the	   American	  experience	   and	   its	   image	   as	   the	   “land	   of	   opportunity”	   (Sullivan,	   Warren,	   and	  Westbrook	  1989,	  341).	  	  The	  fresh	  start	  embodies	  this	  value	  by	  allowing	  bankruptcy	  individuals	  to	  start	  their	   lives	  anew,	  at	   least	  from	  a	  financial	  perspective.	  By	  1915,	  the	   Supreme	   Court	   cited	   the	   principle	   as	   the	   primary	   function	   of	   American	  bankruptcy	  policy:	  It	   is	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  Bankrupt	  Act	   to	   convert	   the	  assets	  of	   the	  bankrupt	  into	   cash	   for	   distribution	   among	   creditors	   and	   then	   to	   relieve	   the	   honest	  debtor	   from	  the	  weight	  of	  oppressive	   indebtedness	  and	  permit	  him	  to	  start	  afresh	   free	   from	   the	   obligations	   and	   responsibilities	   consequent	   among	  business	   misfortunes	   (Williams	   v.	   United	   States	   Fidelity	   Guaranty	   Company,	  236	  U.S.	  549,	  554-­‐55	  (1915)).	  	  By	  1934,	  Justice	  Sutherland,	  writing	  for	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Court	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference	  was	   drafting	   its	  major	   reforms,	   affirmed	   the	  centrality	  of	  the	  fresh	  start	  to	  U.S.	  bankruptcy	  policy	  and	  explained	  its	  relationship	  to	  American	  core	  values:	  When	  a	  person	  assigns	  future	  wages,	  he,	  in	  effect,	  pledges	  his	  future	  earning	  power.	   The	   power	   of	   the	   individual	   to	   earn	   a	   living	   for	   himself	   and	   those	  dependent	  upon	  him	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  personal	  liberty	  quite	  as	  much	  if	  not	  more	  than	  it	  is	  a	  property	  right.	  To	  preserve	  its	  free	  exercise	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance,	   not	   only	   because	   it	   is	   a	   fundamental	   private	   necessity,	   but	  because	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   great	   public	   concern.	   From	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   the	  wage-­‐earner	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  between	  not	  earning	  at	  all	  and	  earning	  wholly	   for	  a	  creditor.	  Pauperism	  may	  be	   the	  necessary	  result	  of	  either.	  The	  amount	  of	  the	  indebtedness,	  or	  the	  proportion	  of	  wages	  assigned,	  may	  here	  be	   small,	   but	   the	  principle,	   once	  established,	  will	   equally	  apply	  where	  both	  are	   very	   great.	   The	   new	   opportunity	   in	   life	   and	   the	   clear	   field	   for	   future	  effort,	   which	   it	   is	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Act	   to	   afford	   the	  emancipated	  debtor,	  would	  be	  of	   little	   value	   to	   the	  wage-­‐earner	   if	   he	  were	  obliged	  to	  face	  the	  necessity	  of	  devoting	  the	  whole	  or	  a	  considerable	  portion	  of	   his	   earnings	   for	   an	   indefinite	   time	   in	   the	   future	   to	   the	   payment	   of	  indebtedness	   incurred	  prior	   to	  his	  bankruptcy	   (Local	  Loan	  Co.	  V.	  Hunt,	   292	  U.S.	  234,	  245	  (1934)).	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Kenneth	  Klee,	  one	  of	   the	  drafters	  of	   the	  1978	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	   calls	   Sutherland’s	  opinion	   “a	   powerful	   statement	   that	   would	   serve	   as	   the	   backbone	   of	   American	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  law	  for	  the	  next	  70	  years	  (Klee	  2008,	  407).	  	  	  	  	   A	  corresponding	  view	  recognizes	  the	  public	  value	  of	  maximizing	  debt	  relief.	  	  Such	   expressions	   were	   being	   made	   as	   early	   as	   1890,	   when	   the	   House	   Judiciary	  Committee	  reported	  the	  following:	  	  It	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  concern	  that	  every	  citizen	  should	  have	  an	  opportunity	  to	  pursue	  the	  calling	  for	  which	  he	  is	  best	  adapted	  and	  in	  the	  way	  and	  under	  the	   circumstances	   which	   will	   enable	   him	   to	   be	   as	   large	   a	   producer	   as	  possible,	  to	  the	  end	  that	  the	  aggregate	  wealth	  of	  the	  community	  in	  which	  he	  lives	  may	  be	  increased.	  	  When	  a	  man	  has	  paid	  his	  honest	  debts	  to	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  his	  property,	  it	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  public	  concern	  that	  he	   should	   be	   released	   from	   his	   indebtedness	   (House	   Judiciary	   Committee	  Report	  1890).	  	  	  Similar	   understandings	   of	   the	   fresh	   start’s	   collective	   role	   figure	   prominently	   in	  political	   and	   legal	   economists’	   analyses	  of	   consumer	  bankruptcy	   law	   (Baird	  2005;	  Jackson	   1986).	   	   Furthermore,	   when	   placed	   in	   a	   wider	   context,	   the	   fresh	   start	  complements	   the	   legal	   and	   legislative	   activity	   that	   dominated	   the	   Sixties	   and	  Seventies.	  	  Kagan	  (2001)	  writes	  that	  cultural	  norms	  among	  policy	  elites	  in	  that	  time	  period	  reflected	  an	  expectation	   that	  rich	  societies	  should	  enact	   laws	   to	  ameliorate	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  victims	  of	  misfortune.	  	  	  Given	   the	  monopoly’s	   status	  within	   its	   own	   field	   and	   the	   consonance	  of	   its	  policy	   image	  with	   the	  broader	  political	  environment,	   its	  dominance	  of	   substantive	  policymaking	   leading	   up	   to	   enactment	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code	   in	   1978	   is	   no	  surprise.	  	  That	  dominance	  would	  prove	  strong	  enough	  to	  defeat	  a	  direct	  effort	  by	  the	  federal	  bench	  and	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  himself	  to	  split	  the	  monopoly	  and	  deny	  referees	  full	  judicial	  status	  under	  the	  new	  law.	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B.	   Bankruptcy	  Reform:	  Enactment	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  Bankruptcy	  policymaking	  entered	  a	   long	  period	  of	  stability	  after	  enactment	  of	   the	   Chandler	   Act	   in	   1938.	   	   	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones’	   punctuated	   equilibrium	  model	   predicts	   such	   periods	   following	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   policy	   monopoly.	  	  However,	   the	   lull	   in	   policymaking	   activity	   must	   be	   attributed	   in	   part,	   at	   least	  initially,	   to	   the	   national	   mobilization	   effort,	   which	   led	   to	   a	   large	   decline	   in	   the	  number	   of	   new	   personal	   and	   business	   bankruptcy	   cases	   filed	   during	   the	   Second	  World	   War.	   	   	   That	   downturn	   contributed	   to	   a	   major	   change	   in	   the	   way	   the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  operated.	  	  Congress	  passed	  the	  Salary	  Act	  in	  1946	  at	  the	  urging	  of	  the	  Justice	  Department.	  	  The	  Salary	  Act	  brought	  the	  referees	  within	  the	  authority	  of	  the	   Administrative	   Office	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Courts,	   and	   replaced	   their	  commission-­‐based	   system	   of	   compensation	   with	   a	   simple	   salary	   and	   overhead	  structure.	   	  The	   referees	  had	  been	  opposed	   to	   such	  action	   in	   the	  1930s.	   	  However,	  case	  filings	  had	  fallen	  so	  low	  during	  the	  war	  that	  the	  commissions	  received	  by	  many	  referees	   were	   inadequate	   to	   keep	   their	   offices	   open,	   let	   alone	   pay	   themselves	  (DeNatale	  and	  Abrams	  1995,	  93).	  	  	  Hence,	  the	  Salary	  Act	  passed	  without	  opposition	  from	  within	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  even	   though	   the	   law	  also	  provided	  for	  the	  consolidation	  and	  reduction	  of	  several	  referee	  positions,	  especially	  part-­‐time	  ones,	  causing	  some	  referees	  to	  lose	  their	  jobs.	  	  Otherwise,	  the	  long	  period	  from	  the	  Forties	  to	  the	  Sixties	  was	  one	  of	  stability	  in	   U.S.	   bankruptcy	   law.	   	   Statutory	   changes	   were	   few,	   technical,	   and	   minor;	   none	  changed	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  the	  law.	  	  Changes	  that	  were	  made	  arose	  from	  within	  the	   community.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   section	   of	   the	   1938	   Chandler	   Act	   governing	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business	   reorganizations	   (Chapter	   XI,	   a	   predecessor	   to	   the	   modern	   Chapter	   11)	  required	   debtors	   to	   file	   voluminous,	   detailed	   documentation	   to	   start	   a	   new	   case,	  even	  when	  the	  perils	  of	  delay	  might	  be	  devastating.	  This	  worked	  to	  the	  disadvantage	  of	   some	  debtors,	  who	  often	  needed	   to	   file	   their	   cases	  quickly	   in	  order	   to	  obtain	   a	  stay	   of	   state	   court	   collection	   proceedings.	   	   The	   bankruptcy	   courts	   in	   some	  jurisdictions,	  including	  the	  Southern	  District	  of	  New	  York,	  adopted	  rules	  to	  facilitate	  emergency	  case	  filings	  by	  allowing	  debtors	  to	  file	  certain	  documents	  subsequent	  to	  their	   petitions.	   	   The	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference	   then	   incorporated	   a	   similar	  provision	   in	   an	   omnibus	   bankruptcy	   bill	   that	   was	   enacted	   by	   Congress	   in	   1952	  (Montgomery	  1953).	  	  Other	  bankruptcy	  legislation	  of	  the	  period	  also	  made	  technical	  adjustments	  to	  the	  existing	  law	  and	  followed	  similar	  paths	  to	  enactment.	  However,	  in	  articles	  and	  elsewhere,	  the	  referees	  in	  this	  period	  began	  focusing	  on	   two	   types	   of	   issues.	   	   The	   first	   set	   included	   an	   increased	   attention	   to	   legal	  questions,	   as	   opposed	   to	  matters	   of	   case	   administration.	   	   The	   issues	   in	   the	   other	  group	  were	  joined	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  have	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  treated	  as	  full-­‐fledged	  judicial	   tribunals	   and	   not	   as	   adjuncts	   of	   the	   district	   courts.	   	   	   These	   two	   concerns	  became	  the	  underlying	  themes	  driving	  bankruptcy	  reform	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	  	  By	  the	  start	  of	  that	  decade,	  the	  referees’	  two	  issues	  were	  incorporated	  within	  the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	  wider	   consensus	   that	   the	   nation’s	   bankruptcy	  laws	  were	   in	   need	   of	  major	   reform.	   	   As	   the	   following	   account	   shows,	   substantive	  reforms	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  relatively	  easy	  to	  achieve,	  given	  the	  community’s	  control	  of	  policymaking.	   	   The	   greater	   challenge	   to	   reform	   came	   from	   the	   opposition	   of	   the	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remainder	   of	   the	   federal	   bench	   to	   enhancing	   the	   status	   and	   privileges	   to	   be	  accorded	  the	  referees.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  overhaul	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  bankruptcy	  law	  in	  1978	  can	  be	  analytically	   divided	   into	   two	   parts.	   	   The	   first	   part	   was	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   new	  “Bankruptcy	  Code,”	  which	  expanded	  protections	  for	  individual	  debtors	  and	  created	  a	   revolutionary	   process	   for	   business	   reorganization	   that	   remains	   the	   envy	   of	   the	  industrialized	   world.	   	   The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   1970s	   reform	   process	   was	   a	  contentious	  debate	  over	  the	  status	  and	  duties	  of	  bankruptcy	  judges	  under	  the	  new	  law.	   	  That	  conflict	   initially	  divided	  two	  of	  the	  monopoly’s	  constituent	  parts,	  pitting	  the	   referees	   against	   the	   NBC.	   	   However,	   intervention	   of	   the	   community’s	   third	  element,	  members	  of	  Congress,	  would	  broker	  a	  reconciliation	  of	  the	  divided	  groups.	  	  The	   monopoly	   would	   hold,	   and	   prevail,	   establishing	   the	   primary	   legislative	  framework	  under	  which	  bankruptcy	  cases	  are	  administered	  yet	  today.	  As	  would	   be	   true	   in	   the	   1990s,	   bankruptcy	   reform	   gained	   attention	   in	   the	  Seventies	   because	   of	   increases	   in	   the	   number	   of	   new	   case	   filings,	   particularly	   by	  consumers.	  The	  post-­‐war	  expansion	  of	  the	  American	  economy	  and	  the	  related	  rise	  of	  consumer	  credit	  had	  by	  the	  late	  sixties	  led	  to	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  new	  bankruptcy	   cases	   filed	   annually.44	  	  Annual	  personal	  bankruptcy	   filings,	  which	  had	   remained	   below	   20,000	   as	   late	   as	   1949,	   increased	   to	   131,402	   by	   1960	   and	  178,202	   by	   1970	   (Skeel	   2001,	   137).45	  	   On	   the	   business	   side,	   case	   volumes	   were	  rarely	   burdensome.	   	   Rather,	   the	   increased	   complexity	   of	   commercial	   transactions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Critics	   of	   the	  bankruptcy	  process	   also	   claimed	   that	   filing	  bankruptcy	   lacked	   the	  stigma	  that	  it	  had	  in	  the	  past,	  much	  as	  they	  would	  again	  in	  the	  1990s.	  45	  Business	   filings	   also	   increased	   overall	   during	   the	   same	   period,	   albeit	   in	   much	  smaller	  numbers.	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and	   a	   shifting	   emphasis	   on	   rehabilitating	   troubled	   firms	   had	   outgrown	   the	  Bankruptcy	   Act’s	   cumbersome	   restructuring	   rules,	   leading	   to	   a	   widespread	  consensus	  favoring	  the	  overhaul	  of	  existing	  corporate	  reorganization	  laws.	  The	   increased	  volumes	  of	  new	  cases	   exacerbated	  existing	  pressures	  on	   the	  courts,	   fueling	   perceptions	   that	   bankruptcy	   administration	   was	   ineffective	   and	  inefficient.	   	   Moreover,	   despite	   periodic	   changes	   made	   since	   1946,	   bankruptcy	  administration	  was	  commonly	  perceived	  in	  some	  quarters	  to	  be	  to	  be	  unethical	  and	  even	   corrupt,	   echoing	   criticisms	   that	   initiated	   the	   investigations	   that	   led	   to	   the	  Chandler	   Act	   in	   the	   1930s.	   	   In	   1971,	   the	   Brookings	   Institution	   issued	   a	   much-­‐anticipated	  report	  primarily	  blaming	  the	  referees	  for	  the	  problem,	  describing	  them	  as	   undisciplined,	   sometimes	   corrupt,	   and	   as	   fostering	   cronyism	   that	   enriched	   the	  referees’	  preferred	  trustees,	  lawyers,	  appraisers,	  and	  auctioneers	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  bankruptcy	   professionals	   outside	   of	   the	   local	   “rings,”	   to	   say	   nothing	   of	   the	  bankrupts	  themselves	  and	  their	  creditors.	  Bankruptcy	   referees	   countered	   that	   the	   Brookings	   report’s	   assessment	   of	  blame	   was	   misplaced.	   	   They	   blamed	   flaws	   in	   the	   statutory	   structure	   of	   the	  bankruptcy	   system,	   which	   relegated	   them	   to	   a	   quasi-­‐judicial	   status	   without	  authority	  to	  effectively	  resolve	  many	  questions	  arising	  in	  the	  cases	  over	  which	  they	  presided.	  	  District	  judges	  continued	  to	  have	  primary	  judicial	  authority	  under	  the	  Act.	  	  However,	  because	  many	  district	   judges	  disliked	  bankruptcy	  matters,	   the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  exercised	  their	  supervisory	  powers	  varied	  from	  court	  to	  court.	  In	  fact,	  by	  the	  1960s	  newer	  referees	  were	  speaking	  out	  in	  favor	  of	  reforming	  the	   bankruptcy	   system.	   	   Periodic	   educational	   conferences	   conducted	   by	   the	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Administrative	   Office	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Courts,	   as	   well	   as	   communication	   and	  meetings	  within	   the	   referees’	   national	   association,	   provided	   these	   referees	  with	   a	  forum	   for	   developing	   their	   ideas.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   referees	   had	   by	   the	   1970s	  developed	  a	  strong	  working	  relationship	  with	  Congress	  (Zelenko	  1969).	  Therefore,	  they	  were	  ready	  to	  act	  when	  Congress	  took	  up	  the	  issue	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform	  in	  the	  late	  sixties.	  	  	  Congressional	   action	   began	   in	   1968	  when	   a	   bankruptcy	   trustee	   told	  North	  Dakota’s	   Democratic	   Senator	   Quentin	   Burdick	   about	   the	   difficulties	   he	   faced	  administering	   his	   cases	   on	   account	   of	   the	   referees’	   limited	   authority	   in	   business	  cases	   (2007a,	  6).	   	  Burdick	  had	  been	  a	  practicing	  attorney	  before	  entering	  politics,	  and	   his	   interest	   was	   piqued	   by	   the	   trustee’s	   complaint.	   He	   sent	   a	   letter	   to	   each	  referee	  seeking	  comments	  on	  the	  existing	  system.	  	  The	  number	  of	  responses	  citing	  a	  need	  for	  reform	  was	  overwhelming	  and	  led	  Burdick	  to	  introduce	  legislation	  creating	  a	  bankruptcy	  review	  commission.	  	  	  	  	  Burdick’s	   counterpart	   in	   the	   House	   was	   California	   Congressman	   Don	  Edwards,	   who	   took	   up	   the	   issue	   of	   reform	   via	   his	   Subcommittee	   on	   Civil	   and	  Constitutional	   Rights.	   	   Edwards	  was	   a	   liberal	  Democrat	   and	   a	   “good	   government”	  advocate	  who	  became	  one	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform’s	  primary	  congressional	  champions	  (Mund	   2007a).	   	   With	   Edwards	   taking	   the	   lead	   in	   the	   House,	   Congress	   enacted	  Burdick’s	   bill	   establishing	   the	   Commission	   on	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Laws	   of	   the	   United	  States46	  in	  1969.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  The	  commission	  was	  commonly	  identified	  both	  in	  the	  media	  and	  by	  its	  members	  as	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Review	  Commission,	  which	  is	  also	  the	  name	  given	  to	  the	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The	   commission	   was	   established	   in	   1970,	   with	   members	   selected	   by	   the	  President,	   the	   Chief	   Justice,	   the	   Speaker	   of	   the	   House,	   and	   the	   president	   of	   the	  Senate.	   	  However,	   there	  arose	  at	   this	   juncture	  what	  was	   to	  be	   the	  reform	  process’	  most	   prominent	   and	   enduring	   controversy.	   	   President	   Nixon’s	   appointees	   were	  fairly	   conventional	   and	   included	   two	   members	   from	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	  Conference:	  Harold	  Marsh,	  a	  prominent	  Los	  Angeles	  commercial	  bankruptcy	  lawyer	  who	  became	   the	   commission’s	   chair,	   and	  Charles	   Seligson,	   the	  NBC’s	  president	   as	  well	   as	   a	   practicing	   attorney	   and	   a	  member	   of	   the	  New	  York	   Law	   School	   Faculty.	  	  The	  president	  also	  appointed	  Wilson	  Newman,	  the	  former	  head	  of	  Dun	  &	  Bradstreet	  to	  the	  commission.	  	  The	  congressional	  appointees	  were	  likewise	  non-­‐controversial.	  	  Besides	   Burdick	   and	   Edwards,	   Representative	   Charles	   Wiggins,	   a	   California	  Republican,	   and	  Senator	  Marlow	  Cook	   (R-­‐KY)	  were	  named	   to	   the	   commission.	   	   In	  addition	   to	   having	   a	   special	   interest	   in	   bankruptcy	   reform,	   all	   of	   the	   legislative	  appointees	  had	  been	  practicing	  lawyers	  before	  seeking	  elective	  office.	  	  However,	   the	   Chief	   Justice’s	   appointees	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   particularly	  controversial,	  first	  because	  neither	  was	  a	  bankruptcy	  referee,	  and	  second	  because	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  appointees	  was	  openly	  contemptuous	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts.	  	  The	  referees	   certainly	   expected	   to	   have	   a	   place	   on	   the	   committee.	   	   Their	   national	  association,	  The	  National	  Conference	  of	  Referees	  in	  Bankruptcy,	  took	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  hearings	  on	  Burdick’s	  bill,	  the	  original	  version	  of	  which	  expressly	  provided	  for	  the	  appointment	  of	  two	  referees	  as	  commission	  members.	  	  As	  a	  whole,	  the	  referees	  were	   keenly	   interested	   not	   only	   in	   raising	   the	   level	   of	   administration	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  congressional	   commission	   formed	   in	   the	   1990s	   to	   investigate	   and	   propose	   new	  bankruptcy	  law	  reforms.	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bankruptcy	  courts,	  but	  in	  enhancing	  their	  own	  status	  as	  judicial	  officers.	   	  Although	  not	   overtly	   political,	   the	   referees	   group	   followed	   the	   practice	   established	   by	   Paul	  King	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  had	  taken	  an	  active	  role	  in	  substantively	  shaping	  bankruptcy	  legislation,	   establishing	   good	   working	   relationships	   with	   members	   of	   Congress	  along	   the	  way.	   	   Although	   the	   referees	   association’s	   public	   activities	   declined	   after	  the	  Chandler	  Act’s	  adoption,	  interest	  among	  its	  members	  was	  rekindled	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  when	  the	  referees	  periodically	  met	  at	  educational	  conferences	  organized	  by	  the	  United	  States	  Courts’	  administrative	  office	  (Mund	  2007a,	  4-­‐5).	  	  By	  the	  1970s,	  the	  referees	   association	   had	   played	   significant	   roles	   in	   drafting	   specific,	   albeit	  piecemeal,	   reforms	   (Zelenko	   1968).	   	   More	   directly,	   the	   testimony	   of	   the	   group’s	  members	  on	  the	  need	  for	  reform	  played	  a	  prominent	  part	   in	  Congress’	  decision	  to	  form	  the	  review	  commission	  (Cyr	  1975).	  	  	  However,	   notwithstanding	   the	   referees’	   substantive	   expertise	   and	   the	   role	  they	   played	   in	   the	   commission’s	   creation,	   they	  were	   denied	   even	   one	   of	   its	   seats	  because	   of	   the	   efforts	   of	   Judicial	   Conference	   of	   the	   United	   States.	   The	   Judicial	  Conference	   of	   the	   United	   States	   is	   the	   federal	   judiciary’s	   supervisory	   body.	  	  Moreover,	   it	   is	   the	   federal	   bench’s	   primary	   liaison	   with	   Congress	   on	   matters	   of	  judicial	   policy.	   	   The	   conference’s	   membership	   includes	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   of	   the	  United	  States,	  who	  serves	  as	  its	  chair;	  the	  chief	  judge	  from	  each	  federal	  circuit	  court	  of	   appeals;	   a	   district	   judge	   from	   each	   federal	   circuit;	   and	   the	   chief	   judge	   of	   the	  International	  Court	  of	  Trade.	  	  Much	  of	  its	  work	  takes	  place	  in	  standing	  committees,	  including	  one	  on	  bankruptcy	  administration.	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Many	  members	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Conference	  were	  disdainful	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  and	  the	  referees,	  and	  became	  more	  assertive	   in	  expressing	  their	   feelings	  as	  the	  latter	  group	  increased	  its	  efforts	  to	  enhance	  their	  authority.	  	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Warren	  Burger,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  referees’	  most	  vocal	  opponents.	  	  As	  recounted	  by	  Judge	  Mund,	  “Burger	  had	  told	  a	  member	  of	  Representative	  Edwards’	  staff	  that	  ‘a	  magistrate	  is	  three	  times	  more	  important	  than	  a	  bankruptcy	  referee’	  and	  that	  ‘elevating	  the	  referees	  to	  judicial	  stature	  is	  like	  elevating	  clerks	  of	  courts	  (Mund	  2007b,	  186).’”	  	  The	  members	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Conference	  barely	  tried	  to	  express	  their	  concerns	   in	   terms	   of	   policy,	   and	   instead	   were	   explicit	   in	   their	   belief	   that	   giving	  referees	   full	   judicial	   status	   would	   diminish	   the	   prestige	   of	   their	   own	   Article	   III	  appointments	   (Mund	  2007b;	  Posner,	  1998;	  Skeel	  2001).	   	   Judicial	  attitudes	   toward	  the	  referees	   took	  on	  petty	  dimensions	   in	  some	   jurisdictions;	   referees	  were	  denied	  reserved	  parking	   spaces	  at	   some	  courthouses,	   and	  others	  were	   forbidden	   to	  wear	  judicial	   robes.	   	   Some	   referees	  were	   barred	   from	   the	   judges’	   dining	   rooms	   (Mund	  1978b,	  184-­‐5).	  	  Therefore,	   the	   Judicial	   Conferences’	   primary	   interest	   in	   bankruptcy	   reform	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  did	  not	  result	  in	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  referees’	  status	  or	  the	  diminishment	   of	   their	   own	   sense	   of	   prestige.	   The	   Judicial	   Conference	   successfully	  lobbied	   to	   have	   the	   referee-­‐designated	   seats	   on	   the	   review	   commission	   removed	  from	  the	  House	  version	  of	  Burdick’s	  bill,	  although	  Burdick	  believed	  he	  had	  the	  Chief	  Justice’s	  agreement	  to	  name	  two	  bankruptcy	  referees	  to	  the	  panel	  regardless	  of	  the	  deletion.	  	  Instead,	  Chief	  Justice	  Burger	  appointed	  two	  federal	  district	  judges,	  Edward	  Weinfeld	   of	   the	   Southern	   District	   of	   New	   York	   and	   Hubert	   Will	   of	   the	   Northern	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District	   of	   Illinois.	   	   Although	   Weinfeld	   was	   chair	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Conference’s	  Committee	   on	   Bankruptcy	   Administration,	   he	   was,	   like	   many	   of	   his	   conference	  colleagues,	  openly	  hostile	  toward	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  (Skeel	  2001,	  138).	  	  	  	  With	  the	  referees	  at	   least	  temporarily	  blocked	  from	  the	  reform	  process,	  the	  Commission	   began	   its	   work.	   	   Just	   as	   the	   president	   drew	   from	   the	   National	  Bankruptcy	   Conference	   membership	   to	   fill	   two	   of	   his	   three	   appointments,	   the	  conference	  itself	  looked	  to	  the	  NBC	  to	  fill	  its	  main	  staff	  position.	  	  The	  commission’s	  executive	  director	  and	  reporter	  was	  Frank	  Kennedy	  of	   the	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  an	   NBC	   member	   and	   one	   of	   the	   nation’s	   foremost	   bankruptcy	   experts.	   	   NBC	  members	   filled	  out	  most	  of	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  commission’s	  staff	   (Warren	  1999,	  191).	  	  Joining	  them	  were	  professors	  Walter	  Phillips	  of	  Texas	  Tech	  and	  Philip	  Shuchman	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Connecticut.	  Phillips	  was	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  NBC,	  but	  was	  active	  in	  bankruptcy	  matters	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  American	  Bar	  Association.47	  	  	  The	  Commission	  began	  work	   in	   June	  1971,	  conducting	   four	  public	  hearings	  and	  deliberating	  as	  a	  full	  committee	  a	  total	  of	  44	  days	  (Klee,	  277).	  	  Its	  staff	  naturally	  devoted	   more	   time	   and	   effort	   to	   the	   project;	   the	   Commission	   submitted	   its	   final	  report	   to	   Congress	   on	   July	   30,	   1973.	   	   The	   Commission’s	   bill	   was	   introduced	  simultaneously	   in	   both	   the	   House	   (H.R.	   10792)	   and	   Senate	   (S.	   4026)	   in	   the	   first	  session	  of	  the	  93rd	  Congress	  (1973).	  	  The	  changes	  proposed	  by	  the	  commission	  were	  dramatic.	   	  On	  the	  commercial	  side,	   it	  proposed	  replacing	  the	  old	  and	  cumbersome	  Chapters	   X,	   XI,	   and	   XII	  with	   an	   all-­‐new	  Chapter	   11,	  which	   provided,	   among	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Phillips	   was	   a	   latecomer	   to	   academia;	   in	   1961,	   he	   was	   appointed	   a	   referee	   in	  bankruptcy	   for	   the	   Northern	   District	   of	   Georgia.	   	   At	   29	   years	   of	   age,	   he	   was	   the	  youngest	  referee	  in	  the	  United	  States	  at	  the	  time.	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things,	   for	   greater	   debtor	   control	   of	   reorganizing	   companies.	   	   It	   created	   a	   new	  Chapter	  13	  bankruptcy	  that	  would	  allow	  consumers	  filers	  the	  opportunity	  to	  repay	  all	   or	   a	   portion	   of	   their	   obligations	   over	   time	   without	   losing	   their	   non-­‐exempt	  property.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  gave	  the	  referees48	  greater	  authority	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  cases	  than	  they	  had	  under	  the	  Act.	  	  Conversely,	  it	  dramatically	  limited	  the	  role	  the	  referees	  would	  play	  in	  most	  bankruptcy	  cases	  by	  assigning	  the	  routine	  duties	  of	  bankruptcy	  administration	  to	  a	  new	  national	  bankruptcy	  administrator.	  As	  Heclo	  (1978)	  explained,	  policy	  networks	  are	  not	  monolithic,	  and	  factions	  within	  the	  network	  are	  sometimes	  in	  conflict.	  	  The	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  is	  no	  exception	  to	  that	  rule.	   	  While	  the	  Commission	  and	  the	  referees	  were	   in	  general	  accord	   on	   substantive	   changes	   to	   bankruptcy	   law,	   they	   differed	   on	   the	   former’s	  proposed	  administrative	  reforms.	  	  Although	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  would	  have	  enhanced	  the	  referees’	  judicial	  powers,	  many	  of	  them	  feared	  that	  the	  elimination	  of	  administrative	   responsibilities	   would	   lead	   to	   significant	   cuts	   in	   their	   overall	  numbers.	  	  Their	  concerns	  were	  bolstered	  by	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  commission	  at	  the	  insistence	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Conference.	  	  	  However,	   the	   referees	   had	   one	   vitally	   important	   advantage,	  which	  was	   the	  close	   working	   relationships	   they	   had	   developed	   with	   key	   members	   of	   Congress,	  particularly	  bankruptcy	  reform’s	  principal	  supporters,	  Representative	  Edwards	  and	  Senator	   Burdick	   (Cyr,	   1975,	   99-­‐100).	   Those	   relationships	   ensured	   the	   referees	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Or	  judges,	  as	  they	  were	  designated	  in	  1974	  in	  the	  first	  uniform	  set	  of	  bankruptcy	  rules,	  and	  would	  be	  identified	  under	  the	  new	  law.	  	  The	  rules	  had	  been	  approved	  by	  the	   Judicial	   Conference,	   which	   apparently	   did	   not	   understand	   their	   implications	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   judicial	   designation.	   	   The	   conference	   sought	   unsuccessfully	  throughout	   their	   subsequent	   lobbying	  efforts	  on	   the	  bankruptcy	   reform	  bill	   to	  get	  Congress	  to	  revert	  to	  the	  referee	  title.	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continued	  access	  to	  the	  legislative	  process,	  if	  not	  to	  the	  commission’s	  deliberations.	  	  	  When	  in	  1974	  the	  judges	  were	  ready	  to	  move	  forward,	  Representative	  Edwards	  and	  Senator	   Burdick	   each	   cosponsored	   their	   bill	   while	   simultaneously	   sponsoring	   the	  Commission’s	  proposed	  legislation.	  The	   competing	  bills	   and	   the	   split	  within	   the	   community	   that	   they	   reflected	  had	   the	   effect	   of	   impeding	   the	   progress	   of	   either.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   neither	   advanced	  beyond	  the	  subcommittee	  stage	  in	  the	  93rd	  Congress.	  	  Each	  bill	  was	  reintroduced	  in	  both	   the	   House	   and	   in	   the	   Senate	   in	   1975,	   with	   the	   same	   sponsors.	   	   However,	  neither	   faction	   within	   the	   community	   exhibited	   an	   interest	   in	   resolving	   their	  differences,	   jeopardizing	  the	  likelihood	  that	  any	  legislation	  would	  be	  passed.	   	  With	  his	  signature	  project	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  collapse,	  Representative	  Edwards	  advised	  the	  National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference	   and	   the	   referees49	  to	   resolve	   their	   differences	   or	  else	  bankruptcy	  reform	  would	  fail	  (Klee,	  279;	  Skeel	  2001,	  140).50	  	  	  Edwards	  warning	  was	  sufficient	  to	  bring	  the	  two	  factions	  together,	  and	  they	  resolved	  their	  differences	  in	  a	  series	  of	  meetings	  in	  1975-­‐76.	  	  However,	  the	  unified	  group	   did	   not	   present	   new	   legislation	   in	   place	   of	   their	   different	   drafts.	   	   Instead,	  Edwards	  directed	  his	  staff	  for	  the	  Judiciary	  Committee’s	  Subcommittee	  on	  Civil	  and	  Constitutional	  Rights	  to	  prepare	  a	  new	  bill	  reconciling	  differences	  in	  the	  commission	  and	   judges’	   bills.	   	   According	   to	   one	   of	   the	   staffers,	  Kenneth	  Klee,	   they	   extensively	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	   referees	   became	   identified	   as	   bankruptcy	   judges	   under	  when	  new	  Rules	   of	  Bankruptcy	  Procedure	  designated	  them	  as	  such	  in	  1974.	  They	  will	  be	  described	  as	  judges	  from	  this	  point	  forward	  in	  this	  account	  to	  maintain	  historical	  consistency.	  50	  It	   is	   interesting	   to	   note	   that	   accounts	   of	   this	   event	   specifically	   mention	   the	  National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference,	   and	   not	   the	   review	   commission,	   as	   one	   of	   the	  recipients	  of	  Edwards’	  warning.	  	  The	  Commission	  had	  maintained	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	   the	   development	   of	   new	   legislation,	   both	   in	   its	   historic	   role	   and	   through	   its	  members	  on	  the	  review	  commission.	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sought	   and	   incorporated	   the	   contributions	   of	   “bankruptcy	   experts,”	   including	  referees,	  attorneys	  and	  law	  professors,	  both	  to	  develop	  the	  bill	  that	  was	  introduced	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  new	  Congress	  in	  1977,	  and	  through	  committee	  mark-­‐ups	  to	  consideration	  by	  the	  full	  Judiciary	  Committee	  in	  July	  1977	  (Klee,	  280-­‐2).	  	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   at	   this	   juncture	   that	   the	   most	   serious	   concerns	   about	  bankruptcy	   reform	   continued	   to	   be	   the	   formal	   status	   of	   bankruptcy	   judges	   under	  the	   new	   law,	   as	   the	   Judicial	   Conference	   remained	   opposed	   to	   any	  measures	   that	  would	   bring	   them	   closer	   to	   the	   privileges	   and	   authority	   possessed	   by	   Article	   III	  judges.	   	  Efforts	   to	   find	  compromise	  were	  unsuccessful.	   	  Peter	  Rodino,	  chairman	  of	  the	   Judiciary	   Committee,	   sought	   to	   resolve	   the	   controversy	   by	   obtaining	   the	  opinions	   of	   some	  of	   the	   country’s	   leading	   constitutional	   scholars,	   including	  Erwin	  Griswold,	  Herbert	  Wechsler,	  and	  Charles	  Alan	  Wright.	  	  However,	  the	  scholars	  were	  themselves	   split	   on	   the	   question,	   and	   so	   they	   had	   no	   effect	   on	   the	   congressional	  debate.	  Similarly,	   a	   provision	   in	   the	   bill	   would	   have	   altered	   tax	   collections	   from	  debtors	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  government.	  	  Implication	  of	  the	  Tax	  Code	  meant	  that	  the	  bill	  would	  have	  to	  be	  referred	  to	  the	  House	  Ways	  and	  Means	  Committee.	  	  Edwards	  and	  his	   allies	   feared	   that	   such	   referral	  would	   result	   in	  dramatic	   alterations	   to	   the	  bill.	  	  However	  the	  referral	  to	  Ways	  and	  Means	  was	  averted	  when	  the	  Judiciary	  Committee	  agreed	  to	  revise	  certain	  tax	  provisions	  so	  that	  they	  only	  applied	  to	  non-­‐federal	  taxes.	  	  This	   allowed	   Judiciary	   to	   retain	   control	   over	   the	   bill	   and	   restrict	   access	   to	   the	  drafting	  and	  revision	  process.	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The	  House	  bill,	  now	  identified	  as	  H.R.	  8200,	  adopted	  many	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  judges’	   preferred	   policies.	   	   It	   elevated	   the	   judges	   to	   full	   Article	   III	   status	   but	   also	  created	  a	  separate	  office	  of	   the	  U.S.	   trustee	  within	   the	  Department	  of	   Justice.	   	  The	  new	   U.S.	   trustee	   would	   be	   responsible	   for,	   among	   other	   things,	   appointing	   case	  trustees	  to	  administer	  individual	  bankruptcy	  cases.	  	  This	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  reforms	  enacted	  in	  the	  1978	  Code.	  	  Transferring	  the	  authority	  to	  appoint	  case	  trustees	  to	  the	  new	  agency	  denied	  judges	  their	  most	  important	  source	  of	  patronage	  and	  effectively	  ended	  the	  despised	  bankruptcy	  rings.	  	  	  The	  legislation,	  as	  amended,	  was	  reported	  out	  of	  the	  Judiciary	  Committee	  on	  a	   vote	   of	   23-­‐8	   on	   September	   8,	   1977.	   	   It	   did	   so	   over	   the	   active	   opposition	   of	   the	  Judicial	   Conference,	   which	   had	   published	   its	   own	   report	   in	   April	   1977	   opposing	  increased	   independence	   for	   bankruptcy	   judges	   and	   courts.	   	   However,	   while	   the	  Judicial	  Conference’s	  position	  did	  not	   find	   favor	  within	   the	   Judiciary	  Committee,	   it	  gained	  more	   favorable	   treatment	  when	   the	   bill	   came	   up	   for	   consideration	   by	   the	  entire	   House,	   succeeding	   via	   a	   late	   floor	   amendment	   from	   Representatives	  Danielson	  and	  Railsback	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  183-­‐158.	  Edwards	   believed	   that	   H.R.	   8200’s	   enhanced	   status	   for	   bankruptcy	   judges	  was	   essential	   to	   effectively	   reform	   the	   bankruptcy	   system.	   	   Moreover,	   he	   was	  unwilling	   to	   give	   up	   on	   his	   judicial	   allies	   to	   gain	   passage	   of	   a	   bill.	   	   Utilizing	   a	  procedural	   prerogative,	   Edwards	   pulled	   H.R.	   8200	   from	   the	   floor	   after	   the	  Danielson-­‐Railsback	  amendment	  passed,	  preventing	  it	  from	  moving	  further	  until	  the	  revision	  was	   stripped	   from	   the	   legislation.	   	  He	   then	  held	   hearings	   on	   the	   issue	   of	  judicial	   status	   and	   bankruptcy	   case	   administration	   in	   his	   Civil	   and	   Constitutional	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Rights	   Subcommittee,	   which	   reaffirmed	   its	   earlier	   position	   proposing	   Article	   III	  status	   for	   bankruptcy	   judges.	   	   Likewise,	   Senator	   Dennis	   DeConcini	   of	   Arizona51	  proceeded	  with	  hearings	  on	   the	  Senate’s	  bankruptcy	  bill,	   S.2266,	  which	   contained	  most	  of	  H.R.	  8200’s	  important	  provisions	  even	  though	  it	  did	  not	  provide	  full	  Article	  III	   status	   for	   bankruptcy	   judges.	   	   Although	   the	   two	   hearings	   were	   not	   formally	  coordinated,	   the	  prospect	  of	  conflict	  with	   the	  Senate	  bill	   raised	   the	   likelihood	   that	  the	   Danielson-­‐Railsback	   amendment	   would	   not	   survive.	   	   Finally,	   the	   judges’	  congressional	   supporters	   lobbied	   their	   colleagues	   to	   reverse	   their	   votes	   on	   the	  amendment.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	   Danielson-­‐Railsback	   amendment	  was	   stripped	   from	  H.R.	  8200,	  and	  the	  legislation	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  House.	  	  As	   indicated	  above,	   the	  Senate	  was	  already	  considering	   its	  own	  bankruptcy	  reform	   legislation.	   	   S.	   2266	  was	   introduced	   by	   Senator	   DeConcini	   on	   October	   31,	  1977,	   and	   it	   was	   substantially	   similar	   to	   H.R.	   8200.	   	   The	   Senate	   Judiciary	  Committee’s	  Subcommittee	  on	  Improvements	  in	  Judicial	  Machinery	  held	  hearings	  in	  November	  and	  December	  1977.	  	  It	  did	  not	  take	  up	  H.	  R.	  8200	  when	  it	  was	  received	  from	  the	  House.	  	  Instead,	  it	  advanced	  S.2266	  to	  the	  full	  Judiciary	  Committee,	  which	  approved	   it	   on	   July	   12,	   1978.	   	   From	   there,	   S.	   2266	   was	   referred	   to	   the	   Finance	  Committee,	   which	   approved	   it	   with	   amendments	   on	   August	   8,	   1978.	   	   The	   Senate	  then	  substituted	  the	  text	  of	  S.	  2266	  for	  the	  H.R.	  8200	  text,	  and	  passed	  the	  House	  bill	  as	  amended	  by	  unanimous	  consent	  on	  September	  22,	  1978.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  DeConcini	   replaced	   Senator	   Burdick	   when	   the	   latter	   moved	   from	   the	   Senate	  Subcommittee	   on	   Improvements	   to	   Judicial	   Machinery	   to	   the	   Appropriations	  Committee.	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At	  this	  juncture,	  ordinary	  congressional	  procedures	  require	  the	  formation	  of	  a	   conference	   committee	   to	   reconcile	   differences	   between	   the	   two	   chambers’	  versions	  of	   the	   legislation.	   	  However,	  because	  of	   the	  pending	  adjournment	   for	   the	  midterm	   election,	   the	   respective	   bill	   managers,	   Rep.	   Edwards	   in	   the	   House	   and	  Senator	  DeConcini	  in	  the	  Senate,	  were	  concerned	  that	  insufficient	  time	  remained	  on	  the	   congressional	   calendar	   to	   form	   a	   conference	   committee,	   let	   alone	  work	   out	   a	  conference	   report.	   	   Therefore,	   in	   lieu	  of	   forming	   a	   conference	   committee,	   the	   two	  bill	  managers	  met	  privately	  to	  resolve	  differences	  between	  the	  House	  and	  Senate.	  	  The	  House	  passed	  the	  managers’	  amended	  version	  of	  HR	  8200	  on	  September	  28,	   1978.	   	   As	   to	   the	   legislation’s	   most	   controversial	   issue,	   the	   amended	   bill	  established	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	   as	   independent	   courts	   within	   the	   federal	  judiciary.	  	  In	  a	  blow	  to	  the	  Judicial	  Conference,	  bankruptcy	  judges	  would	  be	  Article	  I	  judges,	  nominated	  by	  the	  president	  and	  confirmed	  by	  the	  Senate,	  who	  would	  serve	  14-­‐year	   terms.	   	   Despite	   the	   bankruptcy	   judges’	   Article	   I	   status,	   they	   would	   have	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  their	  Article	  III	  counterparts.	  With	  Congress	  scheduled	  to	  adjourn	  on	  October	  14,	  the	  bill	  was	  immediately	  forwarded	  to	  the	  Senate.	  	  Seizing	  the	  new	  opportunities	  presented	  by	  this	  transfer,	  Chief	  Justice	  Burger	  directly	  lobbied	  senators	  to	  reject	  H.R.	  8200.	  	  He	  even	  enlisted	  Griffin	  Bell,	  the	  Attorney	  General	  and	  a	  former	  court	  of	  appeals	  judge,	  to	  assist	  him	  in	   his	   effort	   to	   derail	   the	   bill.	   	   However,	   by	   this	   point	   legislative	  momentum	  was	  with	   the	   bill’s	   supporters,	   and	   H.R.	   8200	   passed	   the	   Senate	   with	   additional	  amendments	  on	  October	  5,	  1978.	  	  The	  House	  ratified	  the	  Senate-­‐passed	  version	  the	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next	  day,	  October	  6,	  1978.	  	  Burger	  appealed	  directly	  to	  Pres.	  Carter	  to	  veto	  the	  bill,	  but	  was	  again	  rejected.	  	  The	  president	  signed	  H.R.	  8200	  on	  November	  6,	  1978.	  
C.	   Analysis	  	   As	   this	   brief	   history	   suggests,	   the	   substantive	   proposals	   to	   reform	   the	  bankruptcy	   laws	   drew	   little	   attention	   beyond	   the	   policy	   community	   and	   were	  enacted	  with	  little	  controversy.	  	  Instead,	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  conflict	  over	  the	  adoption	  of	   the	  new	  Code	   came	   from	   the	   Judicial	   Conference’s	   opposition	   to	   enhancing	   the	  status	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  bench.	  	  While	  this	  intramural	  dispute	  garnered	  little	  public	  attention,	   it	  nonetheless	   threatened	  to	  capsize	  the	  reform	  process.	   	  Ultimately,	   the	  policy	  monopoly	   overcame	   this	   challenge	   to	   achieve	   virtually	   all	   of	   its	   objectives,	  assuring	  its	  dominance	  in	  the	  field	  for	  another	  twenty	  years.	  
1.	   The	  Judicial	  Conference	  and	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Bench	  	   The	   biggest	   obstacle	   to	   bankruptcy	   reform	   in	   the	   1990s	   came	   from	   the	  federal	  bench	  via	  the	  Judicial	  Conference	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Conference	  members	  were	   not,	   strictly	   speaking,	   opposed	   to	   bankruptcy	   reform;	   indeed,	   none	   of	   their	  concerns	   touched	  on	   the	   substance	  of	   bankruptcy	   law.	   	   Instead,	   the	   senior	   judges	  fixated	  on	  opposing	  any	  measure	  that	  would	  enhance	  the	  relative	  status	  of	  referees	  in	  bankruptcy.52	  However,	  despite	   the	  prestige	  of	   the	   federal	  bench	  and	   the	  active	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  The	  referees	  in	  bankruptcy	  began	  identifying	  themselves	  as	  judges	  in	  1974,	  based	  on	   provisions	   in	   the	   newly	   adopted	   Federal	   Rules	   of	   Bankruptcy	   Procedure	   that	  identified	   them	   as	   such.	   	   Although	   the	   inclusion	   of	   that	   designation	   in	   the	   Rules	  might	  have	  been	  inadvertent,	  it	  nonetheless	  quickly	  took	  hold	  and	  the	  referees	  were	  thereafter	   commonly	   called	   “judges.”	   	   The	   name	   change	   adds	   confusion	   to	   the	  debates	  leading	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  in	  1978,	  and	  particularly	  that	  part	   concerning	   the	   status	   of	   the	   referees.	   	   Therefore,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  chapter,	   the	   referees	   in	  bankruptcy	  will	  be	   identified	  by	   their	   formal	   titles,	   except	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involvement	  of	  Chief	   Justice	  Warren	  Burger,	   the	   Judicial	  Conference’s	  efforts	  were	  ultimately	  futile,	  demonstrating	  the	  difficulty	  in	  breaking	  a	  policy	  monopoly.	  As	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   explain,	   the	   long-­‐term	   stability	   of	   policies	   and	  policymaking	  systems	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  “the	  definition	   of	   the	   issues	   processed	   by	   those	   institutions,”	   i.e.,	   the	   dominant	   policy	  image.	   	   (Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   1994,	   15).	   	   	   The	   Judicial	   Conference’s	   efforts	   to	  thwart	   the	  referees	  were	  directed	  at	  both	   factors,	  at	   least	   initially.	   	   Institutionally,	  the	  law	  creating	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Review	  Commission	  gave	  the	  Chief	  Justice	  authority	  to	  appoint	  two	  of	   its	  members.	   	  Senator	  Burdick	  believed	  that	  he	  had	  an	  understanding	   with	   the	   Chief	   Justice	   that	   those	   appointees	   would	   include	  bankruptcy	  judges	  (Mund	  2007a,	  8).	  	  Instead,	  the	  appointees	  were	  members	  of	  the	  Judicial	   Conference	   outspoken	   in	   their	   disregard	   for	   the	   bankruptcy	   bench	   (Skeel	  2001).	  	  Not	  only	  were	  the	  referees	  seemingly	  kept	  out	  of	  the	  reform	  process,	  but	  the	  Judicial	   Conference	   also	   gained	   strategically	   key	   positions	   for	   advancing	   its	  exclusionary	  agenda.	  	  However,	   exclusion	   of	   the	   referees	   from	   the	   Commission	   did	   not	   diminish	  their	  influence	  on	  the	  bankruptcy	  reform	  process.	  	  The	  Judicial	  Conference	  failed	  to	  keep	   the	   referees	   out	   of	   the	   process	   because	   it	   incorrectly	   assumed	   that	   the	  congressionally	   established	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	   Commission	   had	  supplanted	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  as	  the	  dominant	  policymaking	  body	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	   those	   descriptions	   making	   reference	   to	   events	   occurring	   after	   the	   Code’s	  enactment.	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American	   bankruptcy	   policymaking.53	  	   That	   error	   is	   understandable.	   	   The	   NBRC	  included	  both	  prominent	  members	  of	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  and	  the	  congressional	  sponsors	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform.	  	  Given	  the	  federal	  judges’	  low	  regard	  for	   the	   bankruptcy	   bench,	   it	   is	   not	   surprising	   that	   they	   did	   not	   understand	   the	  referees’	   centrality	   to	   the	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   process.	   	   Beginning	   in	   the	  1960s,	  the	  referees	  reasserted	  themselves	  in	  the	  legislative	  process	  as	  advocates	  for	  changes	  to	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Act.	  	  In	  so	  doing,	  they	  formed	  working	  relationships	  with	  members	   of	   Congress	   interested	   in	   bankruptcy	   reform,	   including	   Representative	  Edwards	  and	  Senator	  Burdick.	   	  Those	  alliances	  served	  the	  referees	  well	  when	  they	  were	   excluded	   from	   the	   Review	   Commission.	   	   	   The	   referees	   drafted	   their	   own	  legislation.	  	  Representative	  Edwards	  and	  Senator	  Burdick	  ensured	  that	  the	  referees’	  bill	   would	   have	   equal	   standing	   in	   Congress	   with	   the	   Commissions’	   legislation	   by	  simultaneously	   sponsoring	   and	   introducing	   each	   of	   them.	   	   The	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community’s	  structure	  was	  stable	  enough	  to	  persist	  despite	  the	  Judicial	  Conferences	  serious	  efforts	  to	  sever	  one	  of	  its	  key	  parts.	  The	   Judicial	   Conference’s	   other	   effort	   to	   limit	   the	   referees’	   status	   was	   to	  redefine	   the	   image	   of	   technical	   competence	   cultivated	   by	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community	  since	   the	  1932	  hearings	  on	  reform.	   	  As	  already	  noted,	  members	  of	   the	  Conference	  repeatedly	  and	  publicly	  belittled	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  and	  the	  referees.	  	  However,	   instead	   of	   supporting	   their	   position,	   these	  were	   generally	   seen	   as	   petty	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53 	  Given	   the	   disdain	   expressed	   by	   members	   of	   the	   Judicial	   Conference	   for	  bankruptcy	  law	  in	  general	  and	  the	  referees	  in	  particular,	  it	  seems	  equally	  likely	  that	  the	   federal	   judges	  were	  unaware	  of	   the	  policymaking	  process	   in	   the	   field	   and	   the	  referees’	   unique	   role	   in	   it.	   	   Regardless,	   the	   notion	   that	   special	   legislative	  commissions	  can	  successfully	   replace	  entrenched	  policy	  processes	   is	   common	  and	  helps	  explain	  why	  special	  commissions	  rarely	  see	  their	  proposals	  enacted	  into	  law.	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and	  self-­‐serving,	  and	  they	  undermined	  the	  Judicial	  Conference’s	  own	  credibility	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform:	  While	   they	   [the	   Judicial	  Conference	  of	   the	  United	  States]	  argue	  strenuously	  that	  the	  transformation	  [of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts]	  will	  be	  too	  costly,	  it	  seems	  obvious	   that	   the	   overriding	   reason	   for	   their	   opposition	   is	   the	   upgrading	   of	  the	  referees	  to	  judges,	  the	  removal	  of	  influence,	  control	  and	  jurisdiction	  from	  district	  judges,	  and	  a	  perceived	  diminution	  in	  the	  status	  of	  the	  district	  judges	  (Stuart	  Eizenstat,	  Assistant	  to	  the	  President	  for	  Domestic	  Affairs	  and	  Policy,	  and	   Frank	   White,	   Domestic	   Policy	   Staff	   Associate	   Director	   for	   Justice	   and	  Civil	  Rights,	  in	  a	  memorandum	  to	  President	  Carter	  dated	  November	  4,	  1978,	  cited	  in	  Mund	  2007a,	  1).	  	  Ultimately,	   the	   bankruptcy	   judges	   mostly	   achieved	   what	   they	   wanted.	  	  Instead	  of	  Article	   III	   status,	   they	  were	  made	  Article	   I	   judges.	   	  Rather	   than	   lifetime	  appointments,	  the	  new	  law	  granted	  them	  terms	  of	  fourteen	  years,	  with	  no	  limits	  on	  renewals.	   	   In	   other	   respects,	   their	   judicial	   authority	   in	   bankruptcy	   matters	  approximated	  that	  of	  the	  federal	  bench.54	  	  The	  failure	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Conference’s	  effort	  to	  prevent	  enhancement	  of	  the	  referees’	   status	   demonstrates	   the	   difficulty	   of	   upending	   a	   well-­‐established	   policy	  regime.	   	   The	   prestige	   or	   official	   status	   of	   the	   challenger	   are	   by	   themselves	  insufficient	  to	  effect	  policy	  change.	  	  Moreover,	  perceived	  structural	  changes	  may	  be	  inadequate	   to	   affect	   significant	   changes	   in	   policymaking	   structures	   when	   they	  merely	   add	   new	   entities	   while	   existing	   monopolies	   remain	   intact.	   	   Finally,	   the	  challenger’s	  definition	  of	  relevant	  issues	  should	  broaden	  their	  appeal,	  not	  narrow	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  In	   the	   end,	   however,	   Chief	   Justice	   Burger	   had	   the	   last	  word	   on	   the	   subject.	   	   In	  1982,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   ruled	   that	   the	   new	   bankruptcy	   judgeships	   were	  unconstitutional	   because	   they	   improperly	   extended	   Article	   III	   powers	   to	   Article	   I	  judges.	  Northern	  Pipeline	  Co.	  v.	  Marathon	  Pipeline	  Co.,	   	  458	  U.S.	  50	  (1982).	  	  That	  led	  to	  a	  legislative	  scramble	  that	  re-­‐designated	  the	  bankruptcy	  judges	  as	  officials	  within	  the	  district	  courts,	  somewhat	  analogous	  to	  the	  U.S.	  magistrate	  judges,	  and	  somewhat	  narrowed	  the	  broad	  power	  granted	  them	  in	  the	  1978	  Code.	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to	   only	   reflect	   their	   own	   unique	   interests.	   	   Without	   either	   permanent	   structural	  changes	  or	   a	  message	  with	  broader	  appeal,	   the	   Judicial	  Conference’s	   actions	  were	  destined	  to	  fail.	  
2.	   The	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  and	  the	  Referees	  	  	   A	  more	   curious	   development	  was	   the	   split	   that	   arose	   between	   the	   Review	  Commission	   staffers	   from	   the	  National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference,	   particularly	   Frank	  Kennedy	  (the	  Commission’s	  reporter	  and	  chief	  of	  staff,	  and	  a	  prominent	  member	  of	  the	   NBC),	   and	   the	   referees.	   	   Dealings	   between	   the	   two	   groups	   were	   not	  confrontational,	   and	   the	   referees	   were	   invited	   to	   testify	   before	   the	   Commission.	  	  However,	   the	  Commission’s	  proposed	   legislation	  would	  have	   created	  an	  executive	  branch	  agency	   to	   take	  over	  many	  of	   the	  duties	  handled	  by	   the	   referees	  under	   the	  Act.	   	   That	   proposal	   was	   vigorously	   opposed	   by	   the	   referees	   and	   was	   a	   primary	  reason	  for	  their	  decision	  to	  proceed	  with	  drafting	  their	  own	  bill	  (Mund	  2007a,	  17-­‐8).	   	   However,	   unlike	   the	   Judicial	   Conference,	   it	   does	   not	   appear	   that	   the	  Commission’s	   proposal	   was	   motivated	   by	   antipathy	   toward	   the	   referees.	   Rather,	  political	   considerations	  notwithstanding,	  Kennedy	   and	  other	  NBC	  members	   of	   the	  Review	   Commission	   seem	   to	   have	   sincerely	   believed	   that	   the	   creation	   of	   a	  bankruptcy	  administrator	  would	  be	  more	  efficient	  and	  would	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  bankruptcy	  officiating,	  a	  concern	  of	  the	  Brookings	  report	  (Klee	  2011,	  email	  message	  to	  author).	  	  	  Regardless	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   sincerity,	   its	   proposal	   divided	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  and	  threatened	  to	  end	  bankruptcy	  reform	  efforts.	  	  As	  it	   was,	   the	   bill	   produced	   by	   the	   Commission	   represented	   a	   compromise	   of	   sorts	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between	   the	   Judicial	   Conference	   and	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community.	   	   The	  Commission	   proposed	   that	   Congress	   create	   a	   bankruptcy	   court	   distinct	   from	   the	  district	   courts.	   	  The	  new	  bankruptcy	   judges	  would	  be	  nominated	  by	   the	  president	  and	   confirmed	   by	   the	   Senate	   for	   fifteen-­‐year	   terms.	   	   However,	   the	   district	   judges	  would	   have	   retained	   considerable	   influence	   over	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts.	   	   The	  existing	  referees	  would	  have	  been	  terminated	  on	  the	  effective	  date	  of	  the	  new	  law.	  	  Although	   they	   would	   have	   ostensibly	   been	   eligible	   for	   appointment	   to	   the	   new	  court,	  the	  district	  judges	  in	  each	  district	  were	  given	  authority	  to	  determine	  both	  the	  geographic	  boundaries	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  in	  their	  districts	  and	  the	  number	  of	  judges	  to	  be	  appointed.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  clerks	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  would	  be	  selected	  by	  the	  district	  judges	  and	  would	  be	  employees	  of	  the	  district	  courts	  and	  not	  the	  bankruptcy	  judges.	  	   While	   this	   part	   of	   the	  Commission’s	   bill	  might	  have	  been	   acceptable	   to	   the	  referees,	  its	  proposal	  to	  create	  a	  new	  United	  States	  Bankruptcy	  Administration	  was	  not.	   	   The	   proposed	   executive	   branch	   agency	   would	   have	   had	   primary	  responsibilities	   for	   intake	   of	   most	   initial	   case	   filings	   and	   claims	   disputes.	   Most	  consumer	   cases	   would	   be	   resolved	  within	   the	   Administration,	   which	   would	   have	  extensive	   supervisory	   powers	   in	   business	   matters.	   	   Therefore,	   while	   the	  Commission	  would	  have	  given	   the	   referees	   the	   judicial	   status	   they	  desired,	   it	   also	  reduced	   their	   overall	   authority	   and	   numbers,	   outcomes	   that	   the	   latter	   group	  deemed	  unacceptable.	  The	   rift	   between	   the	   two	   groups	   was	   mended	   only	   when	   Representative	  Edwards	  insisted	  that	  they	  work	  out	  their	  differences	  (Skeel	  2001).	   	  Much	  like	  the	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Judicial	  Conference,	   the	  NBC	  members’	  error	  was	   in	  their	   implicit	  assumption	  that	  the	   Review	   Commission	   had	   replaced	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   as	  America’s	   primary	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   authority.	   	   However,	   as	   the	   Judicial	  Conference’s	   experience	   demonstrated,	   policy	   monopolies	   are	   not	   so	   easily	  displaced.	   	   New	   entities,	   particularly	   short-­‐lived	   special	   commissions,	   may	   not	   in	  themselves	  supplant	  existing	  institutions.	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  NBC	  members	  apparently	  failed	  to	  appreciate	  the	  importance	  their	   congressional	   patrons	   placed	   on	   the	   referees’	   contributions.	   	   As	   the	  policymaking	  process	  proceeds	  toward	  formal	  congressional	  action,	  the	  influence	  of	  members	   of	   Congress	   within	   the	   policy	   community	   naturally	   increases.	   	   In	   the	  1930s,	  Walter	  Chandler,	   the	  House	  sponsor	  who	  gave	   the	  1938	   law	   its	  name,	  was	  especially	   interested	   in	   reforming	   individual	   (i.e.,	   consumer)	   bankruptcy	  procedures.	  	  The	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference,	  which	  had	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  that	   part	   of	   the	   law	   in	   their	   deliberations,	   readily	   acceded	   to	   his	   proposals.	   	   The	  situation	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  somewhat	  different.	   	  The	  NBC	  was	  keenly	   interested	  in	  creation	   of	   a	   new	   administrative	   agency.	   	   However,	   without	   the	   support	   of	  Congressman	  Edwards	  and	  Senator	  Burdick,	  their	  project	  would	  collapse.	  	  Not	  only	  would	   they	   not	   get	   any	   reforms,	   but	   the	   rupture	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community	  might	  mean	   a	   permanent	   loss	   of	   the	   group’s	   influence	   on	   bankruptcy	  policy.	   	  Therefore,	  both	  the	  NBC’s	  near	  and	   long-­‐term	  interests	  were	  served	  by	   its	  concessions	   on	   the	   administrative	   agency	   issue.	   	   The	   NBC’s	   capitulation	   on	   the	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matter	   demonstrates	   how	   aggregate	   benefits	   (i.e.,	   agenda	   control)	   serve	   to	   bind	  policy	  monopolies	  notwithstanding	  their	  members’	  divergent	  interests.55	  	  	  
D.	   Exemptions:	  Limiting	  the	  Scope	  of	  Conflict	  Broad	  reforms	  of	  the	  kind	  advocated	  by	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  in	  the	  1970s	  carry	  with	  them	  a	  certain	  risk.	  	  Statutory	  changes	  to	  the	  bankruptcy	  laws	  necessarily	   require	   the	   involvement	   of	   Congress	   and	   its	   535	   members.	   	   Agenda	  setting	  models	   predict	   that	   the	   likelihood	   that	   a	  monopoly	  will	   lose	   control	   of	   its	  policymaking	   domain	   increases	   as	   the	   number	   of	   participants	   in	   a	   policy	   dispute	  grows.	   	  That	  number	  need	  not	  be	  as	   large	  as	   the	  whole	  of	  Congress.	   	  The	   Judicial	  Conference	  might	  have	  successfully	  leveraged	  its	  prestige	  and	  status	  as	  a	  coordinate	  branch	   of	   government	   to	   upend	   bankruptcy	   reform	   had	   its	   efforts	   not	   been	   so	  narrowly	   focused	   and	   self-­‐serving.	   	   However,	   the	   balancing	   act	   faced	   by	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	   (or	  other	  similarly	   situated	  monopolies)	   is	   to	   invite	  sufficient	  participation	  to	  gain	  success	  with	  losing	  control	  of	  the	  broader	  process.	  Issue	   definition	   is	   one	  method	   of	   limiting	   adverse	   participation;	   another	   is	  issue	   selection.	   	   Broad	   based	   legislation	   like	   the	   proposed	   1970s	   bankruptcy	  reforms	  cover	  numerous	   issues.	   	  Any	  of	   them	  can	  be	  a	   source	  of	   support,	  but	   can	  also	  be	  grounds	  for	  opposition.	  	  The	  latter	  is	  the	  more	  potent	  challenge;	  Congress	  on	  the	  whole	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  actively	  engaged	  on	  an	  issue	  when	  its	  members	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  The	  U.S.	  Trustee	  was	  established	  as	  a	  pilot	  program	   in	   the	  1978	   legislation	  and	  was	  later	  expanded	  to	  cover	  all	  but	  a	  few	  jurisdictions.	   	  It	  appoints	  and	  supervises	  case	  trustees	  in	  Chapter	  7	  cases	  and	  standing	  trustees	  in	  Chapter	  13.	  	  It	  also	  plays	  a	  limited	   administrative	   role	   in	   Chapter	   11	   cases	   and	   has	   standing	   to	   review	   and	  object	   to	   professional	   fee	   requests,	   disclosure	   statements	   and	   plans	   of	  reorganization	   in	   Chapter	   11	  matters,	   and	   to	   file	  motions	   to	   dismiss	   in	   Chapter	   7	  consumer	  cases.	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view	   existing	   policies	   or	   policy	   monopolies	   in	   negative	   ways	   (Baumgartner	   and	  Jones	   1993,	   101).	   	   Therefore,	   policy	   monopolies	   must	   act	   strategically	   when	  engaging	  Congress	  to	  enact	  wide-­‐scale	  legislation.	  	  They	  must	  effectively	  rank	  each	  item	   according	   to	   its	   importance	   to	   their	   greater	   agenda,	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	  assess	   both	   the	   probability	   and	   scope	   of	   opposition	   such	   proposals	  will	   generate.	  	  Monopolies	  will	  drop	  individual	   items	  of	   lesser	   importance	  if	   they	  are	  deemed	  too	  provocative.	  This	   process	   of	   issue	   selection	   is	   exemplified	   by	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community’s	  handling	  of	  exemption	  reform	  in	  the	  1970s.	   	  While	   it	  was	  an	   issue	  of	  keen	  interest	  to	  certain	  members	  of	  the	  community,	  it	  also	  threatened	  to	  draw	  the	  adverse	   attention	   of	   many	   members	   of	   Congress	   not	   otherwise	   interested	   in	  bankruptcy	  reform.	  	  Exemptions	  are	  one	  of	  the	  more	  curious	  intersections	  of	  federal	  and	   state	   law.	   	   American	   debtor	   creditor	   law	   historically	   provided	   individual	  debtors	  with	  a	  kind	  of	   safety	  net,	   through	  provisions	   that	   allowed	   them	  and	   their	  families	   to	   shield	   sufficient	   property	   from	   their	   creditors	   to	   maintain	   at	   least	   a	  meager	   subsistence.56	  	   The	   breadth	   of	   these	   statutes	   varied	   widely	   among	   the	  different	  states.	  	  Some	  states,	  such	  as	  Texas	  and	  Florida,	  granted	  virtually	  unlimited	  protections	   for	   real	   and	   personal	   property	   held	   jointly	   by	   husband	   and	   wife	  (generally	   known	   as	   homestead	   exemptions;	   some	   states	   offer	   similar	   protection	  only	   to	   real	   property).	   	   Other	   states	   granted	  more	  modest	   protections	   to	   homes,	  crops	  and	  livestock,	  tools	  of	  the	  trade,	  family	  heirlooms,	  and	  life	  insurance	  policies.	  	  The	  Bankruptcy	  Act	  incorporated	  these	  state	  provisions	  by	  providing	  that	  consumer	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	  Exemption	   laws	  only	  apply	   to	   individual	  and	  not	  corporate	  debtors.	  See	  11	  USC	  §522.	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debtors	  could	  exempt	  their	  property	  from	  liquidation	  by	  a	  bankruptcy	  trustee	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  provided	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  their	  states	  of	  residence.	  	  The	  result	  was	  a	  legal	  patchwork,	  with	  similar	  cases	  in	  different	  states	  having	  different	  outcomes.	  By	   the	   Seventies,	   critics	   within	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   were	  advocating	   for	   a	   set	  of	  uniform	  bankruptcy	  exemptions.	   	   Some	   simply	  wanted	   the	  exemptions	  to	  be	  uniform.	  	  Some	  believed	  that	  the	  unlimited	  exemption	  schemes	  in	  states	   like	   Texas	   and	   Florida	   were	   too	   generous.	   	   Others	   thought	   that	   the	  exemptions	   in	   some	   states	   were	   too	   meager	   or	   antiquated	   and	   failed	   to	   provide	  debtors	  a	  real	  opportunity	  for	  a	  fresh	  start	  after	  bankruptcy.	  	  	  However,	   the	   states	   tend	   to	   be	   quite	   parochial	   about	   their	   own	   exemption	  laws.	  	  Texas’	  broad	  entireties	  exemption,	  for	  example,	  was	  first	  enacted	  in	  the	  1830s	  as	   an	   incentive	   for	   married	   couples	   and	   families	   to	   migrate	   to	   the	   area	   (then	   a	  republic)	   and	  was	   seen	   by	  many	   there	   as	   an	   inseparable	   element	   of	   their	   state’s	  heritage.	   	   Other	   states,	   like	   Delaware,	   were	   interested	   in	   attracting	   financial	  interests	  to	  their	  state	  and	  therefore	  enacted	  more	  limited	  exemptions.	  	  Members	  of	  Congress	  from	  these	  states	  and	  others	  seemed	  to	  the	  monopoly	  likely	  to	  vigorously	  oppose	  efforts	  to	  adopt	  uniform	  federal	  bankruptcy	  exemptions.	  	  Therefore,	   although	   support	   for	   federal	   exemptions	   was	   strong	   among	  certain	  members	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  they	  were	  realistic	  about	  the	  chances	  of	  displacing	   the	  state	   laws.	   	   Instead,	   the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  proposed	  that	  Congress	  enact	  a	  dual	  exemption	  system,	  under	  which	  debtors	  could	  elect	   either	   uniform	   federal	   exemptions	   or	   those	   provided	   by	   their	   states	   of	  residence	   (but	   not	   a	   combination	   of	   both).	   	   That	   plan	   was	   conceived	   with	   the	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intention	   of	   minimizing	   congressional	   resistance.	   	   However,	   in	   order	   to	   gain	  approval,	  proponents	  of	  the	  federal	  exemption	  rule	  had	  to	  dilute	  it	  even	  further	  to	  include	   a	   clause	   allowing	   individual	   state	   legislatures	   to	   “opt	   out”	   of	   the	   federal	  scheme	  for	  bankruptcy	  filings	  in	  their	  respective	  states.	  	  Several	  states	  quickly	  chose	  to	   do	   so,	   effectively	   leaving	   intact	   the	   patchwork	   system	   that	   bankruptcy	   experts	  had	  sought	   to	  replace.	   	  Consumer	  debtors	   in	  each	  state	  still	  had	  some	  protections,	  just	   not	   the	   ideal	   ones	   envisioned	   by	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community.	   	   More	  important	  to	  the	  community,	  however,	  was	  its	  retention	  of	  authority	  to	  see	  its	  other	  reforms	  enacted	  into	  law.	  	  “By	  keeping	  the	  temperatures	  of	  the	  debates	  low,	  the	  NBC	  and	   other	   reform	   proponents	   achieved	   sweeping	   reform	   with	   remarkably	   little	  controversy	  (Skeel	  2001,	  132).”	  
E.	   Chapter	  Summary	  The	   1978	   Code	   ushered	   in	   a	   sea	   change	   in	   American	   bankruptcy	   law.	   	   It	  streamlined	   reorganization	   provisions	   to	   give	   business	   debtors	   substantial	  discretion	  in	  shaping	  their	  own	  exits	  from	  bankruptcy	  as	  the	  debtor-­‐in-­‐possession,	  a	  legal	   status	   which	   allowed	   the	   debtor	   to	   manage	   its	   own	   business	   while	  reorganizing	  without	  the	  supervision	  of	  a	  court	  appointed	  trustee.	   	  In	  fact,	  Trustee	  appointments	  were	  eliminated	  in	  all	  Chapter	  11	  cases	  except	  in	  instances	  of	  debtor	  misconduct.	   	   Instead,	   the	   new	   Code	   provided	   for	   the	   appointment	   of	   unsecured	  creditors	  committees,	  which	  were	  given	  special	  standing	  to	  monitor	  the	  activities	  of	  debtors-­‐in-­‐possession,	  authority	  to	  hire	  their	  own	  attorneys	  and	  accountants	  (to	  be	  paid	   by	   the	   debtor),	   and	   generally	   act	   as	   a	   watchdog	   to	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	  debtors’	   trade	   creditors,	   who	   otherwise	   occupied	   the	   lowest	   rung	   on	   the	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distribution	   ladder.	   	  However,	   the	  new	  provisions	  encouraged	  courts	   to	  give	  great	  consideration	   to	   negotiated	   outcomes.	   	   Generally,	   the	   Code	   promoted	   efforts	   to	  reorganize	  troubled	  businesses	  over	  their	  immediate	  liquidation.	  The	   new	   statute’s	   provision	   for	   wage	   earner	   reorganizations,	   relabeled	  Chapter	   13	   under	   the	   new	   Code,	   provided	   debtors	   broader	   discharges	   and	   relief	  from	   home	   foreclosure	   than	   was	   available	   under	   Chapter	   7,	   in	   exchange	   for	   an	  agreement	  to	  make	  monthly	  payments	  to	  their	  creditors	   from	  their	   future	   income.	  	  Procedures	   for	   the	   appointment	   of	   Chapter	   7	   case	   trustees	   were	   dramatically	  modified.	   	   While	   cases	   would	   continue	   to	   be	   filed	   in	   the	   bankruptcy	   court,	   most	  consumer	   Chapter	   7	   cases	   were	   handled	   by	   the	   trustees	   without	   formal	   judicial	  intervention,	   particularly	   those	   where	   there	   were	   no	   assets	   to	   liquidate	   after	  allowance	   of	   the	   debtor’s	   exemptions.	   	   The	   bankruptcy	   judges	   would	   no	   longer	  appoint	   case	   trustees	   under	   the	   Code.	   	   Instead,	   they	   would	   be	   appointed	   and	  supervised	   by	   a	   new	   administrative	   agency	   within	   the	   Justice	   Department,	   the	  United	  States	  Trustee.	   	  The	  case	  trustees,	  and	  not	   the	   judges,	  conducted	  the	   initial	  (and	   usually	   only)	   hearing	   in	   Chapter	   7	   cases,	   reviewed	   claims,	   and	   distributed	  proceeds	  from	  liquidated	  assets	  to	  creditors.	   	  While	  at	   first	  glance	  the	  U.S.	  Trustee	  bore	  some	  resemblance	   to	   the	  proposed	  administrative	  agency	   that	  had	  provoked	  the	  judges	  to	  draft	  their	  own	  bill	  in	  the	  early	  Seventies,	  it	  in	  fact	  was	  a	  very	  different	  and	  far	  less	  authoritative	  entity,	  and	  much	  less	  a	  threat	  than	  the	  judges	  had	  feared.57	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  According	   to	   one	   author,	   “the	  U.S.	   Trustee's	  Office	   bears	   no	   resemblance	   to	   the	  agency	   envisaged	   by	   the	   Commission.	   Unlike	   the	   Commission's	   bankruptcy	  administrators,	  U.S.	  Trustees	  are	  charged	  with	  limited	  duties,	  such	  as	  maintaining	  a	  panel	   of	   standing	   trustees	   and	   depositing	   funds	   held	   by	   trustees	   in	   designated	  accounts.	  	  Moreover,	  .	  .	  .	  U.S.	  Trustees	  act	  as	  a	  litigant,	  appearing	  as	  trustee	  in	  wage	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Moreover,	   ending	   the	   judges’	   authority	   to	   appoint	   trustees	   and	   other	   case	  professionals	   ended	   the	   rumors	   of	   “bankruptcy	   rings”	   once	   and	   for	   all.	   	   On	   the	  whole,	  the	  changes	  contributed	  to	  the	  elevated	  perception	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  that	  had	  been	  the	  judges’	  primary	  goal.	  	  Freed	  of	  routine	  ministerial	  duties,	  the	  new	  judges	   (most	   of	   whom	   were	   reappointed	   referees)	   could	   devote	   their	   efforts	   to	  judging	   instead	   of	   the	   administrative	   duties	   that	   had	   been	   their	   primary	  responsibilities	  under	  the	  former	  Act.	  The	  Code	   granted	  bankruptcy	   judges	   expanded	  powers	   comparable	   to	   full-­‐fledged	  Article	  III	  judges.	  	  Unlike	  the	  Act,	  in	  which	  the	  district	  judges	  had	  authority	  over	  many	   significant	  matters,	   the	   Code	   empowered	   bankruptcy	   judges	   to	   decide	  most	  of	  the	  matters	  arising	  in	  cases	  in	  their	  courts.	  Moreover,	  the	  new	  provisions	  for	  business	  reorganization	  meant	  longer	  cases	  with	  more	  judicial	  involvement.	  	  Those	  changes,	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  significant	  legal	  fees,	  attracted	  established	  law	  firms	  to	   the	  bankruptcy	  courts	   for	   the	   first	   time.	   	  Overall,	   the	  effect	  was	   to	   improve	   the	  status	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts,	  almost	  instantly.	  	  Bankruptcy	  courts	  were	  perceived	  as	  courts	  of	  law	  instead	  of	  low-­‐level	  collection	  agencies.58	  Notwithstanding	   its	   structural	   split	   in	   the	   early	   stages	   of	   the	   legislative	  process,	   enactment	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code	   was	   in	   the	   end	   a	   triumph	   for	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	  	  That	  was	  doubly	  true	  for	  the	  new	  bankruptcy	  judges.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  earner	  cases	  and	  a	  party	  in	  formal	  hearings	  on	  fee	  applications,	  plan	  confirmations,	  and	  other	  matter.	  	  Thus,	  U.S.	  Trustees	  add	  an	  additional	  set	  of	  lawyers	  to	  the	  already	  adversarial	  process	  of	  administering	  bankruptcy	  cases	  (Barnes	  1997,	  921).”	  58	  “The	  effect	  of	  the	  changes	  .	  .	  .	  has	  been	  to	  usher	  in	  a	  dramatically	  new	  bankruptcy	  regime.	   	   The	   political	   balance	   between	   debtors’	   and	   creditors’	   interests	   remains	  intact,	   but	   the	   “bankruptcy	   ring”	   has	   disappeared.	   	   For	   both	   better	   and	   worse,	  bankruptcy	   no	   longer	   is	   a	   mysterious	   process	   that	   takes	   place	   in	   dark	   rooms	   or	  behind	  closed	  doors	  (Skeel	  2001,	  159).”	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After	   being	   frozen	   out	   of	   the	   process	   at	   the	   start,	   they	   leveraged	   their	   position	  within	   the	   community	   and	   more	   particularly	   their	   relationships	   with	   reform’s	  congressional	  backers	   to	  realize	  virtually	  all	  of	   their	  policy	  goals.	   	  The	  bankruptcy	  bench’s	   victory	   over	   the	   generalist	   federal	   bench	   emphasized	   one	   of	   the	   former	  group’s	  unique,	  and	  most	  important	  features.	  	  The	  bankruptcy	  judges’	  status	  as	  long	  time	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  gave	   them	  a	  kind	  of	   credibility	  with	  Congress	   that	   they	  would	  likely	  not	  have	  enjoyed	  had	  they	  limited	  their	  activities	  to	  traditional	  judicial	  roles.	   	  That	  influence,	  and	  not	  their	  adjudicatory	  roles,	  enabled	  them	  to	  change	  the	  structure	  and	   jurisdiction	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	  courts.	   	  However,	  once	   those	  changes	  were	  enacted,	  members	  of	  the	  new	  bankruptcy	  bench	  had	  the	   judicial	  authority	  to	  make	  even	  wider	  ranging	  changes	  to	  American	  bankruptcy	  policy.59	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  Code’s	  enactment	  that	  West	  Publishing	  Company,	  the	  official	  publisher	   of	   the	   federal	   judiciary,	   began	   publishing	   its	   Bankruptcy	   Reporter,	   a	  compendium	  of	  bankruptcy	  court	  decisions.	  	  This	  not	  only	  made	  local	  court	  opinions	  more	   readily	   available	   nationwide,	   but	   conferred	   a	   kind	   of	   credibility	   on	   those	  decisions	  that	  they	  did	  not	  enjoy	  when	  they	  were	  only	  included	  in	  smaller,	  specialty-­‐oriented	  publications.	  
	  	  
117	  
CHAPTER	  FIVE:	  BANKRUPTCY	  REFORM,	  1997	  –	  2005:	  The	  Bankruptcy	  
Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  and	  the	  Decline	  of	  the	  
Bankruptcy	  Policymaking	  Community	  The	   number	   of	   new	   bankruptcy	   cases	   grew	   rapidly	   following	   the	   Code’s	  adoption	   in	  1978,	   as	   judges	  and	   lawyers	  alike	  worked	   to	   implement	   the	  new	   law.	  	  However,	   the	   Supreme	   Court’s	   1982	   ruling	   that	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code’s	   judicial	  structure	  improperly	  granted	  Article	  III	  authority	  to	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts60	  posed	  a	  major	  challenge	  to	  the	  law’s	  early	  success.	  	  The	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  still	  riding	  the	  wave	  of	  its	  1978	  triumph,	  used	  its	  influence	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  legislative	  response	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  minimized	  disruption	  of	  the	  new	  system.	  	  Congress	  resolved	   the	   constitutional	   question	   by	   returning	   primary	   jurisdiction	   over	  bankruptcy	  cases	  to	  the	  district	  courts,	  but	  with	  the	  proviso	  that	  the	  district	  courts	  could	   enter	   general	   orders	   referring	  most	   bankruptcy	  matters	   to	   the	   bankruptcy	  judges.	   	  The	  district	  courts	  quickly	  did	  so,	  meaning	   that,	   in	  practice	   if	  not	   in	   form,	  bankruptcy	  judges	  retained	  most	  of	  the	  authority	  they	  had	  gained	  under	  the	  Code.61	  Moreover,	  the	  power	  to	  appoint	  bankruptcy	  judges	  was	  not	  returned	  to	  the	  district	  judges;	   that	   responsibility	  was	   given	   to	   the	   judges	   of	   the	   federal	   circuit	   courts	   of	  appeal.	   	   Therefore,	   despite	   some	   technical	   differences,	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	  continued	  to	  function	  essentially	  as	  contemplated	  in	  1978.62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  See	  Chapter	  Four,	  fn.	  53.	  61	  In	  a	  limited	  class	  of	  matters,	  the	  bankruptcy	  judges,	  like	  federal	  magistrates,	  could	  only	  make	  recommendations	  to	  the	  senior	  court.	  62	  Some	  commentators	  suggest	  that	  the	  1984	  amendments	  might	  not	  have	  resolved	  the	   constitutional	  questions	   raised	  by	   the	  Court	   in	  Northern	  Pipeline	   (Warren	  and	  Westbrook	   2009,	   803).	   	   However,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   has	   passed	   on	   raising	   that	  issue	   directly	   in	   a	   line	   of	   cases	   addressing	   the	   specific	   amendments;	   it	   recently	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Consumer	  lenders	  were	  more	  active	  in	  the	  process	  leading	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  1984	  amendments	  than	  they	  were	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	  	  	  The	  lenders	  were	  undoubtedly	  motivated	  by	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  numbers	  of	  new	  cases	   filed	  following	  the	  Code’s	  enactment.	   	   New	   bankruptcy	   filings	   jumped	   from	   196,976	   in	   1979	   to	   314,886	   in	  1980,	   an	   increase	   of	   almost	   sixty	   percent.63	  	   Although	   filings	   eased	   somewhat	   to	  284,517	   by	   1984,	   alarmed	   lenders	   convinced	   Congress	   to	   place	   some	   limits	   on	  consumer	   filers.	   	   	   Besides	   restructuring	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts,	   the	   1984	  amendments	   gave	   judges	   the	   authority	   to	   dismiss	   consumer	   bankruptcy	   cases	   if	  they	   determined	   that	   the	   filing	   constituted	   a	   substantial	   abuse	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	  laws.64	  	   It	   also	   clarified	   the	   repayment	   requirements	   for	   debtors	   electing	   to	   file	  Chapter	   13.	   	   Some	   commentators	   describe	   the	   changes	   as	   major	   (Warren	   and	  Westbrook	  2009),	  while	  others	  identify	  them	  as	  relatively	  minor	  (Skeel	  2001,	  196).	  	  In	   fact,	   the	  changes	  seem	  to	  have	  had	   little	  practical	   impact	  on	  bankruptcy	   filings.	  	  The	  number	  of	  new	  cases	  continued	  to	  increase,	  from	  341,189	  in	  1985	  to	  549,831	  in	  1988,	  and	  900,874	  in	  1992.	  
A.	   The	   1994	   Amendments	   and	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	  
Commission:	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Policy	  Community’s	  Last	  Best	  Chance	  Congress	   waited	   ten	   years	   before	   it	   again	  made	   significant	   changes	   to	   the	  Code.	   	   Those	   amendments	   were	   enacted	   in	   1994	   with	   little	   attention	   and	   no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  addressed	  the	  matter	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts’	  subject	  matter	  jurisdiction	  under	  the	  1984	   amendments	   and	   left	   untouched	   the	   amendments’	   basic	   scheme	   (Stern	   v.	  
Marshall,	  __	  U.S.	  __,	  131	  S.Ct.	  2594	  (2011).	  63	  Case	   filings	   leveled	   off	   and	   even	   decreased	   somewhat	   in	   subsequent	   years,	   but	  remained	  well	  above	  their	  pre-­‐Code	  rates.	  	  All	  national	  annual	  case	  filing	  data	  in	  this	  section	  is	  taken	  from	  Skeel	  2001,	  188).	  64	  11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b).	  	  As	  described	  below	  in	  this	  chapter,	  this	  provision	  would	  figure	  prominently	  in	  the	  2005	  amendments	  to	  the	  Code.	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surrounding	   controversy.	   	   They	   were	   mostly	   technical	   in	   nature;	   many	   were	  intended	  to	  resolve	  conflicting	  applications	  of	  the	  Code	  that	  had	  arisen	  between	  the	  various	  judicial	  district	  and	  circuits	  since	  1978.	  	  	  The	  most	  consequential	  provision	  in	  the	  new	  legislation	  was	  its	  creation	  of	  a	  new	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	   Commission.	   	   The	   creation	   of	   a	   new	   review	  commission	   was	   not	   a	   foregone	   conclusion.	   	   Earlier	   legislative	   revisions	   of	  bankruptcy	  law	  occurred	  at	  forty-­‐year	  intervals.	  	  In	  addition,	  unlike	  the	  1930s	  or	  the	  1970s,	   there	  were	  no	   complaints	  of	   fundamental	   shortcomings	   in	   the	   structure	  of	  the	   Code.	   	   In	   fact,	   “when	   Congress	   established	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	  Commission,	   it	   pronounced	   itself	   ‘generally	   satisfied	   with	   the	   basic	   framework	  established	   in	   the	   current	   Bankruptcy	   Code,’	   counseling	   that	   the	   Commission’s	  recommendations	   ‘not	   disturb	   the	   fundamental	   tenets	   of	   current	   law	   (National	  Bankruptcy	  Review	  Commission	  (“NBRC”)	  1997,	  iv).’”	  	  	  However,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   alignment	   of	   interest	   groups	   supporting	   and	  opposing	  the	  Commission’s	   formation,	   it	   is	  probable	  that	  creditor	   influence	  played	  an	   important	  role.	   	  Many	  creditor	  groups	  publically	  supported	   formation	  of	  a	  new	  Review	  Commission.65	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  and	  several	   consumer	   groups	   opposed	   it.	   It	  may	  be	   surmised	   that	   both	   sides	   believed	  that	   formation	   of	   the	   Commission	   would	   open	   up	   the	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	  process,	  making	  it	  more	  accessible	  to	  creditor-­‐friendly	  influences.	  	  	  Hence,	   Congress’	   creation	   of	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	   Commission	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  The	   American	   Bankruptcy	   Institute,	   a	   non-­‐partisan	   group	   devoted	   mainly	   to	  professional	  education	  that	  drew	  its	  members	  from	  across	  the	  bankruptcy	  bar	  and	  bench,	  also	  supported	  creation	  of	  the	  new	  Commission.	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was	  a	  set	  back	  for	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  and	  a	  distinct	  sign	  that	  its	  hold	  over	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   had	   weakened.	   	   Nonetheless,	   once	   Congress	  authorized	   creation	   of	   the	   Commission,	   the	   community	   moved	   to	   assume	   its	  traditional	   role.	   	   The	   Commission’s	   original	   chairperson,	   former	   Oklahoma	  Democratic	   congressman	  Michael	   Synar,	   had	   an	   important	   role	   in	   sheparding	   the	  1994	  amendments	  through	  the	  House,	  as	  well	  as	  legislation	  in	  1986	  that	  expanded	  the	   United	   States	   Trustee	   Program	   and	   enacted	   Chapter	   12,	   which	   provided	  specially	   targeted	  bankruptcy	  relief	   for	   family	   farmers.	   	  When	  Congressman	  Synar	  died	  in	  early	  1996,	  he	  was	  replaced	  by	  Brady	  Williamson,	  a	  prominent	  commercial	  bankruptcy	  attorney	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  (“NBC”),	  as	  was	  Harold	  Marsh,	  his	  counterpart	   in	  the	  1970s.	   	  Another	  former	  congressman,	  M.	  Caldwell	  Butler	  (D-­‐VA),	  was	  also	  appointed	  to	  the	  Commission.	  	  Butler	  provided	  legislative	   continuity	   to	   the	   group;	   he	   had	   been	   one	   of	   the	   Code’s	   primary	   co-­‐sponsors	  when	  it	  was	  enacted	  in	  1978.	  	  The	   membership	   of	   the	   new	   Review	   Commission	   differed	   from	   its	   1970s	  predecessor	   in	  one	   important	   respect.	   	  Unlike	   the	  earlier	  commission,	   from	  which	  bankruptcy	   judges	   were	   actively	   excluded,	   the	   new	   legislation	   included	   terms	  requiring	  that	  the	  Commission’s	  members	  be	  knowledgeable	  in	  bankruptcy	  law.	  The	  Chief	  Justice	  used	  one	  of	  his	  appointments	  to	  name	  Illinois	  bankruptcy	  judge	  Robert	  Ginsburg	  to	  the	  panel.	  	  Ginsburg	  became	  vice	  chairman	  of	  the	  group,	  and	  served	  as	  its	  acting	  chairman	  after	  Synar’s	  death.	  	  He	  was	  a	  member	  of	  both	  the	  NBC	  and	  the	  National	  Conference	  of	  Bankruptcy	  Judges.	  	  The	  authorizing	  legislation	  also	  required	  the	  Commission	  reflect	  a	  “diversity	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of	  background	  and	  opinion”	  in	  bankruptcy	  matters.	  	  Chief	  Justice	  William	  Rehnquist	  took	  this	  proviso	  to	  heart.	  	  His	  other	  appointee	  to	  the	  Commission	  was	  Fifth	  Circuit	  Court	  of	  Appeals	  Judge	  Edith	  Jones.	  	  Judge	  Jones	  specialized	  in	  bankruptcy	  law	  while	  in	   private	   practice	   and	   served	   on	   various	   Judicial	   Conference	   and	   American	   Bar	  Association	  committees	  on	  the	  subject.	  	  She	  was	  also	  famously	  conservative	  and	  her	  rulings	   in	   bankruptcy	   and	   debtor-­‐creditor	   matters	   frequently	   sided	   with	   the	  creditors.	   Her	   appointment	  would	   have	   considerable	   consequences,	   as	   she	  would	  turn	   out	   to	   be	   the	   leading	   spokesperson	   within	   the	   Commission	   for	   pro-­‐creditor	  reforms.66	  	   Judge	   Jones’	  counterpoint	  on	  the	  Commission	  would	   turn	  out	   to	  be	  not	  one	  of	  her	  fellow	  appointees	  but	  instead	  Professor	  Elizabeth	  Warren	  of	  Harvard	  Law	  School.	   	   A	  member	   of	   the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	   and	   the	   co-­‐author	   of	   a	  leading	   bankruptcy	   casebook	   and	   several	   other	   texts	   on	   the	   subject,	  Warren	  was	  named	   the	   Commission’s	   reporter	   at	   its	   first	   meeting.	   	   Although	   not	   formally	   a	  commission	  member,	  she	  would	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  its	  most	  forceful	  debtors’	  advocate.	  The	   Commission	   met	   frequently	   and	   held	   public	   hearings	   throughout	   the	  country	   prior	   to	   issuing	   its	   report	   on	   October	   20,	   1997.67	  	   Unlike	   the	   1970s	  commission	   (or	   for	   that	   matter,	   the	   informally	   authorized	   National	   Bankruptcy	  Conference	  of	  the	  1930s),	  the	  Commission’s	  nine	  members	  were	  sharply	  split	  along	  debtor-­‐creditor	  lines,	  with	  many	  issues	  decided	  by	  a	  single	  vote	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  NBC-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  The	   other	   commission	   appointees	   were	   Jay	   Alix,	   a	   corporate	   reorganization	  specialist	   from	  Detroit;	   Babette	   Ceccotti,	   a	   New	  York	   lawyer;	   John	   Gose,	   a	   Seattle	  lawyer	   specializing	   in	   real	   estate	   insolvency;	   Jeffrey	  Hartley,	   a	   lawyer	   and	   former	  majority	   counsel	   to	   the	   Senate	   Courts	   and	   Administrative	   Practice	   subcommittee,	  and	  James	  Shepard,	  a	  bankruptcy	  and	  tax	  lawyer.	  67 	  The	   full	   report	   is	   available	   online	   at	   http://govinfo.	   library.unt.edu/	  nbrc/reportcont.html	  (most	  recently	  viewed	  10/20/11).	  
	  	  
122	  
led	   pro-­‐debtor	   group.	   	   Neither	   group	   seemed	   interested	   in	   achieving	   a	   workable	  consensus.	  	  While	  both	  sides	  agreed	  on	  many	  matters,	  some	  of	  them	  significant,	  they	  refused	   to	   budge	   on	   the	   central	   issue	   of	   consumer	   bankruptcy	   reform.68 	  The	  Commission’s	  majority	   favored	   the	  Code’s	   existing	  pro-­‐debtor	  bias	   and	   refused	   to	  entertain	   most	   of	   the	   minority’s	   suggestions.	   	   	   Although	   the	   majority’s	   report	  included	   170	   separate	   recommendations,	   its	   proposed	   changes	   to	   consumer	  bankruptcy	   law	   were	   essentially	   an	   extension	   of	   existing	   policy.	   	   Moreover,	   the	  report	   resurrected	   two	  of	   the	  policy	   community’s	   unsuccessful	   standbys	   from	   the	  past,	  uniform	  exemptions	  for	  consumer	  debtors	  and	  Article	  III	  status	  for	  bankruptcy	  judges.69	  	  	  	  Motivating	   the	   majority’s	   proposals	   was	   its	   fundamental	   commitment	   to	  existing	  law	  and	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  fresh	  start.	  	  They	  characterized	  their	  proposals	  to	  modify	   consumer	   bankruptcy	   law	   as	   an	   interconnected	   “framework,”	   such	   that	  the	   removal	   or	   alteration	   of	   any	   of	   its	   provisions	   would	   undermine	   the	   entire	  structure	   and	   cause	   its	   collapse.	   	   	   	   The	  majority	   relied	  on	   that	   characterization	   to	  block	  consideration	  of	  changes	  favored	  by	  the	  minority,	  including	  amendments	  that	  would	   have	   placed	   stricter	   qualification	   requirements	   on	   debtors	   filing	   Chapter	   7	  bankruptcy.	   	   The	  majority	  members	  may	  have	   stood	   firm	   in	  defense	   of	   their	   own	  notion	   of	   the	   fresh	   start,	   but	   their	   steadfastness	   cost	   them	   a	   larger	   and	   more	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	  The	  majority	  and	  minority	  concurred	  on	  the	  need	  for	  technical	  changes	  to	  Chapter	  11	   and	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   nationwide	   bankruptcy	   case	   filing	   system.	   	   They	   also	  agreed,	   at	   least	   in	  principle,	   on	   the	  need	   to	   limit	   repeat	   bankruptcy	   case	   filers,	   to	  improve	   debtor	   education,	   and	   even	   on	   increasing	   utilization	   of	   Chapter	   13.	  	  However,	  the	  majority’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  full	  Commission	  adopt	  its	  proposals	  as	  a	  single	   package	   prevented	   even	   these	   uncontroversial	   items	   from	   receiving	   a	  consensus	  recommendation.	  	  69	  See	  Chapter	  Four.	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balanced	  consensus.	   	  Two	  of	   the	  dissenting	  members	  wrote	   separately	   to	   indicate	  that	  the	  majority’s	  intransigence	  left	  them	  no	  option	  but	  to	  side	  with	  the	  minority:	  “Unfortunately,	  the	  framework	  [i.e.,	  the	  majority	  proposal]	  was	  put	  forth	  on	  a	  ‘take	  it	  or	   leave	   it’	   basis	   .	   .	   .	  Many	  of	   its	   substantive	  proposals	   are	   both	  unfeasible	   and,	   if	  adopted,	   would	   put	   unnecessary	   strain	   on	   the	   current	   consumer	   system.	  (Commissioners	  Gose	  and	  Hartley,	  concurrence	  with	  Consumer	  Dissenting	  Opinion,	  NBRC	  1995,	  1120).”	  	  The	  minority	  insisted	  on	  alternate	  proposals	  limiting	  debtors’	  existing	   options	   and	   rejecting	   reforms	   that	   in	   their	   view	   would	   have	   placed	  additional	  burdens	  on	  creditors,	  calling	  them	  “misguided	  and	  unresponsive	  (NBRC	  1995,	  1046).”	  	  	  Underlying	  and	  ultimately	  consuming	  the	  Commission’s	  deliberations	  was	  a	  debate	  over	  the	  fundamental	  direction	  and	  purposes	  of	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  To	  a	  large	  extent,	  the	  debates	  within	  the	  Commission	  became	  a	  kind	  of	  blame	  game.	  	  The	  basic	  facts	   were	   beyond	   dispute.	   	   Both	   consumer	   borrowing	   and	   personal	   bankruptcy	  filings	   had	   dramatically	   increased	   since	   the	   Seventies.	   	   The	   Commission	   reported	  that	  while	  fewer	  than	  forty	  percent	  of	  American	  families	  had	  at	  least	  one	  credit	  card	  in	   1978,	   that	   number	   had	   doubled	   by	   1997	   (NBRC	   1997,	   ii).	   Non-­‐business	  bankruptcy	   case	   filings	   likewise	   increased;	   they	   exceeded	   the	   1	   million	   mark	   in	  1996,	   and	   reached	   1,350,118	   in	   1997,	   the	   year	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   report.	  	  However,	  each	  side	   interpreted	  the	  raw	  data	  to	   its	  own	  ends.	   	  The	  majority,	  being	  drawn	  from	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  traditional	  bankruptcy	  establishment,	  emphasized	  their	  belief	  that	  preservation	  of	  the	  fresh	  start	  was	  central	  to	  bankruptcy	  policy.	   	  As	  the	  core	   image	   on	  which	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   was	   built,	   the	   fresh	   start	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remained	  central	  to	  the	  majority’s	  proposals:	  “While	  some	  debtors	  in	  bankruptcy	  no	  doubt	   file	   for	   reasons	   that	   are	   illegitimate,	  most	   families	   come	   to	   the	   bankruptcy	  courts	  as	  they	  have	  for	  many	  years	  –	  seeking	  relief	  from	  debts	  they	  have	  virtually	  no	  hope	  of	   repaying	   (NBRC	  1997,	  83).”	   	  Furthermore,	   the	  majority	  challenged	  critics’	  arguments	  that	  the	  rising	  numbers	  of	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  filings	  were	  the	  result	  of	   lenient	   bankruptcy	   policies.	   	   Instead,	   they	   countered,	   the	   increase	   in	   new	  bankruptcy	   cases	   was	   the	   result	   of	   the	   over-­‐extension	   of	   credit	   and	   a	   lack	   of	  restraint	  by	  the	  lenders	  themselves	  (NBRC	  1997,	  84-­‐87;	  Jacoby	  2004,	  1096).	  The	   minority	   group,	   led	   by	   Judge	   Jones,	   described	   bankruptcy	   in	   a	   very	  different	   way,	   one	   that	   challenged	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   fresh	   start	   as	   its	  fundamental	  image:	  One	   basic	   defect	   in	   the	   Framework	   [the	   name	   commonly	   used	   within	   the	  Commission	   to	   identify	   the	   majority’s	   proposal]	   is	   philosophical.	   	   The	  Framework	   is	   based	   on	   two	   major	   assumptions:	   first,	   that	   debtors	   are	  financially	   disadvantaged	   through	   no	   fault	   of	   their	   own;	   and	   second,	   that	  debtors	  are	  inadequately	  represented	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  process.	  	  From	  these	  two	   assumptions	   comes	   the	   Framework’s	   inevitable	   conclusion:	   that	   as	   a	  matter	  of	   social	   justice,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   level	   the	  playing	   field	  by	   insuring	  that	   debtors	   are	   treated	   better	   under	   the	   reformed	   Code	   than	   they	   were	  before.	   	  As	   a	   result,	  much	  of	   the	  Framework	   can	  be	   characterized	  as	   social	  engineering	  designed	  to	  redistribute	  wealth,	  rather	  than	  bankruptcy	  reform	  (Jones	  and	  Shepard,	  NBRC	  1997,	  1115-­‐16).	  	   The	   minority’s	   alternate	   concept	   of	   bankruptcy’s	   proper	   role	   grew	   out	   of	  what	   economists	   call	   “moral	   hazard.”	   	   Moral	   hazard	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   people	   will	  engage	  in	  riskier	  behavior	  in	  search	  of	  greater	  returns	  if	  they	  are	  insulated	  from	  the	  consequences	   of	   their	   actions.	   	   Bankruptcy,	   argued	   the	   minority,	   makes	   it	   too	  convenient	   to	   ignore	  one’s	   financial	  obligations.	   	   In	   its	  own	  recommendations,	   the	  minority	  wrote:	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[T]here	  is	  a	  growing	  perception	  that	  bankruptcy	  has	  become	  the	  first	  resort	  rather	   than	   a	   last	  measure	   for	   people	  who	   cannot	   keep	  up	  with	   their	   bills.	  	  Lenders	  everywhere	  are	  reporting	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  bankruptcy	  petitions	   filed	   by	   people	   who	   were	   current	   on	   their	   debt	   payments.	   	   This	  phenomenon	   implies	   that	   bankruptcy	   relief	   is	   too	   easy	   to	   obtain,	   that	   the	  moral	  stigma	  once	  attached	  to	  bankruptcy	  has	  eroded,	  and	  that	  debtors	  are	  insufficiently	   counseled	   both	   about	   personal	   financial	   management	   and	  about	   the	   use	   of	   bankruptcy	   (Minority	   Recommendations,	   NBRC	   1997,	  1044).	  	  	  	  	  The	  minority	  argued	  that	  the	  majority’s	  proposal	  (and	  by	  extension	  the	  underlying	  premises	   of	   existing	   bankruptcy	   law)	   incorrectly	   shifted	   the	   risk	   of	   failure	   to	   the	  vastly	  larger	  number	  of	  borrowers	  who	  do	  not	  default	  or	  file	  bankruptcy	  but	  instead	  prudently	  handle	  their	  credit:	  The	   tragedy	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   review	   process	   has	   been	   that	   the	   largest	  affected	  group	  has	  been	  left	  out:	  the	  legions	  of	  hard-­‐working	  individuals	  who	  live	   within	   their	   means	   and	   pay	   their	   bills.	   	   They	   have	   been	   entirely	  unrepresented.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  Framework	  implicitly	  assumes	  that	  its	  proposed	   changes	  will	   have	  no	  broader	   effects.	   	  We	  disagree.	   	  Many	  of	   the	  proposed	   changes	   will	   adversely	   affect	   this	   group	   through	   increased	  borrowing	   costs,	   and	   reduced	   credit	   availability	   .	   .	   .	   If	   the	  Framework	  does	  nothing	   to	   stem	   the	   flood	   of	   increasing	   bankruptcy	   petitions	   during	  prosperous	   times,	   then	   a	   cataclysm	   of	   filings,	   whose	   damage	   we	   cannot	  foresee,	  will	  ensue	  with	  the	  next	  recession	  (Jones	  and	  Shepard,	  NBRC	  1997,	  116).	  	  The	   minority	   argued	   that	   bankruptcy	   law	   needed	   to	   be	   changed	   to	   force	   more	  debtors	   to	  make	   partial	   payments	   of	   their	   debts	   as	   determined	   by	   a	   new	   “means	  test.”	  As	  originally	  conceived	  in	  the	  1978	  Code,	  the	  choice	  of	  obtaining	  an	  immediate	  discharge	  of	  debts	  under	  Chapter	  7	  or	  making	  repayments	  under	  a	  Chapter	  13	  plan	  was	  left	  to	  the	  debtor	  (the	  1984	  amendments	  did	  allow	  judges	  to	  dismiss	  Chapter	  7	  in	   undefined	   instances	   of	   “substantial	   abuse,”	   but	   such	   dismissals	  were	   relatively	  uncommon).	   	   Unsurprisingly,	   the	   great	   majority	   of	   consumer	   debtors	   filed	  bankruptcy	  under	  the	  faster	  and	  less	  rigorous	  Chapter	  7	  procedure.	  Proponents	  of	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creditor-­‐friendly	   reforms	   argued	   that	   many	   debtors	   filed	   Chapter	   7	   after	  accumulating	   large	   credit	   card	  balances,	  wiping	  out	   such	   claims	  even	   though	   they	  had	   sufficient	   regular	   income	   to	   allow	   them	   to	   repay	   at	   least	   of	   portion	   of	   such	  amounts	  through	  a	  Chapter	  13	  plan.	  	  The	  means	  test	  conditioned	  consumer	  debtors’	  election	  of	  Chapter	  7	  on	  meeting	  certain	   income	  qualifications.	   	  Proponents	  of	   the	  test	   argued	   that	   it	   was	   fairer	   to	   creditors	   and	   would	   promote	   consumers’	  responsible	  use	  of	  credit	  by	  borrower	  by	  making	  it	  harder	  for	  them	  to	  simply	  walk	  away	  from	  large	  loan	  balances	  by	  filing	  bankruptcy,	  regardless	  of	  their	  income.	  In	   sum,	   even	   though	   each	   side	   started	   from	   the	   same	   set	   of	   facts,	   their	  disparate	   ideologies	   led	   them	   to	   opposing	   explanations	   of	   its	   causes	   and	  consequences.	  	  Neither	  side	  was	  willing	  to	  concede	  to	  the	  other	  on	  the	  most	  critical	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  issues.	   	  While	  this	  polarization	  would	  work	  to	  the	  majority’s	  advantage	   within	   the	   Commission,	   its	   broader	   implications	   proved	   fatal	   to	   the	  majority’s	  recommendations.	  	  The	  close	  dispute	  within	  the	  Commission	  assured	  that	  its	   report	  would	   be	   ignored.	   	   Senator	   Grassley	   (R-­‐IA),	   one	   of	   the	   Senate’s	   reform	  leaders,	  said	  upon	  presentation	  of	  the	  report,	  “The	  commission’s	  recommendations	  are	   highly	   controversial.	   	   Because	   they	   passed	   by	   a	   5-­‐4	   majority,	   I	   don’t	   think	  Congress	   will	   be	   guided	   by	   them	   (Hansell	   1997).”	   	   The	   dissension	   gave	   reform	  proponents	   the	   opening	   they	   needed	   to	   engage	   Congress	   directly.	   However,	   even	  though	   the	   report	   itself	   rapidly	   disappeared	   as	   a	   subject	   of	   ongoing	   debate,	   the	  distinctive	   images	   underlying	   each	   group’s	   characterization	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	  process	  would	  dominate	  congressional	  debates	  for	  the	  next	  eight	  years.	  Because	  of	  the	  highly	  publicized	  nature	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  deliberations,	  its	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divided	  vote	  was	  expected	  and	  reform	  proponents	  had	  mobilized	  for	  congressional	  action	   (Jacoby	   2004,	   1098).	   	   By	   December	   1996,	   consumer	   lenders	   formed	   the	  National	  Consumer	  Bankruptcy	  Coalition.	  70	  	  This	  organization	  would	  be	  the	  primary	  representative	  of	  the	  groups	  supporting	  reform.	   	  Following	  the	  example	  set	  by	  the	  bankruptcy	   policy	   community,	   it	   drafted	   its	   own	   proposed	   legislation	   and	  established	   key	   alliances	   with	   members	   of	   Congress.	   	   Unlike	   the	   community,	   the	  Coalition	  used	  its	  financial	  clout	  to	  hire	  prominent	  lobbyists	  to	  make	  its	  case	  to	  the	  legislature.71	  	  Reform	   opponents	   were	   not	   nearly	   so	   well	   organized	   for	   a	   congressional	  fight.	   	   The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   was	   constructed	   to	   make	   policy	   in	  dominant,	   low	   conflict	   situations,	   not	   high	   conflict	   competitive	   ones.	   	   Community	  members	   like	   the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  and	   the	  National	  Conference	  of	  Bankruptcy	   Judges	   would	   issue	   position	   papers,	   testify	   at	   hearings,	   and	   publish	  articles	   in	  scholarly	   journals,	  but	  did	  not	  directly	  engage	  Congress	   in	   the	  way	   that	  the	   financial	   community	   did.	   	   Debtor	   interests	   are	   by	   themselves	   notoriously	  difficult	   to	   organize	   (Posner	   1997;	   Warren	   1999;	   Skeel	   2001).	   	   By	   definition,	  debtors	  lack	  the	  resources	  essential	  for	  organized	  advocacy.	   	  More	  importantly,	  no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  The	   members	   of	   the	   coalition	   were	   the	   American	   Bankers	   Association,	   Credit	  Union	   National	   Association,	   America’s	   Community	   Bankers,	   Independent	   Bankers	  Association,	   Visa	   USA,	   National	   Retail	   Federation,	   American	   Financial	   Service	  Association,	  MasterCard	   International,	   and	  Consumer	  Bankers	  Association.	   	  MBNA	  America,	   a	  major	   credit	   card	   issuer,	   funded	  a	   substantial	  portion	  of	   its	  operations	  (Nunez	  and	  Rosenthal	  2004,	  535).	  71 	  The	   Coalition’s	   lobbyists	   included	   leading	   members	   of	   the	   Washington	  establishment	  such	  as	  Lloyd	  Bentsen,	  the	  former	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury;	  former	  Republican	   National	   Committee	   chair	   Haley	   Barbour;	   and	   Lloyd	   Cutler,	   who	   had	  been	   White	   House	   counsel	   for	   Bill	   Clinton	   and	   whose	   firm,	   Wilmer,	   Cutler	   &	  Pickering,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  firms	  hired	  by	  the	  Coalition	  to	  write	  the	  new	  bill	  (Warren	  1999,	  195).	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one	  wants	   to	  be	   a	  debtor;	   at	  most,	   it	   is	   a	   transient	   state	   from	  which	   its	  members	  hope	  to	  escape,	  the	  sooner	  the	  better.	  	  	  Hence,	  debtor	  interests	  must	  rely	  on	  others	  to	  do	  their	  bidding	  for	  them.	  	  The	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  built	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  fresh	  start,	  filled	  that	  role	  in	  the	  Thirties	  and	  Seventies.	  	  However,	  other	  entities	  had	  to	  fill	  the	  void	  left	  by	  the	  Community’s	  marginalization	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  report.	  Consumer	   advocacy	   groups	   and	   a	   newly	   formed	   association	   of	   debtors’	   attorneys	  lacked	   the	   resources	   or	   clout	   to	   effectively	   compete	  with	   the	   better-­‐financed	   and	  organized	  creditor	  interests.	  	  	  Finding	  themselves	  outside	  the	  policymaking	  process	  for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   more	   than	   sixty	   years,	   members	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community	  were	  forced	  to	  look	  beyond	  their	  own	  ranks	  for	  support.	  Conflict	   expansion	   models	   identify	   issue	   linkage	   as	   an	   important	   tool	   for	  gaining	  allies	  (Pralle	  2003,	  51).	  Parties	  to	  policy	  disputes	  can	  gain	  critical	  support	  by	  associating	   their	   concerns	   with	   those	   of	   others	   nominally	   not	   interested	   in	   the	  dispute.	  	  “When	  the	  public	  and	  policymakers	  connect	  a	  previously	  isolated	  problem	  to	  a	  broader	  issue,	  its	  significance	  increases	  .	  .	  .	  [I]f	  problem	  proponents	  are	  able	  to	  connect	   their	   issue	   to	   deep	   cleavages	   or	   ideological	   debates	   in	   politics,	   then	   the	  stakes	  of	   the	   issue	   increase	  as	   the	  battle	   takes	  on	  added	  significance	  (Pralle	  2003,	  19-­‐20).”	   	   With	   their	   own	   influence	   in	   Congress	   dissipated	   and	   their	   resources	  outmatched,	  reform	  opponents	  would	  employ	  this	  strategy	  with	  remarkable	  success	  over	  the	  next	  eight	  years.	  
B.	   A	  Chronological	  Review	  of	  Bankruptcy	  Reform	  Legislation	  (1997-­‐2005)	  
	  	   The	  legislative	  history	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform	  from	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  first	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bill	   in	  1997	  until	   its	  eventual	  enactment	   in	  2005	  demonstrates	  how	  congressional	  minorities	   can	   succeed	   despite	   overwhelming	   opposition.	   	   Reformers	   needed	   to	  make	   five	  attempts	  over	  eight	  years	   to	   finally	  obtain	  approval	  of	   their	  bill.	   	  When	  examined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  agenda	  setting,	  these	  events	  provide	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	   minority	   interests	   can	   leverage	   congressional	   rules	   to	   thwart	   their	   better-­‐financed	  opponents.	  
1.	   The	  105th	  Congress	  (1997-­‐98)	  	  Because	  of	   the	  public	  nature	  of	   its	  proceedings,	   the	  outcome	  of	   the	  Review	  Commission’s	  efforts	  were	  known	  in	  advance	  of	  its	  final	  report.	  	  The	  credit	  industry	  and	   its	   congressional	   supporters	   moved	   forward	   without	   waiting	   on	   the	  Commission.	   	   Congressman	   Bill	   McCollum	   (R-­‐FL)	   introduced	   “The	   Responsible	  Borrower	  Protection	  Bankruptcy	  Act,”	  on	  September	  18,	  1997,	  a	  month	  before	  the	  NBRC	   submitted	   its	   report.	   	  McCollum’s	  withdrew	  his	   bill	   the	   following	   February,	  when	   it	  was	  replaced	  by	  Representative	  George	  Gekas’	   (R-­‐PA)	  Bankruptcy	  Reform	  Act	  of	  1998	   (H.R.	  3150).	   	  Gekas’	  bill	  passed	   the	  House	  on	   June	  10,	  1998.	   	  The	  bill	  enjoyed	  widespread	  bipartisan	  support.	   	   In	  a	  pattern	  that	  would	  be	  followed	  in	  all	  House	   voting	   on	   bankruptcy	   reform	   legislation	   through	   five	   sessions	   of	   Congress,	  H.R.	  3150	  passed	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  306-­‐118,	  with	  82	  Democrats	  joining	  every	  Republican	  in	  support.	  In	   the	   Senate,	   Senators	  Grassley	   and	  Durbin	   (D-­‐IL)	   filed	   their	   own	  bill,	   the	  Consumer	  Bankruptcy	  Reform	  Act	  of	  1997	  (S.1301)	  on	  October	  21,	  1997,	  two	  days	  after	   the	   Commission	   filed	   its	   report.	   	   Eventually,	   that	   bill	   was	   replaced	   by	   the	  House-­‐passed	  version	  of	  H.R.	  3150	  and	  approved	  by	  an	  overwhelming	  97-­‐1	  majority	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on	  September	  23,	  1998.	   	  Senate	  amendments	  to	  the	  bill	  precipitated	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  conference	  committee,	  which	  was	  duly	  formed	  and	  issued	  its	  report.	  	  The	  House	  approved	  the	  report	  on	  a	  300-­‐125	  vote,	  but	  efforts	  to	  bring	  it	  to	  a	  vote	  in	  the	  Senate	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  term	  failed.	  	  Opponents	  relied	  on	  the	  Senate’s	  slower	  calendar	  and	   formidable	   procedural	   barriers	   to	   stall	   the	   bill.	   	   Their	   recourse	   to	   dilatory	  tactics	   was	   a	   desperate	   move	   but	   one	   that	   they	   would	   use	   again	   in	   an	   effort	   to	  prevent	  bankruptcy	  reform	  from	  becoming	  law.	  
2.	   The	  106th	  Congress	  (1999-­‐2000)	  Representative	   Gekas	   and	   Senator	   Grassley	   each	   introduced	   the	   1998	  conference	   report	   as	   new	   legislation	   in	   the	   following	   term,	   on	   February	   24,	   1999	  and	   March	   16,	   1999,	   respectively.	   	   The	   House	   again	   quickly	   approved	   the	   bill	  (without	  amendment)	  on	  May	  5,	  1999,	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  313-­‐108.	   	  The	  Senate	  adopted	  the	   House	   bill	   in	   place	   of	   its	   own	   (as	   S.625)	   and	   approved	   it,	   again	   with	  amendments,	   on	   February	   2,	   2000.	   	   Another	   conference	   committee	   was	   formed.	  	  The	  House	  approved	   the	  conference	   report	  by	  voice	  vote	  on	  October	  12,	  2000.	   	   It	  likewise	  passed	  in	  the	  Senate	  on	  vote	  of	  70-­‐28	  on	  December	  7,	  2000.	  At	  this	  point,	  with	  passage	  of	  the	  bill	  virtually	  certain,	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	   pulled	   out	   the	   last	   tool	   left	   at	   its	   disposal,	   a	   direct	   appeal	   to	   the	  President.	   	  Although	   the	  report	  had	  been	  approved	  by	  veto	  proof	  margins	   in	  each	  chamber,	  Congress	  was	  set	  to	  adjourn	  for	  the	  year,	  leaving	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  pocket	  veto.	  Having	   been	  marginalized	   in	   the	   legislative	   process,	   and	   given	   unanimous	  Republican	   support	   for	   the	   legislation,	   the	   bankruptcy	   community	   established	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alliances	  with	   traditional	   Democratic	   interests,	   including	   groups	   devoted	   to	   labor	  issues,	   civil	   rights,	   and	   women’s	   and	   children’s	   interests.	   	   The	   latter	   association	  proved	   particularly	   useful,	   as	   First	   Lady	   Hillary	   Clinton	   was	   well	   known	   to	   be	  particularly	  concerned	  with	   those	   issues.	   	  According	   to	  Mrs.	  Clinton,	  she	  “weighed	  in”	  on	  the	  President’s	  decision,	  citing	  concerns	  that	  the	  legislation	  relegated	  unpaid	  child	   support	   obligations	   to	   the	   same	   status	   as	   credit	   card	   debt	   (Clinton	   384-­‐5).	  	  President	  Clinton	   in	   fact	  pocket	  vetoed	   the	  bill.72	  	  Attempts	  by	  supporters	   to	   force	  the	   President	   to	   approve	   the	   bankruptcy	   bill	   by	   attaching	   it	   to	   pending	   spending	  legislation	   were	   likewise	   unsuccessful.	   	   Therefore,	   despite	   overwhelming	  congressional	  support	  for	  the	  legislation,	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  and	  its	  new	  allies	  had	  yet	  again	  succeeded	  in	  keeping	  the	  creditors’	  reforms	  from	  becoming	  law.	  
3.	   The	  107th	  Congress	  (2001-­‐02)	  Given	   their	   legislation’s	   widespread	   support,	   congressional	   sponsors	   of	  bankruptcy	   reform	  were	  not	  deterred	  by	   their	   two	   failures.	   Indeed,	  2001	   saw	   the	  inauguration	  of	  a	  Republican	  president	  who	  supported	  their	  efforts.	  	  On	  January	  31,	  2001,	  Rep.	  Gekas	  introduced	  the	  106th	  Congress’	  conference	  report	  as	  H.R.	  333.	  	  The	  bill	  passed	  by	   the	  now	  usual	  overwhelming	  margin	  of	  306-­‐108	  on	  March	  1,	  2001.	  	  The	   Senate,	   acting	   with	   more	   alacrity	   than	   in	   past	   sessions,	   approved	   similar	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  72 	  The	   primary	   reason	   cited	   by	   the	   President	   in	   his	   veto	   message	   was	   the	  legislation’s	   continued	   incorporation	   of	   controversial	   state	   exemption	   laws	   like	  those	   in	   Texas	   and	   Florida	   (See	   Part	   3	   of	   this	   chapter).	   	   Other	   sources	   cite	   the	  deletion	   from	   the	   final	   bill	   of	   Senate	   Democrat	   Charles	   Schumer’s	   amendment	   to	  deny	  the	  discharge	  of	  civil	  judgments	  against	  abortion	  clinic	  protesters.	  (Mann	  and	  Ornstein,	   143).	   	   This	   latter	   provision	   would	   figure	   prominently	   in	   the	   next	   two	  attempts	  to	  pass	  the	  reform	  bill.	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legislation,	   designated	   S.	   420,	   by	   a	   vote	   of	   83-­‐15	   on	  March	   15,	   2001.	   	   	   This	   time,	  outside	  events	  slowed	  further	  consideration	  of	  the	  bill.	  	  Congressional	  attention	  was	  first	   directed	   to	   enactment	   of	   President	   Bush’s	   tax	   cutting	   plan,	   and	   then	   to	   the	  response	   to	   the	   September	   11th	   attacks	   and	   the	   subsequent	   D.C.	   anthrax	   scare,	  which	   closed	   down	   or	   hindered	   congressional	   operations	   in	   late	   2001	   and	   into	  2002.	  	  When	  the	  conference	  committee	  finally	  met,	  it	  was	  faced	  with	  two	  significant	  obstacles.	  	  The	  first	  related	  back	  to	  President	  Clinton’s	  veto	  message	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  personal	  exemptions.	  	  	  News	  reports	  of	  wealthy	  debtors	  escaping	  their	  creditors	  by	  relocating	  to	  states	  with	  generous	  homestead	  exemptions	  like	  Florida	  and	  Texas	  led	  gave	   new	   life	   to	   the	   matter	   of	   exemption	   reform.	   	   Legislators	   from	   both	   parties	  supported	   proposals	   to	   either	   enact	   uniform	   exemptions	   or	   at	   least	   limiting	   the	  amounts	  debtors	  could	  claim	  using	  state	  exemptions	  in	  bankruptcy.	  However,	  Texas	  and	  Florida’s	   congressional	  delegations	  unanimously	  opposed	   such	  measures,	   and	  threatened	   to	  block	   the	  entire	   legislation	   if	   the	  caps	  were	  not	   removed.	   	  Although	  the	   two	   sides	   repeatedly	   seemed	   at	   an	   impasse,	   House	   and	   Senate	   conferees	  ultimately	   reached	   a	   compromise	  with	   the	  Texas	   and	  Florida	  delegations	   that	   left	  unlimited	  exemptions	  in	  place	  for	  debtors	  who	  had	  resided	  in	  a	  state	  for	  at	  least	  40	  months	  prior	  to	  filing	  bankruptcy.	  The	  more	  troublesome	  provision	  for	  reform	  proponents	  was	  an	  amendment	  made	   by	   Senator	   Charles	   Schumer	   (D-­‐NY).	   	   Schumer	   had	   taken	   up	   the	   debtor’s	  cause,	   leading	   efforts	   to	   block	   the	   reforms	   from	   becoming	   law	   despite	   their	  overwhelming	   congressional	   support.	   	   His	   amendment	   pushed	  what	  was	   possibly	  the	   hottest	   button	   in	   partisan	   politics,	   abortion	   rights.	   	   The	   added	   provision	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authorized	   bankruptcy	   judges	   to	   block	   the	   discharge	   of	   any	   debts	   incurred	   on	  account	   of	   criminal	   fines	   or	   civil	   damages	   arising	   out	   of	   violent	   abortion	   clinic	  protests.	  The	  amendment	  had	  no	  real	   impact	  on	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	   	  Existing	   laws	  already	   barred	   the	   discharge	   of	   debts	   resulting	   from	   willful	   and	   malicious	   acts.	  	  Bankruptcy	   experts	   acknowledged	   as	   much.	   	   However,	   as	   a	   political	   strategy,	  Schumer’s	  maneuver	  was	   brilliant.	   	   The	   solid	  Republican	   support	   for	   the	   bill	  was	  split;	   many	   conservative	   legislators,	   under	   pressure	   by	   pro-­‐life	   interest	   groups,	  refused	  to	  support	  the	  conference	  report	  so	  long	  as	  it	  included	  the	  abortion	  violence	  amendment.	   	   Conversely,	   many	   Democrats	   who	   had	   previously	   voted	   for	   the	   bill	  indicated	  that	  they	  would	  not	  do	  so	  again	  if	  the	  amendment	  were	  stripped	  out.	  	  	  The	   legislation	  was	   reported	  out	   of	   the	   conference	  with	   the	   amendment	   in	  place.	   	  True	   to	   their	  word,	   the	  Republican-­‐led	  House	   refused	   to	  bring	   it	   to	   a	   floor	  vote,	  instead	  blocking	  further	  consideration	  of	  the	  report	  on	  a	  vote	  of	  243-­‐172,	  and	  bankruptcy	  reform	  died	  for	  yet	  a	  third	  time.	  	  
4.	   The	  108th	  Congress	  (2003-­‐04)	  When	   the	   108th	   Congress	   convened	   in	   2003,	   bankruptcy	   reform	   legislation	  had	  a	  new	  name	  and	  a	  new	  House	  sponsor.	  	  The	  old	  name,	  Bankruptcy	  Reform	  Act,	  had	  given	  way	   in	   the	   style	  of	   the	  2000s	   to	   a	  more	  elaborate	  one,	  The	  Bankruptcy	  Abuse	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act,	  commonly	  known	  by	  its	  acronym,	  BAPCPA.	  	  In	  addition,	   Representative	   George	   Gekas	   had	   lost	   his	   bid	   for	   reelection.	   	   James	  Sensenbrenner	   (R-­‐WI)	   assumed	   leadership	   of	   House	   efforts	   to	   enact	   bankruptcy	  reform.	   	  He	   introduced	  his	  bankruptcy	  bill,	   identified	  as	  H.R.	  975,	  on	  February	  27,	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2003.	   	   It	   was	   essentially	   the	   same	   as	   the	   one	   the	   House	   approved	   in	   the	   prior	  session	  of	  Congress.	   	  It	  again	  went	  through	  the	  House	  quickly,	  passing	  on	  a	  vote	  of	  315-­‐113	  on	  March	  19,	  2003,	  and	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  Senate.	  However,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   reform	  opponents	  had	  repeatedly	  succeeded	  in	  quashing	  the	  legislation	  by	  playing	  the	  Senate	  off	  of	  the	  House,	  reform	  supporters	  had	  yet	  to	  coordinate	  the	  chambers’	  efforts.	  	  The	  Senate	  did	  not	  take	  any	  action	  on	  H.R.	  975.	  	  Instead,	  it	  took	  up	  Senator	  Grassley’s	  version	  of	  the	  bill,	  S.1920,	  which	  he	  introduced	   on	   November	   21,	   2003.	   	   It	   passed	   the	   Senate	   four	   days	   later	   by	  unanimous	   consent.	   	   The	   House	   took	   up	   S.1920	   after	   returning	   from	   its	   holiday	  break	  and	  approved	  it,	  with	  amendments,	  on	  January	  28,	  2004.	  	  Another	  conference	  committee	  was	  duly	   formed.	   	  However,	   threats	  by	  Schumer	  and	  others	   to	  add	   the	  abortion	   clinic	   provision	   to	   S.1920	   left	   little	   appetite	   among	   members	   of	   either	  chamber	  to	  pursue	  the	  bill	  further.	  	  In	  addition,	  congressional	  attention	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Iraq	   and	   upcoming	   elections	   meant	   that	   the	   legislation	   received	   no	   additional	  attention.	  It	  died	  without	  further	  action	  when	  Congress	  adjourned	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.	  
5.	   109th	  Congress	  (2005)	  The	  2004	  elections	  placed	  both	  Congress	   and	   the	  White	  House	  under	   solid	  Republican	   control.	   	  Moreover,	   legislative	   supporters	  of	  bankruptcy	   reform	   finally	  realized	  that	  wide	  majorities	  were	  by	  themselves	  inadequate	  to	  achieve	  its	  passage.	  Unlike	   in	   the	   four	   prior	   sessions,	   Republican	   leadership	   in	   the	   two	   chambers	  coordinated	  their	  efforts.	  	  	  Consideration	  of	  the	  legislation	  would	  begin	  this	  time	  in	  the	  Senate,	  since	  the	  House	   leaders	  had	  committed	  to	  pass	  any	  measure	  approved	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by	   the	   upper	   chamber	   and	   thereby	   bypass	   a	   historically	   troublesome	   conference	  committee.	   	  To	   facilitate	  House	  passage,	   the	  Senate’s	  Republican	   leadership	  said	   it	  would	  block	  efforts	  to	  tack	  unfavorable	  amendments	  to	  the	  bill.	  House	  Republicans	  agreed	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  	  This	  by	  itself	  should	  have	  been	  controversial.	   	  However,	  in	  the	  highly	  charged	  partisan	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  modern	  Senate,	  such	  maneuvers	  had	  become	  commonplace.	  	  Senator	  Grassley	  introduced	  the	  bill,	  S.256,	  for	  the	  final	  time	  on	  February	  1,	  2005.	  	  In	  little	  more	  than	  two	  weeks	  it	  was	  passed	  without	  changes	  by	  the	  Judiciary	  Committee	   and	   was	   sent	   to	   the	   floor,	   where	   it	   was	   approved	   with	   minor	  amendments	  on	  March	  10,	  2005	  on	  a	  vote	  of	  74-­‐25.	  	  The	  bill	  was	  sent	  to	  the	  House,	  where	   it	   was	   substituted	   for	   H.R.	   685,	   a	   similar	   bill	   that	   had	   been	   introduced	   by	  Representative	   Sensenbrenner	   as	   a	   placeholder	   while	   the	   Senate	   engaged	   in	   its	  deliberations.	   	   S.625	   cleared	   the	   House	   Financial	   Services	   Committee	   on	   April	   8,	  2005,	  and	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  House	  (without	  amendments)	  by	  a	  vote	  of	  302-­‐126	  on	   April	   14,	   2005.	   	   True	   to	   their	  word,	   the	  House	   Republican	   leadership	   blocked	  attempts	   to	   amend	   the	   bill.	   	   There	   was	   no	   need	   for	   a	   conference	   committee	   to	  reconcile	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  chambers.	   	  S.625	  was	  sent	   to	  the	  president,	  who	   signed	   it	   on	  March	  10,	   2005.	   	   It	   became	  effective	   just	   short	   of	   seven	  months	  later,	  on	  October	  5,	  2005.	  
6.	   A	   Brief	   Summary	   of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Abuse	   and	   Consumer	  
Protection	  Act	  For	  all	  of	  the	  controversy	  they	  generated,	  the	  2005	  reforms	  followed,	  rather	  than	  replaced,	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  existing	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	  	  Essential	  procedures	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and	   institutions	  were	   left	   intact;	   the	  basic	   standards	   for	  obtaining	  discharge	  were	  essentially	  unchanged.	  	  Instead,	  the	  most	  important,	  and	  most	  controversial	  parts	  of	  the	  new	  law	  were	  so-­‐called	  “gate-­‐keeping”	  or	  qualifying	  provisions	  intended	  to	  limit	  debtors	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  consumer	  cases.	  	  The	  most	  controversial	  addition,	  means	  testing,	   conditioned	   individual	   filers’	   election	   of	   the	   quicker,	   less	   burdensome	  Chapter	   7	   proceedings	   on	   qualification	   under	   a	   complex	   income	   and	   expense	  analysis	   derived	   from	   IRS	   collection	   procedures.	   	   Debtors	  with	   specified	   net	   cash	  flow,	   identified	   in	   the	   law	  as	  “disposable	   income,”	  would	  be	  compelled	  to	  repay	  at	  least	  of	  portion	  of	  their	  debts	  to	  creditors	  under	  a	  Chapter	  13	  plan	  of	  three	  to	  five	  years	   length.	   	  New	  filers	  who	  passed	  the	  means	  test	  were	  not	  automatically	   in	  the	  clear.	   	  Their	   cases	  might	   still	   be	   subject	   to	  dismissal	   if	   a	   judge	   concluded	   that	   the	  filing	  was	  for	  an	  improper	  purpose	  that	  was	  an	  “abuse”	  of	  the	  terms	  and	  protections	  of	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code	   (11	   U.S.C.	   §707(b);	   Wedoff	   2005;	   Wedoff	   2006).	   	   This	  amendment	  was	  derived	   from	   the	   various	  bills	   introduced	  by	   Senator	  Grassley;	   it	  was	   intended	   to	   give	   judges	   broader	   discretion	   to	   review	   new	   cases	   than	   the	   old	  standard,	  which	   required	   actionable	   abuse	   to	   be	   “substantial”	   (Hansell	   1997)	   and	  resulted	  in	  relatively	  few	  dismissals.73	  	  Other	  parts	  of	  BAPCPA,	  while	  still	  controversial,	  drew	  less	  attention	  than	  the	  means	   test.	   	   All	   consumer	   filers	  were	   required	   to	   attend	   a	   debtor	   education	   class	  before	  seeking	  bankruptcy	  relief.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  new	  law	  imposed	  an	  obligation	  on	  attorneys	  to	  independently	  verify	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  information	  contained	  in	  their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  73	  Congress	  has	  not	  defined	  the	  term	  “abuse”	  in	  §707,	  even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  part	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  since	  1984.	  	  Judicial	  interpretations	  of	  the	  term	  have	  widely	  varied.	  	  See	  Ruttenberg	  (2009)	  and	  Chapter	  Six	  of	  this	  dissertation.	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debtor	  clients’	  schedules	  of	  assets	  and	  liabilities	  and	  statements	  of	  financial	  affairs,	  documents	  that	  require	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  a	  filer’s	  financial	  circumstances.	   	  One	  uncontroversial	   provision	   important	   placed	   restrictions	   on	   serial	   filers,	   who,	   for	  example,	  filed	  bankruptcy	  to	  stop	  foreclosure	  but	  otherwise	  did	  nothing	  until	  their	  cases	   were	   dismissed,	   and	   then	   filed	   again	   when	   foreclosure	   proceedings	   were	  restarted	  against	  them.	  
C.	   Analysis	  The	  main	  challenge	  facing	  proponents	  of	  pro-­‐creditor	  bankruptcy	  reforms	  in	  the	  early	  Nineties	  was	   the	   fact	   that	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  was	  dominated	  by	  a	  monopoly	  that	  had	  been	  in	  place	  for	  sixty	  years.	  	  Monopolies	  are	  by	  definition	  closed	  to	   new	   participants,	   especially	   reformers	   whose	   goals	   are	   at	   odds	   with	   the	  monopoly’s	   core	   policy	   image.	   	   As	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	   Commission	  report	   demonstrated,	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   rejected	   most	   of	   the	  reformers’	   proposals,	   but	   it	  was	  most	   emphatically	   opposed	   to	  measures	   like	   the	  means	   test	   that	   it	   perceived	   as	   being	   at	   odds	   with	   the	   fresh	   start	   principle.	  	  Therefore,	  creditor	  groups	  had	  to	  break	  the	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  community’s	  hold	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process	  in	  order	  to	  see	  their	  proposals	  become	  law.	  	  Since	  American	   bankruptcy	   is	   based	   in	   federal	   law	   (Warren	   1999,	   189),	   the	   key	   to	   the	  pro-­‐creditor	  reformers’	   success	  was	   to	  bypass	   the	  community	  and	  directly	  engage	  Congress	   in	   the	   policymaking	   process.	   	   Their	   strategy	   encompassed	   two	   related	  challenges:	  (1)	  breaking	  the	  community’s	  hold	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  and	  (2)	  expanding	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  to	  draw	  Congress	  directly	  into	  the	  policymaking	  fray.	  In	   order	   to	   displace	   a	   policy	   monopoly,	   challengers	   must	   both	   develop	   a	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compelling	   image	   of	   their	   own	   and	   discredit	   the	   monopoly’s	   core	   image	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  1993).	  	  Defining	  the	  issue	  to	  assert	  that	  the	  existing	  system	  had	  unfairly	  tipped	  the	  balance	  in	  the	  relationship	  between	  debtors	  and	  creditor	  too	  far	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   former	   would	   not	   in	   itself	   have	   been	   likely	   to	   gain	  sufficient	   congressional	   support	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   credit	   card	   industry	   was	  reporting	   record	   profits.	   	   Instead,	   reformers	   defined	   their	   efforts	   in	   terms	   of	  promoting	  personal	  responsibility.	   	  The	  motivating	  image	  underlying	  the	  statutory	  reforms	   in	   1938	   and	   1978,	   and	   on	   which	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   was	  built,	  was	  of	  providing	  a	  fresh	  start	  to	  the	  honest	  but	  unfortunate	  debtor.	  	  The	  great	  mass	  of	  consumer	  filers	  were	  viewed	  as	  victims	  of	  circumstances	  which	  were	  either	  beyond	  their	  control	  (e.g.,	   job	  loss	  or	  illness),	  or	  were	  at	  most	  the	  creation	  of	  their	  own	  erroneous	  judgment.74	  	  	  Reform	   proponents	   turned	   that	   image	   around	   in	   the	   1990s.	   	   The	  proliferation	   of	   credit	   card	   debt,	   increases	   in	   consumer	   goods	   purchases,	   and	   the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  bankruptcy	  filings	  allowed	  reformers	  to	  redescribe	  many	  consumer	  filers	  as	  shiftless	  rather	  than	  honest	  and	  manipulative	  instead	  of	  unfortunate.	   	  The	  National	  Consumer	  Bankruptcy	  Coalition	   in	  objecting	   to	   the	  Review	  Commission’s	  majority	   report	   (three	   months	   before	   it	   was	   actually	   released),	   published	   the	  following	  statement:	  	  [T]he	   Commission	   has	   assembled	   a	   package	   of	   proposed	   consumer	  bankruptcy	   "reforms"	   which	   would	   benefit	   unscrupulous	   or	   undeserving	  debtors	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   lenders	   and	   responsible	   borrowers,	   and	   would	  encourage	  more	  chapter	  7	  bankruptcy	  filings.	  Its	  recommendations	  condone	  and	  encourage	  outrageous	  and	  irresponsible	  financial	  behavior.	  Adoption	  of	  these	   proposals	   would	   substantially	   increase	   lenders’	   risk	   and	   result	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  See	  Chapter	  Four.	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consumer	   credit	   becoming	   less	   available	   and	   more	   costly.	   The	   public’s	  overwhelming	   view	   that	   those	  who	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   repay	   should	   do	   so	  would	   be	   thwarted.	   And	   the	   public	   would	   likely	   view	   the	   resulting	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  as	  a	  perverse	  system	  of	  debt	  forgiveness	  on	  demand	  for	  the	  financially	  reckless	  (National	  Consumer	  Bankruptcy	  Coalition	  1997).	  	   The	   Review	   Commission’s	   minority	   group	   refined	   the	   coalition’s	  characterization	  with	  the	  observation	  that	  many	  debtors	  were	  using	  bankruptcy	  as	  an	   option	   of	   “first	   resort”	   (Minority	   Recommendations,	   NBRC	   1997,	   1044).	   	   Such	  images	   were	   fueled	   by	   industry-­‐funded	   studies	   from	   Purdue	   University	   asserting	  that	  possibly	  as	  much	  as	  twenty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  bankruptcy	  filers	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  repay	  at	  least	  some	  of	  their	  discharged	  debts	  (Seelye	  1998;	  Warren	  1999).75	  	  	  Congressional	   supporters	   of	   reform	   legislation	   were	   quick	   to	   incorporate	  these	  themes	  into	  their	  own	  descriptions	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  process.	  	  Congressman	  Scott	   McInnis	   (R-­‐CO)	   said	   that	   the	   legislation	   was	   “another	   example	   of	   this	  Congress’s	   efforts	   to	   encourage	   individual	   responsibility.	   	  We	  will	   renotify	   people	  that	  they	  do	  need	  to	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  debts	  that	  they	  have	  accumulated.	  	  We	  will	  remind	  them	  about	  keeping	  their	  work.	  	  We	  will	  remind	  them	  about	  ‘Don’t	  go	   out	   and	   spend	   money	   that	   you	   don’t	   have.’	   (Seelye	   1998a).”	   	   Representative	  Deborah	   Pryce	   (R-­‐OH)	   offered	   an	   even	   broader	   critique	   of	   debtors:	   “[W]hen	  intelligent	  citizens	  ignore	  basic	  common	  sense	  by	  spending	  outside	  of	  their	  means,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  75	  Consumer	   advocates	   criticized	   the	   Purdue	   studies	   were	   both	   because	   of	   the	  researchers’	   methodology	   and	   their	   conclusions	   (Warren	   1999,	   195,	   calling	   the	  results	   “made	  up”).	   	   	   Studies	  by	   consumer	   advocates	  have	  been	   subject	   to	   similar	  criticism.	   	   In	   one	   such	   study,	   the	   authors	   claimed	   that	   nearly	   one-­‐half	   of	   all	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  cases	  were	  “medical-­‐related	  (Jacoby,	  et	  al.	  2001).	   	  Cases	  in	  a	  sample	  taken	  from	  eight	  different	  jurisdictions	  were	  designated	  as	  medical-­‐related	  if	   described	   as	   such	   by	   the	   filers	   themselves,	   or	   if	   the	   court	   documents	   indicated	  medical	  debts	  greater	  than	  $1,000.	  	  Critics	  of	  that	  study	  argue	  that	  these	  standards	  are	   arbitrary	   and	   fail	   to	   account	   for	   other	   significant	   factors	   that	   may	   have	  contributed	  to	  the	  debtors’	  decisions	  to	  file	  bankruptcy	  (Jacoby	  2001,	  236,	  fn.	  24).	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we	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  reasonable	  level	  of	  accountability	  and	  demand	  some	  personal	  responsibility	   to	   protect	   those	   who	   have	   extended	   credit	   to	   them	   in	   good	   faith	  (quoted	  in	  Jacoby	  2004,	  fn.	  8).”	  “Personal	   responsibility”	   became	   the	   reformers’	   rallying	   cry.	   	   It	   met	   the	  requirement	  that	  policy	  images	  derive	  from	  fundamental	  values.	  	  In	  addition,	  while	  sounding	  positive,	   it	   implicitly	  denigrated	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   fresh	   start.	   	   If	   refraining	  from	   filing	   bankruptcy	   was	   a	   sign	   of	   responsible	   behavior,	   then	   the	   growing	  numbers	  of	  bankruptcy	  filings	  were	  a	  mark	  of	  increasing	  irresponsibility,	  or	  worse,	  fraud.	   	  Congressman	  Gekas	  echoed	   the	  NBRC	  minority	  when	  he	  said	   in	  support	  of	  his	   bill,	   “We	  guarantee	   a	   fresh	   start	   to	   any	  American	  who	  needs	   it	   .	   .	   .	   But	   by	   the	  same	  token,	  we	  can’t	  permit	  anyone	  to	  use	  bankruptcy	  as	  a	  financial	  planning	  tool	  (Labaton	  2000).”	  	  Representative	  McCollum	  was	  more	  pointed	  in	  his	  criticism:	  	  [P]eople	   see	   bankruptcy	   as	   a	   financial	   planning	   tool,	   spurred	   on	   by	  advertisements....[T]he	   social	   stigma	   associated	   with	   filing	   for	   bankruptcy	  has	  eroded.	  Bankruptcy	  was	  never	  meant	  to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  financial	  planning	  tool	   or	   for	   mere	   convenience.	   These	   “bankruptcies	   of	   convenience”	   are	   a	  clear	  misuse	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	   system,	   as	  bankruptcy	  becomes	   a	   first	   stop	  rather	  than	  a	  last	  resort	  (quoted	  in	  Jacoby	  2004,	  fn.	  8).	  	  Defining	   debtors	   as	   irresponsible	   also	   enabled	   the	   reformers	   to	   expand	  conflict	   to	   attract	   support	   among	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   consumers	   who	   borrowed	  conservatively,	  paid	  their	  bills	  on	  time,	  and	  did	  not	  file	  bankruptcy.	   	  The	  argument	  at	   least	   allowed	   members	   of	   Congress	   to	   claim	   to	   be	   acting	   on	   their	   behalf.	   	   An	  officer	   of	   the	   American	   Bankers	   Association	   criticized	   the	   Review	   Commission’s	  majority	   report,	   stating	   that	   the	   “recommendations	   make	   it	   easy	   for	   people	   of	  means	  to	  walk	  away	  from	  their	  debts	  while	  raising	  the	  cost	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  for	  every	  U.S.	  consumer-­‐-­‐not	  the	  solution	  we	  need	  given	  record	  consumer	  bankruptcy	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filings	   (Donald	  G.	  Ogilvie,	   Executive	  Vice	  President,	  Am.	  Bankers'	  Ass'n,	   Letters	   to	  the	  Editor:	  Placing	   the	  Blame	   for	  Bankruptcy	  Reform,	  Wall	  St.	   J.,	  Aug.	  26,	  1997,	   at	  A17,	   cited	   in	   Jacoby	   2004,	   fn.	   26).	   	   Judge	   Jones	   and	   James	   Shepard	   made	   the	  argument	  most	  dramatically	  in	  their	  minority	  recommendations	  to	  the	  NBRC	  report,	  when	   they	   described	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   majority	   to	   take	   account	   of	   the	   costs	   of	  discharge	   on	   non-­‐filing	   borrowers	   as	   a	   “tragedy.”76	  	   The	   creditors’	   coalition	   ran	   a	  series	  of	  advertisements	  to	  bolster	  this	  argument,	  asserting	  that	  the	  cost	  of	  covering	  discharged	  debts	  amounted	  to	  a	  $400	  annual	  tax	  on	  non-­‐bankrupt	  households.77	  	  	  Finally,	   because	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   dominance	   of	   the	  policymaking	  process	  was	  predicated	  on	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  fresh	  start	  as	   its	  policy	  image,	   discrediting	   that	   doctrine	   undermined	   the	   community’s	   long-­‐standing	  authority	   and	   exiled	   it	   from	   the	   new	  policymaking	   process	   (Jacoby	   2004;	  Warren	  1999).	   	   Representative	   McCollum	   described	   the	   “campaign	   of	   false	   information	  being	  disseminated	  by	  bankruptcy	  attorneys,	  bankruptcy	  ‘experts’	  and	  other	  people	  maligning	  the	  legislation	  to	  further	  their	  agendas	  (Jacoby	  1999,	  fn.	  3).	  	  Congressman	  Gekas	   announced	   at	   a	   speech	   to	   the	   American	   Bankruptcy	   Institute’s	   annual	  meeting	  in	  1998	  that	  he	  was	  not	  interested	  in	  receiving	  input	  from	  the	  bankruptcy	  community	   (Tabb	   1999,	   351).	   	   Senator	   Grassley	   resorted	   to	   lawyer	   stereotypes,	  arguing	  that	  bankruptcy	  lawyers	  opposed	  reform	  out	  of	  self-­‐interest:	  Many	   lawyers	   who	   specialize	   in	   bankruptcy	   view	   bankruptcy	   as	   an	  opportunity	   to	  make	   big	  money	   for	   themselves.	   	   This	   profit	  motive	   causes	  bankruptcy	  lawyers	  to	  promote	  bankruptcy	  as	  the	  only	  option,	  even	  when	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  76	  Chapter	  Five,	  Part	  A;	  Jones	  and	  Shepard,	  NBRC	  1997,	  1116.	  77	  Warren	   1999,	   195;	   according	   to	   Professor	   Warren,	   “the	   number	   [was]	   simply	  made	  up.”	   	  The	  advertisements	  were	  based	  on	  the	  Purdue	  studies	  described	  above	  in	  footnote	  16.	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financially	   troubled	   client	   might	   obviously	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   repay	   some	  debt	  (Jacoby	  2004a).78	  	  	  	  However,	   as	   usual,	   the	   most	   pointed	   commentary	   was	   from	   Judge	   Jones	   and	  Commissioner	  Shepard	  in	  their	  NBRC	  dissent:	  Seen	  in	  its	  best	  light,	  the	  Framework	  reflects	  the	  well-­‐intentioned	  aspirations	  of	   individuals	  who	   live	   in	   ivy-­‐covered	   towers	  who	  have	  no	   real	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  experience	   with	   the	   law	   they	   are	   seeking	   to	   reform.	   	   The	   sum	   of	   their	  knowledge	  of	  consumer	  bankruptcy	  is	  the	  incomplete	  raw	  data	  from	  selected	  judicial	  districts	  from	  which	  they	  draw	  “undisputable”	  conclusions	  and	  make	  recommendations,	  and	  the	  culled	  and	  selected	  portions	  of	  the	  Commission’s	  hearings	   and	   materials	   forwarded	   to	   the	   Commission	   which	   reflect	   and	  support	  their	  preconceived	  ideas	  of	  problems	  and	  the	  need	  for	  reform	  (NBRC	  1997,	  1115).79	  	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  (1993)	  point	  out	  that	  Congress	  generally	  responds	  only	  to	  negative	  characterizations	  of	  existing	  policies.	   	  By	  re-­‐characterizing	   the	   fresh	  start	  as	   a	   tool	   for	   unscrupulous	   debtors,	   and	   by	   extension	   impugning	   the	   role	   and	  motives	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  reform	  proponents	  not	  only	  broke	  the	  community’s	   hold	   on	   the	   policymaking	   process,	   but	   also	   fully	   isolated	   the	  community	   and	   its	   members	   from	   any	   role	   in	   Congress’	   policy	   deliberations.	  	  Organizations	  like	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  and	  the	  National	  Conference	  of	   Bankruptcy	   Judges	   offered	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   drafting	   process	   but	   were	  rebuffed	   (Jacoby	   1999),	   and	   no	   wonder.	   	   Once	   the	   reformers	   had	   displaced	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	  In	  defense	  of	  the	  lawyers,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  fees	  paid	  to	  attorneys	  in	  Chapter	  13	   cases	   are	   generally	   more	   than	   those	   paid	   in	   Chapter	   7,	   reflecting	   the	   greater	  amount	   of	   work	   required	   in	   the	   former.	   	   Under	   Senator	   Grassley’s	   reasoning,	  attorneys	   should	   be	   directing	   their	   clients	   to	   the	   better	   compensating	  Chapter	   13	  filings.	  79	  This	  comment	  was	  a	  none-­‐too-­‐veiled	  criticism	  of	  Commission	  Reporter	  Elizabeth	  Warren,	  a	  professor	  of	   law	  at	  Harvard	  and	  the	  author	  of	  several	  empirically	  based	  studies	   of	   consumers	   and	   consumer	   debt,	   who	   spent	   virtually	   her	   entire	  professional	   career	   in	   the	   ranks	   of	   academia	   until	   becoming	   President	   Obama’s	  special	  advisor	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Consumer	  Financial	  Protection	  Bureau	  in	  2010.	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community’s	   monopoly,	   it	   was	   of	   no	   benefit	   to	   them	   to	   allow	   the	   community’s	  members	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  new	  policymaking	  table.	  
D.	   The	  Effect	  of	  Congressional	  Support	  of	  Financial	  Interests	  	  According	   to	   Kingdon,	   the	   likelihood	   of	   bringing	   about	   policy	   change	   is	  maximized	  when	  three	  conditions	  simultaneously	  converge:	  (1)	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  event	   or	   problem	   subject	   to	   resolution	   by	   policymakers;	   (2)	   a	   solution	   to	   the	  problem	  that	  may	  be	  adopted	  by	  policymakers;	  (3)	  a	  political	  atmosphere	  conducive	  to	   adoption	   of	   the	   proposed	   solution	   (Kingdon	   1984;	   see	   also	   Chapter	   Two,	   Part	  D.3).	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  1990s	  bankruptcy	  reform,	  financial	  interests	  and	  their	  political	  allies	   successfully	   defined	   the	   problem	   as	   the	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	  irresponsible	   consumer	   bankruptcy	   filers.	   	   Their	   solution	   was	   to	   change	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	   to	  place	   stricter	   requirements	  on	   those	  debtors.	   	  As	   to	   the	   third	  condition,	   it	   is	   fair	   to	   say	   that	   by	   the	   mid	   1990s,	   Congress	   did	   not	   need	   much	  encouragement	   to	   take	   positions	   favorable	   to	   the	   financial	   industry.	   	   Pro-­‐banking	  attitudes	  had	  become	  increasingly	  prevalent	  among	  policymakers	  by	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  1990s;	  bankruptcy	  reform	  fit	  neatly	  into	  the	  new	  legislative	  agenda.	  	  	  
1.	   Bankruptcy	  Reform	  and	  the	  Financial	  Sector	  Bankruptcy	  reform	  advocates	  operated	  in	  a	  congressional	  environment	  that	  was	   broadly	   supportive	   of	   scaling	   back	   restrictions	   on	   the	   financial	   industry.	  Bankruptcy	  reform	  was	   just	  one	  of	  many	   issues,	  and	  not	  even	   the	  most	   important	  one,	   advanced	   by	   the	   financial	   sector	   and	   supported	   by	   Congress	   in	   the	  Nineties.	  	  Other	   legislative	   successes	   for	   the	   industry	   included	   the	   Riegle-­‐Neal	   Act	   of	   1994,	  which	   permitted	   interstate	   banking;	   the	   Gramm-­‐Leach-­‐Bliley	   Act	   of	   1999,	   which	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repealed	  the	  Depression	  Era	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  Act	  and	  eliminated	  the	  barriers	  between	  commercial	  and	   investment	  banking,	   and	   the	  Commodities	  Futures	  Modernization	  Act	  of	  2000,	  which	  placed	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  derivatives	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  federal	  regulators.	  	  	  In	  other	  words,	  bankruptcy	  reform	  was	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  agenda	  favoring	  the	  financial	  industry	  that	  enjoyed	  widespread	  bipartisan	  support	  in	  Congress.	  The	  financial	  sector’s	   influence	  was	  the	  product	  of	   three	  factors:	  (1)	  money	  spent	   on	   campaign	   contributions	   and	   lobbying	   expenditures	   (see	   below);	   (2)	   the	  appointment	  of	  Wall	  Street	  executives	  to	  prominent	  executive	  branch	  positions;	  and	  (3)	  a	  near	  unrestrained	  admiration	  among	  policymakers	  for	  the	  financial	   industry:	  “The	   idea	   that	  a	  sophisticated,	  unrestrained	   financial	  sector	  was	  good	   for	  America	  became	   part	   of	   the	   conventional	   wisdom	   of	   the	   political	   and	   intellectual	   class	  (Johnson	  and	  Kwak,	  90,	  105).”	  80	  In	  Johnson	  and	  Kwak’s	  analysis,	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  spent	  by	  the	  financial	  sector	  on	  public	  affairs	   is	  only	  part	  of	   the	   reason	   for	   its	   success.	   	  However,	   in	   the	  case	   of	   financial	   reform,	   the	  money	   spent	   by	   the	   industry	   to	   promote	   bankruptcy	  reform	  became	  the	  focus	  of	  contention	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  (Jacoby	  2004).	  	  The	  financial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Footnote:	   several	   books	   have	   detailed	   how	   the	   financial	   industry	   successfully	  lobbied	  Congress	  in	  the	  1990s	  to	  dismantle	  long-­‐standing	  restrictions	  on	  banks	  and	  other	   financial	   institutions,	   ultimately	   leading	   to	   dramatic	   profits	   for	   those	  institutions	  but	   also	   to	   the	   financial	   crisis	  of	  2008.	   	  These	   include	   Johnson,	   Simon	  and	   Kwak,	   James	   (2010).	   13	   Bankers:	   The	   Wall	   Street	   Takeover	   and	   the	   Next	  
Financial	  Meltdown.	   New	   York:	   Vintage	   Books;	   Morgenson,	   Gretchen	   and	   Rosner,	  Joshua	   (2011).	  Reckless	  Endangerment.	   New	  York:	   Times	  Books;	  McLean,	   Bethany	  and	  Nocera,	   Joe	   (2010).	  All	   the	  Devils	  are	  Here:	   the	  Hidden	  History	  of	   the	  Financial	  
Crisis.	  New	  York:	  the	  Penguin	  Group.	  	  	  See	  also	  Financial	  Crisis	  Inquiry	  Commission	  (2011).	  The	  Financial	  Crisis	  Inquiry	  Report:	  Final	  Report	  of	  the	  National	  Commission	  
on	   the	   Causes	   of	   the	   Financial	   and	  Economic	   Crisis	   in	   the	  United	   States.	   New	   York:	  Public	  Affairs.	  	  None	  of	  these	  books	  address	  bankruptcy	  reform	  legislation;	  instead,	  they	   provide	   a	   broader	   view	   of	   the	   political	   atmosphere	   in	   which	   congressional	  bankruptcy	  policy	  was	  made	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	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sector	  (including	  banking,	  insurance,	  and	  real	  estate)	  is	  by	  far	  and	  away	  the	  largest	  contributor	  to	  congressional	  campaigns.81	  	  The	  New	  York	  Times	  reported	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  passage	  of	  BAPCPA	  in	  2005	  that	  the	  main	  financial	  organizations	  supporting	  the	  bill	  had	  spent	  more	  than	  $40	  million	  on	  political	   fund	  raising	  since	  1989	  (Labaton	  2005).	  	  By	  2000,	  the	  amount	  paid	  by	  these	  companies	  for	  lobbyists	  just	  to	  work	  on	  bankruptcy	  legislation	  was	  more	  than	  $5	  million	  (Bartlett	  and	  Steele).	  	  Press	  stories	  routinely	  mentioned	  the	  amounts	  spent	  by	  the	  financial	   industry	   in	  reports	  on	  the	  successive	   bankruptcy	   bills,	   and	   other	   accounts	   frequently	   cited	   money	   as	   the	  primary	  reason	  for	  the	  legislation’s	  resilience	  and	  ultimate	  passage.	  	  The	  industry’s	  expenditures	  became	  a	  reason	  itself	  for	  opposition	  to	  the	  bill.82	  However,	   the	   instances	   in	  which	  vote	  buying	  can	  be	  proven	  with	  statistical	  certainty	   are	   uncommon;	   this	   is	   particularly	   true	   when	   legislation	   enjoys	  widespread	   bipartisan	   support	   and	   virtually	   all	   legislators	   receive	   some	  contributions	   from	  the	   financial	   sector.	   	  Direct	  correlations	  between	  contributions	  and	  roll	  call	  votes	  in	  such	  cases	  are	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  to	  detect.83	  	  	  By	  way	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  81	  Johnson	  and	  Kwak	  report	  that	  from	  1998	  to	  2008,	  the	  financial	  sector	  spent	  $1.7	  billion	  on	   campaign	   contributions	   and	  $3.4	  billion	  on	   lobbying	   expenses	   (Johnson	  and	  Kwak	  2010,	  91).	  82	  For	   instance,	   the	  Washington	   Post’s	   David	   Broder,	   frequently	   described	   as	   the	  dean	   of	   the	   D.C.	   press	   corps,	   wrote	   in	   2005:	   “This	   ‘reform,’	   which	   parades	   as	   an	  effort	   to	   stop	   folks	   from	   spending	   lavishly	   and	   then	   stiffing	   creditors	   by	   filing	   for	  bankruptcy	   protection,	   is	   a	   perfect	   illustration	   of	   how	   the	   political	  money	   system	  tilts	  the	  law	  against	  average	  Americans.	  	  The	  simple	  fact	  that	  for	  eight	  straight	  years	  it	  has	  gained	  a	  place	  on	  a	  crowded	  congressional	  calendar	  is	  testimony	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  that	  banks	  and	  credit	  card	  companies	  have	  spent	  on	  lobbyists	  and	  campaign	  contributions	  .	  .	  .	  .	  For	  two	  weeks	  [in	  2005]	  the	  Senate	  sponsors	  shot	  down	   virtually	   every	   attempt	   to	   separate	   the	   sheep	   from	   the	   goats	   and	   carve	   out	  protections	  for	  the	  average	  family	  trapped	  by	  circumstances	  (Broder	  2005).”	  83	  Nunez	   and	   Rosenthal	   (2004)	   examined	   roll	   call	   votes	   on	   bankruptcy	   reform	  legislation	   in	   the	  107th	  Congress	   (2001-­‐02).	   	  They	   found	  no	  significant	  correlation	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a	   straightforward	   illustration,	   the	   table	   below	   compares	   the	   roll	   call	   votes	   on	  bankruptcy	  reform	  legislation	  in	  the	  108th	  Congress	  by	  the	  eight	  highest	  and	  lowest	  Democratic	   House	   recipients	   of	   campaign	   contributions	   from	   the	   financial	   sector	  (including	  banking,	  insurance,	  and	  real	  estate)	  in	  the	  2003	  –	  2004	  election	  cycle,	  as	  compiled	   by	   the	   Center	   for	   Responsive	   Politics.	   	   The	   following	   chart	   shows	   that	  members	  of	  each	  group	  were	  equally	  divided	  in	  their	  support	  of	  the	  legislation:	  
Figure	   5.1:	   Roll	   Call	   Votes	   by	   Democratic	   House	   Members	   on	   H.R.	   975,	   by	  
Receipt	  of	  Contributions	   from	  the	  Financial	  Sector,	  Eight	  Highest	  and	  Lowest	  
(2003-­‐04)84	  	  
Top	  8	  Recipients:	   Bottom	  8	  Recipients:	  Gephardt	  (MO)	   Y	   Deutsch	  (FL)	   Y	  Carson	  (OK)	   Y	   Dooley	  (CA)	   Y	  
Emanuel	  (IL)	   N	   McCarthy	  (MO)	   Y	  
Menendez	  (NJ)	   N	   Turner	  (TX)	   N	  Ford	  (TN)	   Y	   Conyers	  (MI)	   N	  Frost	  (TX)	   Y	   DeFazio	  (OR)	   N	  
Meehan	  (MA)	   N	   Sanders	  (VT)	   Y	  
Frank	  (NY)	   N	   Taylor	  (MS)	   N	  	  	  	   The	  lack	  of	  a	  significant	  correlation	  between	  campaign	  contributions	  and	  roll	  call	  votes	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  money	  played	  no	  role	   in	   the	  ultimate	  success	  of	   the	  credit	  card	  industry	  in	  gaining	  support	  for	  BAPCPA;	  it	  may	  only	  mean	  that	  such	  tests	  are	  not	  a	  suitable	  metric	  for	  ascertaining	  such	  influence.	  	  As	  Johnson	  and	  Kwak	  point	  out,	  political	  expenditures	  may	  be	  best	  understood	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  picture,	  with	  indirect	   or	   distant	   rewards,	   including	   a	   political	   environment	   receptive	   to	   wide-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  between	   roll	   call	   voting	   and	   contributions	   from	  particular	   finance	   and	   credit	   card	  companies.	   	   However,	   they	   also	   found	   that	   the	   National	   Consumer	   Bankruptcy	  Coalition’s	  contributions	  to	  House	  members	  were	  mainly	  directed	  to	  the	  Republican	  leadership;	  while	   those	  members’	   favorable	   votes	  may	  not	  have	  been	   in	  question,	  the	  contributions	  were	  thought	  necessary	  to	  keep	  the	  bill	  on	  the	  House’s	  legislative	  agenda	  notwithstanding	  proponents’	  repeated	  failures	  gain	  its	  enactment.	  	  	  84	  Data	  source:	  Center	  for	  Responsive	  Politics,	  www.opensecrets.org.	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ranging	  legislative	  reforms	  favorable	  to	  the	  contributors.85	  	   2.	   Bankruptcy	  Reform	  and	  Partisanship	  Moreover,	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  financial	  sector’s	  political	  spending	  obscures	  other	   congressional	   motivations.	   	   Partisanship	   and	   ideological	   polarization	   in	  Congress	  both	  increased	  markedly	  following	  the	  Republican	  takeover	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  1994	  (Mann	  and	  Ornstein).	  	  Studies	  demonstrate	  that	  roll	  call	  votes	   on	   bankruptcy	   reform	   legislation	   in	   the	  House	  were	   positively	   aligned	   on	   a	  conservative	  –	  liberal	  ideological	  axis,	  i.e.,	  conservatives	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  the	   legislation,	   while	   liberal	   members	   tended	   to	   oppose	   it	   (Nunez	   and	   Rosenthal	  2004).	   	   Congress’s	   increasing	   conservatism	   in	   the	   Nineties	   was	   reflected	   in	   its	  retreat	   from	   the	   social	   welfare	   policies	   of	   earlier	   decades.	   	   Bartels	   (2008)	   and	  Hacker	  and	  Pierson	  (2010)	  demonstrate	  how	  Congress	   is	  more	   likely	  now	  than	   in	  the	  past	  to	  disfavor	  policies	  that	  directly	  benefit	  the	  poor	  and	  disadvantaged	  and	  the	  middle	  class.86	  	  According	  to	  Hacker	  and	  Pierson	  (2010a,	  154),	  shifts	   in	  U.S.	  public	  policy	  as	   it	  relates	  to	   financial	  markets,	  corporate	  governance,	   industrial	  relations,	  and	   taxation,	   reflect	   a	   distinct	   governmental	   bias	   in	   favor	   of	   the	   wealthy	   that	   is	  largely	   the	   result	   of	   the	   actions	   of	   organized	   interests	   like	   those	   described	   by	  Johnson	  and	  Kwak.	  	  Because	  the	  benefits	  of	  this	  activity	  accrue	  almost	  exclusively	  to	  the	  already	  wealthy,	  with	  little	  distributed	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population,	  Hacker	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  In	   addition	   to	   broadly	   supporting	   financial	   deregulation,	   Congress	   in	   the	   1990s	  was	   increasingly	   conservative	   and	   receptive	   to	   a	   general	   retrenchment	   of	   social	  welfare	  policy.	  	  86	  The	  most	  prominent	   of	   these	   efforts	  was	   the	  welfare	   reform	   law	  of	   1996.	   	   Like	  bankruptcy	  reform	  legislation,	   it	  was	  given	  a	  name	  that	  obscured	   its	  real	  purpose:	  The	  Personal	  Responsibility	  and	  Work	  Opportunity	  Reconciliation	  Act.	   	  Note	  again	  Congress’	  use	  of	  the	  phrase	  “personal	  responsibility.”	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Pierson	  have	  named	  the	  process	  “winner-­‐take-­‐all	  politics.”	   	  Bankruptcy	  reform	  fits	  into	  this	  pattern,	  with	  its	  shift	  in	  emphasis	  from	  the	  debtor-­‐friendly	  fresh	  start	  to	  a	  creditor-­‐friendly	  policy	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  When	   viewed	   in	   terms	   of	   competing	   ideologies,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   battle	  between	  interest	  groups	  with	  vastly	  disproportionate	  resources,	  the	  long	  fight	  over	  the	  enactment	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform	  makes	  more	  sense.	  	  If	  money	  by	  itself	  were	  an	  accurate	   predictor	   of	   political	   success,	   then	   bankruptcy	   reform	   legislation	   would	  have	  passed	  Congress	  in	  1998.	  	  Instead,	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  was	  able	  to	   hinder	   the	   financial	   industry-­‐backed	   reform	   forces	   in	   four	   consecutive	  congressional	  sessions,	  notwithstanding	  its	  limited	  resources.	  	  	  
E.	   The	  Bankruptcy	  Policy	   Community’s	  Response	   to	  Bankruptcy	  Reform:	  
Expanding	  the	  Scope	  of	  Conflict	  The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   had	   two	   goals	   the	   outset	   of	   the	   reform	  process	  in	  1994:	  (1)	  to	  ensure	  that	  bankruptcy	  policy	  remained	  consistent	  with	  its	  own	   preferences,	   and	   (2)	   to	   maintain	   its	   monopoly	   over	   the	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  process.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  1990s,	  unlike	  in	  the	  1930s	  or	  the	  1970s,	  the	  community	  had	  to	  adopt	  new	  strategies	  reflecting	   its	  declining	   influence	  over	   that	  process.	   The	   community	   mostly	   opposed	   formation	   of	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	  Review	   Commission,	   fearing	   (with	   good	   reason)	   the	   loss	   of	   its	   policymaking	  authority	   to	   the	   financial	   interests.	   	  However,	  once	  the	  commission	  was	   formed,	   it	  attempted	   to	   reassert	   its	   authority	   and	   assume	   the	   leadership	   position	   it	   had	  occupied	   for	  more	   than	   sixty	   years.	   	  Members	  of	   the	   community,	   principally	   from	  the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference,	   filled	  many	   of	   the	   spots	   on	   the	   Commission	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and	   its	   staff.	   	   They	   formed	   a	   solid	   voting	   bloc	   that	   controlled	   the	   content	   of	   the	  Commission’s	  final	  report	  to	  Congress.	  	  	  However,	   unlike	   in	   1938	   or	   1978,	   the	   commission	   also	   included	   vocal	  outsiders	  opposed	   to	   the	   fundamental	   aims	  of	   existing	  bankruptcy	  policy.	   	  Rather	  than	   accommodate	   competition,	   as	   the	  NBC	  did	   in	  1938	  when	   it	   incorporated	   the	  SEC’s	  position	  on	  business	  reorganization,	  or	  1978,	  when	  compromise	  between	  the	  NBC	   and	   the	   bankruptcy	   judges	   resulted	   in	   a	   single	   bill	   that	   for	   the	   most	   part	  became	  the	  new	  Code,	  the	  commission	  majority	  refused	  to	  consider	  compromise	  on	  the	   issue	   of	   means	   testing,	   preferring	   to	   send	   its	   report	   to	   Congress	   despite	   the	  vigorous	  dissent	  of	  its	  minority	  members.	  	  In	  addition,	  members	  of	  the	  community,	  both	  on	  and	  off	   the	  commission,	  engaged	   their	  critics	   in	   the	  popular,	  professional,	  and	  academic	  media.	  	  	  These	  efforts	  may	  have	  been	  meant	  to	  reinforce	  the	  status	  quo,	  but	  in	  reality	  were	  counter-­‐productive	  to	  that	  end.	  	  Increased	  attention	  rarely	  benefits	  the	  status	  quo,	   especially	   not	   when	   it	   is	   embodied	   in	   a	   closed	   policy	   monopoly.	   	   The	  controversy	   engendered	   by	   the	   NBRC	   report	   and	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community’s	   publicity	   campaign	   made	   it	   certain	   that	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	  would	  attract	  Congress’s	  attention	  and	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  community’s	   influence	  in	  the	  field.	  Being	  suddenly	  relegated	  to	  a	  minor	  place	  in	  bankruptcy	  policymaking,	  and	  faced	  with	  overwhelming	  opposition	  among	  members	  of	  Congress,	   the	  community	  quickly	   adopted	   the	   legislative	   strategies	   of	   policymaking	   minorities.	   	   It	   formed	  strategic	   alliances	   with	   key	   political	   figures	   and	   interests	   by	   linking	   existing	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bankruptcy	  policies	  to	  allies’	  special	  areas	  of	   interest,	   like	  women’s	  rights.	   	   It	  tried	  with	   remarkable	   success	   to	   divide	   the	   legislation’s	   supporters,	   first	   on	   exemption	  policy,	  and	  then	  on	  the	  highly	  volatile	  politics	  of	  the	  abortion	  debate.	  However,	   these	  efforts,	  while	  successful	   in	   the	  short	   term,	  ultimately	   failed.	  	  BAPCPA’s	   opponents	   were	   never	   able	   to	   diminish	   its	   support	   among	   legislators.	  	  Despite	  repeated	  defeats,	   roll	   call	  voting	   for	   the	  bill	   remained	  virtually	  unchanged	  from	   the	   105th	   Congress	   to	   the	   109th.	   	   Without	   new	   legislative	   support,	   the	  minority’s	   strategy	   of	   blocking	   and	   delay	   inevitably	   ran	   its	   course.	   	   Supporters	  learned	   to	   tailor	   their	  own	  strategy	   to	  block	   the	  minority’s	  methods,	   and	  BAPCPA	  was	  eventually	  approved	  in	  2005.	  	  	  
F.	   The	  Bankruptcy	  Policy	  Community	  Reacts	  to	  its	  New	  Status	  The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   long	   dominance	   of	   the	   policymaking	  process,	   followed	   by	   its	   relatively	   sudden	   loss	   of	   authority,	   typifies	   the	   cyclical	  nature	  of	  policymaking.	  	  	  Baumgartner	  and	  Jones	  (1993)	  describe	  the	  process	  as	  one	  of	   “punctuated	   equilibrium.”	   	   Policy	   monopolies	   dominate	   their	   fields	   for	   long	  periods	  of	  time,	  but	  they	  are	  displaced	  quickly.	   	  That	  displacement	   is	  a	   function	  of	  the	  changing	  definitions	  of	  a	  policy’s	  central	  issues.	  	  Bankruptcy	  policy’s	  redefinition	  had	  two	  aspects:	   (1)	  a	  shift	   in	   focus	   from	  providing	  debtors	  a	   fresh	  start	   from	  the	  effects	   of	   financial	   misfortune	   to	   holding	   them	   accountable	   for	   their	   debt	  management,	  and	  (2)	  marginalization	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  community	  themselves.	  Monopolies’	   declines	   happen	   so	   suddenly	   that	   members	   of	   the	   monopoly	  often	   do	   not	   comprehend	   the	   changes	   in	   time	   to	   make	   adjustments	   that	   might	  extend	   their	   dominance.	   	   By	   the	   mid	   Nineties,	   Congress	   had	   moved	   away	   from	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enacting	  laws	  intended	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  unfortunate;	  policies	  like	  the	   fresh	   start	   had	   lost	   their	   salience.	   	   However,	   a	   reading	   of	   accounts	   by	   some	  members	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   of	   the	   legislative	   battle	   over	   reform	  suggests	   that	   they	   came	   too	   late	   to	   realize	   that	   their	   formerly	   unchallenged	  influence	  with	  Congress	  was	  gone.	  	  In	  one	  telling	  account,	  a	  committee	  staffer	  wrote	  of	   the	   early	   legislative	   process	   that	   “the	   Senate	   essentially	   preempted	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Commission's	  efforts	  with	  its	  own	  bill”	  (Jacoby	  2004,	  1099),	  as	  though	  the	  Commission	  had	  lawmaking	  authority	  independent	  of	  Congress.	  The	   community	   did	   not	   see	   itself	   as	   an	   interest	   group,	   and	   objected	  when	  Congress	  treated	  it	  as	  such,	  even	  though	  its	  efforts	  to	  engender	  support	  in	  the	  media	  and	   its	   alliances	   with	   other	   interests	   only	   reinforced	   that	   treatment.	   	   Instead,	  members	  saw	  themselves	  was	  one	  of	  an	  apolitical	  expert	  class	  that	  was	  above	  self-­‐interest:	  	  	  The	  bankruptcy	  professionals,	  volunteering	  their	  time,	  and	  working	  in	  a	   far	  less	  structured	  and	  coordinated	  environment,	  fought	  an	  uphill	  battle	  to	  find	  legislators	  and	  staffers	  who	  would	   listen	  to	   their	  views	  and	  understand	  the	  incredible	   complexity	   of	   the	   system	   Congress	   was	   considering	   re-­‐writing	  (Warren	  1999,	  193-­‐94).87	  	  Given	  the	  broad	  support	  in	  Congress	  for	  limiting	  the	  availability	  of	  discharge	  for	  certain	  individuals,	  the	  passage	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform	  legislation	  was	  inevitable.	  	  The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   refusal	   to	   compromise	   or	   offer	   realistic	  alternatives	  guaranteed	  its	  marginalization	  in	  the	  reform	  process.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  a	  long-­‐standing	  policy	  monopoly	  like	  the	  community	  can	  adopt	  positions	   contrary	   to	   its	   core	   policy	   image,	   or	   even	  more	   fundamentally,	   alter	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Note	  that	  this	  passage	  reiterates	  one	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Policy	  Community’s	  main	  images,	  that	  bankruptcy	  law	  is	  too	  technical	  for	  outsiders.	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core	   image	   and	   retain	   its	  monopoly	   status.	   The	   question	   suggests	   an	   answer	   that	  seems	  in	  part	  a	  matter	  of	  degree	  (i.e.,	  how	  much	  compromise?),	  but	  more	  so	  one	  of	  definition.	   	   For	   example,	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   saw	   means	   testing,	  which	   requires	   Chapter	   7	   filers	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   their	   disposable	   income	   is	  within	   specified	   limits,	   as	   being	   fundamentally	   incompatible	   with	   its	   core	   policy	  image.	   	   However,	   debtors	   have	   long	   had	   to	   satisfy	   exclusionary	   debt	   and	   income	  standards	  to	  qualify	   for	  Chapter	  13.	   	  When	  viewed	  in	  that	  context,	   the	  adoption	  of	  means	   testing	   requirements	   for	   Chapter	   7	   filers	   might	   be	   considered	   more	   an	  incremental	   extension	   of	   existing	   policy	   rather	   than	   an	   upending	   of	   the	   entire	  policy.88	  	  	  Because	  policy	   image	   is	  central	   to	  a	  policy	  monopoly,	  modification	  of	   those	  images	  may	  not	  be	  definitionally	  possible,	  especially	  when	  the	  monopoly	  is	  a	  long-­‐standing	  one	  and	  its	  image	  is	  firmly	  entrenched	  in	  existing	  policies.	   	  Under	  agenda	  setting	  models,	  new	  images	   imply	  new	  participants	  and	  new	  purposes.	   	  Therefore,	  monopolies	  cannot	  survive	  image	  redefinition;	  even	  if	  successful,	  the	  result	  is	  a	  new	  monopoly.	   	  However,	   it	   is	  more	   likely,	  as	  happened	  here,	   that	  the	  monopoly	   is	  not	  sufficiently	   malleable	   to	   accommodate	   such	   changes.	   	   It	   loses	   influence,	   and	  opponents	   take	   active	   measures	   to	   keep	   the	   former	   monopolists	   outside	   of	   the	  policy	   process	   they	   once	   dominated.	   The	   new	  outsiders’	   challenge	   is	   to	   find	   their	  way	   back	   into	   the	   policy	   debate.	   	   Professor	   Warren,	   recognizing	   the	   bankruptcy	  policy	  community’s	  lost	  influence	  in	  the	  Nineties,	  urged	  her	  colleagues	  to	  take	  on	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  88	  In	   fact,	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	   Commission	   members	   Gose	   and	   Hartley	  made	   this	   specific	   argument	   in	   their	   written	   concurrence	   of	   the	   Minority	  Recommendations.	   Commissioners	   Gose	   and	  Hartley,	   concurrence	  with	   Consumer	  Dissenting	  Opinion,	  NBRC	  1995,	  1120.	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more	  overtly	  political	  role	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  reform	  debate:	  The	   professionals	  who	   once	   patiently	   crafted	   the	   .	   .	   .	   Bankruptcy	   Code,	   no	  longer	   have	   the	   power	   to	   write	   whole	   sections	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   laws	   by	  talking	  only	  with	  each	  other.	  Debates	  that	  were	  once	  confined	  to	  those	  who	  were	   “in	   the	   know”	   have	   expanded	   greatly—in	   scope	   and	   in	   volume.	   The	  professionals	   still	   have	   an	   important	   role	   to	   play,	   but	   the	   world	   in	   which	  bankruptcy	  laws	  are	  made	  has	  shifted	  dramatically	  (Warren	  1999,	  204).	  	  The	  next	  chapter	  will	  describe	  how	  the	  “professionals”	  were	  not	  entirely	  shut	  out	  of	  the	  policymaking	  process.	  	  Instead,	  notwithstanding	  the	  legislative	  changes	  wrought	  by	   bankruptcy	   reform,	   they	   still	   had	   near-­‐complete	   control	   of	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  in	  another	  venue,	  the	  courts.	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CHAPTER	  SIX:	  BANKRUPTCY	  
POLICYMAKING	  IN	  THE	  POST-­‐BAPCPA	  ERA	  
	   The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   long	   period	   of	   closed-­‐structure	  policymaking	   dominance	   (Chapters	   Three	   and	   Four),	   followed	   by	   the	   sudden	  rupture	  of	  its	  stable	  legislative	  arrangements	  and	  resulting	  loss	  of	  monopolist	  status	  (Chapter	   Five),	   follows	   Baumgartner	   and	   Jones’	   classic	   model	   of	   punctuated	  equilibrium	   (1993).	   	   Punctuated	   equilibrium	   models	   predict	   that	   major	   policy	  changes	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  long	  periods	  of	  stasis.	   	   	  However,	  while	  policy	  systems	  may	   achieve	   new	   equilibriums	   and	   even	  new	  dominant	   coalitions,	   such	   outcomes	  are	  not	  automatic	  and	  in	  any	  event	  may	  not	  occur	  until	  after	  a	  significant	  period	  of	  competition	   and	   disjunction.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   policymaking	   systems	   may	   remain	  dynamic	  for	  some	  time	  following	  punctuated	  disruptions.	  	  Venue	  shopping	  in	  these	  periods	   may	   increase	   as	   policy	   competitors	   seek	   to	   capitalize	   on	   their	   unique	  resources.	  	  The	  study	  of	  this	  competition	  promotes	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  role	  of	  venues	  in	  agenda	  setting.	  Therefore,	   this	   chapter	   begins	   with	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   post-­‐BAPCPA	  policymaking	   environment,	   followed	   by	   a	   discussion	   of	   judicial	   policymaking	   that	  expands	  on	  the	  material	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  and	  further	  explores	  the	  role	  of	  bankruptcy	  courts	  as	  alternate	  policymaking	  venues.	  	  
A.	   Congressional	  Policymaking	  After	  BAPCPA	  As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  Five,	  the	  process	  leading	  to	  BAPCPA’s	  enactment	  in	  2005	   did	   not	   eliminate	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   so	   much	   as	   make	   it	  irrelevant	   to	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   legislative	   process.	   	   The	   community	   has	   not	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regained	  the	  prominence	  it	  enjoyed	  prior	  to	  1997.	  	  It	  remains	  active,	  collectively	  and	  through	   its	   constituent	  parts,	  but	  does	  so	  as	   just	  one	  of	  many	   interests	   seeking	   to	  influence	  Congress	  on	  bankruptcy	  issues.	  	  For	  its	  part,	  Congress	  has	  not	  enacted	  any	  major	   bankruptcy	   reforms	   since	   2005,	   although	   it	   has	   considered	   several	   minor,	  mostly	  technical	  bills.	   	  This	  is	  expected	  from	  punctuated	  equilibrium	  theory,	  which	  predicts	  that	  systemic	  policy	  disruptions	  are	  followed	  by	  long	  periods	  of	  stasis.	  	  	  However,	  the	  absence	  of	  legislation	  is	  not	  for	  lack	  of	  problems	  or	  proposals;	  it	   is	  also	  a	  sign	  of	  negative	  attention.	   	   In	  other	  words,	  congressional	  policy	  activity	  may	   be	   directed	   toward	   blocking	   new	   initiatives.	   Baumgartner,	   et	   al.	   (2009,	   20)	  explain	   that	   existing	   policies	   reflect	   current	  mobilizations	   of	   social,	   business,	   and	  corporate	  interests.	  “Unless	  something	  important	  has	  changed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  inputs	  to	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   (e.g.,	   a	   new	   set	   of	   policy	   makers,	   important	   new	  evidence	   about	   a	   policy	   alternative,	   a	   new	   understanding	   of	   an	   issue,	   a	   newly	  mobilized	  interest	  group),	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  expect	  the	  outputs	  to	  change.”	  	  	  The	  most	  prominent	  example	  of	  this	  in	  the	  post-­‐BAPCPA	  period	  is	  Congress’	  rejection	  of	  legislation	  that	  would	  have	  allowed	  some	  homeowners	  file	  bankruptcy	  and	  amend	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  home	  mortgage	  loans	  to	  avoid	  foreclosure.	  One	  of	  the	  most	   straightforward	   solutions	   to	   the	   foreclosure	   crisis	   introduced	   in	  Congress	   in	  the	   wake	   of	   the	   2008	   financial	   crisis	   would	   have	   amended	   Chapter	   13	   to	   enable	  bankruptcy	   judges	   to	  modify	   the	  balance	  debtors	  owed	  on	   their	  home	  mortgages,	  based	   on	   the	   properties’	   decreased	   values.	   	   The	   proposed	   legislation	   had	   several	  benefits:	   it	  would	  have	   stemmed	   the	   rising	  numbers	  of	   foreclosures,	  which	  would	  have	  allowed	  people	  to	  remain	  in	  their	  homes,	  and	  would	  have	  reduced	  the	  number	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of	  unsold	  empty	  properties	  that	  were	  depressing	  home	  values.	   	  Since	  the	  proposal	  would	   have	   applied	   existing	   bankruptcy	   procedures	   in	   an	   established	   forum,89	  it	  could	  have	  been	  implemented	  quickly.	  	  	  Despite	   these	  benefits,	   the	   legislation	   failed	   to	  gain	  Senate	  approval.	   	  All	   of	  the	  chamber’s	  Republicans	  and	  twelve	  of	  its	  Democratic	  members	  voted	  against	  the	  bill.	   	   Debate	   over	   the	   measure	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   moral	   hazard	   argument	  underlying	   BAPCPA’s	   enactment	   in	   2005	   continued	   to	   motivate	   congressional	  opposition	  to	  pro-­‐debtor	  legislation	  (Andrews	  2009).	  Echoing	  the	  BAPCPA	  debates,	  opponents	   of	   these	   homeowner	   relief	  measures	   argued	   that	   the	   foreclosure	   crisis	  was	  the	  result	  of	  overspending	  borrowers	  abetted	  by	  federal	  agencies	  (Freddie	  Mac	  and	  Fannie	  Mae)	   that	  provided	  access	   to	  easy	  credit.	   	   (McArdle	  2009).	   	  Therefore,	  prevailing	   congressional	   attitudes	   continue	   to	   be	   hostile	   to	   “fresh	   start”	   type	  legislation.	  	  	  
B.	   Policy	  Implementation	  and	  Policy	  Images	  However,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   has	  disappeared.	   	   Instead,	   it	   may	   be	   that	   the	   community	   has	   redirected	   its	   efforts	   to	  other	   venues	   and	   other	   forms	   of	   policymaking.90	  	   Punctuated	   equilibrium	   theory	  maintains	   that	   policy	  monopolies	   retain	   their	   authority	   over	   long	   periods	   of	   time	  but	  lose	  it	  relatively	  quickly	  (Baumgartner	  and	  Jones,	  1993).	  	  However,	  the	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  policy	  monopolies	  indicates	  that	  their	  members	  may	  not	  simply	  disappear	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Existing	   law	   allowed	   bankruptcy	   judges	   to	  modify	   the	   terms	   and	   conditions	   of	  many	  kinds	  of	  secured	  debt,	  but	  not	  primary	  mortgages	  securing	  home	  loans.	  90	  Jacoby	  (2004,	  226)	  suggests	  that	  after	  the	  long	  battle	  over	  enactment	  of	  BAPCPA	  “many	   bankruptcy	   experts	   are	   both	  weary	   and	  wary,	   and,	   consequently,	   likely	   to	  stay	  away	  from	  Washington,	  D.C.”	   
	  	  
157	  
from	   the	   policy	   process,	   but	   instead	   press	   on	   in	   hopes	   of	   regaining	   their	   former	  prominence.	   	   Moreover,	   the	   existence	   of	   multiple	   venues	   within	   the	   American	  political	   system	   provides	   members	   of	   displaced	   monopolies	   with	   alternative	  policymaking	   opportunities,	   notwithstanding	   formal	   changes	   made	   elsewhere.	  	  Therefore,	   policymaking	   can	   be	   relatively	   static	   in	   one	   venue,	   but	   simultaneously	  active	   in	   another.	   This	   observation	   is	   the	   underlying	   premise	   of	   that	   part	   of	   the	  implementation	   literature	   that	   conceptualizes	   implementation	   as	   part	   of	   the	  broader	   policymaking	   framework,	   such	   as	   Matland’s	   ambiguity-­‐conflict	   model,	  Sabatier’s	   advocacy	   coalition	   framework,	   and	   the	   interbranch	   perspective	   of	   the	  courts.91	  	   Placing	  the	  matter	  within	  the	  implementation	  literature,	  the	  basic	  question	  is	  whether	  policymakers	  enacting	  major	  changes	  in	  one	  venue	  will	  see	  those	  changes	  fully	   effected	   in	   another,	   given	   the	   potential	   susceptibility	   of	   those	   venues	   to	  influence	   from	  other	   interests.	   	   According	   to	  Mazmanian	   and	   Sabatier	   (1983,	   25),	  faithful	   implementation	   of	   policies	   depends	   on,	   inter	   alia,	   (1)	   the	   degree	   of	  hierarchical	   integration	  within	   and	   among	   implementing	   institutions,	   and	   (2)	   the	  implementing	  officials’	  commitment	  to	  the	  policymakers’	  objectives.	   	   In	  the	  matter	  of	  bankruptcy	  policy,	  the	  constitutional	  separation	  of	  powers	  means	  that	  the	  degree	  of	   hierarchical	   integration	   between	   Congress	   and	   the	   courts	   is	   low.92	  	   	   Moreover,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  91	  See	  Chapter	  Two.	  92	  Which	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	   Congress	   lacks	   coercive	   power	   over	   the	   bankruptcy	  courts.	   	   Like	   all	   lower	   federal	   courts,	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	   are	   a	   creation	   of	  Congress.	  	  The	  bankruptcy	  clause	  in	  Article	  I,	  §8	  of	  the	  Constitution	  gives	  Congress	  exclusive	  power	  to	  make	   laws	  concerning	  bankruptcy,	  but	   it	  does	  not	  require	   it	   to	  do	   so.	   	   Congress	   chose	   not	   to	   have	   national	   bankruptcy	   laws	   for	  most	   of	   the	   19th	  century.	  	  It	  enacted	  and	  repealed	  three	  laws	  in	  that	  time	  and	  could	  do	  the	  same	  with	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Wilson	  (2000,	  265)	  indicates	  that	  reorganization	  of	  implementation	  structures	  is	  a	  necessary	   element	   in	   policy	   change.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   major	   policy	   changes	   may	  require	  not	  just	  a	  change	  of	  laws	  but	  a	  change	  in	  the	  structures	  that	  implement	  them	  as	  well	  Despite,	  or	  more	  accurately,	  because	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	   community’s	  long-­‐standing	   dominance	   in	   its	   field,	   it	   was	   excluded	   from	   any	   important	   role	   in	  formulating	   the	  2005	  BAPCPA	  amendments.	  Those	  amendments	  were	  drafted	  and	  enacted	   by	   a	   new	   coalition	   of	   members	   of	   Congress	   and	   representatives	   of	   the	  financial	  industry.	  The	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  new	  coalition’s	  attention	  was	  the	  reform	  of	  consumer	   bankruptcy	   law,	   premised	   on	   a	   policy	   image	   that	   emphasized	   holding	  debtors	  at	  least	  partially	  accountable	  for	  their	  financial	  troubles.	  	  	  	  However,	  despite	  this	   fundamental	   image	   shift,	   Congress	   largely	   left	   intact	   the	   basic	   institutions	   of	  bankruptcy	   law	   (i.e.,	   the	   courts	   and	   the	   overall	   structure	   and	   processes	   of	   the	  Bankruptcy	   Code).	   	   Therefore,	   to	   restate	   the	   dilemma	   raised	   by	   Mazmanian	   and	  Sabatier	   in	   agenda	   setting	   terms,	   will	   faithful	   implementation	   of	   new	   policies	   be	  thwarted	  if	  the	  conflicting	  images	  underlying	  the	  replaced	  policy	  remain	  entrenched	  in	   the	   implementing	   entities?	   More	   specifically,	   would	   BAPCPA’s	   implementors	  (mainly	  bankruptcy	   judges	  and	   lawyers)	  mediate	  the	  new	  law’s	  effects	   through	   its	  interpretation	   and	   application	   according	   to	   their	   own	   long-­‐held	   image	   and	  understanding	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy?	   	   The	   next	   section	   discusses	   particular	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  all	  or	  part	  of	  the	  current	  law	  if	  it	  chose	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Despite	  this	  authority,	  and	  repeated	  efforts	   to	   turn	   over	   all	   or	   some	   of	   the	   duties	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	   to	   an	  administrative	   agency,	   the	   modern	   Congress	   has	   demonstrated	   no	   inclination	   to	  disband	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  (See	  Chapters	  Three	  and	  Four).	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examples	   of	   overt	   policymaking	   activity	   by	   bankruptcy	   judges.	   	   The	   section	  following	  that	  one	  proposes	  an	  empirical	  test	  of	  the	  proposition.	  
C.	   Policymaking	  in	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Courts.	  	   Jacoby	   (2004,	   2005)	   raises	   the	   possibility	   that	   bankruptcy	   professionals,93	  who	  were	  excluded	  from	  participation	  in	  the	  reform	  process,	  might	  alter	  or	  impede	  BAPCPA’s	   implementation	   through	   their	   interpretation	  and	  application	  of	   the	  new	  law:	  	   Bankruptcy	   may	   be	   especially	   susceptible	   to	   shaping	   by	   the	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  actors	  because	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  cases	  yield	  no	  formal	  litigation,	  let	  alone	  appeals.	   	   Whether	   one	   prefers	   a	   precise	   model	   of	   local	   legal	   culture	   [see	  Chapter	  2]	  or	  a	  more	  generalized	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  real	  people,	  this	  inevitable	   shaping	   and	   filtering	   complicate	   statute-­‐centered	   assessments	   of	  the	   future	  of	  bankruptcy.	   Indeed,	   .	   .	   .	   the	   latest	   revisions	  may	   invite	  system	  players	   to	   shape	   the	   system	  much	  more	   than	  Congress	   anticipated	   (Jacoby	  2005,	  177).	  	  	   Variation	   among	   individual	   courts	   has	   been	   a	   durable	   characteristic	   of	   the	  American	  bankruptcy	   system	  since	   its	   creation	   in	  1898.	   	  The	  adoption	  of	  uniform	  standards	  of	  practice	  was	  one	  of	   the	  primary	  goals	  motivating	   the	   founders	  of	   the	  National	   Association	   of	   Referees	   in	   Bankruptcy	   in	   1926	   (National	   Association	   of	  Referees	   in	   Bankruptcy	   1926-­‐27).	   	   Variation	   persisted	   among	   the	   courts	   despite	  those	   efforts.	   	   The	   Association	   eventually	   scaled	   back	   its	   efforts	   in	   the	   1930s,	  changing	   the	   name	   of	   its	   Committee	   on	   Uniformity	   of	   Practice	   to	   simply	   the	  Committee	   on	   Practice.	   	   A	   1940	   report	   by	   the	   attorney	   general	   found	   major	  differences	   in	   the	  general	  administration	  of	  bankruptcy	  cases	  among	  courts	   in	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93 	  Jacoby	   uses	   the	   terms	   “bankruptcy	   professionals”	   and	   “bankruptcy	   experts”	  interchangeably.	   	  Her	  use	  of	  the	  term	  encompasses	   judges,	  attorneys,	  and	  scholars	  actively	   engaged	   in	   what	   she	   describes	   as	   the	   bankruptcy	   “system.”	   Jacoby’s	  terminology	   overlaps	   and	   is	   encompassed	   within	   what	   is	   described	   here	   as	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	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various	   federal	   districts	   (Shea	   1941).	   	   Although	   bankruptcy	   referees	  were	   placed	  under	   the	   supervisory	   authority	   of	   the	   Administrative	   Office	   of	   the	   United	   States	  Courts	   in	   1946,	   the	   Brookings	   Study	   found	   that	   substantial	   variation	   among	   the	  courts	  in	  their	  application	  of	  the	  Act	  continued	  to	  persist.	  	  	   This	   continued	   across	   some	   issues	   notwithstanding	   enactment	   of	   the	  Bankruptcy	   Code.	   	   Sullivan,	   et	   al.	   and	   Lopucki’s	   local	   legal	   culture	   studies94	  are	  based	   on	   observed	   variations	   in	   the	   ways	   different	   courts	   and	   practitioners	  interpret	   and	   apply	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code.	   	   In	   1997,	   the	  NBRC	  minority	   described	  differences	   in	   consumer	   bankruptcy	   discernible	   just	   from	   reported	   cases.	   	   In	   a	  lengthy	   footnote	   to	   its	   dissent,	   the	   minority	   identified	   differences	   in	   Chapter	   13	  cases95	  relating	   to	   the	   length	   of	   time	   a	   debtor	   must	   remain	   in	   bankruptcy,	   the	  minimum	  percentage	  of	  indebtedness	  to	  be	  repaid	  for	  a	  plan	  to	  be	  approved,	  and	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  courts	  valued	  property	  subject	  to	  liens.	  	  The	  minority	  similarly	  reported	   differences	   in	   Chapter	   7	   cases	   pertaining	   to	   standards	   for	   dismissal	   of	  cases	  under	  §707(b)	  and	  for	  the	  reaffirmation	  of	  debts,	  a	  process	  permitted	  by	  the	  Code	   that	   allows	   debtors	   to	   agree	   to	   pay	   particular	   debts	   notwithstanding	  bankruptcy,	  usually	  in	  exchange	  for	  retaining	  property	  subject	  to	  liens	  like	  homes	  or	  motor	  vehicles	  (NBRC	  Report,	  Minority	  Dissent,	  1112-­‐13).	  	   Most	   of	   the	   variation	   occurs	   within	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   bankruptcy	  statutes	  and	  case	  precedents,	  which	  nevertheless	  can	  lead	  to	  diametrically	  different	  outcomes.	  Less	  often,	  bankruptcy	  judges	  employ	  the	  Code	  creatively	  to	  reach	  results	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  See	  Chapter	  Two.	  95	  Chapter	  13	  requires	  debtors	  to	  commit	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  income	  to	  repaying	  their	  creditors	  over	  a	  specified	  period	  of	  time,	  usually	  three	  to	  five	  years,	  according	  to	  the	  terms	  of	  a	  court	  approved	  plan	  (see	  Chapter	  One).	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expressly	   prohibited	   by	   Congress.	   	   One	   prominent	   recent	   example	   of	   judicial	  deviation	  from	  long	  established	  statutory	  policy	  was	  some	  courts’	  adoption	  of	  what	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “critical	  vendor	  rule.”	  Among	  bankruptcy	  law’s	  basic	  rules	  is	  that	   creditors	   in	   Chapter	   11	   cases	  may	   receive	   payment	   on	   account	   of	   their	   pre-­‐filing	   claims	   only	   according	   to	   a	   very	   specific	   priority	   classification	   scheme	  established	   by	   statute	   and	   implemented	   through	   a	   court	   approved	   plan	   of	  reorganization.	  	  The	  system	  groups	  creditors	  according	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  claim,	  for	  example	  secured	  claims,	  taxes,	  employee	  wages	  and	  benefits,	  trade	  debt,	  and	  so	  forth	  (see	  11	  U.S.C.	  §§	  507,	  726,	  1129).	  The	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  further	  mandates	  that	  all	  creditors	  within	  a	  particular	  priority	  class	  must	  be	  treated	  equally.	  	  Finally,	  most	  trade	   debt	   incurred	   prior	   to	   bankruptcy	   is	   classified	   as	   general	   unsecured	   debt,	  which	   occupies	   the	   lowest	   statutory	   priority	   status	   among	   creditors.	   Unsecured	  creditors	  rarely	  receive	   full	  payment	  of	   their	  pre-­‐filing	  claims	   in	  Chapter	  11	  cases,	  and	  in	  many	  instances	  they	  wait	  several	  years	  to	  receive	  even	  pennies	  on	  the	  dollar.	  	  Distribution	  is	  made	  pro-­‐rata	  according	  to	  claim	  size	  when	  funds	  are	  insufficient	  to	  pay	  all	  creditors	  within	  a	  class	  in	  full.	  Beginning	   in	   the	   1990s,	   attorneys	   for	   both	   creditors	   and	   debtors	   began	   to	  seek	   orders	   allowing	   debtors	   to	   pay	   certain	   unsecured	   claims	   in	   full	   immediately	  after	   filing	   Chapter	   11.	   	   These	   requests	   were	   based	   on	   assertions	   that	   goods	   or	  service	   provided	   by	   a	   particular	   vendor	  were	   essential	   to	   the	   debtor’s	   successful	  reorganization	   but	   that	   the	   vendor	   refused	   to	   continue	   to	   trade	   with	   the	   debtor	  unless	   its	   outstanding	   bills	   were	   paid	   in	   full.	   While	   judges	   in	   some	   jurisdictions	  rejected	   these	   requests,	   those	   in	   Delaware’s	   business-­‐friendly	   bankruptcy	   court	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granted	   them,	   adopting	   came	   to	   be	   called	   the	   critical	   vendor	   rule.	   	   The	   critical	  vendor	  rule	  could	  not	  be	  found	  in	  any	  statute;	  in	  fact,	  the	  Code	  expressly	  bars	  such	  payments.96	  To	   avoid	   the	   prohibition,	   Delaware’s	   judges	   relied	   on	   the	   general	  equitable	  powers	  granted	  them	  in	  11	  U.S.C.	  §105(a).	  	  Under	  that	  statute,	  “The	  court	  may	  issue	  any	  order,	  process,	  or	  judgment	  that	  is	  necessary	  or	  appropriate	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  title	  [i.e.,	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code].”	  	  While	  the	  language	  of	  the	  section	  seems	  to	  give	  bankruptcy	  courts	  broad	  authority	  to	  depart	  from	  the	  Code’s	  express	   restrictions,	   the	   Supreme	   Court	   had	   long	   held	   that	   §105	   is	   not	   an	   open	  ended	   grant	   of	   authority	   to	   be	   used	   to	   expand	   or	   contradict	   the	   specific	   powers	  given	   to	   judges	  by	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	   (Norwest	  Bank	  Worthington	  v.	  Ahlers,	   485	  U.S.	  197	  (1988)).	  	  	  Once	   the	   critical	   vendor	   rule	   gained	   traction	   in	   Delaware,	   some	   judges	   in	  other	  jurisdictions	  followed	  suit.	  	  According	  to	  one	  scholar	  who	  was	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  rule,	  its	  adoption	  was	  not	  motivated	  by	  legal	  considerations	  but	  instead	  was	  the	  result	  of	  competition	  between	  specific	  courts	  to	  attract	  large	  high	  profile	  Chapter	  11	  cases	   to	   their	   districts	   by	   easing	   statutory	   restrictions	   on	   the	   parties	   (Lopucki	  2005).	   	   The	   rule’s	   spread	   eventually	   stalled	   when	   the	   Seventh	   Circuit	   Court	   of	  Appeals	  reversed	  a	  bankruptcy	  court	  order	  in	  Kmart	  Corporation’s	  Chapter	  11	  case	  authorizing	   the	   company	   to	   pay	   up	   to	   $300	   million	   in	   “critical	   vendor”	   claims,	  finding	  that	  such	  orders	  were	  prohibited	  by	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code.97	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  11	  U.S.C.	  §§362,	  549.	  97	  In	  re	  Kmart	  Corporation,	   359	  F.3d	  866	   (7th	   Cir.	   2005).	   	   The	  disparate	   treatment	  between	   critical	   and	  non-­‐critical	   vendors	   in	   these	   cases	   is	   emphasized	  by	   the	   fact	  that	  Kmart’s	  unsecured	  creditors,	  including	  the	  putative	  critical	  vendors,	  ultimately	  received	  about	  10¢	  on	  the	  dollar	  for	  their	  claims,	  most	  of	   it	   in	  the	  form	  of	  stock	  in	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This	  recounting	  of	  the	  story	  of	  the	  critical	  vendor	  rule	  is	  not	  made	  to	  suggest	  that	   bankruptcy	   judges	   routinely	   ignore	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code’s	   express	   terms;	  experience	  indicates	  otherwise.	   	  Rather,	   its	  purpose	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  capacity	  of	   judges	  to	   find	  both	  real	  and	  arguable	  contradictions	  within	  and	  among	  statutes,	  even	  when	  the	  legislative	  proscriptions	  seem	  explicit.	   	   In	  fact,	  studies	  indicate	  that	  judges	  on	  the	  whole	  are	  usually	  more	  restrained	  (Baum	  1976).	  	  They	  are	  more	  likely	  to	   find	   variation	   within	   the	   ambiguities	   of	   established	   statutory	   or	   precedential	  parameters,	  or	  at	  least	  make	  only	  incremental	  excursions	  beyond	  them.	  	  Within	  the	  judiciary,	  this	  restraint	  is	  due	  in	  large	  part	  to	  an	  institutional	  respect	  for	  precedent	  and	   the	   rule	  of	   law	   (Chapter	  Two).	   	   Feeley	  and	  Rubin	   (1999,	  355)	   state	   that,	   “the	  process	   of	   judicial	   policy	  making	   is	   constrained	   by	   legal	   doctrine	   .	   .	   .	   the	   need	   to	  maintain	  contact	  with	  existing	  doctrine,	   to	  stretch	   it	  without	  snapping	   it,	   is	  one	  of	  several	  conditions	  for	  effective	  judicial	  policy	  making.”	  They	  cite	  the	  courts’	  respect	  for	  legal	  doctrine	  as	  the	  factor	  that	  distinguishes	  judicial	  policymaking	  from	  that	  of	  other	  governmental	  institutions.	  Even	  within	  those	  boundaries,	  the	  accumulated	  effects	  of	  even	  small	  changes	  can	  result	  in	  significant	  alterations	  in	  policy.	  	  	  Legislators’	  use	  of	  vague	  or	  undefined	  terms,	   the	  rare	   instances	  of	  appeal,	  and	  the	  ability	   to	  resort	   to	  multiple	  sources	  of	  authority98	  give	   judges	   considerable	   latitude	   in	   making	   decisions.	   	   Feeley	   and	  Rubin’s	   (1999)	   explanation	   of	   how	   judges	   extended	   their	   existing	   authority	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  the	  reorganized	  company	  (Lopucki	  2005,	  284).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  had	  the	  bankruptcy	  court’s	  critical	  vendor	  order	  been	  affirmed,	  the	  critical	  vendors	  would	  have	  received	  1000%	  more	  than	  their	  fellow	  unsecured	  trade	  creditors.	  98	  For	  example,	  both	  the	  majority	  and	  dissenting	  opinion	  contain	  copious	  references	  to	  case	  precedent	  supporting	  their	  respective	  positions	  in	  virtually	  every	  appellate	  case.	  
	  	  
164	  
reform	   Southern	   prisons,	   and	  Barnes’	   (2008)	   description	   of	   the	   development	   and	  implementation	  of	  asbestos	  victim	  compensation	  plans	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  are	  better	  examples	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  trial	  level	  judges	  can	  adapt	  existing	  rules	  and	  procedures	   to	   enact	   broad-­‐scale	   policy	   changes.99	  	   Moreover,	   the	   legal	   culture	  studies	  and	  the	  other	  analyses	  cited	  above	  in	  this	  section	  and	  in	  Chapter	  Two	  show	  that	  bankruptcy	  judges	  can	  dramatically	  affect	  policy	  not	  just	  through	  their	  pursuit	  of	  specific	  programs	  but	  in	  their	  routine	  administration	  of	  cases	  in	  their	  courts.	  	  	  In	  this	  context,	  judicial	  policymaking	  resembles	  incrementalism,	  or	  bounded	  decision-­‐making	  (Lindblom,	  1959).	  	  	  
D.	   Chapter	  Summary	  The	  administration	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  United	  States	  bankruptcy	  courts	  has	  long	  been	   characterized	  by	  differences	   in	   the	  way	   specific	   statutes	   are	   interpreted	  and	  applied	  in	  particular	  jurisdictions.	  	  While	  such	  variations	  are	  usually	  small,	  they	  may	  sometimes	   mark	   significant	   departures	   from	   the	   Bankruptcy	   Code.	   	   Either	   way,	  these	  differences	  can	  have	  significant	  impacts	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  bankruptcy	  cases.	  Studies	   indicate	   that	   policymakers	   are	   most	   likely	   to	   see	   their	   objectives	  implemented	   when	   implementing	   officials	   share	   their	   commitment	   to	   the	   same	  goals	   and	   purposes.	   	   Shared	   commitments	   are	   weakest	   when	   policymakers’	   and	  implementing	  officials’	  respective	  policy	  images	  are	  at	  odds.	  	  	  Such	  may	  be	  the	  case	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   changes	   made	   by	   Congress	   when	   it	   enacted	   the	   Bankruptcy	  Abuse	   Prevention	   and	   Consumer	   Protection	   Act	   in	   2005.	   	   Those	   amendments	  reflected	   a	   major	   change	   in	   the	   way	   that	   Congress	   conceptualized	   bankruptcy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  99	  Both	  studies	  are	  discussed	  at	  length	  in	  Chapter	  Two,	  Part	  C.3.	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A	  BANKRUPTCY	  POLICYMAKING	  FRAMEWORK	  
	  	   Several	   characteristics	   of	   American	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   can	   be	  discerned	   from	   the	  analyses	   contained	   in	   the	   foregoing	   chapters.	   	  The	   first	   is	   that	  although	   the	   Constitution	   gives	   Congress	   sole	   authority	   “to	   establish	   .	   .	   .	   uniform	  laws	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   bankruptcies	   throughout	   the	   United	   States,”	   bankruptcy	  policy	   in	   fact	  derives	   from	  three	  sources:	  Congress,	   the	  courts,	  and	  a	  sub-­‐systemic	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	  	  These	  three	  venues	  were	  tightly	  linked	  for	  over	  sixty	  years,	  with	  the	  community	  being	  the	  system’s	  most	  influential	  member.	  	  They	  split	  in	   the	   1990s-­‐2000s,	   with	   Congress	   separating	   itself	   from	   the	   others	   to	   assert	   its	  constitutional	  prerogative	  apart	   from	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  community.	   	  Bankruptcy	  judges	   remained	   a	   source	   of	   policy	   throughout,	   based	   both	   on	   their	   traditional	  duties	  and	  as	  policy	  advocates	  and	  entrepreneurs.	  	   These	  various	  events	  are	  explained	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  agenda	  setting	  and	  policy	   implementation	   literature.	   	   Taken	   together,	   these	   factors	   describe	   a	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	   framework	  that	   fully	   integrates	   the	  activities	  of	  all	   three	  venues.	   	  As	  such,	  the	  framework	  makes	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  the	  literature	  that	  identifies	  courts	  as	  essential	  policymakers	  in	  the	  American	  system.	  	   This	  chapter	  begins	  by	  constructing	  a	  general	  framework	  for	  understanding	  bankruptcy	   policymaking.	   	   	   A	   discussion	   of	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   framework	  follows.	   	   Finally,	   the	   framework	   is	   compared	   to	   existing	   public	   choice	   theories	   of	  bankruptcy	  policymaking.	  
A.	   The	  Sources	  of	  American	  Bankruptcy	  Policy	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The	   examination	   of	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   in	   the	  United	   States	   over	   the	  seventy-­‐five	   year	   period	   between	   1930	   and	   2005	   contained	   in	   Chapters	   Three	  through	  Six	   indicates	   that	  such	  policies	  are	  made	   in	   three	  separate	  but	  sometimes	  strategically	   interconnected	   venues.	   	   The	   first	   two	   of	   are	   formal	   institutions	   of	  government;	  the	  other	  is	  what	  is	  commonly	  described	  as	  a	  policy	  subsystem.	  	  The	   first	   institutional	   venue	   is	   Congress,	   which	   has	   sole	   constitutional	  authority	   to	   enact	   bankruptcy	   laws.	   	   As	   Warren	   (1999,	   189-­‐90)	   states,	   “Without	  congressional	  action,	   there	  would	  be	  not	  national	  bankruptcy	   laws.”	  However,	   the	  analyses	   in	   Chapters	   Three	   and	   Four	   demonstrates	   that	   in	   the	   long	   period	   from	  1932	   to	  1997,	  Congress	   effectively	  delegated	   the	  development	  of	  new	   laws	   to	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	  and	  enacted	  that	  group’s	  proposals	  with	  little	  general	  attention	  or	  debate.	  	  The	  community’s	  hold	  on	  the	  policymaking	  process	  was	  broken	  only	   when	   the	   proponents	   of	   pro-­‐lender	   reforms	   drew	   Congress	   directly	   into	   a	  lengthy	  and	  contentious	  policy	  fight.	  	  While	  Congress	  relied	  on	  the	  lender	  interests	  for	  technical	  support,	  the	  institution	  as	  a	  whole	  debated	  the	  scope	  and	  direction	  of	  bankruptcy	  policy	  in	  a	  way	  it	  had	  not	  since	  at	  least	  the	  early	  1930s.	  	  	  The	   second	   institutional	   source	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy,	   as	   described	   in	   the	  foregoing	   section,	   is	   the	   courts,	   principally	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts,	   but	   to	   a	  significant	   but	   lesser	   extent	   (in	   terms	   of	   volume	   and	   activity),	   the	   federal	   district	  and	  appellate	  courts.	  	  Judges	  make	  policy	  through	  their	  decisions	  in	  individual	  cases,	  although	  policy	  changes	  may	  only	  be	  discernible	  over	  time.	  	  In	  most	  federal	  districts,	  the	   courts	  may	   also	   enact	   local	   rules	   that	   institutionalize	   local	   practices.	   	   Judicial	  policymaking	   is	   highly	   structured	   and	   its	   effects	   are	   at	   least	   initially	   narrow	   in	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scope.	   	   However,	   judicial	   policies	  may	   expand	   to	   include	   all	   of	   the	   cases	   before	   a	  particular	  judge,	  or	  all	  of	  the	  cases	  in	  a	  particular	  court.	  	  Some	  judge-­‐made	  policies	  will	  be	  applied	  in	  other	  jurisdictions,	  as	  information	  is	  transmitted	  through	  personal	  communication,	   conferences	   and	   seminars,	   case	   reporting	   services,	   or	   formally	  through	  stare	  decisis	  (if	  a	  local	  policy	  is	  affirmed	  on	  appeal).	  	  The	  third,	  non-­‐institutional,	  source	  of	  bankruptcy	  policy	  is	  identified	  here	  as	  the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community.	   As	   described	   in	   Chapters	   Three	   and	   Four,	   the	  community	   is	   a	   policy	   subsystem	   made	   up	   of	   bankruptcy	   lawyers,	   bankruptcy	  judges,	   and	   legal	   scholars.	   	   They	   engage	   in	   policymaking	   primarily	   through	  associations	   and	   trade	   groups.	   	   The	   two	   most	   significant	   of	   these	   representative	  groups	   are	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference	   and	   the	   National	   Conference	   of	  Bankruptcy	   Judges	   (Warren	   1999,	   191).100	  	   Although	   they	   are	   highly	   influential,	  both	   organizations	   draw	   their	   membership	   from	   a	   narrow	   group	   of	   bankruptcy	  specialists.	   	   The	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference	   (“NBC”)	   claims	   to	   be	   the	   elite	  intellectual	  organization	  for	  bankruptcy	  policy	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Membership	  in	  the	  group	  is	  by	  invitation.	  	  The	  NBC	  describes	  itself	  as	  “A non-profit, non-partisan, 
self-supporting organization of approximately sixty lawyers, law professors and 
bankruptcy judges who are leading scholars and practitioners in the field of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  A	  newer	  organization,	  the	  American	  Bankruptcy	  Institute,	  is	  a	  broad	  based	  trade	  association	   that	   draws	   its	   membership	   principally	   from	   attorneys,	   other	  professionals,	   and	   judges.	   	   While	   it	   does	   engage	   in	   some	   legislative	   activity,	   its	  primary	  role	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  is	  to	  promote	  the	  dissemination	  of	  policies	   and	   practices	   through	   publications	   and	   conferences.	   	   Other	   organizations	  provide	   similar	   roles.	   	   These	   include	   the	   National	   Association	   of	   Bankruptcy	  Trustees,	   the	   National	   Association	   of	   Chapter	   13	   Trustees,	   and	   the	   National	  Association	  of	  Consumer	  Bankruptcy	  Attorneys,	  and	  the	  Commercial	  Law	  League.	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bankruptcy law. Its primary purpose is to advise Congress on the operation of 
bankruptcy and related laws and any proposed changes to those laws.”101.	  	  After	  its	  ad	  hoc	  origins	   in	  1932,	   the	  NBC	   formally	  organized	   in	   the	  1940s.	   	   It	   remained	  the	  dominant	  member	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	   community	  until	   the	  1970s	   (when	   its	  influence	  was	  matched	  by	  that	  of	  the	  bankruptcy	  judges),	  and	  it	  continued	  to	  make	  major	  contributions	  to	  bankruptcy	  legislation	  until	  its	  marginalization	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  It	  still	  retains	  considerable	  respect	  within	  the	  community.	  The	   other	   group	   of	   major	   significance	   within	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community	   is	   the	   National	   Conference	   of	   Bankruptcy	   Judges.	   As	   described	   in	  Chapter	  Three,	   this	  group	  was	  organized	   in	  1926;102	  its	   founding	  member,	  Paul	  H.	  King	   of	   Detroit,	   was	   one	   of	   the	   principal	   organizers	   of	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	  Conference	   in	  1932.	  The	   group’s	   formal	   efforts	   to	   influence	  Congress	  waned	  after	  the	   Chandler	   Act	   was	   passed	   in	   1938,	   but	   were	   revived	   in	   the	   1960s,	   when	   the	  referees’	  association	  was	  a	  major	  instigator	  of	  bankruptcy	  reform	  in	  the	  late	  Sixties	  and	  early	  Seventies.	  	  The	  referees	  built	  strong	  relationships	  with	  select	  members	  of	  Congress	  during	  that	  period.	  	  That	  access	  not	  only	  provided	  them	  with	  influence	  in	  the	  area	  of	  bankruptcy	  policymaking,	  but	  it	  allowed	  them	  to	  withstand	  efforts	  in	  the	  Seventies	   to	   diminish	   their	   status	   by	   both	   the	   federal	   bench	   and	   by	   the	   NBC-­‐led	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Review	  Commission	  (Chapter	  Four).	  	  Although	  membership	  in	  the	  judges’	  group	  is	  necessarily	  restricted	  to	  bankruptcy	  judges,	  it	  is	  generally	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  101	  http://nationalbankruptcyconference.org/history.cfm,	  last	  accessed	  November	  28,	  2011.	  	  102	  The	  group	  was	  known	  as	  the	  National	  Conference	  of	  Referees	  in	  Bankruptcy	  until	  the	  1970s.	  
	  	  
170	  
inclusive	   than	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Conference.	   	   The	   National	   Conference	   of	  Bankruptcy	   Judges	  publishes	  one	  of	   the	  most	  prestigious	   journals	   in	   the	   field,	   the	  
American	   Bankruptcy	   Law	   Journal,	   and	   holds	   an	   annual	   conference	   open	   to	   the	  general	  bar.	  	  It	  also	  conducts	  regular	  educational	  conferences	  for	  its	  members.	  One	   of	   the	   most	   distinctive	   structural	   features	   of	   the	   framework	   is	   the	  participation	   of	   bankruptcy	   judges	   in	   two	   separate,	   albeit	   complementary,	   roles.	  	  	  Bankruptcy	   judges	   are	   important	   policymakers	   in	   their	   formal	   capacity	   as	   judges,	  that	   is,	  through	  interpreting	  and	  applying	  the	  law	  in	  specific	  cases.	   	  However,	  they	  also,	  at	  various	  times,	  make	  important	  contributions	  to	  American	  bankruptcy	  policy	  as	  policy	  entrepreneurs,	  quite	  explicitly	  so	  in	  the	  case	  of	  both	  the	  Chandler	  Act	  and	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code.	  	  	  	  This	  dual	  role	  appears	  to	  be	  unique	  within	  the	  broader	  class	  of	   federal	   judges,	   whose	   efforts	   to	   influence	   Congress	   are	   generally	   limited	   to	  matters	   of	   court	   administration	   or	   rules	   of	   evidence	   and	   procedure.103	  	   However,	  while	  the	   judges	  benefited	  from	  their	  entrepreneurial	  roles	   in	  the	  Thirties	  and	  the	  Seventies,	  such	  activity	  has	  a	  potential	  downside.	  	  Warren	  (1999,	  193;	  201)	  suggests	  that	  while	   some	   judges	   remained	   actively	   involved	   during	   the	  BAPCPA	  debates,	   a	  great	  many	  others	  chose	  to	  sit	  on	  the	  sidelines	  for	  fear	  of	  provoking	  reprisals	  from	  Congress.	   	  This	  suggests	   that	   judicial	  engagement	  of	  Congress	   is	  more	   likely	  when	  the	  two	  groups	  share	  policy	  goals.	   	  Engagement	  may	  therefore	  be	  strategic;	   judges	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  lobby	  Congress	  when	  they	  believe	  they	  will	  be	  successful.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  On	  the	  latter	  point,	  see	  Staszak	  2010.	  	  One	  exception	  to	  the	  general	  practice	  was	  the	   effort	   by	   federal	   judges	   in	   the	   early	   2000s	   to	   convince	   Congress	   to	   eliminate	  mandatory	  criminal	  sentencing	  rules.	   	  These	  efforts	  were	  ultimately	  supplanted	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court’s	  ruling	  that	  such	  laws	  were	  unconstitutional	  in	  United	  States	  v.	  
Booker,	  543	  U.S.	  220	  (2005).	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Of	  course,	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  congressional	  cooperation	  with	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	   community.	   	  Unlike	   traditional	   iron	   triangles,	  members	  of	  Congress	  are	  not	  regular	  participants	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	  	  Instead,	  the	  relationships	  are	  mutually	  strategic.	   	  The	  community	  forms	  congressional	  relationships	  in	  order	  to	   achieve	   formal	   enactment	   of	   its	   major	   initiatives.	   	   Members	   of	   Congress	   gain	  access	  to	  technical	  expertise	  rather	  than	  political	  support.	  	  As	  described	  in	  Chapter	  III,	  the	  community	  brought	  Congressman	  Walter	  Chandler	  into	  its	  fold	  in	  the	  1930s	  in	   order	   to	   turn	   its	   long-­‐gestating	   proposals	   into	   law.	   	   Chandler,	   having	   been	  designated	  by	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  House	  Judiciary	  Committee	  to	  usher	  bankruptcy	  reform	   to	   its	   conclusion,	   allied	   himself	   with	   the	   community	   as	   the	  most	   effective	  way	   to	   complete	   his	   mission.	   	   In	   the	   Seventies,	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   NBC	   and	   the	  bankruptcy	   bench	   in	   reform	   complemented	   Congressman	   Edwards	   and	   Senator	  Burdick’s	   own	   interest	   in	   bankruptcy	   and	   their	   general	   support	   for	   “good	  government”	  legislation.	  	  	  By	  contrast,	  Chapter	  Five	  describes	  how	  Congress	  and	  the	  community	  split	  in	  the	   1990s	   over	   bankruptcy’s	   policy	   image.	   The	   community,	   rather	   than	   being	  treated	   by	   members	   of	   Congress	   as	   a	   source	   of	   technical	   expertise,	   was	   instead	  portrayed	  as	  another	  entrenched	  interest	  group	  seeking	  to	  block	  popular	  legislation.	  	  Moreover,	   although	   other	   groups	   rose	   to	   challenge	   pro-­‐creditor	   reforms,	   the	  community’s	   technical	   expertise	  played	  a	  minimal	   role	   in	   efforts	   to	  derail	   the	  bill.	  	  Congressional	   opponents	   of	   the	   measure	   engaged	   their	   traditional	   allies	   (e.g.,	  women’s	   groups,	   consumer	   rights	   organizations,	   etc.)	   to	   repeatedly	   block	   its	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adoption.	   	  Unlike	   in	   the	   past,	   the	   community	   had	  become	   just	   one	   voice	   of	  many,	  even	  among	  its	  allies.	  
B.	   The	  Structure	  of	  American	  Bankruptcy	  Policymaking	  Community.	  The	   foregoing	   section	   identifies	   three	   sources	   of	   American	   bankruptcy	  policy:	   (1)	   the	   courts;	   (2)	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community;	   and	   (3)	   Congress.	  	  From	   the	   1930s	   to	   the	   1970s,	   the	   community	   was	   at	   the	   center	   of	   American	  bankruptcy	   policymaking.	   	   Moreover,	   its	   influence	   broadly	   overlapped	   the	   other	  sources.	   	  The	  dual	   role	  of	   referees/judges	   in	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  ensured	   its	  influence	   in	   judicial	   policymaking.	   	   Moreover,	   congressional	   reliance	   on	   the	  community’s	  technical	  expertise	  and	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	  policy	  goals	  meant	  that	   Congress	   mostly	   adopted	   its	   proposals	   with	   little	   debate.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  community	  monopolized	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  for	  six	  decades.	  However,	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   Congress	   became	   the	   locus	   of	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	   activity	   when	   proponents	   of	   reform	   succeeded	   in	   breaking	   the	  bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   hold	   on	   the	   policymaking	   process.	   	   Instead	   of	   a	  unified,	   three	   part	   structure,	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   American	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  structure	  was	  split	   into	  two,	  with	  Congress	  on	  one	  side	  of	  the	  divide	  and	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  on	  the	  other.	  The	   implications	  of	   the	  split	  are	  two	  fold.	   	  First,	  placement	  of	  Congress	  and	  the	   courts	  on	  opposite	   sides	  of	   the	  policy	  divide	   contradicts	   traditional	   top-­‐down,	  agency-­‐based	  conceptions	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Congress	  and	  the	  courts,	  but	  is	   fully	   consistent	   with	   the	   interbranch	   perspective’s	   conception	   of	   the	   latter	   as	  distinct	  policy	  actors	  in	  the	  American	  system	  of	  separated	  powers.	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Second,	  while	   the	   division	   separated	   Congress	   from	   the	   courts	   in	   terms	   of	  policymaking,	   it	   did	   not	   sever	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   courts	   and	   the	  bankruptcy	   policy	   community.	   	   That	   connection	   between	   the	   two	   latter	   venues	  remained	  intact,	  reflecting	  their	  shared	  membership	  and	  policy	  image.	  	  Chapter	  Five	  describes	  how	  consumer	   lenders	  and	   their	  congressional	  allies	  made	  policy	   image	  the	   essential	   fault	   line	   in	   the	  debate	  over	  bankruptcy	   reform.	   	  The	   likelihood	   that	  policymakers’	  goals	  will	  be	  achieved	  is	  increased	  if	  implementing	  officials	  share	  the	  same	   objectives	   (Sabatier	   and	   Mazmanian	   1983;	   Baum	   1976).	   	   Unlike	   earlier	  periods,	  when	   bankruptcy	   policymaking’s	   coordinated	   structure	   did	   not	   allow	   for	  the	  expression	  of	  conflicting	  views,	   the	  distinct	  policy	   images	  on	  either	  side	  of	   the	  divide	  suggest	  the	  possibility	  of	  differing	  outcomes	  based	  on	  venue	  choice.	  C.	   Scope	  of	  Conflict	  and	  American	  Bankruptcy	  Policymaking	  	   Bankruptcy	  policy	  is	  made	  in	  three	  distinct	  venues.	  	  Over	  time,	  those	  venues	  and	   their	   relationship	   to	   each	  other	   can	  be	   characterized	   in	   large	  measure	  by	   the	  images	  reflected	  in,	  and	  rendering	  intuitively	  plausible,	  the	  policies	  they	  make.	   	  As	  explained	   in	   Chapter	   Two,	   image	   (or	   definition)	   is	   central	   to	   the	  management	   of	  policy	   conflict.	   	   Policy	   image	  may	   serve	   to	   join	   the	   venues,	   as	   it	   did	   in	   the	   1930s	  when	   characterization	   of	   bankruptcy	   as	   a	   technical	   enterprise	   united	   groups	  seeking	  to	  advance	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  fresh	  start	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression.	  	  However,	   major	   changes	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy,	   as	   in	   the	   1990s-­‐2000s,	  are	  founded	  on	  distinctly	  different	  images.	  The	  level	  of	  conflict	  surrounding	  a	  given	   policy	   is,	   in	   turn,	   closely	   associated	  with	   its	   likelihood	   of	   change.	   	   In	   other	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words,	  the	  relative	  influence	  of	  any	  venue	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time	  is	  related	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  conflict	  surrounding	  bankruptcy	  policy	  at	  that	  same	  point	  in	  time.	  	  	   At	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  system,	  policy	  is	   made	   in	   the	   courts.	   	   Conflict	   of	   this	   type	   can	   be	   described	   as	   private	   conflict.	  	  Policymaking	  at	  this	  level	  occurs	  in	  individual	  cases.	   	  Unlike	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  where	  third	  parties	  can	  file	  amicus	  briefs	  solely	  on	  account	  of	   their	   interest	   in	  the	  policies	  in	  question,	  procedural	  rules	  limit	  participants	  to	  the	  judge	  and	  parties	  with	  a	  tangible	  or	  institutional	  interest	  in	  a	  particular	  case:	  the	  debtor,	  creditors,	  the	  case	  trustee,	   the	   U.S.	   Trustee,	   etc.104	  Policymaking	   in	   the	   courts	   is	   incremental,	   and	  generally	  occurs	  within	  the	  parameters	  of	  existing	  statutory	  law	  and	  case	  precedent.	  	   The	  term	  courts,	  as	  used	  here,	  is	  not	  simply	  synonymous	  with	  judges.	  	  It	  must	  necessarily	  also	  include	  other	  case	  participants,	  but	  especially	  lawyers.	   	  As	  is	  often	  noted,	  American	  courts	  are	   fundamentally	  reflexive	   institutions;	  party	  prosecution	  is	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  the	  adversary	  system.	   	  Parties,	  acting	  through	  their	  legal	  counsel,	  select	  the	  cases	  to	  be	  brought	  to	  the	  courts	  and	  the	  matters	  at	  issue	  within	  those	  cases.	   	  They	   frame	   those	   issues	  and	  offer	  competing	  solutions	   through	   their	  pleadings,	   motions	   and	   trials	   (Barnes	   2009).	   	   Judges	   select	   between	   these	  alternatives.105	  	  The	  process	  is	  mutually	  reinforcing.	  Assuming	  that	  a	  judge’s	  rulings	  on	  a	  given	  issue	  are	  consistent	  over	  time,	  subsequent	  parties	  and	  their	  lawyers	  will	  take	   those	  rulings	   into	  account	   in	   their	  own	  cases	   (Sullivan,	  et	  al.	  1994).	   	   In	  other	  words,	  trial	  lawyers	  are	  not	  necessarily	  interested	  in	  establishing	  policy;	  their	  goal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Amicus	  briefs	  are	  accepted	  in	  a	  small	  number	  of	  bankruptcy	  appeals,	  but	  usually	  only	  those	  that	  reach	  the	  Supreme	  Court.	  105	  Jury	  trials	  are	  rare	  in	  bankruptcy	  cases.	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is	   to	  win	   cases.	   	   In	   order	   to	  do	   so,	   they	  will	   shape	   the	  positions	   in	   the	  ways	   they	  believe	  will	  most	   likely	   result	   in	   success	  with	   the	  decision-­‐makers,	   i.e.,	   the	   judges	  overseeing	  their	  cases.	  	  	  A	  case	  in	  point	  is	  Barnes’	  examination	  of	  asbestos	  injury	  compensation	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts	  (2008).	   	   Johns-­‐Manville	  and	  other	  large	  asbestos	  manufacturers	  elected	  to	  file	  Chapter	  11	  not	  to	  stop	  their	  imminent	  collapse	  but	  rather	  to	  control	  the	   enormous	   number	   of	   lawsuits	   against	   them	   alleging	   injuries	   caused	   by	   their	  products.	   	   Lawyers	   for	   the	   companies	   filed	   plans	   in	   the	   bankruptcy	   courts	   that	  adapted	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code’s	  provisions	  for	  reorganization	  and	  payment	  of	  claims	  to	   create	   no-­‐fault	   claims	   trusts	   for	   alleged	   asbestos	   victims.	   	   However,	   these	  proposals	   were	   not	   binding	   on	   the	   parties	   until	   approved	   by	   the	   courts.	   	   Once	  approved	  by	  the	  courts,	  the	  bankruptcy	  trusts	  were	  enforceable	  against	  the	  parties,	  brought	  all	  of	  the	  claimants	  within	  the	  trust,	  and	  provided	  a	  template	  for	  resolution	  of	  other	  similar	  cases.	  	   The	   second	   policy	   venue,	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community,	   may	   facilitate	  policy	   change	   in	   the	   courts,	   principally	   through	   its	   dissemination	   of	   information	  among	  lawyers	  and	  judges.	  	  However,	  its	  more	  important	  role	  occurs	  when	  existing	  statutes	   and	   precedents	   cannot	   be	   interpreted	   and	   extended	   to	   address	   new	   or	  changed	   circumstances.	   	   The	   inadequacy	   of	   existing	   policies	   to	   address	   these	  challenges	   gives	   rise	   to	   what	   can	   be	   described	   as	   sub-­‐systemic	   conflict.	   	   Sub-­‐systemic	  conflict	   is	  wider	   than	  private	  conflict	   (i.e.,	  have	  more	  participants),	  but	   it	  remains	   within	   the	   bounds	   of	   the	   policy	   sub-­‐system,	   i.e.,	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community.	  
	  	  
176	  
	   The	  processes	   leading	   to	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  Chandler	  Act	   in	  1938	  and	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	  in	  1978	  were	  both	  examples	  of	  sub-­‐systemic	  policymaking.	  	  Policy	  disputes	  in	  both	  instances	  had	  the	  potential	  of	  spreading	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  the	  sub-­‐system.	   	   However,	   as	   sub-­‐systemic	   policymaking	   is	   dominated	   by	   a	   policy	  monopoly,	   conflict	   containment	   is	   a	   critical	   feature	   of	   policymaking	   at	   this	   level.	  Possible	   boundary-­‐breaking	   conflicts	   in	   the	   1930s	   included	   (1)	   the	   competing	  legislation	  introduced	  by	  Congressman	  Sabath,	  and	  (2)	  the	  interjection	  of	  William	  O.	  Douglas	   and	   the	   SEC.	   	   Similar	   conflicts	   in	   the	   1970s	   included	   (1)	   the	   dispute	  between	  the	  NBC	  and	  the	  bankruptcy	   judges;	  (2)	   the	   federal	  bench’s	  disregard	  for	  bankruptcy	  judges;	  and	  (3)	  exemption	  reform.	  	   In	  each	  instance,	  the	  community	  employed	  similar	  tactics	  to	  limit	  conflict.	  	  It	  cultivated	   an	   image	  of	   technical	   complexity	   in	   order	   exclude	  outsiders.	   	  However,	  that	  image	  alone	  was	  insufficient	  to	  fend	  off	  the	  external	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  SEC	  in	  the	  1930s,	  or	  the	   intramural	  dispute	  that	  threated	  to	  scuttle	  bankruptcy	  reform	  in	  the	  Seventies.	   	   In	  those	  matters,	  the	  community	  compromised	  on	  specific	   issues	  in	  order	  to	  retain	  its	  control	  over	  the	  broader	  policy	  process.	  The	  other	  characteristic	  of	  policymaking	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  is	  that	  while	  congressional	  participation	  is	  essential	  to	  passage	  of	  the	  sub-­‐system’s	  major	  initiatives,	  that	  participation	  is	  limited	  and	  episodic.	  	  This	  is	  as	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  congressional	   interest	  as	   it	   is	   the	  desire	  of	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	   to	  limit	  the	  participation	  of	  non-­‐specialists.	  	  As	  a	  deliberative	  body,	  Congress	  gave	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  passage	  of	  bankruptcy	  legislation	  in	  either	  1938	  or	  1978.	  	  Although	  legislation	   gestated	   for	   long	   periods	   within	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community,	   it	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passed	  relatively	  quickly	  and	  without	  significant	  debate	  once	  it	  reached	  the	  floor	  of	  each	  chamber.106	  	  	  Broad	  congressional	  involvement	  in	  both	  instances	  was	  limited	  to	  ratification	  of	  the	  community’s	  proposals.	  By	  contrast,	  reform	  proponents	  in	  the	  1990s,	  unable	  to	  gain	  support	  within	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  (as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  rejection	  of	  their	  proposals	  by	   the	   National	   Bankruptcy	   Review	   Commission	   majority),	   escalated	   the	   level	   of	  conflict	   to	   directly	   engage	   Congress	   on	   the	   issue.	   	   The	   events	   of	   1997	   -­‐	   2005	  represent	  a	   third	   form	  of	  bankruptcy	  policy	  conflict,	  which	   is	   identified	  as	  here	  as	  congressional,	  or	  public,	  conflict.	  	  This	  level	  of	  conflict	  is	  necessarily	  high,	  and	  is	  as	  much	  about	  toppling	  the	  existing	  policy	  monopoly	  as	  it	  is	  about	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  proposed	   reforms.	   	   Reformers	   seeking	   policy	   changes	   must	   displace	   the	   existing	  monopoly.	   	   Doing	   so	   necessarily	   requires	   expansion	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   conflict	   to	  include	   Congress.	   	   Since	   Congress	   generally	   only	   directs	   its	   attention	   to	   an	   issue	  when	   the	   publicity	   surrounding	   it	   is	   negative	   (Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   1993),	  disparagement	   of	   the	   policy	   image	   supporting	   the	   existing	   monopoly	   is	   a	   classic	  tactic	  used	  to	  gain	  legislative	  attention.107	  	  	  	  The	  increased	  attention	  ensures	  greater	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  The	  Danielson-­‐Railsback	  amendment	  did	  briefly	  delay	  House	  passage	  of	  the	  Code	  in	  1978	  (Chapter	  Four),	  but	  the	  dispute	  was	  resolved	  fairly	  quickly.	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  amendment	  was	  an	  effort	   to	   advance	   the	   concerns	  of	   the	   Judicial	  Conference,	   and	  did	   not	   address	   the	   Code’s	   broader	   substantive	   and	   procedural	   changes	   to	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  107	  Baumgartner	   and	   Jones	   (1993,	   101)	   describe	   this	   as	   a	   “Schattschneider-­‐type	  mobilization,	   that	   is,	   agenda	   access	   under	   negative	   publicity.”	   	   Such	   action	   is	  effectively	   the	  obverse	  of	  Kingdon’s	   policy	   streams	  model	   (1995),	   in	  which	  policy	  entrepreneurs	  link	  problems	  to	  solutions.	  	  Negative	  image	  re-­‐characterization	  seeks	  to	   link	   problems	   to	   existing	   policies.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy,	   reform	  proponents	   successfully	   associated	   the	   rising	   number	   of	   consumer	   bankruptcy	  filings	   in	   the	  1990s	   to	   the	   fresh	  start	  policy	  championed	  by	   the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community	  (Chapter	  Four).	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participation	   in	   the	   policy	   debate	   and	   higher	   levels	   of	   conflict.	   	   The	   adoption	   of	  BAPCPA	   in	   2005	   was	   preceded	   by	   eight	   years	   of	   public	   and	   often	   acrimonious	  debate,	   four	   separate	   roll	   call	   votes,	   conference	   committees,	   and	   continuous	  lobbying.	  	  The	  displaced	  bankruptcy	  policy	  monopoly	  did	  not	  simply	  disappear,	  nor	  was	   it	   is	   deprived	   of	   allies.	   	   Its	   members	   fought	   to	   block	   the	   legislative	   reforms,	  assuring	  that	  the	  level	  of	  conflict	  remained	  high	  throughout	  the	  period.	  	  However,	  as	  only	   one	   voice	   in	   the	   debate,	   and	   no	   longer	   the	   dominant	   one,	   their	   efforts	  were	  doomed	   to	   failure	   as	   bankruptcy’s	   new	   policy	   image	   attracted	   a	   resolute	  congressional	  majority.	  	  	  	  
D.	   The	  Significance	  of	  the	  Framework	  	   The	   central	  premise	  of	   the	   interbranch	  perspective	   is	   that	   the	   courts	   share	  policymaking	  authority	  with	  Congress	  and	  the	  President	  in	  the	  American	  system	  of	  government	   (Chapter	   II,	   Part	   C.2).	   	   While	   multiple	   studies	   identify	   instances	   of	  judicial	  policymaking,	  only	  a	  few	  examine	  lower	  courts	  and	  even	  fewer	  explain	  how	  courts	   exercise	   such	   authority	   relative	   to	   the	   political	   branches	   of	   government.	  	  Recent	   interbranch	   studies	   describe	   policymaking	   as	   a	   “dialogue”	   between	   the	  branches	   (Miller	   and	   Barnes	   2008).	   	   However,	   that	   term	   is	   only	   descriptive	   and	  somewhat	   euphemistic,	   since	   it	   implies	   some	   form	   of	   direct	   or	   indirect	  communication	   and	   cooperation.	   In	   addition,	   it	   overemphasizes	   the	   role	   of	  institutions	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  system	  and	  glosses	  over	  the	  dynamic	   tension	   among	   all	   involved	   institutions	   and	   groups.	   	   For	   example,	   the	  events	   leading	   to	  adoption	  of	   the	  Bankruptcy	  Code	   in	  1978	  and	   those	   resulting	   in	  the	  enactment	  of	  BAPCPA	  in	  2005	  would	  be	  described	  as	  part	  of	  Miller	  and	  Barnes’	  
	  	  
179	  
policy	  dialogue,	  even	  though	  the	  former	  was	  as	  extension	  and	  reinforcement	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  the	  latter	  represented	  a	  major	  change	  in	  the	  direction	  and	  structure	  of	   bankruptcy	   policymaking.	   	   Likewise,	   the	   notion	   of	   policymaking	   as	   a	   form	   of	  institutional	   dialogue	   seems	   to	   exclude	   a	   place	   for	   both	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	  community	   and	   the	   lower	   courts.	   	   Therefore,	   characterization	   of	  multi-­‐institution	  policymaking	   as	   dialogue	   is	   at	   best	   a	   shorthand	   description	   for	   the	   direct	   and	  indirect	   interactions,	   and	   actions	   and	   reactions	   that	   take	   place	   within	   a	   policy	  system.	  	   American	  public	  law’s	  focus	  on	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  and	  the	  Constitution	  has	  not	   only	   limited	   the	   field’s	   scope	   of	   inquiry,	   but	   has	   also	   restricted	   its	   means	   of	  study.	   Scholars	   of	   judicial	   politics	   have	   only	   mildly	   embraced	   the	   promise	   of	  Shapiro’s	   concept	   of	   political	   jurisprudence,	   i.e.,	   using	  methods	   and	   theories	   from	  the	   field	   of	   political	   science	   to	   understand	   legal	   systems	   and	   actors.	   	   However,	  integrated	  studies	  are	  essential	  to	  understanding	  judicial	  policymaking,	  not	  only	  to	  understand	  the	  courts	  as	  political	  institutions,	  but	  for	  the	  analytical	  tools	  needed	  to	  explain	   the	   interplay	   between	   the	   courts,	   the	   “political”	   branches	   of	   government,	  and	  other	  political	  actors	  such	  as	   interest	  groups.	   	   If	   the	  courts	  are	  “in	  politics,”	   in	  Shapiro’s	   terminology,	   then	   they	   must	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   same	   way	   as	   other	  political	  institutions.	  The	   long	   term	  of	   the	   study	   involved	  here	   (75	  years)	   allows	  examination	  of	  both	  the	  creation	  and	  collapse	  of	  a	  strong	  policy	  monopoly.	  	  and	  identification	  of	  the	  relative	  level	  of	  conflict	  as	  the	  controlling	  variable	  in	  that	  cycle.	  The	  conflict-­‐based	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framework	  provides	  definition	  and	  predictability	  to	  political	  jurisprudential	  models	  of	  policymaking	  by	  connecting	  processes	  and	  venues	  to	  outcomes.	  The	   framework’s	   two	   other	   contributions	   to	   understanding	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  are	  its	  identification	  of	  (1)	  a	  distinct	  and	  influential	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community,	   and	   (2)	   bankruptcy	   judges’	   dual	   policymaking	   roles.	   	   The	   former	  highlights	  the	  role	  of	  non-­‐institutional	  participants	  in	  the	  policymaking	  process,	  and	  how	  they	  relate	   to	   the	  courts,	  which	  are	  not	  normally	  understood	  to	   interact	  with	  such	  entities	  except	   in	   formal	  ways	   (as	   litigants,	   through	   the	   judicial	   confirmation	  process,	   etc.).	   	   The	   link	   between	   the	   courts	   and	   Congress	   that	   the	   community	  provides	  in	  times	  of	  low	  to	  moderate	  policy	  conflict	  tangibly	  manifests	  the	  dialogue	  described	  in	  the	  interbranch	  literature.	  	  Likewise,	  the	  account	  of	  bankruptcy	  judges’	  dual	   policymaking	   roles	   describes	   how	   they	   provide	   ideological	   cohesion	   to	  bankruptcy	  policy	  in	  periods	  of	   low	  and	  moderate	  conflict	  (albeit	   imperfectly),	  but	  are	  potentially	  more	  likely	  to	  depart	  from	  congressional	  intentions	  when	  conflict	  is	  high.	  
E.	   Comparison	  to	  Public	  Choice	  Models	  	   The	   framework	   better	   explains	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   than	   does	   public	  choice	  analysis,	  the	  predominant	  model	  used	  to	  explain	  bankruptcy	  policy.	  	  The	  use	  of	   public	   choice	   models	   in	   this	   context	   was	   introduced	   by	   Posner	   (1997),	   in	   his	  study	  of	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Bankruptcy	  Code,	  and	  extended	  by	  Skeel	  (2001)	  in	  his	  historical	  survey	  of	  the	  field.	  Public	  choice	  theory	  applies	  economic	  methods	  to	  the	  study	   of	   politics.	   	   Its	   fundamental	   premise	   is	   that	   individuals	   (or	   groups	   of	   like	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individuals)	  engage	   in	  political	  activities	   in	  order	   to	  maximize	   their	  own	   interests,	  and	  that	  political	  outcomes	  are	  the	  successful	  result	  of	  collective	  action:	  We	   assume	   that	   agents	   maximize	   utility.	  	  Creditors,	   debtors,	   lawyers,	   and	  other	   citizens	   seek	   legislation	   that	   transfers	   wealth	   to	   them.	  	  Judges	   and	  other	   government	   officials	   seek	   prestige,	   either	   for	   its	   own	   sake	   or	   for	   its	  effect	   on	   future	   income.	  	  	  We	   adopt	   the	   standard	   public	   choice	   view	   that	   a	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  people	  with	  similar	  interests	  and	  a	  lot	  at	  stake	  will	  have	   more	   of	   an	   incentive	   to	   organize	   into	   politically	   effective	   interest	  groups,	  while	  larger	  numbers	  of	  people	  will	  have	  less	  of	  an	  incentive	  to	  form	  such	   groups.	  	  Interest	   groups	   have	   a	   disproportionate	   influence	   on	   the	  outcome	  of	  legislation,	  because	  politicians	  depend	  on	  their	  financial	  support	  for	  reelection	  and	  because	  politicians	  depend	  on	  the	  information	  supplied	  by	  interest	  groups	  with	  respect	  to	  legislative	  proposals.	  	  (Posner	  1997,	  59).	  	  In	  other	  word,	  public	  choice	  models	  predict	  that	  groups	  with	  the	  best	  organization	  and	  the	  greatest	  resources	  will	  prevail	  in	  a	  policy	  dispute.	  	  	  	  However,	   public	   choice	   models	   have	   significant	   shortcomings.	   	   They	  oversimplify	  policy	  disputes,	  ignoring	  variables	  like	  the	  scope	  or	  depth	  of	  a	  problem,	  the	   feasibility	   of	   proposed	   solutions,	   the	   dominant	   political	   environment,	   policy	  image,	  etc.	   	  The	  theory’s	  reliance	  on	  power	  as	  its	  sole	  variable	  limits	  its	  usefulness	  as	   a	   predictor	   of	   policy	   outcomes.	   	   In	   the	   case	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy,	   it	   does	   not	  explain	   why	   better	   financed	   and	   organized	   financial	   interests	   failed	   four	   times	  before	  finally	  seeing	  BAPCPA	  enacted	  into	  law.	  	  Moreover,	  public	  choice	  models	  do	  not	  adequately	  explain	  why	  for	  over	  sixty	  years	  bankruptcy	  policies	  were	  built	  on	  a	  debtor-­‐friendly	   image,	  even	   though	  debtors	  were	  neither	  politically-­‐organized	  nor	  directly	   represented	   within	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   in	   either	   1938	   or	  1978.	  	  Skeel	  notes	  that	  although	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference’s	  membership	  includes	   many	   commercial	   lawyers,	   and	   effectively	   has	   no	   consumer	   bankruptcy	  lawyers,	  it	  nonetheless	  was	  an	  ardent	  advocate	  for	  pro-­‐debtor	  reforms	  in	  the	  1970s.	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He	  acknowledges	   that	  public	  choice	   theory	  cannot	  resolve	   the	  matter,	  and	   instead	  treats	  it	  as	  an	  anomaly.	  	  Skeel	  describes	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference	  members	  as	   “public-­‐spirited”	   on	   issues	   of	   structural	   reform,	   and	   generally	   possessing	   a	  “sympathetic”	   and	   “long-­‐standing,	  widespread	   ideological	   commitment”	   to	  helping	  troubled	  debtors	  (Skeel	  2001,	  138,	  156-­‐57).	  	  	  	   The	  agenda	  setting	  framework	  places	  the	  National	  Bankruptcy	  Conference’s	  “ideological	   commitment”	   in	   context,	   by	   explaining	   how	   that	   commitment	   was	  embodied	   in	   the	   “fresh	   start”	   image	   that	   formed	   the	   foundation	   of	   the	   policy	  community’s	  sixty	  year	  monopolization	  of	  the	  field	  (Chapter	  Four).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Conference’s	  “ideological	  commitments”	  are	  not	  exceptions	  to	  the	  broader	  rule	  but	   are	   instead	   essential	   to	   a	   general	   explanation	   of	   bankruptcy	   policymaking.	  	  Group	   resources	   and	   mobilization	   are	   important	   factors	   in	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	  only	  when	  conflict	  expands	  to	  the	  congressional	  level,	  and	  even	  then	  they	   are	   qualified	   by	   other	   factors.	   	   Those	   factors	   have	   little	   or	   no	   influence	   on	  policymaking	  processes	  in	  the	  courts	  or	  within	  a	  closed	  system	  like	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community.	  	  
F.	   Conclusion	  	   The	  fundamental	  premise	  of	  interbranch	  studies	  is	  that	  all	  three	  branches	  of	  government	   share	   policymaking	   authority	   in	   the	   American	   system.	   	   This	   basic	  insight	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  Martin	  Shapiro,	  who	  maintains	  not	  only	  that	  courts	  are	  in	   fact	   political	   institutions,	   but	   that	   they	   can	   be	   studied	   and	   understood	   in	   the	  manner	   of	   the	   other	   branches.	   	   This	   dissertation	   puts	   these	   ideas	   into	   practice	  through	  a	  longitudinal	  case	  study	  of	  policymaking	  in	  a	  single	  policy	  area,	  bankruptcy	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law.	   	   The	   study	   draws	   on	   both	   agenda	   setting	   and	   implementation	   literature	   to	  identify	   three	   sources,	   or	   venues,	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy:	   Congress;	   the	   courts,	  particularly	   bankruptcy	   courts;	   and	   a	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community	   consisting	   of	  attorneys,	   judges,	  and	  academics.	   	  Scope	  of	  conflict	  principles	  determine	   the	   three	  venues’	   relative	   influence.	   	   That	   conflict	   is	   in	   large	   measure	   the	   product	   of	  manipulation	  of	  bankruptcy’s	  policy	  “image.”	  	  	  The	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   dominance	  was	   based	   on	   an	   image	   of	  bankruptcy	   policy	   that	   was	   part	   ideological,	   and	   partly	   technical.	   	   Policy	   images	  speak	  to	  fundamental	  values.	   	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  fresh	  start	  spoke	  to	  broader	  core	  values	   in	   the	   American	   canon	   like	   economic	   opportunity.	   	   It	   served	   as	   the	  foundational	   principle	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy	   for	   over	   sixty	   years.	   	   Meanwhile,	   the	  community	  controlled	  the	  terms	  of	  debate	  by	  limiting	  access	  to	  the	  policy	  process.	  	  Its	   exclusive	   dominance	   of	   the	   process	   was	   achieved	   through	   its	   successful	  characterization	   of	   bankruptcy	   policymaking	   as	   a	   complex	   endeavor	   best	   left	   to	  specialists.	  	  	  Congress	  shared	  and	  fostered	  these	  images	  until	  the	  1990s,	  when	  consumer	  lenders	   capitalized	   on	   congressional	   attitudes	   favoring	   financial	   deregulation	   and	  social	  welfare	  retrenchment	  to	  draw	  the	  legislature	  into	  debates	  over	  a	  new	  law	  that	  required	  some	  debtors	  to	  bear	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  their	  fiscal	  misfortunes	  and	  placed	  greater	  burdens	  on	  all	   filers.	   	   In	   the	  process,	  Congress	  not	  only	   rejected	   the	   fresh	  start	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  policy	  image	  that	  emphasized	  personal	  responsibility,	  but	  it	  broke	  the	  bankruptcy	  policy	  community’s	  six	  decade-­‐long	  hold	  on	  the	  shape	  and	  direction	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of	   policy	   in	   the	   field,	   following	   the	   classic	   pattern	   of	   monopoly	   dominance	   and	  collapse	  described	  in	  the	  punctuated	  equilibrium	  literature.	  Perhaps	   the	  most	   intriguing	   aspect	   of	   the	   framework	   described	   here	   is	   its	  recognition	   of	   the	   significant	   policy	  making	   roles	   played	   by	   bankruptcy	   judges	   in	  two	   distinctly	   different	   capacities.	   	   In	   its	   traditional	   juridical	   capacity,	   the	  bankruptcy	   bench	   has	   long	   been	   noted	   for	   its	   considerable	   variation	   in	  interpretation	   and	   application	   of	   the	   laws	   across	   (and	   sometimes	   even	   within)	  jurisdictions.	   	   In	  addition,	  bankruptcy	   judges	  (as	  well	  as	  other	  professionals)	  have	  been	  leading	  advocates	  for	  legislative	  changes	  in	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  These	  two	  factors	  suggest	   important	  questions	  about	  bankruptcy	  policy	   implementation	  and	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  in	  significant	  part	  a	  “bottom	  up”	  process.	  	  Another	   potential	   area	   of	   study	   is	   whether	   the	   framework	   is	   generally	  applicable	   to	   other	   areas	   of	   policy	   that	   rely	   on	   judicial	   implementation	   and	  enforcement.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  legislative	  advocacy	  in	  which	  bankruptcy	  judges	  engage	  may	  be	  unique,	  at	  least	  in	  degree,	  among	  the	  federal	  judiciary.	  	  On	  the	  other,	  the	  increase	  in	  specialization	  noted	  in	  the	  courts	  (Baum	  2011)	  indicates	  that	  judges	  may	   have	   important	   roles	   to	   play	   as	   policy	   advocates	   in	   other	   areas	   of	   law,	   and	  warrant	  further	  examination	  according	  to	  the	  methods	  employed	  here.	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APPENDIX	  A:	  A	  PROPOSED	  TEST	  OF	  JUDICIAL	  POLICYMAKING	  Chapters	  Two	  and	  Six	  highlight	   the	   long	  history	  of	  variable	   implementation	  of	  statutes	  in	  the	  bankruptcy	  courts.	  	  As	  Chapter	  Six	  suggests,	  that	  history	  supports	  the	  possibility	  that	  bankruptcy	  judges	  and	  lawyers	  might	  mediate	  BAPCPA’s	  effects	  through	  their	  interpretation	  and	  application	  of	  the	  new	  law	  according	  to	  their	  own	  long-­‐held	   image	   and	   understanding	   of	   bankruptcy	   policy.	   	   	   The	   changes	   to	   the	  Bankruptcy	   Code	   made	   in	   2005	   provide	   an	   opportunity	   to	   test	   this	   proposition	  empirically.	  	  	   A.	   11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b)	  and	  the	  Means	  Test	  The	  empirical	   test	   involves	  an	  examination	  of	   the	  outcomes	   for	  one	  kind	  of	  proceeding,	   specifically	   being	   to	   dismiss	   Chapter	   7	   cases	   for	   “abuse”	   of	   the	  provisions	   of	   Chapter	   7	   of	   the	  Bankruptcy	   Code	   as	   specified	   in	   11	  U.S.C.	   §707(b).	  	  This	   statute	   is	   the	   centerpiece	   of	   the	   2005	   amendments,	   and	   drew	   the	   greatest	  attention	   and	   objections	   from	   the	   policy	   community.	   The	   amended	   law	   is	   in	   two	  parts.	   	  The	  first	  part	  contains	  a	  specific	  means	  test	  for	  Chapter	  7	  filers;	  the	  second	  part	  tracks	  the	  prior	  law	  but	  increases	  bankruptcy	  judges’	  authority	  to	  dismiss	  such	  cases	  if	  filers	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  “abusing”	  the	  bankruptcy	  law.	  	  The	  means	  test	  is	  a	  gate-­‐keeping	  provision	  intended	  to	  compel	  certain	  higher	  income	   debtors	   to	   repay	   a	   portion	   of	   their	   debts	   from	   their	   ongoing	   earnings	  through	  court	  approved	  Chapter	  13	  plans,	   rather	   than	  obtain	  a	   rapid	  discharge	  of	  their	  obligations,	  without	  repayment,	  through	  less	  stringent	  Chapter	  7	  filings.	   	  The	  means	   test	   creates	   a	   rebuttable	   presumption	   that	   the	   debtor	   does	   not	   qualify	   for	  Chapter	   7	   if	   the	   results	   of	   a	   detailed	   arithmetical	   test	   reveal	   the	   debtor	   to	   have	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“disposable	   income”	   above	   the	   amount	   necessary	   to	   pay	   specific	   expenses.	  	  However,	   even	   if	   the	   debtor	   satisfies	   the	   means	   test	   or	   rebuts	   its	   statutory	  presumption,	  the	  court	  may	  still	  dismiss	  the	  case	  if	  “the	  granting	  of	  relief	  would	  be	  an	  abuse	  of	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  chapter	  (11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b)(1),	  emphasis	  added).”	  	  Grounds	  for	  finding	  abuse	  absent	  failing	  the	  means	  test	  include	  a	  showing	  that	  the	  debtor	  filed	  the	  petition	  in	  bad	  faith	  or	  that	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  debtor’s	  financial	  situation	  demonstrates	  abuse	  (11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b)(3)).	  	  	   Prior	   to	   BAPCPA,	   §707(b)	   did	   not	   include	   an	   explicit	   means	   test,	   and	   the	  standard	   for	   dismissal	   was	   not	   just	   abuse	   but	   was	   substantial	   abuse.	   	   Judges	  commonly,	   although	   not	   universally,	   applied	   various	   means	   tests	   of	   their	   own	  making,	  with	   divergent	   results	   (Ruttenberg	   2009).	   	   The	  means	   test’s	   arithmetical	  form	  was	  intended	  to	  limit	  judicial	  discretion	  by	  standardizing	  decisional	  variables.	  	  Moreover,	  for	  those	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  means	  test	  did	  not	  catch	  offending	  filers,	  the	  standard	   for	   improper	   debtor	   conduct	   was	   changed	   from	   “substantial	   abuse”	   to	  “abuse.”	   Congress	   intended	   to	   broaden	   the	   scope	   of	   disqualifying	   criteria	  when	   it	  eliminated	  the	  word	  “substantial”	  from	  §707(b).108	  	  However,	  the	  only	  criterion	  the	  statute	   offers,	   that	   abuse	   be	   demonstrated	   based	   on	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   debtor’s	  financial	  situation,	  provides	  little	  more	  guidance	  than	  the	  term	  itself	  conveys.	  	   The	  2005	  changes	  to	  §707(b)	  offer	  a	  way	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  Bankruptcy	  court	  decisions	  on	  pre-­‐BAPCPA	  motions	  to	  dismiss	  for	  substantial	  abuse	  under	  the	  former	   §707(b)	   can	   be	   compared	   to	   post-­‐BAPCPA	  motions	   to	   dismiss	   under	   new	  §§707(b)(2)	  &	  (3).	  	  An	  increase	  in	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  such	  motions	  are	  granted	  would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Hansell	  1997.	  	  See	  Chapter	  Five.	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indicate	   that	   bankruptcy	   professionals	   are	   applying	   the	   rules	   consistent	   with	  congressional	   intent.	   Conversely,	   if	   cases	   are	   being	   dismissed	   per	   the	   new	  §707(b)(2)	   and	   (3)	   at	   the	   same	   or	   lower	   rate	   as	   under	   the	   old	   statute,	   such	  outcomes	  may	  be	   consistent	  with	   the	  hypothesis	   that,	   as	  members	  of,	   bankruptcy	  judges	   adhere	   to	   values	   embodied	   in	   the	   bankruptcy	   policy	   community’s	   policy	  image,	   i.e.,	   the	   fresh	   start,	   rather	   than	   the	   newer	   image	   supporting	   the	   2005	  reforms.	  
B.	   Testing	  the	  Hypothesis	  Comparisons	  should	  include	  analyses	  of	  individual	  courts	  to	  control	  for	  local	  influences	   and	   to	   isolate	   “cancellation	   effects,”	  where	   variable	   applications	  within	  separate	  districts	  might	  balance	  each	  other	  out.	  The	  salient	   features	   the	  study	  are	  summarized	  as	  follows:	  A. Hypothesis:	   	  Changes	  in	  11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b)	  simultaneously	  limiting	  the	  ability	  of	  higher	  income	  bankruptcy	  filers	  to	  seek	  discharge	  of	  their	  debts	  in	  Chapter	  7	  and	  relaxing	  the	  standards	  to	  dismiss	  cases	  for	  abuse	  have	  resulted	  in	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  motions	  to	  dismiss	  under	  the	  statute	  are	  granted.	  B. Null	  hypothesis:	  Changes	  in	  the	  11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b)	  simultaneously	  limiting	  the	  ability	  of	  higher	  income	  bankruptcy	  filers	  to	  seek	  discharge	  of	  their	  debts	  in	  Chapter	  7	  and	  relaxing	  the	  standards	  to	  dismiss	  cases	  for	  abuse	  have	  not	  changed	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  motions	   to	  dismiss	  under	   the	   statute	   are	   granted	   [note:	   findings	   consistent	  with	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  would	  support	  the	  thesis].	  C. Dependent	  variable:	  Judicial	  dispositions	  (i.e.,	  grants	  and	  denials)	  of	  motions	  to	  dismiss	  pursuant	  to	  11	  U.S.C.	  §707(b)	  filed	  by	  U.S.	  Trustees.	  	  Dispositions	  should	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be	   recorded	   as	   either	   grants	   or	   denials,	   and	   should	   be	   expressed	   as	   a	   rate,	   e.g.,	  motions	  granted/motions	  filed.	  	  	  D. Independent	  variables:	  	  
a. Changes	   in	   11	  U.S.C.	   §707(b),	   as	   incorporated	   in	  motions	   to	   dismiss	  filed	  by	  United	  States	  Trustees	  in	  the	  federal	  bankruptcy	  courts.	  	  Other	  independent	  variables	  are	  cited	  below	  in	  sub-­‐part	  F.3.	  
b. Time	  Periods:	  
1. October	  1,	  2000	  to	  October	  4,	  2005	  
2. October	  5,	  2005	  to	  September	  30,	  2011.	  Ideally,	   a	   longer	   time-­‐series	   post-­‐BAPCPA	   would	   determine	   whether	   effects	   are	  permanent	   or	   temporary,	   and	  would	   allow	   better	   control	   for	   other	   variables,	   like	  economic	  conditions.	  E. Data	  source:	  Statistical	  data	  collected	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  Executive	  Office	  for	   United	   States	   Trustees,	   an	   office	   of	   the	   Department	   of	   Justice	   responsible	   for	  oversight	   of	   bankruptcy	   administration.	   United	   States	   Trustees	   have	   primary	  statutory	   responsibility	   to	   seek	   dismissal	   of	   cases	   under	   11	   U.S.C.	   §707(b).	   	   The	  program	   collects	   the	   data	   from	   each	   of	   its	   field	   offices109	  and	   provides	   summary	  reports	   in	   its	   annual	   Report	   of	   Significant	   Accomplishments.	   	   This	   data	   has	   been	  obtained.	  F. Methodology:	  1. Further	   study	  would	   compare	  pre	  and	  post	  BAPCPA	  dismissal	   rates.	  	  Specifically,	   rates	   at	   which	   the	   U.S.	   Trustee’s	   §707(b)	   motions	   to	   dismiss	   were	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  For	  reasons	  that	  are	  both	  historical	  and	  political,	  the	  U.S.	  Trustee	  program	  does	  not	  oversee	  cases	  in	  Alabama	  or	  North	  Carolina.	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granted	   prior	   to	   amendment	   will	   be	   compared	   with	   post-­‐amendment	   rates	   for	  dismissal	  of	  all	  U.S.	  Trustee	  post-­‐amendment	  motions	  to	  dismiss	  under	  §707(b).	  	  	  2. Pre	   and	   post	   amendment	   dismissal	   rates,	   both	   overall	   and	   across	  districts,	   will	   be	   initially	   compared	   using	   cross	   tabulation	   methods	   to	   identify	  significant	  changes	  in	  §707(b)	  motion	  outcomes.	  	  3. Further	  comparison	  will	  be	  made	  using	  multiple	  regression	  analysis.	  	  Other	   variables	   can	   include	   local	   income/changes	   in	   local	   income;	   unemployment	  rate;	  case	  filings	  (adjusted	  for	  population,	  and/or	  as	  a	  function	  of	  annual	  variations);	  etc.	   	   A	   lack	   of	   significant	   change	   (or	   a	   negative	   change)	   in	   the	   y-­‐intercept	   would	  support	  the	  hypothesis.	   	  Positive	  shifts	  in	  the	  y-­‐intercept	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  judicial	  adherence	  to	  congressional	  intent,	  i.e.,	  rejection	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  	  4.	   Case-­‐specific	  effects:	   	  As	  pointed	  out	   in	  Chapter	  Two,	  every	  trial	   level	  case	   is	   unique.	   	   Any	   given	   event	   is	   a	   case	   is	   influenced	   by	   numerous	   variables,	  making	   comparisons	   between	   cases	   difficult.	   	   Decisive	   outcomes	   can	   occur	   at	  multiple	  points	  in	  a	  case,	  and	  in	  multiple	  forms.	   	  Cases	  may	  be	  decided	  following	  a	  trial.	   	  The	  trial	  may	  be	  by	   jury,	  but	   in	  many	  cases	  the	   judge	  acts	  as	  both	  presiding	  officer	   and	   fact-­‐finder.	   	   Cases	  may	   be	   resolved	   through	   dispositive	  motions	  made	  before	  trial.	  	  Non-­‐dispositive	  orders	  on	  issues	  of	  evidence	  or	  procedure	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  outcomes:	  “Unlike	  in	  the	  typical	  appellate	  case,	  a	  district	  judge	  may	  rule	  in	  a	  single	  case	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  and	  on	  different	  types	  of	  questions,	  only	  a	   few	  of	  which	  could	  be	  dispositive	  but	  all	  of	  which	  affect	  the	  case’s	  progress	  and	   ultimate	   outcome	   (Kim,	   et	   al.	   85).”	   Whether	   or	   not	   a	   trial	   judge’s	   policy	  preference	   influences	   these	  decisions,	  other	   factors	  clearly	  play	  an	   important	  role.	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Degree:	  	  Doctor	  of	  Philosophy	  	   The	  Bankruptcy	  Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Consumer	  Protection	  Act	  of	  2005	  was	  enacted	  amid	  much	  controversy	  and	  was	  considered	  by	  many	  observers	  to	  mark	  a	  major	  change	   in	   the	  direction	  of	  U.S.	  bankruptcy	  policy.	   	  The	  dissertation	  uses	   the	  law’s	   passage	   as	   a	   vehicle	   to	   develop	   an	   explicit	   model	   of	   the	   integrated	   role	   of	  Congress,	  issue	  networks,	  and	  the	  courts	  in	  making	  policy.	  	  Following	  Baumgartner	  and	   Jones	   (1993),	   Sabatier	   (1988),	   and	   others,	   the	   dissertation	   tracks	   bankruptcy	  policymaking	   and	   implementation	  over	   a	   seventy-­‐five	   year	  period	   to	  demonstrate	  that	  policy	  is	  made	  in	  three	  distinct	  venues:	  Congress;	  a	  policy	  community	  made	  up	  of	   lawyers,	  bankruptcy	   judges,	  and	  members	  of	  academia;	  and	  the	  courts.	   	  Agenda	  setting	   theory	   explains	   why	   policymaking	   authority	   shifts	   between	   traditionally	  understood	   venues	   like	   Congress	   to	   non-­‐traditional	   ones	   like	   the	   courts	   and	   the	  policy	  community.	  The	  community	  monopolized	  bankruptcy	  policymaking	  from	  the	  1930s	  until	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  	  Its	  hold	  on	  policymaking	  was	  broken	  when	  pro-­‐creditor	  forces	   successfully	   characterized	   proposed	   reforms	   as	   fitting	   within	   a	   broader	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congressional	   agenda	   of	   retrenchment	   in	   social	   welfare	   policy	   in	   favor	   of	   laws	  promoting	  particular	  notions	  of	  personal	  responsibility.	  	  	  The	  dissertation	  identifies	  the	  key	  role	  of	  bankruptcy	  judges	  in	  the	  three-­‐part	  structure:	  they	  make	  policy	  not	  only	  in	  their	  traditional	  juridical	  capacities,	  but	  also	  as	  active	  entrepreneurs	  and	  advocates	   for	   legislative	   reforms	  as	  part	  of	   the	  policy	  community.	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  courts	  in	  the	  model	  places	  the	  dissertation	  squarely	  in	  the	  emerging	  area	  of	  interbranch	  scholarship.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  extends	  existing	  studies	  in	   that	   field	   through	   its	   application	   of	   agenda	   setting	   and	   policy	   implementation	  scholarship.	  	  The	  model	  suggests	  the	  differing	  policy	  image	  increases	  the	  likelihood	  that	   the	  new	   laws	  will	   not	  be	   faithfully	   implemented.	   	  The	  dissertation	   includes	   a	  proposal	  for	  testing	  its	  hypothesis.	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